Emotion in Action

THUCYDIDES AND THE TRAGIC CHORUS

EIRENE VISVARDI

BRILL

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By

Eirene Visvardi

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For Natasha

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CHAPTER 1

Choral Emotions and Collective Passions: Questions and Approaches, Old and New

1 Introduction

Intense emotion pervades Greek tragedy. So does the presence of the chorus. Increasing interest in emotion in antiquity has turned to both Greek tragedy and Aristotle for the insights they provide into emotion in the classical period and beyond. Despite the proliferation of such work in the last twenty years, however, collective emotion tends to be overlooked. This book aims precisely to direct attention to collective emotion in 5th c. Athenian life, with special focus on the choral voice of Greek tragedy.

More specifically, by examining how a particular set of choruses performs and theorizes fear and pity, my aim is to elucidate the content, mechanics, and effect of collective fear and pity within the plays, on the one hand; and to contribute to a better understanding of the role itself of the tragic chorus, on the other. This understanding of choral emotion, however, is not to be seen in a vacuum. This book argues that, partly through its choruses, Greek tragedy participates in exploring and shaping collective psychology in the 5th c. During this period the workings and power of collective emotion are explicitly addressed in various public fora for the import they have in political life. To substantiate this claim, I turn to an analysis of collective emotion in Thucydides' *History*. The historian's depiction of the desires, fears, hopes, and sympathies of the *dêmos* raises invaluable questions about the nature and role of collective emotion in Athenian public life. Choral emotion is, in turn, shown to engage with similar questions from a markedly, if highly mediated, collective perspective. It thus becomes apparent, this book suggests, that both Thucydides' *History* and the choral discourse of tragedy reflect and address in diverse ways what emerges as a vital preoccupation in 5th c. Athenian culture: how to engage (with) collective emotion in order to direct its motivational power into action that is conducive to social cohesion and collective prosperity in the polis.

Before I turn to the *History* and the plays themselves, the following sections lay the groundwork and rationale for my analysis. Section 2 presents the assumptions that lie behind the questions pursued in this book. These assumptions regard my understanding of the emotions more broadly—their nature and function as complex processes—and in classical Athenian culture in

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particular, which I view as 'a culture of passions'; the integration of aesthetics and sociopolitics and the circulation of emotional discourses in 5th c. Athens; and the function of tragedy and its choruses in this context. In Section 3, I turn to Aristotle to discuss the ways in which his work—regarding especially the (tragic) emotions as well as action—forms an influential background and a valuable point of departure for my analysis of choral emotion. I then move to the tragic chorus in Section 4. I situate my approach vis-à-vis previous interpretations and delineate the aspects of chorality that are particularly pertinent to my reading, introduce the choruses that I will focus on, and conclude by raising certain methodological points regarding my approach. Section 5 elaborates on the insights provided by an analysis of Thucydides' text for contextualizing the choral discourse of pity and fear. Last, Section 6 introduces a recent theoretical approach to 'civil passions' that offers useful conceptual tools for my analysis of both Thucydidean history and tragedy in the chapters that follow.

2 Preliminaries: Assumptions and Questions

Like scholarship in a number of fields in the humanities and social sciences, classical scholarship has shown a growing interest in the study of the emotions.[1] Treatments of ancient emotions often begin from contemporary approaches and their relationship to Aristotle partly because the juxtaposition brings to the fore major ways in which the dichotomy between emotion and reason is or ought to be undermined. To put it in relatively uncontroversial terms, emotions tend to be seen as based on thinking and evaluative processes that go hand in hand with different degrees of changes in the brain and the rest of the body. Emotions, in other words, are complex processes of response to real or imagined stimuli, which include and reflect affect and cognition, physiological and mental change. Under debate remains the precise nature and dynamic between these elements: the genetic and cultural factors that define each one of them, their position in the chronology, as it were, of the emotional experience, their malleability, and the ways in which they interact and (re)define each other and human conduct.[2]

1 To mention only a few notable examples: Lada-Richards (1993), Cairns (1993), Nussbaum (1994) and (2001), Braund and Gill (1997), Konstan (1999), (2000), (2001), and (2006), Harris (2001), Fortenbaugh (2002), Braund and Most (2003), Konstan and Rutter (2003), Kaster (2005), Sternberg (2005) and (2006), Munteanu (2011) and (2012).

2 As Prinz (2004) has put it, the problems addressed in the study of emotion can be categorized under two headings: the problem of parts, namely what actually *is* the emotion

Within classics and the humanities more broadly, the study of the emotions aims to reveal the ways in which emotion is conceived of through different representational lenses, what it reveals regarding ideology, moral psychology, and the very concept of the self as an embodied and social being. The (re)presentation of emotion is thus seen as providing access to systems of beliefs and ideas as well as patterns of communication that define, question, and consistently redefine cultural norms in different periods. While I begin from these broad premises, I add a notion regarding the classical period in particular: diverse literary genres not only reflect patterns of thought and behavior through the emotional discourses they include; they also delineate classical Athenian culture as a culture of passions.[3]

By assuming Athenian culture to be a culture of passions, I mean to foreground the fact that 5th c. Athenians explicitly give emotion a prominent place in their public discourses and decisions. Alongside the performance of different poetic genres, emotions figure prominently in debates in the assembly and the courts as well as in display oratory. Such debates evince that deliberation does not aim to expel or neutralize emotion in the process of decision making. Rather the underlying effort is to define the appropriate emotions that will lead to beneficial and expedient decisions and consequent action. Public debate, in other words, aims not for dispassionate decisions but for appropriately passionate ones. With regard to the place of anger (*orgê*) in the Athenian

in the whole emotional experience and the problem of plenty, namely how the different parts hang together to create a coherent whole. Prinz himself supports the somatic nature of the emotions while also arguing for their semantic contribution to our mental life. The so-called 'affective turn' gave rise to extensive examination of sensation as an essential aspect of emotional experience and a questioning of the predominantly cognitive approach to the emotions. See, e.g., the contributions to Clough and Halley (2007) and Gregg and Seigworth (2010). For a criticism of the turn to affect as a move that reinforces theories about the basic emotions, see Leys (2011). Recent neuroscientific work has shown the connection between practical reasoning and feeling, namely that the former cannot take place without the latter. See, e.g., LeDoux (1996) and Damasio (2000). Different configurations of cognitivist, empiricist, and sociological approaches undertake to show the different degrees to which emotions are based on evaluative/rational processes that are inculcated by different cultural practices. These categories are of course broad and the literature in the different fields vast. Representatives include Solomon (1980), Rorty (1980), de Sousa (1987), Lazarus (1991), Nussbaum (2001) and (2004), Bourke (2005), Prinz (2007). The contributions to Rorty (1980) cover a wide range of disciplines and trends that continue to define the debate on emotions. Last, in classical studies, Budelmann (2010) discusses the use of cognitive science for analyzing ancient texts and studying performance reception (see also n. 8).

3 I use the terms passion and emotion interchangeably, partly in order to reflect the ancient term πάθος.

political world throughout the life of the democracy, for instance, Danielle Allen has convincingly argued that "authoritative definitions of what constituted anger, of when it was appropriate to be angry, and of what sorts of action were appropriate expressions of anger were woven into the definitions of law and justice that operated in the Athenian courts and that shaped life in the Athenian polis".[4] Such valorization reveals an ethics of anger that constrains both citizen behavior and the very function of institutions within the state.[5] Work on pity in different genres and media including oratory, historiography, tragedy, medical writings, and vase painting reveals some of the ways in which the Athenians deal with the ethical demands of empire.[6] Thus public debate on the appropriateness of different emotions points to emotional and moral dispositions that are thought of as recurrent and necessary to direct; the connection between social and political beliefs and ethical demands or lack thereof; and the role of emotion in directing decision making and consequent action, because of the pull that it exerts on both individuals and collective bodies in the very process of weighing different courses of action.

This book turns to tragic choruses with the aim to shed light on the construction of the tragic emotions within tragedy itself and, consequently, on conceptions of pity and fear in 5th c. Athenian life, as well as on the contested role of the tragic chorus. I am particularly interested in the connection between emotion as an affective-cum-cognitive experience and action or inaction as a conscious choice, with special emphasis on collective emotion. Tragic choruses offer a unique and rich source for examining the enactment and implications of collective emotion in social and political life. Such examination of course takes into account the particular nature of the chorus in the context of dramatic fiction.

The overarching assumption behind this undertaking is that tragedy plays a role in shaping ways of thinking and feeling within Athenian culture. This has been termed the 'civic function' of tragedy and has by no means been uncontested.[7] Instead of reiterating the long and ongoing debate, however,

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4 Allen (2003) 77. See also Allen (2000) 50–9.

5 Allen (2003) 83.

6 Here I refer to the contributions in Sternberg (2005).

7 For well-known representatives of the debate, see Vernant (1988a) 23–28 and (1988b) 29–48, the contributions to Winkler and Zeitlin (1990), Hall (1996), Seaford (1994), (1996b) and (2000), Griffith (1995) and (2005), Friedrich (1996), Griffin (1998), Goldhill (2000), Foley (2001) esp. 19–55, Rhodes (2003). For the most recent contributions to the debate see Carter (2011) with further references. Most scholarly work that examines different plays and their connection to social and political ideology at the time of their performance assumes the (or a) civic function of tragedy and has been prevalent in the study of tragedy in the past thirty years.

I only elaborate here on some of the ideas that my analysis builds on. Tragedy as a genre raises questions that can be seen as 'universal' concerns, shared across different times, peoples, and cultures.[8] Such concerns, however, are reconfigured to some degree in any given receiving context. And they remain consistently and inevitably filtered through the cultural parameters of the context that hosts their reception, whether that be the production or reading of the plays.[9] In this book I focus on how the discourse of choral emotion that is embedded in tragedy reflects and participates in shaping the role of emotions in its original context of performance, 5th c. democratic Athens. By concentrating on the language in plays that either recalls court-rhetoric or focuses on political action, Josiah Ober and Barry Straus have discussed the role of tragedy in what they call the generation of new signs that contribute to the dynamism of political culture. In this scheme, political culture and dramatic texts influence each other in a two-way dynamic process. If, as the two scholars succinctly articulate, "Attic tragedy both displays and creates private temperament and social temper",[10] I argue that it achieves that partly through the representation and construction of emotion. Similarly, Simon Goldhill has insisted that "in discussing tragedy, it is not merely that we should try to avoid too exclusive an opposition between strong emotions and political *paideusis*,

Collections such as Euben (1986) and Goff (1995a), works such as Meier (1993), Croally (1994), Zeitlin (1996), Pelling (1997), and Tzanetou (2012) offer a sliver of representative examples. Hall (2006) turns to tragedy, comedy, satyr drama, and oratory in an attempt to offer a wide-ranging approach to the role of drama in Athenian society. For a reading that views tragedy's special character as deriving not so much from democracy but from the acquisition of empire, see Kurke (1998).

8 For an approach that recommends the use of cognitive science in order to examine the universals behind the experience and thus reception of Greek tragedy, see Budelmann (2010). Budelmann argues that cognitive science reveals the propensities of the human mind as an intersection of nature and culture and thus provides us with the concepts that allow us to bring into our scholarly discussions unexpressed instinctive beliefs (esp. 118–119).

9 On an outline of twelve principles/paradoxes for the interpretation of Greek tragedy, see Griffith and Carter (2011) 1–7 and esp. 2–3. Griffith's eighth principle states: "These plays BOTH (a) were <like most specific works of art or literature, and like any public performance, anywhere> historically contingent, socially embedded cultural productions AND (b) have been (demonstrably) admired and appreciated (in various ways) during subsequent eras as universal, almost timeless, expressions of the human condition" (2).

10 Ober and Strauss (1990) 247.

but rather that we should explore their imbrication".[11] Choral emotion, this book suggests, is particularly revealing in this regard.

An underlying premise of this book, therefore, is that the developing democracy sanctions institutional spaces and practices where emotions are publicly expressed and impinge on the life of the state. Through the range of its choruses, tragedy offers one of few invaluable sources of extensive expression of collective emotion. To shift the conversation in this direction, I focus on the 'tragic' emotions (with special emphasis on fear) in five plays whose choruses I see as particularly instructive for the ways in which they dramatize collective emotion and bring out its social and political workings and implications. In my analysis of Thucydides, however, I include other emotions (such as anger, *erôs*, hope) as well to provide a broader background of ideas regarding collective and individual psychology.

3 Aristotle and the (Tragic) Emotions: Uses and Limitations

The emotions that I analyze in tragedy are the so-called quintessential tragic emotions—pity and fear. My focus on these emotions relates of course to the Aristotelian definition of tragedy in the *Poetics*. In addition to the profound influence that the *Poetics* has had on how we view tragedy as a genre, growing interest in the emotional life of the classical Greeks often turns to Aristotle for his very conception of the emotions. He is seen as offering an accurate—or, at the very least, useful—account of how emotions worked and were perceived as working by his broadly conceived contemporaries. The debate on Aristotle's overall theory of the emotions, which includes the question itself of whether it is possible to reconstruct a consistent Aristotelian theory, is ongoing.[12] To do justice to it, one ought to examine the position and role of emotion in its relation to sensation, perception, knowledge, and virtue in the Aristotelian corpus

11 Goldhill (2000) 41.

12 Leigton, Cooper, Frede, Striker, and Nussbaum in Rorty (1996) 206–323 are good representatives of questions that recur in the debate. See also the chapters by Halliwell, Nussbaum, and Nehamas primarily on emotions in the *Poetics* in Rorty (1992) 241–314, Fortenbaugh (2002), Konstan (2003) and (2007). For readings that investigate the role of emotion in political life both in the Aristotelian corpus and in terms of the application of Aristotle's approach to contemporary political theory and analysis, see, e.g., Koziak (1998) 260–288 and (2000) 81–126 who views *thumos* as signifying a general capacity for emotion; and Sokolon (2006). In pp. 31–32, Sokolon provides characteristics and principles that can be seen as consistent in the Aristotelian approach to the emotions despite conflicts and inconsistencies in the different works of the corpus.

in its entirety, an undertaking that is beyond the scope of this book. In this section, I focus on certain aspects of Aristotle's conception of the emotions, which provide a valuable background and productive points of departure for the questions that I raise.

First, Aristotle's work comes as the culmination in the classical period of a tradition that sees pity and fear as quintessential to tragedy with Gorgias and Plato as his most obvious predecessors.[13] I focus on pity and fear not only because of this prominent tradition but also because the two emotions figure prominently, consistently, and explicitly in the surviving plays. Aristotle's detailed definitions of the emotions in the *Rhetoric* and his conception of their nature and workings both in the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* help us articulate questions regarding pity and fear and the emotions more broadly both in tragedy and in the context of the social and political interactions of the Athenians as reflected in other sources such as Thucydides. Second, despite the conceptualization and production of tragedy in the 5th c. as a choral genre, Aristotle essentially ignores the chorus in the *Poetics*, even though he sees tragedy as originating from the dithyramb and he elsewhere discusses extensively the effects of music—the instigation of pity and fear included—on human character and culture.[14] If, furthermore, we see the *Poetics* as responding to Plato's criticism of tragedy, the absence of a more integrated examination of the chorus becomes particularly marked given the Platonic focus on *choreia* and choral culture.[15]

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13 The most recent treatments of Plato and Gorgias as well as Aristotle, with extensive references, are by Destrée (2011) 267–298, Halliwell (2011) 155–207, 208–284 and Munteanu (2012) 37–140.

14 I discuss Aristotle's brief treatment of the chorus in the *Poetics* in Chapter 3. For Aristotle's treatment of the effects of *mousikê* on the soul and its place in education and leisure, see *Politics* 8.5–8. Aristotle famously brings up pity, fear, and catharsis in his explication of the different types of *harmoniai* and *melê* and their ideal use in ch. 7–8. This brief treatment has triggered debate on its connection with tragedy and especially catharsis in the *Poetics*. I do not expand on this debate here, since catharsis is beyond the scope of my analysis. The mention, however, of pity and fear as an emotional response to music inevitably points to its potential relevance to choral performance. On seeing Aristotle's discussion of *mousikê* as referring specifically to music, see Ford (2004) 309–336 and his engagement with approaches that view it as representing poetry or literature more broadly.

15 The *Poetics* is traditionally seen as a response to Plato's condemnation of tragedy, especially in the *Republic*. For a notable exception, see Nehamas (1992) 291–314. On *choreia* and poetic performance in the *Laws* see, e.g., the contributions in Peponi (2013b). Murray, ibid., 294–323 focuses on tragedy. See also Laks (2010) 217–231.

To start with the 'tragic' emotions, Aristotle's definition of tragedy in the *Poetics* (1449b23–28) has instigated a long debate on his delineation of the genre and his conception of its emotional effect, the instigation of pity and fear and the famous catharsis. Part of the challenge in comprehending pity and fear (as well as catharsis) arises from Aristotle's silence in the rest of the *Poetics* about what these emotions entail.[16] To overcome this omission, most readings turn to the extensive definitions of the two emotions in the *Rhetoric*. Fear and pity are defined respectively as:

> [A] painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain (λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ); for men do not fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote; [...] even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing

16 The famous definition of tragedy ends with a reference to ἔλεος and φόβος: δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν (through pity and fear accomplishing the catharsis of such emotions). As the translation indicates, I take παθήματα to refer to emotions. For the interpretation of δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου as "pitiful and fearful events", see, e.g., Else (1957) 228–232 and Nehamas (1992) 303–308. In the rest of the *Poetics*, we find two more references to pity and fear as the emotions appropriate to tragedy and, then, a discussion of what constitutes pitiful and fearful events. I provide here the relevant references: 1452a2–3: ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἡ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν (given that the mimesis is not only of a complete action but also of fearful and pitiable matters); 1452a38–1452b2: ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις καὶ περιπέτεια ἢ ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον, οἵων πράξεων ἡ τραγῳδία μίμησις ὑπόκειται (such a joint recognition and reversal will yield either pity or fear, just the type of actions of which tragedy is taken to be a mimesis); 1452b30–33: ἐπειδὴ οὖν δεῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγῳδίας μὴ ἁπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτην φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεώς ἐστιν) (since, then, the structure of the finest tragedy should be complex not simple, as well as representing fearful and pitiable events (for this is the special feature of such mimesis)); 1453b1–4: ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. (now, what is fearful and pitiable can result from spectacle, but also from the actual structure of events, which is the higher priority and the aim of a superior poet); 1453b9–13: οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον (it is not every pleasure one should seek from tragedy, but the appropriate kind. And since the poet should create the pleasure which comes from pity and fear through mimesis, obviously this should be built into the events). Text and translation by Halliwell (1999).

> itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the approach of anything fearful. [...] In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion (ὡς δ' ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἑτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν).[17]
>
> [A] kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil, which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near (λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται). [...] Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites their pity when others are the victims (ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι, ὅσα ἐφ' αὑτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν). And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, [...] it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past (ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ὅλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι· ἐγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὡς μέλλον ἢ ὡς γεγονός).[18]

Aristotle clearly sees pity and fear as closely interrelated as he does in his definition of tragedy. Despite the differences between the two genres, the concepts of *phantasia* and *hupocrisis* facilitate the application of these definitions to the emotions evoked through theatrical performance as well. Even though its precise epistemic nature is disputed, *phantasia* conveys the notions of appearance or impression, imagination, and perception in the mind's eye, which relate to dramatic representation both in the poet's and audience's mind in the process of composing and reading a play respectively and in the theater itself. Delivery (ὑπόκρισις), on the other hand, translated here as "dramatic action", clearly applies to enactment in the theater more directly, as it explicitly involves gestures, voice, and dress.[19]

17 *Rhetoric* 1382a25–1382b32. Text and translation by Freese (1926).

18 *Rhetoric* 1385b14–1386a41.

19 Aristotle explicitly connects *hupocrisis* in the *Rhetoric* itself with tragedy and rhapsody as well as acting (1404a2–10). He views *hupocrisis* particularly in terms of appropriately

The definition of fear, the emotion that I focus on more extensively in my analysis of both Thucydides in Chapter 2 and the majority of the plays in Chapters 3 and 4, is the one that has raised extensive discussion regarding its applicability as a response to the suffering of others. Fear, in the *Rhetoric*, is explicitly defined as fear for oneself. Does fear in the *Poetics* refer to fear for the hero or for oneself? Along with a number of scholars, I see the definition of fear in the *Rhetoric* as not precluding the possibility of experiencing the emotion for others' misfortunes. Fear in the *Poetics* can thus be seen as stemming initially from the fear felt for the suffering hero. Such sympathetic fear, however, is not divorced from a certain fear for oneself. Rather it reflects their

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using the voice, as the attribute of performance that carries the day in both dramatic and political contests due to its power and, in the case of political debate, the corrupt polity. Irrespective of the qualities of the audience, however, some attention to *lexis*, of which *hupocrisis* is part, is necessary in all systems of instruction because it renders things clear (πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι). And "all these" (*lexis, hupocrisis*, acting) are *phantasia*: ἀλλ᾽ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ᾽ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν (1404a6). This final statement has been highly contested because it is often rendered as "ostentation" or "mere appearance", as in Freese's translation "but all these things are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer". Therefore, one of the questions about *phantasia* (and consequently about the nature of emotional response) is its epistemic nature and validity and, concomitantly, its biological and psychological apparatus. To address these questions, scholars use the *De Anima*, which itself presents a number of interpretive difficulties regarding the epistemic and sensory apparatus of *phantasia*. Here I only mean to establish that *phantasia* and *hupocrisis* contribute to creating images that can be seen as parallel with the images that tragedy creates, and we can, therefore, assume that analogous processes in the audience's mind trigger pity and fear in both the theater and during oratorical debate of different kinds. Especially if Frede (1992) 294 and *passim* is correct that *phantasia* supplies the necessary links between the sensible and intelligible both in practical and theoretical thinking, it seems that it would work *in tandem* with the tragic *muthos* of the *Poetics*, which generates the comprehension or contemplation of universals through intelligible concrete stories. For a recent treatment of pity and fear in Aristotle with a discussion of *phantasia*, see Munteanu (2012) 70–128 with pp. 95–103 specifically on *phantasia*. Munteanu suggests that an understanding of active *phantasia* with the help of the *De Anima* and the *Rhetoric* sheds light on the psychological effects of tragedy on its audience. "[W]hen the tragedian envisions his play, through creative *phantasia*, he conveys pity and fear and, further, he actualizes the two emotions for the audience, by making the events look real" (100). Munteanu also discusses divergent approaches to *hupocrisis* depending on whether it is acting for the sake of acting (in which case it is despised) or acting for the communication of *pathos* (in which case it is praised), in both the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*. For further discussion of *phantasia*, see, e.g., Schofield (1992) 250–279 and González (2006) 99–131. Sandys (1877 [1966]) 105 compares the passage on the evocation of pity through *hupocrisis* with *Poetics* ch. 17.1ff. and ch. 14.1 where the emphasis is on vivid representation and *opsis*.

close implicit connection and experience, since our sympathy is based on perceiving certain similarities between ourselves and the suffering other. Our fear for others, in other words, reveals that we also imaginatively entertain the possibility that similar sufferings may inflict us and that, by acutely sensing what such possibility would entail, we fear for ourselves as well.[20]

The definition of fear in the *Rhetoric*, then, helps elucidate the possible operation of fear in the spectators in the theater. At the same time, it can significantly contribute to our understanding of representations of fear as it provides us with questions that help the investigation of fear within the plays: how do characters and choruses experience and perceive evil? Based on their role within the dramatic action, when and why do they fear for others and when and why do they fear for themselves? And what do such fears reflect about their (changing) connections with other characters at different moments? The relevance of the *Rhetoric* becomes more pointed, if we consider the prominent position of rhetorical *agônes* in tragedy, which blur the distinction between different types of fear evoked in (and by) the plays. Often cast in terms borrowed from judicial and political deliberation, such agonistic discourses aim to persuade through extensive argumentation and the explicit evocation of the emotions, thus activating the operation of self- and other-regarding fear in diverse internal audiences and characters involved.

In addition to providing detailed characteristics of individual emotions, the *Rhetoric* also points to Aristotle's conception of the nature of emotional experience. The emotions are presented as based on and reflecting processes of evaluation. In other words, Aristotle's conception of the nature of the emotions emphasizes the cognitive element of emotional response, which is malleable and therefore useful to the training orator. While shedding light on the mechanics of emotional experience, such a conception points to emotional expression as a rich source of information about what is considered and deeply experienced as valued.

A number of scholars have noted Aristotle's contribution to connecting emotional responses with beliefs and evaluative processes. William Fortenbaugh is the first one to offer an extensive and systematic approach to Aristotle's ideas about the emotions and to emphasize that the philosopher "showed

20 On this imaginative fear that is based on sympathy, see esp. Halliwell (1986) 176 with further references and Nehamas (1992) 303–304. Else (1957) 372, who also sees fear in the *Poetics* as fear for the hero, sees the tragic emotions as based on a feeling of community (τὸ φιλάνθρωπον). For the view that, through its relation to pity, fear as a response to tragedy is fear for oneself, see, e.g., Munteanu (2012) 93–95.

that emotional response is intelligent behavior open to reasoned persuasion".[21] Fortenbaugh also argues that precisely because of the Aristotelian definition of the emotions "a new moral psychology was developed and a variety of problems within the sphere of politics and ethics received a new interpretation".[22] Ismene Lada-Richards agrees that "the first full-scale theoretical investigation of emotions as stemming from cognitive processes belongs to Aristotle";[23] but she points out that the poetically expressed feeling of the interdependence of affect and reason can be traced as early as the Homeric epics in the Sirens' song.[24]

More recently, David Konstan's work has significantly expanded our understanding of Aristotle's positions on the emotions. Offering a history of modern approaches to the emotions, Konstan too situates Aristotle at the early stages of the development of the cognitivist approach.[25] He also argues that the Aristotelian account accurately communicates how the Greeks viewed the emotions: they considered them responses to stimuli in their environment, which was defined by interpersonal relationships and competition. In other words, emotional reactions arise primarily in and through social interactions.[26] That Aristotle considers the emotions in a treatise on rhetoric does not diminish the representative value of his discussion. Quite the contrary:

> [I]t may also be that forensic and deliberative environments were seen as exhibiting intensified scenarios of the way emotions operated in Greek life generally, where they were closely tied to communal interactions and manifested principally in a continuous and public negotiation of social

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21 Fortenbaugh (2002) 17.

22 Ibid., 9. See also Else (1957) 432–453 (esp. 432–436) who discusses Aristotle's ideas about the emotions in order to demonstrate that "the tragic emotions—like all emotions, for that matter—comport an element of judgment" (433).

23 Lada-Richards (1993) 116. See also Lada (1996) 403.

24 Lada-Richards (1993) 117.

25 By referring to 'the' cognitive approach, I do not imply that there is one universally acknowledged and accepted cognitive approach in all its specifics. I only mean to indicate one element shared by numerous theories of the emotions, i.e. that emotions incorporate an element of cognition or evaluation. How such an element precisely operates is seen differently depending on the field of study and use of the relevant evidence. With Aristotle, Konstan (2006) 37 suggests that the role of evaluation in emotion is dynamic: "a belief enters into the formation of an emotion that in turn contributes to modifying some other belief or, perhaps, intensifying the original one. In the latter case, the emotion would act on belief in such a way as to confirm the emotion itself".

26 Konstan (2006) 31, 39.

> roles. […] It is not that Aristotle is right on the emotions and Darwin wrong, but rather that Aristotle's approach may better describe what the emotions meant in the social life of the classical state, whereas Darwin's may be better suited to the way emotions are perceived in the modern, post-Cartesian universe.[27]

This emphasis regarding both the context and the subtext of the Aristotelian definitions resonates with my analysis. I approach tragedy as one of the environments that offer intensified scenarios of how emotions operate. Within this environment, as I show in Chapters 3 and 4, the chorus takes on a particularly potent role. It enacts, triggers, and theorizes pity and fear.[28] And it renders emotional expression and activity public and political—within and beyond the fictive world of the plays—through its performance, identity, and collective presence, characteristics that I discuss in detail in the next section.

In my analysis, therefore, I start in effect from Aristotle's definitions of the emotions in the *Rhetoric*, by investigating the ideas and values dramatized in and through the emotional expression of the chorus. At the same time, however, an underlying interest throughout my investigation concerns the diverse ways in which fear and pity are represented as relating to (political) action and how not only belief but also affect as a constituent of emotional experience figures in this dynamic relation. This focus inevitably moves beyond the *Rhetoric*. To clarify: as is the case with the definitions of pity and fear cited earlier, pleasure and/or pain or disturbance (ἡδονή, λύπη, ταραχή) figure in the experience of all emotions, while certain emotions, such as anger, are also seen as leading to action. As we saw, however, while including this affective element, the *Rhetoric* foregrounds the cognitive dimension of emotional response, an emphasis that shifts in other works, depending on the goals of the work at hand.[29] This shifting emphasis has generated a complex debate regarding Aristotle's theory of the emotions. Within this debate, that Aristotle sees in emotional response a cognitive basis of beliefs and judgments is a matter of consensus. The extent to which these cognitive processes are in themselves rational is a question that remains open. The *Nicomachean Ethics* contributes significantly to this debate

27 Ibid., 27–28.

28 By theorizing, I refer to indicating directly or through explanatory myths, metaphors, and imagery how pity and fear are evoked, experienced, and perceived.

29 Striker (1996) 293 argues that the fact that an orator does not aim to instigate his listeners to immediate action makes Aristotle focus on judgment and leads him to distinguish the emotion itself from the desire that it may give rise to and, therefore, from the action that it may motivate as well.

as it addresses explicitly the location of the emotions in the soul as well as the relationship between emotion and moral virtue revealed in action. I close my treatment of Aristotle by turning here to the *Nichomachean Ethics* to discuss briefly certain attributes of the emotions that, juxtaposed to the definitions offered in the *Rhetoric*, have informed my thinking of the connection between emotion and action.

The emotions (πάθη) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* constitute one of the three states of the soul, the other two being capacities and dispositions (δυνάμεις, ἕξεις), and belong to its desiring part (τὸ δ᾽ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν). Aristotle appears indecisive as to whether this part should be seen as nonrational or in some way rational.[30] In the latter case, the desiring part would have to form a subdivision within the rational part of the soul. Thus divided in two, the rational part would host rational principle (λόγος) in one of its subdivisions and the desiring part, emotions included, in the other. The alternative is a bipartite division of the soul with the wholly rational part on one side and the vegetative (that which causes nutrition and growth) and desiring parts combining to constitute the nonrational part. In both cases it is the desiring part that hosts the emotions. Aristotle's indecision stems from the relationship between the desiring part and *logos*. Even though not rational in itself, the division that includes the emotions is amenable (κατήκοον) and obedient (πειθαρχικόν) to reason, in the sense in which we speak of 'paying heed' to one's father and friends.[31] The desiring part, in other words, has the capacity and can learn how to listen to reason. Consequently, virtue is of two kinds: intellectual and moral. Moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way with regard to pleasures and pains by observing the mean. It is thus defined as "a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions".[32] As such, it is produced through habituation, through the very practice of virtuous

30 I use "nonrational" for ἄλογος. As, e.g., Sokolon (2006) 12 suggests, "nonrational" is preferable because "the *alogos* function of the soul is not necessarily contrary to right reason". The connotations of the term "irrational", on the other hand, are "of an action contrary to right reason or against the best course of action".

31 The Platonic influences on the Aristotelian division of the soul are often noted and discussed. See, e.g., Fortenbaugh (2002) 23–44 and *passim*. Ogren (2004) (http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/vol8/aristotle.html) sees the capacity of the irrational part to listen to reason as a form of cognition that is "a uniquely human hermeneutic element of the soul" and an awareness of Being as opposed (but closely related) to the "cognition of Being" of the rational part.

32 See *NE* 1106b36–1107a6. Translation by Rackham (1934). See also *NE* 1104b27–28.

activities. In Alexander Nehamas' words, "what appears good and evil to the emotion will one day come to coincide with what is in fact good and evil".[33]

The connection between emotion, moral disposition, and activity is central:

> It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow-men that some of us become just and others unjust; by acting in dangerous situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we become courageous or cowardly. And the same holds good of our dispositions with regard to the appetites, and anger; some men become temperate and gentle, other profligate and irascible, by actually comporting themselves in one way or the other in relation to those passions. In a word, our moral dispositions (αἱ ἕξεις) are formed as a result of the corresponding activities (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν). Hence it is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions.[34]

Like our actions, our emotional life is directly dependent on and reflects our moral virtue or lack thereof—and vice versa. By presenting the emotions as amenable to reason and defining our moral dispositions with respect to our emotions, Aristotle not only foregrounds the role of habituation as activity that cultivates virtue; he also indicates that in the ongoing process of learning how to be virtuous by feeling and being virtuous, emotion itself works—or comes to work—as motivation for virtuous action. Our virtuous dispositions and our emotional tendencies are closely interdependent.[35] Within such dispositions, emotions come to be aligned with *logos* while, at the same time, the position of the emotions in a nonrational part of the soul seems to contribute to their continuously affective and motivational power.

Focusing on the *Rhetoric*, John Cooper summarizes what he sees as a common structure of the emotions, noting, however, that Aristotle does not give equal attention to all elements in each emotion he discusses: "[emotions] are agitated, *affected* states of mind, arising from the ways events or conditions *strike* the one affected, which are at the same time *desires* for a specific range of specific behaviors or other changes in the situation as it appears to her or him to be".[36] The brief account from the *Nicomachean Ethics* confirms this

33 Nehamas (1992) 299.

34 *NE* 1103b14–23.

35 See also Halliwell (2011) 254.

36 Cooper (1996) 251. Cooper's emphasis on 'striking' the one affected comes from his interpretation of *phantasia* here and in connection with *De Anima* 3.3, which he sees as a sort

structure and adds to it. It further explicates and emphasizes the emotions' inherent amenability to reason, which is also present in the *Rhetoric*;[37] and it elaborates on the connection between emotion and behavior. The amenability of the emotions to reason means "not only that we can sometimes be talked out of an emotion by arguments to show that our first impression was mistaken; it also means that our reason-based beliefs and convictions will make us disposed to be impressed in certain ways and to have the corresponding emotional responses".[38] By developing the right emotional dispositions, we may, therefore, be able to develop the right moral perspective.[39] In this context, habituation contributes to rendering the emotions as affected states less agitated and more reasonable, and, therefore, potentially reliable guides toward worthy moral directions. Such moral directions are essential to (our contemplation of) different behaviors and indicate the association of emotion with action: emotions have a bearing on action—how we conceive of it or how we actually proceed to act—even though not all emotions necessarily lead to action.[40] Action itself, the *Nicomachean Ethics* asserts, reflects and in turn shapes moral—and, therefore, emotional—dispositions, as it instantiates how (strongly) we feel about the beliefs according to which we lead our lives.

When the different elements of emotional experience are brought to bear on the *Poetics*, the aim of Aristotle's prescriptive account becomes more transparent. Plays that dramatize the right type of events, we can infer, will evoke the right type of pity and fear that will, in turn, help attune the audience's

of non-epistemic appearance "according to which something may appear to, or strike one, in some way [...] even if one knows there is no good reason for one to take it so" (247). In my reading of Aristotle's definition, the role of *phantasia* is not as transparent, given the complexity of the term in the *De Anima* and the fact that even more reasonable instantiations of the same emotions (e.g., well-founded anger) can be produced through *phantasia*. For an interpretation that sees *epithumia* as excluded in the *Rhetoric* but included in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, see Leighton (1996) 225–230.

37 See also Ogren (2004) 11 who shows that a particular kind of cognition with its own rationality is inherent in the (irrationally) desiring part of the soul. Though very different from the pure rationality of the wholly rational part of the soul, it is this element that enables interaction between the two parts.

38 Striker (1996) 299.

39 Ibid., 298.

40 On practical and non-practical emotions, see, e.g., Fortenbaugh 79–83. Fortenbaugh argues that certain emotions such as anger and fear are practical "in the sense of involving a possible goal for which one acts" (80). Other emotions on the other hand, such as shame and pity, do not include an inherent propensity for action, they are not "logically tied to action", even if they carry importance in actual behavior (81–2).

emotional capacities and, as a consequence, moral dispositions and virtue. Stephen Halliwell has made a strong case for the connections between the emotional and moral dimensions of experiencing tragedy based on Aristotle's psychology of the passions:

> When an audience is drawn into intense fear and pity for the characters of tragedy, Aristotle supposes that it is not simply having its feelings exposed to a kind of nervous excitation. Rather, the emotions—which are a dynamic factor in the mind's evaluative reactions to life—both reflect and help to shape how spectators grasp and see the underlying patterns of significance in a plot's structure of action and suffering. The value of tragedy, on Aristotle's interpretation, is that it channels understanding through surges of deep emotion.[41]

This understanding of Aristotle's interpretation of what ideally constructed drama achieves prompts questions about the (unideal) surviving dramas. What do the different Aristotelian insights into emotion contribute to an analysis of 5th c. plays?

My examination of emotion takes as a point of departure the Aristotelian account as reconstructed here. My interest, at the same time, is to stay primarily *within* the surviving plays while turning to the chorus, the element of tragedy that Aristotle essentially bypasses. With regard to action, as pointed out above, according to Aristotle, not all emotions are defined explicitly as leading to action; but moral and, therefore, emotional dispositions are shown in action. Similarly and famously, action (πρᾶξις) in the *Poetics* occupies the primary position among the elements of tragedy and is defined as the goal (τέλος) of the genre.[42] When we turn to the dramatization of pitiful and fearful events in the surviving plays with this conceptual background, the experience and enactment of pity and fear by individual characters and choruses invite us to witness or reconstruct how their emotional dispositions and responses are formed and revealed in (dramatic) action; and how such dispositions and responses factor into their deliberations and motivate their decisions and consequent action. In other words, the question becomes how precisely the tragic emotions shape interactions and acts within the plays, that is, dramatic action itself. In this context, the definitions of the emotions in the *Rhetoric* are particularly helpful for looking at the cognitive or belief basis of pity and fear. In the case of fear, for instance, I examine how choruses perceive or envision

41 Halliwell (2011) 233–4.

42 *Poetics* 1450a15–24.

"an evil that causes destruction" and how they render it a public concern—that is, what triggers one's capacity to fear with and for others. In instances of pity, I am particularly interested in the notion of desert—how what one deserves is perceived, construed, and evaluated. In all cases, I examine what renders these emotions experiences that compel one to action. My focus on the tragic chorus, however, along with the ideological and affective aspects of its emotional discourse that relate more specifically to its collective character—on which I expand in the next section—raise questions that move away from the Aristotelian account, with regard especially to the effects of emotional 'action' on the plays' political community.

In my analysis, then, I investigate the constitution of emotions as they are instantiated within the plays by examining both the belief basis of pity and fear (the ideas and impressions that trigger them) and the affective aspects (desires, pleasures, pains, and attachments) that render them, or fail to render them, concerns that motivate action. As I explain in the following section, I focus specifically on choruses that are 'active' or 'enact' the tragic emotions—terms defined in the two relevant chapters. Such choruses offer indispensable insights into the interrelationship between emotion, decision, and action, reveal connections between individual and collective psychology, and (re)define the role of emotion in the life of the polis and its institutions.[43]

43 This focus renders the discussion of the tragic emotions one that examines aesthetic, psychological, ethical, and political questions as closely interdependent and relevant to the Athenian polis—another point of departure from Aristotle's *Poetics*. The reasons for the absence of the polis or polis-related concerns in Aristotle's aesthetic theory have been extensively debated. Hall (1996) 295–309, for instance, argues that Aristotle erases "even the abstract idea of the polis as an institution, whether Athenian, democratic, or otherwise", an innovation that on the one hand obscures the local ideological specificities of tragedy while on the other it has contributed significantly to the constant revival of the genre. For a response according to which the *Poetics* should be read in the context of Aristotle's philosophical anthropology, see Heath (2009) 468–485. In this context, poetry is a universal human activity and all human activities are necessarily answerable to politics. In Heath's view, Aristotle, is not writing about Athenian or Greek tragedy but about tragedy that, even though contingently local, was in principle a normatively universal human practice (esp. 472–5). Wise and Hanink recently revisited the debate by focusing on 4th c. theatrical realities that they view as defining Aristotle's perception of tragedy. While Wise (2008) and (2013) views the lack of politics in the *Poetics* as resulting from the rise of the actor and the new organization of the program at the City Dionysia (such as the separate production of satyr plays) in the 4th c., Hanink (2011) sees it largely "as a symptom of Athenian tragedy's successful diffusion throughout the Greek world" (324).

4 Collectively Dancing the Emotions

4.1 *The Tragic Chorus*

The connection between individual and collective behavior and emotion is not often raised in the study of tragedy. Scholars, however, have turned to the tragic chorus in order to examine possible ways in which it relates to the audience. In this context, the emphasis on the collective character of the two groups varies. Notably, August Wilhelm Schlegel's interpretation of the chorus as an ideal spectator has been brought under scrutiny. It overlooks both the chorus' frequent misunderstandings as well as the fact that, because of their dramatic identity such as women, captives, old men, choruses cannot represent what Schlegel calls "the common mind of the nation".[44] Jean-Pierre Vernant's reconfiguration that saw in the chorus "the collective and anonymous presence embodied by an official college of citizens" whose "role is to express through its fears, hopes, questions, and judgments the feelings of the spectators who make up the civic community" has also been extensively discussed for a similar misconception.[45] It "elides the fifth-century identity that lies beneath the masks and costumes of tragic chorus members with their dramatic role", which tends to be that of socially marginal figures.[46] This model, however, has offered a productive springboard for analyzing the chorus in the context of Athenian democracy.

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44 According to Schlegel (1904) 70, as the Greeks turned to the heroic ages for their compositions, they used the chorus in order to give "a certain republican cast" to the families of the heroes and thus they gave "publicity" to their actions: "Whatever it might be and do, [the chorus] represented, in general, first the common mind of the nation, and then the general sympathy of all mankind. In a word, the Chorus is the ideal spectator. It mitigates the impression of a heart-rending or moving story, while it conveys to the actual spectator a lyrical and musical expression of his own emotions, and elevates him to the region of contemplation". According to Goldhill (2013) 40, Schlegel "offers an ideal chorus to explore our artistic ideals, not to describe the genre of Greek tragedy comprehensively". The chorus is thus reduced to the functional role of "rais[ing] the spectators to a level of profound reflection" that is separate from any reference to particular stanzas (41). Goldhill's discussion of Schlegel is part of his delineation of how the German Idealist tradition has fundamentally shaped our perception of the Greek chorus in theory and in theater production.

45 Vernant (1988b) 33–34.

46 The quotation is from Murnaghan (2011) 246–7. On Vernant see also Gould (1996) 218–220 who is the one who develops the notion of social marginality and Goldhill (1996) 244–6. Social marginality itself has been reconsidered, see below.

Overall these approaches call attention to two broad questions that persist in subsequent attempts to offer a nuanced understanding of the tragic chorus: first, how are we to explain the intuition that the collective chorus relates to the collective theater-audience in a distinct way? And second, what is the nature and effect of the choral voice as it is filtered through the performance of song and dance and the double identity of the chorus as a performer of ritual in the festival of Dionysus and as a dramatic character? To address these questions, certain choral characteristics recur as focal points: choral otherness and collectivity; the chorus' role as a respondent to the dramatic events and actors and its own (in)ability to act; the ritual aspect and institutional history of choral dancing. In what follows, I discuss a number of approaches to these questions. My discussion, however, does not offer an exhaustive survey of approaches to the tragic chorus. On the contrary, it is highly selective. My aim is rather to foreground certain questions and ideas that recur in different interpretations and especially how they bear on my interpretation and its goal to move the debate in a new direction.

The predominance of tragic choruses that can be seen as Other within the Athenian context is often noted. Choruses tend to consist of old men, slave or foreign women, or deities, that is, of dramatic agents that are defined in opposition to citizen-men at the prime of their age. In an influential article, John Gould argues that such identity renders choruses socially marginal and hence deprives their discourse of authority: such groups have a collective identity, a collective name, and collective 'social' memory that is not that of the sovereign citizen-body.[47] They more often express "the experience of the excluded, the oppressed, and the vulnerable".[48] Even so, the collective and constant choral presence renders choruses an essential part of the plays' fiction and of our very conception of the tragic by conveying "the sense that the human condition embraces both the individual and the group, and that all experience, even the ultimate, all-consuming experience of 'the tragic', is to be lived through, perceived, and recollected collectively as well as individually".[49] Responding to Gould, Goldhill argues that the centrality of the institution of the *chorêgia* and the tradition of choral dance-song as educational and ideological perfor-

47 Gould (1996) 223–224. Gould locates this otherness not only in the fictional identity but also in the dialectical coloring of the chorus' language, which he sees as "a distant tongue" and "the speech of the 'other'" (219). Rosenmeyer (1982) 157, conversely, sees authority coming from the fact that the chorus' voice is communal and makes comparisons with mythic paradigms.

48 Ibid., 224.

49 Ibid., 233.

mance, on the contrary, imbue the choral voice with authority.[50] The chorus' status, moreover, is crucial to tragedy's explorations of authority, knowledge, and tradition within the dynamics of democracy's ethics of group and individual obligations.[51] Goldhill concludes by reiterating the significance of the choral voice—and tragedy—within Athenian democracy, precisely because of its ability to mobilize and question the authority of collective wisdom.[52]

The question of choral authority within tragedy remains challenging because of the elusiveness of the notion itself.[53] The chorus as a performer in the festival of Dionysus indeed participates in and continues a long ritual and authoritative tradition. And as a character within the plays, it draws from and reconfigures such tradition.[54] But tragedy as a genre consistently questions definitions of authoritative discourse, especially efficacious authoritative discourse. Figures like the tyrants of tragedy, for instance, offer an obvious case in point for the ways in which they help question and reconfigure sources of political authority.[55] Regarding the chorus in particular, it may be more productive to look at choral discourse in terms of weightiness and consequence. Irrespective of the chorus' fictional political status in different plays, the performance of ritual as part of its role both in the festival and in the dramatic plot as well as its perception of and involvement in the dramatic events gives choral discourse its own weightiness and significance. Choruses not only render the tragic events public; they also often perform public acts, frequently connected to rituals such as prayer and supplication; they sometimes impact

50 Goldhill (1996) 250–251. For a different approach to the educational role of choral performance, see Winkler (1990) 20–62 who argues that the tragic chorus consisted of *ephebes* whose very participation in the chorus formed part of the training necessary for their transition to manhood. On the institution of the *chorêgia*, see Wilson's (2000) seminal work.

51 Ibid., 253.

52 Ibid., 255. See also his most recent (2012) interpretation of Sophocles in particular, where he views the portrayal of the chorus' response to the hero as "one way of thinking about the difficulties of integrating [excessive, demanding, transgressive individuals] into the collective enterprise" and thus "good for the Athenians to think with, politically" (132–133).

53 On the elusiveness of 'tragic authority', see also Foley (2003) 2. Dhuga (2011) continues the discussion of authority while questioning the attribute of marginality, specifically with respect to choruses of old men. He argues that old men "are perhaps *expected* to make decisions precisely because they are old and often show great wisdom on account of their experience. However, the extent to which a given chorus is actually involved in decision making seems to be informed more strongly by the chorus' relationship to the ruler than by an *a priori* categorization of the chorus' identity" (3).

54 See especially Calame (1999) and Swift (2010).

55 On tragic tyranny, see, e.g., Seaford (2003).

the course of action; and they consistently influence the (characters' and the audience's) perception of the dramatic events and the issues that they raise. Even though the choral voice remains partial and contingent upon the specific identity and perspective of the chorus in each play, it engages the audience in the very process of responding.[56] In this process, it offers experiential and conceptual paradigms for doing so and invites their assessment. To give a brief example: to the experience of Phaedra's *erôs* as disease (*nosos*), the chorus of Euripides' *Hippolytus* juxtaposes the experience of *erôs* as battle and the kind of fear that it triggers. By opting for the latter metaphor, the chorus members construe the threatening experience of *erôs* as one that allows for both individual responsibility and the possibility of noble fight as opposed to the shame of uncontrollable and incapacitating disease. And they invite an evaluation of both, given especially their identity as young married women.[57] To the extent that it is sustained—and I will return to this point—choral otherness allows for a greater versatility of such paradigms.

Two further points articulated by Helene Foley contribute to this idea of versatility and a conception of choral discourse with a weightiness particular to it. First, "choruses consisting of men of military age, especially if they acted as civilians rather than soldiers, could indirectly raise awkward questions about the relation between leaders and followers in the democracy, whereas the choruses culturally defined as 'natural' followers like women or foreigners would not".[58] Second, "domestic and public worlds are often linked far more intrinsically in the Greek mind than in our own".[59] Thus the choral voice allows for difficult questions to be raised and facilitates a reevaluation of social and political categories, that of self and Other included.[60] This leads to a point that may be overlooked, if otherness is overemphasized. The plays consistently exploit and undermine otherness at the same time, in the case of both individual characters and choruses. In the case of choruses in particular, familiarity with the ritual elements of their performance and the introduction of the so-called

56 In Easterling's words (1997) 164, the collective identity of the chorus "gives its behavior more scope to fluctuate with fluctuating circumstances: it does not have to be as consistent as a single individual, and it speaks of itself in the plural just as freely as in the singular. Its job is to help the audience *become involved in the process of responding*, which may be a matter of dealing with profoundly contradictory issues and impulses".

57 Visvardi (2007) 253–257.

58 Foley (2003) 11–12. But see also her discussion of the *Rhesus*, in which the chorus does confront such awkward questions (pp. 17–19).

59 Foley, ibid., 22.

60 Individual characters as well invite similar processes of reevaluation. The chorus, however, mobilizes alternate ways of engagement and identification.

gnomic wisdom lessens the distance created through the characteristics that render choruses marginal. Previous participation in choral performances by the audience members themselves and the pleasure derived from identifying with a collective body as a member of a collective body, which I discuss shortly, also complicate the notion of identifying with the Other. Otherness in other words must have been seen and felt as a transparent device of distancing—transparent, that is, to the original audiences as it is to us.[61]

As part of such (relatively transparent) otherness, strong and especially disruptive emotion tends to be associated with femininity and barbarism. A prominent aspect of the choral voice and performance, the expression and enactment of emotion, I suggest, is presented as inviting, and at times even forcing, attentive hearing and action within the plays. This is particularly the case with choruses that participate in the dramatic events as actors, an instantiation of choral function not sufficiently addressed in discussions that focus on choruses that respond to the dramatic events. Such choruses, all Aeschylean, are analyzed in Chapter 3. Tied with the very identity of these choruses (the Erinyes in the *Eumenides*, the Danaids in the *Supplices*, and Theban women in the *Seven Against Thebes*), the demands enacted by choral emotion invite, I will argue, an expansion of the sympathetic imagination that gives access to alternate ways of thinking, feeling, and, therefore, acting.

The collective character of the chorus is self-evident. The ways, however, in which it facilitates and possibly reflects audience involvement have been extensively debated. Survival of the anonymous collective is seen as one way to relate the two groups, especially in Sophoclean dramaturgy. Sophoclean choruses appear to survive after having been under threat. As a collective experience, the fate of survivors offers a perspective that the anonymous theater audience can and wishes to identify with.[62] From a more politically oriented

61 Of course how transparent such a device was would vary between different audience members.

62 The two extensive approaches that see survival as a characteristic of Sophoclean choruses are offered by Budelmann (2000) and Murnaghan (2009). Each sees different implications in the notion of collective survival. Budelmann suggests that there is continuity between every play's chorus and a large off-stage group—itself too large to be counted—with which the chorus has connections and is part of. The chorus thus provides the only group-perspective available for the audience to identify with as members of a group themselves, while a vagueness regarding this larger group facilitates such identification. The Sophoclean chorus always survives after having initially been under threat. Through this concern with groups in danger and safety, Sophoclean tragedy has the potential of capturing the attention of many spectators, who, even if varying in their interests, judgments and much else, must share a desire for safety and survival (205). Thus "Sophoclean

perspective that looks at plays from all three tragedians, such survival is viewed as inextricable from the socially subordinate position of the chorus-members (as well as other minor characters) and their dependence upon their 'brilliant dynasts', that is, the leading characters who belong to the elite. This dramatic reality replicates what transpires in the 'real world' not just of the Athenian democracy but of many other Greek cities as well.[63] It has been pointed out, however, that, when we turn to Euripidean tragedy, collective survival is not always guaranteed. As a result of Euripides' interest in suffering victims, the future of enslaved choruses, in particular, can be uncertain.[64]

Other approaches locate the connection between collective chorus and collective audience in the chorus' ritual character that contributes to *paideia* as education or broader cultivation. In Gregory Nagy's words, the enactment of marginal roles "conforms to the ritual function of the chorus as an educational collectivization of experience".[65] The chorus identifies with both the world of heroic dramatic action and the civic world in which it performs. It is the intersubjectivity of choral performance that allows for the identification of the *pathos* (as suffering or ordeal) of the hero with the *pathos* (as emotion) of the audience.[66] For Nagy, then, the *pathos* in and of choral dance-song is instrumental to communicating to the audience the experience of the tragic hero. Choral performance reflects, produces, and secures intersubjectivity.

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choruses and the large group that is somewhere behind them provide a degree of permanence and stability in a world of death, despair and destruction" (272). Without making a connection with a larger group, Murnaghan too suggests that the chorus provides "a positive model for the audience of tragedy as eventual survivors of what they witness" (327). The picture that emerges, however, is that the condition of such survival is fraught and ambiguous: "The characters, on the one hand, show us the hazards of thinking one can really get clear of the deaths of others; the chorus, on the other, allows us to draw a sharper line between our lives and the dead, who are marked as truly different, and offers us a model of endurance that we can comfortably adopt and take away from our time in the theater" (329). Even though the model is encouraging, Murnaghan concludes, it is not necessarily a comfortable one because of the many forms of ignorance that survival entails and that tragedy intensifies (333).

63 See Griffith (1995) specifically on the *Oresteia* and (2011) on plays from all three tragedians produced throughout the 5th c. By emphasizing that the family feuds among the elites that pervade tragic plots reflect panhellenic and not just Athenian realities, Griffith argues that, in the end, it is the polis itself that survives, which should not be seen as referring exclusively to the Athenian democratic polis.

64 Foley (2003) 16–17.

65 Nagy (1994–5) 50–51.

66 Ibid., 52.

Similarly, ritual is also the focus of a highly influential article by Albert Henrichs who traces the connection between chorus and audience in their sharing choral rituals and the institutions that incorporate them. Henrichs argues that certain choruses perform 'self-referentiality' by referring explicitly to the ritual background of the play, the festival, or the polis overall. Such choruses provide the spectators with a point of reference to their own reality and perhaps a shared perspective as they "invite the audience to participate in a more integrated experience, one in which the choral performance in the orchestra merges with the more imaginary performance of the rituals of polytheism that take place in the action of each play". Thus actual choral performance becomes integrated with the performative power of the choral voice.[67] Last, Sheila Murnaghan has recently developed further the possible implications of choral self-referentiality and tragic chorality from a broader point of view. By pointing out that choral activity is normally associated with festivity, she argues that choral self-referentiality and the recurrent references to tragic music as non-music or perverted musicality convey that, within tragedy's extreme disorder, the chorus is exiled from festivity. In other words, the chorus performs its very displacement from its usual and proper role.[68] Different types of resolution achieved within the plays as well as the staging of satyr-plays after the tragedies in the City Dionysia result in reinstating proper choral activity. Athens and Athenian institutions are presented as "instrumental in resolutions that involve a restoration of the chorus' festive nature, a healing of the rift between a chorus' identity as a chorus and its involvement in the tragic plot".[69] Such restoration may be that of the return of festivity itself or of the preconditions necessary for such festivity.

The interpretations that focus on survival trace a connection between the collective chorus and the collective audience that points to a universalizing or panhellenic concern with communal safety. Approaches that focus on ritual, on the other hand, embed choral performance firmly in the polis-context of the plays. For Nagy and Murnaghan such context is specifically democratic.[70] Interestingly, while in both Henrichs' and Murnaghan's approaches chorality is instrumental in grounding the audience's experience to the here and now

67 Henrichs (1995) 59 and 90. For choral projection, which Henrichs defines as an important corollary to choral self-referentiality, see Henrichs (1996) 48–62.

68 Murnaghan (2011) *passim* and especially p. 251.

69 Ibid., 252.

70 Murnaghan, ibid. 258, however, also suggests that the reinstated choral festivities envisioned in tragedy "also allude to the role of tragedy as a cultural export, capable of being performed in many cities".

of the dramatic festival, the implied emphasis is not necessarily on the collectivity of chorus and audience. Even so, their approaches invite consideration of the collective character of both bodies as participants in ritual and other institutions of the polis.

Building on the insights of these approaches, I see the ritual character of the chorus (both real and fictional) as contributing to its cohesive perspective. The element of intersubjectivity that Nagy discusses applies to the body of the chorus itself as it does to the relationship between the chorus and the audience: the interchangeable use of the first person singular and plural by the chorus (I/We) points precisely to the integration of the individual into the collective in a seamless and cohesive way. These aspects of the choral persona have been pointed out in different studies.[71]

71 Kaimio (1970) offers a detailed survey and analysis of the use of person and number in the chorus in all three tragedians and Aristophanes, taking into account the tradition of non-dramatic lyric poetry. Overall the first person plural brings out the collectivity of the choral body and its characteristics as a dramatic person, in different ways and to different degrees in the four authors. "The relationship between the first person singular and the role of the chorus is more difficult to define" but it seems to emphasize the cohesiveness of the chorus, which speaks as an individual (240, 61). With regard to emotional expression, in particular, Kaimio shows that the first person singular is consistently used and suggests that first-person singular expressions "have a strong nuance of personal experience" (61, 64). Calame (1999) connects the interchangeability of the choral I/We with what he defines as choral polyphony that is fundamental to constructing multiple virtual positions for the audience members. The different voices that constitute such polyphony—and are complemented by equivalent performative dimensions—are the ritual, the hermeneutic, and the affective (128–129). After the spectator has delegated part of his own choral competence and authority (that come from his musical education in classical Athens) to the chorus of the drama in the festival, he is invited to assume the 'virtual' position of the choral performer precisely through the choral I/We. He is thus called to address himself to the actors or to the gods with the thoughts and feelings of the chorus and thus to *sunagônizesthai* with the dramatic action that is presented to him. Such invitation takes place by means of the performative dimension of the choral odes along with their emotive component (150). This choral I/We also refers back to the ideal author. In this way, we have the construction of a virtual spectator, who blends into the figure of the ideal author by way of the virtual performer through which the actual public comes to occupy the position of the choral speaker. This kind of affective collaboration, according to Calame, invites the substitution of Nagy's notion of intersubjectivity, mentioned earlier, with the concept of 'interaction' (151–153). What choral polyphony achieves by constructing different virtual positions for the audience is to render the spectators active participants in choral performance, which becomes an education of the civic community. For an earlier discussion of the different choral voices, see Calame (1995).

One point, however, is not sufficiently brought out: a habit of thinking of oneself through the lens of participation in collective activity and integration into the cohesive feeling and thinking of a group. The original audience-members—Athenian citizens and foreigners from places with choral traditions, at the very least—are experienced in being addressed as both an individual and a member of the collective through choral dancing. Since the expression of emotion is a prominent element within choral discourse, the integration of individual and the collective within the choral body also points to a perception of individual and collective psychology. They are seen as analogous and thus reflect some of the mechanics of both individual and collective action and the dynamic between the two. For this reason, choral performance does not merely invite collective response. It also indicates that such response is of particular interest and gravity. Within the plays, it is not solely the light that the chorus sheds on the individual characters that matters. How the collective group itself thinks, feels, and acts is also central to the genre as it is in contemporary ritual and politics—that is, in the practices that define the communal life of the Athenians.

One last characteristic of collective emotion that is not brought up explicitly by tragic choruses adds significantly to what I have called the weightiness of choral emotion, its effect, and our understanding of its power.[72] In addition to the analogy between individual and collective psychology, there seems to be (a belief in) a pleasure in collectively sharing emotions—even painful emotions—and all that they entail. Plato in the 4th century will paretymologize the name of the chorus as originating from the joy (*chara*) derived by singing and moving harmoniously in a group.[73] Instead, however, of turning to Plato and his prescriptive agenda for all choruses, I turn to two other sources that offer particularly illuminating insights in this regard, while each takes us in a different direction: the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* and Thucydides' *History*. In the former, we find a well-known idealization of choral performance, that of the Delian Maidens, which contributes to our understanding of tragic chorality. In the latter, as I show in the next section, we can trace a consistent preoccupation with how indulgence in collective emotion defines social and political action in 5th c. Athens.

72 This characteristic, however, can be seen as implicit in the so-called escape odes where we find the chorus' longing for participation in collective ritual activity. See, e.g., *Hippolytus*, 732–775; *Helen*, 1478–1494; and *Trachiniae* 947–961. For a reworking of escape-ode elements in the *Hecuba* and the *Trojan Women* with similar implications, see Visvardi (2011) 274–279.

73 *Laws* 653e6–654a3.

The Delian Maidens who perform at the festival on Delos in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* famously represent a wondrous and exceptionally pleasurable chorus:

> πρὸς δὲ τόδε μέγα θαῦμα, ὅου κλέος οὔποτ᾽ ὀλεῖται,
> κοῦραι Δηλιάδες Ἑκατηβελέταο θεράπναι·
> αἵ τ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἂρ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀπόλλων᾽ ὑμνήσωσιν,
> αὖτις δ᾽ αὖ Λητώ τε καὶ Ἄρτεμιν ἰοχέαιραν,
> μνησάμεναι ἀνδρῶν τε παλαιῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν
> ὕμνον ἀείδουσιν, θέλγουσι δὲ φῦλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων.
> πάντων δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς καὶ κρεμβαλιαστὺν
> μιμεῖσθ᾽ ἴσασιν· φαίη δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος
> φθέγγεσθ᾽· οὕτω σφιν καλὴ συνάρηρεν ἀοιδή.
>
> There is also a great wonder, the fame of which will never perish,
> The Delian maidens, the servants of the far-shooter.
> Who, after hymning Apollo
> And then in turn Leto and arrow-pouring Artemis
> Sing a hymn that enchants the races of humans.
> The voices and the rhythmic patterns of all humans
> They know how to represent; each one might think
> That he himself is speaking, so beautifully is their song fitted together.[74]
> (156–164)

Each and all the members of the audience are drawn to the chorus' uniquely enchanting enactment. They profoundly identify with them as they can 'hear' themselves in the maidens' performance. What exactly this identification entails has been a matter of debate. In Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi's reading, the Delian maidens' ability to perform a holistic representation of the audience does not refer to formal characteristics such as linguistic identity but to shared sensibilities that only this exceptional chorus can enact and thus create "a common responsiveness for all the different visitors".[75] According to this interpretation, then, the chorus reinforces bonds of a pleasurable experience of empathy with the audience, which is conceived of both as consisting of individuals and as a collective body. Such empathy has the power to render the audience virtual performers: "An essential part of the Delian Maidens'

74 Text is by Allen (1912) and translation by Peponi (2009) 67 n. 74.

75 Peponi (2009) 64.

enchantment is to make you feel that in their voice you can hear your own, that in their performance you can see yourself".[76] Last, the Deliades also turn into a collective listener addressed by the most pleasurable rhapsode himself (ll.169–73).

What does this depiction and interpretation of the Delian chorus add to our approach to the tragic chorus? First, the depiction of the Delian Maidens offers an explicit early statement that confirms the intuition that (apparent) otherness does not forestall empathy. Every member of the audience, irrespective of gender, age, and social background takes pleasure in empathizing with these maidens. Or, to put it differently, through its representational abilities in the dance-song, which are to be seen as paradigmatic for what they achieve, this chorus eliminates the differences among the audience members and between the audience members and themselves. As the Delian Maidens, moreover, turn from performers to internal audience, we are reminded of a 5th c. Athenian reality: a lot of Athenian citizens in the audience of tragic performances were experienced in choral dancing.[77] Thus the example of the Delian Maidens intimates one more level of empathy with a (tragic) chorus: the alternation of roles between spectating in the theater and performing in a chorus.[78]

More importantly, however, it is the idea of creating common responsiveness through pleasurable empathy that resonates with the tragic chorus. If we see this as an archetypal aim of choral performance, tragic choruses take on this role partly through the enactment of emotion itself. Ideally, engagement with the tragic chorus—both within the plays and in the theater—reflects shared emotional sensibilities and, at the same time, expands them (due to the choral characteristics discussed in this section), through the empathetic responsiveness that it creates in a pleasurable way.

The role of shared pleasure is also seen as central in a recent approach to theater and citizenship. Recommending that "we conceive of tragedy as a mode

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76 Ibid., 67.

77 Such choral dancing includes participation in dithyrambic as well as tragic, comic, and satyric choruses at the City Dionysia and smaller local festivals.

78 As mentioned above, Peponi views the degree of the audience's empathy as such that they turn to virtual performers. Nagy (2013) 250 expands on the point by suggesting that the audience members "are potential performers in their own right because it is their own various choral traditions that the Delian Maidens can perform by virtue of their divine status as models of all varieties of choral performance". He, moreover, views the Delian Maidens as practitioners of a kind of choral mimesis that assimilates different genres of choral song-making and mediates between solo and choral performance. As such, they stand as a model of the tragic chorus that mediates between the actors in the plays and the citizens in the Athenian state theater (256).

of chorality", David Wiles argues that such performance practice provides a kind of pleasure that builds community.[79] If the body of citizen-spectators in the theater is understood through the Aristotelian conceptions of *philia* and *koinônia*, according to which the friend is perceived as another self (*heteros autos*) and co-perception (*synaisthêsis*) constitutes the condition for friendship, then "the goal of *koinônia* or community involves not only working together but also *syntheôrein*, co-spectatorship as in a festival".[80] Within the theater, consequently, tragedy has the power to move the audience not as 'rationalistic spectators' who individually pick apart ambiguities in the plays' civic discourse but as a body that responds emotionally en masse.[81]

Wiles does not focus on particular attributes of the chorus or its own enactment of emotion but his approach to tragedy as a choral practice cogently foregrounds communal experience as well as an element of pleasure that I view as vital to how the chorus engages collective response. At the same time, however, I see the division between rationalistic thinking and emotion as too sharp and thus potentially downplaying the rationale that is inherent in emotional response—aesthetic and otherwise. Since emotional engagement incorporates affect and cognition, in enacting and theorizing pity and fear the tragic chorus can be seen, I suggest, as enabling a pleasurable access to both the affect and beliefs that constitute these emotions while consolidating the audience in the very experience of empathizing with choral emotion. From this perspective, the set of choruses that I focus on take on a particularly potent role.

4.2 *Rethinking Choral Action(s)*

Building on the aspects of choral performance discussed so far, this book makes the case that choral fear and pity can give us new access to both the role of the chorus and the tragic emotions within 5th c. Athenian culture. The aforementioned approaches tend to focus on choruses that respond to the dramatic events, which constitute the majority of choruses in the surviving plays. The following chapters on tragedy aim to shift this focus. Moving

79 Wiles (2011) 47.

80 Ibid., 14–5. The notions of co-spectatorship and co-perception are part of Aristotle's conception of the good life as a shared life. Active co-perception in particular, Wiles suggests, "which stems from [Aristotle's] sense that selfhood is not bounded by the individual, offers a useful foundation for a more communitarian account of theatre spectatorship". Such an account is truer to 5th c. Athenian reality.

81 Ibid., 30. It is this attribute, according to Wiles, that relates directly to the Athenians' ability "to act en masse and follow through collective decisions" outside the theater as well. Wiles attributes the model of the atomized thinking spectator to Simon Goldhill and his approach to Athenian drama and opposes it to Voltaire's model of a feeling spectator.

temporarily away from choruses that mostly respond to the events can open up new venues for understanding tragic chorality and emotion in the rest of the plays as well. For this reason I examine choruses that I see as 'active' and as agents of the emotions. Choral activity and agency are defined and discussed in detail in the introductions of Chapters 3 and 4. To anticipate part of that discussion, we can set the possibilities for action on a spectrum with acting on one end and responding verbally only on the other. By 'active', I refer to choruses that not only participate as actors in the dramatic action and move the plot of the plays forward, but also, intentionally or unintentionally, instigate fear and pity and offer an extensive discourse about the tragic emotions. These are the Aeschylean choruses discussed in Chapter 3 (*Eumenides, Supplices, Seven Against Thebes*). For my analysis in Chapter 4, I turn to choruses that each would fall in different positions on the spectrum of action, namely the chorus of sailors in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the chorus of Asian women in Euripides' *Bacchae*. I see these choruses as offering notable examples for the ways in which they participate in the dramatic plot, and experience, enact, and theorize fear and pity.

There is an underlying question behind this choice: what can the tragic chorus tell us about the relationship between emotion and action, and especially collective action? Emotion in tragedy of course motivates its individual transgressive characters as well. My interest, however, is in the way choral emotion offers insights into this question precisely because it addresses the audience-members as both individuals and members of a collective body. Because the choruses that I examine are active in different ways, they bring out the power of collective emotion to motivate action—their own and/or that of others—and, therefore, to affect communal life. For this reason, they raise a question that is at the center of the community's interest: how is emotion, pity and fear more specifically, to be incorporated in or addressed through institutions and practices of the polis?

Given the conception of emotion discussed earlier as a complex process that necessarily incorporates evaluation and affect, this broader question leads to two interrelated considerations: what are the beliefs and concerns on the one hand, and the attachments on the other that are reflected in the experience and expression of pity and fear and render them such as to motivate action? By attachments I refer to different types of relationality and connection including different expressions of *philia* as well as committed adherence to certain values and ideas (e.g., *erôs* for the polis). Because of these questions—and to anticipate part of my argument in the following chapters on tragedy—the enactment and theorization of fear and pity by tragic choruses often involves a process of partially rationalizing, sublimating, or civilizing these emotions

through different institutions;[82] a reflection, with different degrees of explicitness, on the limitations of such rationalizing processes; and an exploration of what constitutes legitimate and desirable attachments. Put differently, the choral discourse of the emotions dramatizes and reflects attempts and ways to render emotion in all its complexity conducive to both individual contentment and collective prosperity.[83] If this analysis is correct, Plato's later program in the *Laws* to regulate all forms of *choreia* may have been inspired, to a great extent, by tragic choruses.[84]

4.3 *On Methodology*

In my discussion of both the tragic emotions in the previous section and the chorus here, I move from questions about what takes place in the theater to analogous questions about what happens within the plays. In Section 3, I begin by discussing the use of the Aristotelian conception of the emotions as a response to rhetoric and drama. I then emphasize that my analysis of the emotions in tragedy focuses on how emotions operate within the plays. Similarly, here I survey approaches to the chorus regarding how the chorus facilitates audience-engagement. Subsequently, I posit that my analysis focuses on how choral enactment and expression of pity and fear operate in relation to the characters involved within the plays and how emotion contributes to the dynamic movement of the dramatic action itself. As I mentioned in Section 2, I begin from the assumption that tragedy participates in a dialogue of issues that are at the center of public life in 5th c. Athens and contributes to shaping ideas and sensibilities about them. By moving on to discuss the workings of the emotions and characteristics of the tragic chorus, I establish the frame-

82 Despite the differences in the meaning of these terms, I use them interchangeably because I see the different nuances that each one brings into the picture as operating all together. These nuances include (but are not exhausted in) clarifying and, to a degree, rendering acceptable or normative, the evaluative and belief basis of the emotions as well as the attachments that they honor. The notions of civilizing the emotions and of attachment will become clearer in the final section of this chapter.

83 I do not imply that the processes of sublimation and institutionalization are revealed exclusively through choral emotion. The emotions of individual characters necessarily contribute to these processes since choruses are in continuous dialogue with them and do not act in a vacuum. The workings of this interaction will become apparent in my analysis in the following chapters. It is the contention of this book, however, that in the plays under consideration choral emotion is emphatically instrumental to the realization and understanding of these processes.

84 The prominent dithyramb would very likely be another genre that contributed to Plato's response.

work that renders relevant what the choral voice reveals in the different plays. My subsequent emphasis that my analysis focuses on the world of the plays means to indicate that, in the absence of additional evidence, I will not draw conclusions about the (possible) emotional responses on the part of the historical audience. The relevance and gravity of the emotional discourses that I examine for the ways in which 5th c. Athenians may think and feel or, more precisely, are invited to think and feel will become clear. But how the audience would actually respond to the plays is a question that I do not raise.[85]

Last, my analysis focuses on choral 'discourse', primarily because of the nature of our sources from the 5th c. I take it as a given that both music and dance enhance the ways in which choruses emotionally engage internal interlocutors and external audiences.[86] Philosophical debate about the power of music to enter and shape the soul offers testimony to beliefs about the emotional and moral effect of music.[87] Diverse sources on dancing in combination with studies of lyric meter also point to its ability to communicate and instigate emotion and meaning, even though the exact ways in which either of the two works remain under debate.[88] Because of the paucity, nature, and date of such

85 This is one of the fundamental differences between my work and Munteanu's analysis of tragic pity and fear in her recent (2012) book on tragic *pathos*. In addition to her focus on a different set of plays (*Persians, Prometheus Bound, Ajax, Orestes*), and her interest in the chorus as an internal audience, Munteanu looks at "how, why, and when internal audiences (the chorus and various characters) express the two emotions" with the aim not only to compare such expressions with her earlier analysis of theoretical approaches to the emotions (Gorgias, Plato, and Aristotle) but also to appraise "how these internal viewpoints might have been received by the contemporary spectators" (141–2).

86 Stanford (1983) 49–90 discusses the different aural and visual techniques used by the tragedians to evoke the emotions of their audiences. These include elements that pertain to the chorus such as music, song, the rhythm of poetic language itself, and dance.

87 E.g., Plato, especially but not exclusively, in the *Republic* (esp. Bks. 2, 3, 4, 7) and the *Laws* (esp. Bks. 2, 3, 7) and Aristotle in the *Politics* (esp. Bk. 8) discuss extensively how music enters the soul and can define emotional and moral dispositions. On Damon of Oa, see Wallace (2004). On the New Music and the discourse around its effects, see, e.g., Csapo (2004).

88 Webster (1970b), Lawler (1964a) and (1964b), and Lonsdale (1993) remain some of the main reference works with discussion of archaeological and literary material on dance as well as on the rhythm and potential movements conveyed through meter. Golder (1996) 11 and *passim* discusses the stylized movements of the chorus and the ways in which they would enlarge "the visual meanings, *schêmata*, and *cheironomia* that represented the stylized expression of the actors". Golder views tragic acting as painterly and sculptural and argues that choral dance would also draw from the visual arts. Mullen (1982) analyzes the possible relation between choreography and metrical patterns specifically in Pindar.

evidence—different types of material (literary, philosophical, archaeological) from different moments in the archaic and classical period—I do not attempt a systematic reconstruction of the kind of dancing that may have accompanied choral diction. I introduce references to choral performance when available (through self-reference or description by other characters) and relevant, that is, when they contribute to our understanding of the particular inflection of the emotion under consideration. Otherwise, as mentioned earlier, I trace the affective side of emotional experience through the communication of attachments to characters and ideas as well as of visceral reactions and experiences. References to rhythm and meter are, similarly, adduced when thought relevant. Despite the elusiveness of dance itself, however, the choral discourse of pity and fear yields invaluable insights into the configurations and shifts of individual and collective emotion.

5 Collective Emotion Outside the Theater: Thucydides' *History*

If tragic choral discourse reveals a preoccupation with how individual and collective emotion motivate action, Thucydides' *History* offers a rich comparandum, because it comments extensively on the role of both, and especially collective emotion, in Athenian democracy. If, moreover, we view this work as the first document of political science that explains the Athenian sociopoliti-

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Naerebout (1997) offers an extensive criticism of previous scholarly treatments of dance in antiquity because of the nature of the surviving evidence, which he sees as insufficient for any kind of accurate reconstruction of what dancing was actually like. He suggests that the question to ask is what dance was about and for, constructs a model through which he invites a reconsideration of dance and its meaning at public events, and emphasizes the effectiveness of dance as a means of non-verbal communication and its ability to mobilize the audience. Regarding metrical analysis and its possible origins and meaning, see Dale (1968) and Herington (1985) esp. 103–124. Extensive studies that discuss meter and its meaning in the three tragedians include Scott (1984) on Aeschylus and (1996) on Sophocles; and Goldhill (2012) on Sophocles as well, with special interest in the relationship of the semantic power of choral meter and the political power of Sophoclean drama. Lourenço (2011) offers the latest complete survey of Euripides' metrical practice. For a survey of the pervasiveness of *mousikê* (as song, dance, and music) as well as instruments and the different aspects of music and its notation, see West (1992). Overall, there is a growing interest in understanding *mousikê* both as performance that encompasses different components and as a social and political phenomenon. See, e.g., the contributions in Murray and Wilson (2004) as well as Bundrick (2005) who examines a wide range of iconographical evidence (of instruments, figures associated with music, rituals, and a number of institutional practices) to analyze the complex role of *mousikê* in classical Athens.

cal system in terms "of the reflexive interaction between a technology of power and human psychology",[89] the presentation of collective emotion therein is an attempt to analyze and shape citizen psychology in the 5th c. and beyond. The depiction of the *dêmos* and the historian's assessments of emotion, then, convey ideas and concerns that are in dialogue with those of other contemporary genres, tragedy included. For this reason, I turn to Thucydides in Chapter 2 in order to contextualize the choral discourse of pity and fear that I analyze in the two chapters that follow.[90] The prominence of Thucydides in the title of this book, therefore, does not indicate that the *History* and the tragic chorus take up equal space in my analysis. Rather my view of Thucydides' depiction of collective emotion has deeply informed my approach to emotion in the 5th c. and my conceptualization of the tragic chorus as an emotional 'actor'.

My analysis looks at Thucydides' presentation of emotions primarily as collective responses—their nature, characteristics, and effects. Even though my focus in tragedy is on pity and fear, in the case of Thucydides I also include an examination of *orgê, erôs*, and hope, all of which are essential to an analysis of collective emotion in the *History*. Depending on context, *orgê* especially denotes either anger or passion more broadly. Thucydides' text itself directs the focus on collective emotion to certain closely interrelated questions: what is the relationship between emotion and reason? What shapes collective emotion? Why does emotion, and collective emotion more specifically, occupy a prominent position in Athenian politics and in the *History* itself?

The relationship between reason and emotion, most often encapsulated in the opposition between *gnômê* and *orgê*, and how it defines human nature and action, posit questions that persist throughout Thucydides' work. By examining how the historian portrays and often problematizes this relationship, we can trace the different types of thinking processes as well as the attachments that emotional expression reflects. Thucydides' Pericles famously constructs the ideal citizen as an *erastês* of the city who views collective interest and prosperity as the only true and necessary conditions for individual flourishing and contentment. Such an attachment to the city would ideally define the quality and hierarchy of all interpersonal and public relations. Throughout Thucydides' text, collective emotion reflects precisely the negotiation between self- and collective interest and how such negotiation consistently directs

89 Ober (2006) 148, 156–9.

90 Unlike the other sections in this chapter that present material I will not extensively return to, this section introduces questions and themes that I will fully develop in Chapter 2. For these reasons, I defer extensive engagement with scholarly work until my analysis in the relevant chapter.

decision making within Athens and in the context of the Athenian empire. By giving us access to the emotional life of the Athenian citizen as citizen, collective emotion reveals some of the motives behind political thinking and action.

In addition to the workings and effects of emotion, the *History* also offers interesting insights into what (the historian thinks) shapes collective emotion. To unearth these insights I examine how human agents (e.g., orators in the assembly) and external circumstances (peace, democracy, equality, war, *stasis*, disease) determine emotional response and its expression; and how participation in a group influences emotional and, consequently, social and political experience and action. It is well known that Thucydides distrusts the *dêmos* and the ways in which it collectively emotes and makes decisions. His work essentially traces the detrimental role of mass psychology in democratic politics. But by so doing, it also emphatically brings out its motivational power. I analyze the mechanics and results of this power in the context of both intra- and inter-state politics. In these contexts, we find a problematic that is particularly valuable for the reading of the choral discourse of pity and fear in tragedy. Intellectual rigor, namely a consistent and vigilant re-assessment of the beliefs inherent in emotional response, is presented as instrumental to rendering the emotions efficacious and beneficial within democratic deliberation and action. Such rigor, however, does not suffice. It ought to be combined with an experience of strong attachment. For this reason what constitutes significant attachments that compel the citizen-body to honor them wholeheartedly and how such attachments can be created by cultivating the emotions that sustain them are issues central to the *History* as they are in tragedy. In other words, like the tragic chorus but through different generic registers, the *History* reveals how participating in a collective body, in this case the Athenian *dêmos* or army—and the pleasure inherent in such empowering participation—can foster, or fails to foster, a sense of relationality and trust among the individuals it connects and habituate them to thinking and feeling responsibly together. The Athenians are consistently faced with the challenge of finding ways to translate participation and the emotions that it encourages or cultivates into a truly shared vision of responsible political action.

Collective participation and the emotions that accompany it, pleasure in participation itself included, are communicated through an aesthetics created in Thucydides' text. Collective action is often cast as an aesthetic event that may or may not be perceived as such by the participants themselves but that, nevertheless, influences profoundly their emotions and subsequent conduct. In the Mytilenean debate, Cleon famously accuses the citizens in the assembly of being spectators of speeches. By allowing themselves to be swayed by different emotions through the spectacle of public deliberation and indulging in

such changes collectively, they lose sight, Cleon seems to claim, of how such indulgence undermines their sense of political responsibility.[91] The decision-making process for the Sicilian expedition is shaped by the anticipation of novel *opsis* and a *theôria*-like undertaking and a perspective that is defined by the literal remoteness of Sicily and the metaphorical *erôs* of what is absent.[92] Finally, the actual fighting in Sicily powerfully dramatizes how *opsis* itself, clear or obstructed, redefines what the soldiers see and how they feel and act but also how their perspective on the expedition itself is redefined.[93] In my analysis I examine how this aesthetic dimension is artfully developed and what it reveals with regard to collective imagination and feeling, decision making and action. Through this aesthetic and aestheticized focus, Thucydides brings to the fore the challenges of creating a truly shared perspective that allows for competent collective judgment and feeling and thus true emotional and social cohesion. Thus it will become evident that both the choral discourse of tragedy and Thucydides' text reflect and offer diverse approaches to what seems to emerge as a vital preoccupation in 5th c. Athens: how to cultivate, or even sublimate, collective emotion in the democratic state in order to channel its motivational power into judicious action and, therefore, render it conducive to social cohesion and collective prosperity.

6 Civilizing the Passions? Theorizing Emotion in Action

In Section 3, I discussed aspects of the Aristotelian approach to the emotions that facilitate a more nuanced understanding of how emotions operate in tragedy and Thucydidean history. In this section, I turn to a recent approach to the emotions in political life that I see as particularly helpful for thinking through the role of emotion and sympathy in 5th c. Athenian life. Sharon Krause's theory of civil passions concerns the role of emotion in contemporary liberal democracy. She, however, articulates ideas and principles that resonate markedly with the ancient sources that I examine and discusses institutions, fora, and practices that help us (re)consider practices and structures in democratic Athens. For this reason, while avoiding facile parallels and not overlooking major differences between the two political systems and cultures, I discuss some of her concepts that can sharpen an approach to 5th c. practices and habits of thought and feeling. I first present some of the main tenets of

91 3.37–39.

92 6.14, 24.

93 7.44, 64, 71, 75.

Krause's theory and then turn to connections with the classical material that will resurface in my analysis of the 'conversation' between tragic choruses and Thucydides' *History* in Athenian culture.

Krause begins by pointing to neuroscientific research, according to which we cannot deliberate about practical ends without affect. Such research makes clear that no sentiment-free form of practical judgment is available to us. It is for this reason that rationalist models of political deliberation and action suffer from a motivational deficit while affective models suffer, in turn, from a normative deficit. Krause aims instead to articulate "an ideal of affectively engaged impartiality and hence an account of judgment and deliberation that is both motivationally and normatively compelling".[94] She notes:

> [T]he communication of sentiments is already happening all around us; deliberation is steeped in passions as it is. The challenge is to civilize the passions that we cannot avoid and that practical reason cannot fully transcend. [...] Our mistake has been to regard impartiality as flowing from an ideal of reason that no one has ever known and that human beings are constitutionally incapable of realizing.[95]

In Krause's new model, two concepts derived from Hume are central and also helpful for approaching classical material: the generalized perspective of moral sentiment brought about through sympathy; and the expansion of the sympathetic imagination that contributes to affective impartiality. Krause advocates that it is necessary to cultivate the so-called generalized perspective of moral sentiment. To develop this perspective, we are to use sympathy, which has double function and meaning. First, it is a faculty of the mind with an informational function, much like imagination or memory. It both communicates passions to us and stimulates similar passions in us. Second, it is an affective state. As such, it involves caring for others.[96] This understanding of sympathy emphasizes the intersubjective basis of moral feeling. "Human beings are continuously responding to the responses of others and sympathy gives us access

94 Krause (2008) 203. As to how we define 'affect', Krause points out that psychologists tend to define it capaciously "to include all mental states that take the form of feeling as opposed to mere belief or understanding". Some emotions are forms of affect "but so are desires, aversions, and attachments". In addition to including beliefs, affects tend to motivate us. "They have a special connection to the will because they are states of mind that involve a wish that the world be, or come to be, one way rather than another" (7).

95 Ibid., 25.

96 Ibid., 79–80.

to these responses [...] Sympathy reverberates within and between persons in complex ways to generate moral sentiments of approval and disapproval".[97] By expanding our sympathetic capacities, we can and should take on the point of view of affected parties. Such perspective "does not demand the wholesale abandonment of our identities or an unattainable level of knowledge about the lives of others. Yet it does make our judgments more than self-referential".[98]

This idea is all the more vital since, in any event, our judgments and feeling are never developed in isolation. Our moral perspective is necessarily shaped by the political order we find ourselves in: "The political order inevitably inscribes moral sentiment and the judgments that derive from it with the prevailing relations of power". This intersubjectivity makes moral judgment a political phenomenon. The question of course is why a generalized perspective that builds on sympathy should constitute a sought-after ideal. Krause suggests that in the long run "judgments based on self-love and limited sympathy turn out to be poor guides for action because they regularly conflict with the judgment of others". Because we depend on others in order to meet our needs and succeed in our purposes, shared moral standards are necessary.[99]

To achieve impartiality, therefore, we need reflective feeling. For the generalized perspective to be sensitive to the sentiments of all those affected, we need practices that precisely allow us to expand our sympathy and thus cultivate such reflective feeling. In the context of liberal democracy, inclusive political institutions are necessary: "We can imagine the sentiments of others much better if they are able to tell us about them, after all". Krause, however, is not blind to the limitations of sympathy itself. She acknowledges the fact that we may get trapped into perpetuating ideas deeply embedded within the ideology and social habits of any given group we may belong to. To counteract this danger, she suggests conversation with a wide range of persons. In addition to institutional inclusion, conversation may also be metaphorical: "Conversation—much like history, literature, and art—allows us to correct our false tastes and erroneous judgments by bringing the sentiments of others and the facts of human experience to bear on our sympathetic imagination".[100]

At the center of this concept of conversation is an idea of deliberation as a spectrum of practices that contributes to altering what Krause calls "the public's horizon of concern".[101] On this spectrum deliberation that directly results

97 Ibid., 81.
98 Ibid., 163–4.
99 Ibid., 84.
100 Ibid., 114.
101 Ibid., 118.

in decisions and policy occupies one end. Moving away from that end, we find symbolic expressions and testimonials in different media—such as print and news media, participation in civil associations, political activism, entertainment industry.[102] Such expressions are seen as deliberative because "they press (however implicitly) justice claims, or claims about the common good, and thereby contribute to individual and public reflection on matters of law and policy".[103] Thus diverse voices that can be different in kind depending on the medium they use and the forum they are heard in can contribute to expanding individual sympathetic imagination and the public horizon of concern.

Last, a particularly interesting aspect in this process is the ways in which it brings together existing concerns and new claims. One of the examples that Krause uses is that of activists advocating gay unions. She points out that they tend to connect the value of gay unions (a novelty) with the values associated with personal partnerships that are central concerns for most people (e.g., love and commitment). Thus intellect in the new model "illuminates the ways in which new claims intersect with the things that matter to us".[104] Evaluation and affect thus work together to make us share the sentiments of others and render them public concerns. It is never sufficient to know cognitively what others' concerns are in order to take them into account during deliberation. They must become concerns for us as well or connect with concerns we have so that we feel attached to them and compelled to act.[105] For any of these processes to be possible and effective, a necessary precondition is the openness of public deliberation that allows for continuous contestation.

If Athenian culture is a culture of passions, as defined in Section 2, Krause's request to admit that deliberation is necessarily steeped in passion is an endorsed reality in 5th c. Athens. The very nature of participatory democracy, moreover, and the integration of politics and aesthetics in its context render Krause's expanded concepts of discussion and deliberation particularly relevant. While impartiality as a concept does not figure *per se* in the classical context, it nevertheless resonates with both Thucydidean and tragic concerns, especially when seen in combination with interdependence. Considerations of impartiality, that is, help us think through the preoccupation with the relationship between self- and collective interest in Thucydides in the context of both the Athenian state and the empire, especially in cases where the appropriateness of pity is raised. Choral emotion, in turn, often brings to center

102 Ibid., 24.
103 Ibid., 121.
104 Ibid., 123.
105 Ibid., 164.

stage voices that do not get a public hearing in the life of the polis and raise, precisely, questions regarding which voices are (to be) heard and whose feelings, along with the judgments they reflect, (are to) define public concerns and political decisions.

The notions, therefore, of deliberation and conversation with others that aim to expand the sympathetic imagination in order to foster well-informed, shared concerns and consequent acts are most pertinent. Political, judicial, and display oratory and tragedy would occupy different places on Krause's spectrum of deliberation and as such dynamically shape the public conversation in classical Athens. The choral discourse of the emotions performed by choruses that often represent marginal statuses takes a special position on this spectrum. Because of their particular characteristics discussed earlier—their ritual character and history, institutional significance, integration of individual and collective within the choral body, and special connection with the audience—they powerfully trigger a metaphorical discussion and have a unique power to bring together existing concerns and new claims. For this reason, choruses are particularly apt to invite, or even compel, an expansion of the sympathetic imagination and 'discuss' what attachments are significant enough to become public concerns within the plays, the theater, and the polis.

Similarly, public debate in Thucydides constitutes deliberation about what should define the public horizon of concerns. Such deliberation often addresses, more or less explicitly, individual and collective emotion in an attempt to render it more reflective and thus channel it toward decisions that benefit the community as a whole. Once again, defining which attachments are significant enough to demand collective support becomes central. Narratives, therefore, like those of *stasis* and the plague, in which shared conceptions of justice and even language itself are shown to be fundamentally undermined, bring home the consistent need for such definition and reevaluation.

Two concepts, then, are particularly useful and will return in my discussion in subsequent chapters: the expansion of the sympathetic imagination and the notion of attachment. The former helps us expand the notion of engaging with the Other. As is well known, Froma Zeitlin has articulated the highly influential concept and model of 'playing the other', namely the use of femininity in different expressions and functions in tragedy to explore and open up the dominant masculine perspective. In Zeitlin's words:

> [T]ragedy, understood as the worship of Dionysus, expands an awareness of the world and the self through the drama of 'playing the other' whose mythic and cultic affinities with the god logically connect the god of women to the lord of the theater.

> In the end, tragedy arrives at closures that generally reassert male, often paternal, structures of authority, but before that the work of the drama is to open up the masculine view of the universe. It typically does so through energizing the theatrical resources of the female and concomitantly enervating the male at the price of initiating actor and spectator into new and unsettling modes of feeling, seeing, and knowing.[106]

In my own analysis too, especially in Chapter 3, Zeitlin's approach to gender is particularly helpful for examining some of the emotional and power dynamics that are developed in the plays under examination. At the same time, while overlapping conceptually with Zeitlin's model, the notion of expanding the sympathetic imagination brings a different emphasis and aims at a broader conception of opening up the spectators' viewpoint. More specifically, it emphasizes the interconnection between feeling, seeing, and knowing as aspects of emotional experience itself; it aims to include imaginative engagement with categories that are not strictly defined as binary opposites; and it assumes a degree of transparency in the use of otherness as a device that must have factored into the kind of emotional engagement that was triggered within the plays and in the theater. As such, it can also help approach the use and role of emotion, pity especially, in Thucydides' (aestheticized) historical narrative. The notion of attachment, in turn, allows for a similar expansion as it includes the concept of *philia* and variously defined relations between *philoi* as well as conceptual attachments such as commitment to entities, ideas, and values (e.g., the polis or *dikê*). Within such emotional connections—and alongside their ideological basis—it is also meant to emphasize the affective side of emotional experience that compels to action.[107]

It is clear that Krause's theory does not raise wholly novel questions.[108] It is also not to be superimposed on the ancient material. It does, however, help us

106 Zeitlin (1990) 86–87.

107 For the differences in signification between the verb *philein*, the concrete noun *philos*, and the abstract noun *philia*, see Konstan (1997) esp. 53–58.

108 When Aristotle, for instance, discusses the need for *lexis* in *Rhetoric* 1404a1–12, he explains that the orator ought to care about delivery because oratory deals with opinion (δόξα). If justice only were the question, the facts themselves would suffice and nothing outside demonstration (ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι) would be necessary. But the orator has to exert a more visceral effect, that is, to offend or please in order to move the audience's opinions. Aristotle attributes such need to the corruption of audiences (μοχθηρία), the fact that they precisely base their decisions on *doxa*. In other words, Aristotle's understanding of deliberation is very similar with that of Krause's, even though Krause does not see it as (epistemologically or morally) corrupt: deliberation is steeped in passions as it is. See

rethink with more precision the role of pity and fear and the emotions more generally—vehement and civilized emotions included as well as what renders them such—in Athenian life. It is the very idea of civilizing the passions that is especially valuable for looking at practices and institutions that negotiate the role of (collective) emotion in 5th c. Athens. They too allow affect in political life while attempting to harness its disruptive potential but without sanitizing the emotions, that is, without eliminating their power to influence perspective and motivate action. This book examines precisely some of the prominent 5th c. discourses that reveal such attempts. It will become apparent through my analysis that, *mutatis mutandis*—and the specific parameters in each context will be carefully defined—I see both Thucydides' historical account and tragedy as reflecting a similar preoccupation with civilizing the passions. By participating in a public discussion in 5th c. Athens, they each offer different institutional and conceptual paradigms for achieving this goal. And they both often show the different degrees to which this ethical, social, and political process of civilizing the passions is rife with tensions and limitations that only continuous—and variously crafted and emotional—contestation can address.[109]

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also Gonzalez (2006) 104 who suggests that Aristotle sees *lexis* as an expedient "only from the point of view of an ideal society". On how the tragic poets offer an education of and through pity specifically, and how such civilizing act relates to democratic judgment and may create emotional solidarity within the polis, see the dialogue between Alford (1993a) and (1993b) and Schwartz (1993).

109 This theory, as mentioned above, also invites alertness regarding the potential stalemates and power dynamics that may be perpetuated or supported by different institutional and social practices, consciously or not. A question from this perspective already raised in the scholarship on tragedy is whether it is fundamentally democratic or hegemonic discourse (*per*, e.g., Goldhill and Griffith respectively, as discussed in Section 3) that tragedy dramatizes and normalizes.

CHAPTER 2

Contextualizing Choral Emotions: Thucydides and Collective Psychology

1 Preliminaries: 'Feeling Together' in Thucydides

Classical scholars and political theorists have suggested different ways in which tragedy informs Thucydides' conception of history as well as the structure and style of his work. His narrative is often seen as portraying the rise and tragic fall of the Athenian empire because of the individual and collective pathologies that develop during the ascendance of Athenian power.[1] This chapter does not

1 Already in antiquity, comments on Thucydides' appeal to the reader's emotions such as Plutarch's well-known discussion of *enargeia* in the *History* (*De Gloria Atheniensium* 347) are part of a broader discussion about the relationship between history and literature/poetry (e.g., Aristotle, *Poetics* 9; Polybius, 2. 56–61), which scholars continue to debate. See, e.g., Connor (1977), Dover (1983), Walker (1993), and Rood (1998) with further references. Starting with Cornford at the beginning of the 20th c. there is a particular interest in how Thucydides' work is informed specifically by tragedy. Cornford (1907) argues that Thucydides learned his psychology from drama and discusses extensively the role of the tragic passions in the *History*. To mention only a few more recent 'tragic readings' of Thucydides: Immerwahr (1973) examines how the speeches contribute to the tragic tone of the work by revealing the gradual corruption of power, which is accompanied by a similarly gradual corruption of reason and excess of passion. Lateiner (1977a) discusses how Thucydidean rhetoric presents the suffering (*pathos*) especially of bystanders so as to intensify the readers' *pathos* (emotion) and reveals the historian's moral concerns. Macleod (1983) looks at the structure of the *History* from Pylos down to the Sicilian expedition, examines the speeches in comparison with Euripidean plays, and argues that Thucydides constructs his history and interprets its events "in a strict sense of the term, tragically" (145). Like the tragedians, he represents suffering on the grand scale as the utmost of human experience but he draws his tragic influences from Homer. Mittelstadt (1985) finds in Thucydides' history a tragic vision and a powerful statement on the tragic nature of man that does not, however, undermine his historical accuracy. He discusses extensively how the historian portrays the interaction between the moral and the natural, especially as it is expressed in the depiction of human nature. Bedford and Workman (2001) argue that Thucydides should not be viewed in the same way as 20th c. realists. Written as a tragic narrative, his history "reveals Thucydides' lament for the eclipse of reasoned moderation in Greek life generally, and in Athenian conduct in particular" (52). They focus on four instantiations of the degradation of Greek life that show the tragic themes of the narrative: the tension between passion and *logos* and the eclipse of the latter by the former; the decline of *logos* and the ascendancy of *ergon*; the violation of *nomos* and the

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attempt to reexamine structural similarities between the *History* and tragedy. It rather turns to a different element that is common in the two genres, namely an interest in the (re)presentation of collective emotion.

My analysis focuses on Thucydides' depiction of the nature, characteristics, and effects of emotions as collective responses. Thucydides' *History* consistently presents how collective emotion influences domestic and international policy. Politicians, in the *History*, both manipulate and often directly address the emotions of the *dêmos* in the process of deliberation and decision making. The historian, in turn, assesses with varying degrees of explicitness the (actual) workings of these emotions. Put in general terms, then, the *History* and choral emotion in tragedy reflect a common attempt: to examine and define the content and function of collective emotion, namely the ideas and attachments that underlie it as well as its effect on action. In the process, both genres reveal the power (or force) of collective emotion and posit different ways in which it can and ought to be directed or cultivated in order to contribute to communal prosperity and social cohesion. Thus irrespective of the degree of accuracy in the transcription of the speeches and the precise chronology of composition of the *History*, the depiction of emotion can be seen as representing ideas and concerns that are in dialogue with those dramatized by tragic choruses.[2] As already discussed in Chapter 1, it is primarily disenfranchised groups that perform and act on collective emotion in tragedy; choral identity, however, does not impede audience empathy. In Thucydides' *History*, on the other hand, it is the collective desires, fears, hopes, and sympathies of the enfranchised *dêmos* that come under scrutiny. The analysis of collective emotion in the *History*, then, helps us to situate choral emotion in the context of intellectual and political debates in the 5th c. and to elucidate why the mechanics of collective

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movement toward *phusis*; and the tendency to overreaching ambition (*pleonexia*) caused by excessive hope (*elpis*) (56). Lebow (2003) sees Thucydides as the last of the great tragedians because of the connections he draws between ethical principles and considerations of justice on the one hand and influence and *hêgemonia* on the other. Last, Greenwood (2006) 19–41 traces the emphasis on viewing and sight throughout the *History* and suggests that "Like the spectator (*theatês*) of Greek drama who sees more and knows more than the characters in the drama, the reader of Thucydides views a replay of the war that offers much fuller coverage than the limited perspectives of those involved in the war" (20). In pp. 83–108, she reads Bk. 8 of the *History* and Sophocles' *Philoctetes* as 'parallel texts' that reveal "a shared conception of the events of 411 BC as being characterized by dissembling, acting, and a crisis of trust" (83).

2 For an updated outline of representative approaches to the composition and unity of the *History* as well as the accuracy and function of the speeches in it, see Rusten (2009) 3–10.

emotion as enacted and theorized by tragic choruses must have been of particular interest to the Athenian audience.

A first question that occupies a central position in the *History*—and is particularly prominent in female choruses in tragedy—is the relationship between reason and emotion. Scholars often suggest that the emotions stand as the archenemy of reason in Thucydides. David Bedford and Thom Workman, for instance, argue that "the fall of Athens is accounted for by its increasing propensity to substitute impassioned action for reasoned deliberation".[3] The dichotomy between reason and passion is, however, sustainable only to a limited degree.[4] One of my aims in this chapter is to examine both what sustains and what problematizes or undermines this dichotomy. My reading will suggest that the distinction between reason and emotion in the *History* points in conflicting directions that undermine the sharp divide. Passion appears, at times, vehemently to oppose rational and systematic thinking (most often encapsulated in the term *gnômê*) and thus to lead to impulsive decisions in the assembly and on the battlefield. In most cases, however, it is inseparable from conscious reflection regarding what constitutes self-interest and justice. Even when emotion appears at first as lacking in reason, closer examination shows that it stems from a rationale that subverts accepted laws and customs and results in controversial individual or collective decisions. It would, therefore, be more accurate either to redefine the dichotomy as one between competing types of reasoning (e.g., moral vs. immoral, preoccupation with collective prosperity vs. preoccupation with self-interest) that are accompanied by emotions of varying identity and intensity, or to think of Thucydidean emotion along a spectrum of degrees and types of rational considerations.

At the same time, the analogy between individual and collective psychology permeates Thucydides' *History* and converts questions of psychology into political and moral dilemmas. Thus an examination of the interrelation between emotional expression and the different types of thinking processes that it reflects can contribute to our understanding of Thucydides' preoccupation with the emotional life of the Athenian *qua* citizen. Such preoccupation reveals, I suggest, the motivational power of emotion as well as its normative value. Even though the *dêmos* is often criticized for emotional reactions that are volatile and short-sighted, we never hear that emotion ought to be eliminated.[5] Rather, emotional involvement and attachment remain necessary

3 Bedford and Workman (2001) 56, 58.

4 I use both terms (emotion, passion) to convey the varying degrees of intensity or viscerality of the affective experiences that Greek *pathos* is used for.

5 On mass psychology and the aptness of an analysis at the psychological (and not the sociological) level in Thucydides, see Hunter (1986) and (1988).

in the process of collective decision making that determines policy and action. What remains under negotiation is the appropriate emotion (and its rationale) in each situation as well as the appropriate understanding and experience of attachment. By attachment, as already discussed in Chapter 1, I refer to different types of relationality including different expressions of *philia*. Thucydides' Pericles famously constructs the ideal citizen as an *erastês* of the city who, like himself, views collective interest and prosperity as the only true and necessary conditions for individual flourishing and contentment. Such an attachment to the city would ideally define the quality and hierarchy of all interpersonal and public relations. Throughout Thucydides' text, collective emotion reflects precisely the negotiation between self- and collective interest. Understanding and fine-tuning the citizens' emotional capacities, Thucydides' text suggests, is imperative in order to render them conducive to political and social cohesion and prosperity.

As much as collectivity itself adds to the power of the *dêmos'* emotion, it also presents challenges precisely with regard to how it can be understood and cultivated for the common good. I look at the different factors that shape collective emotionality. Human agents such as orators in the assembly consciously direct or manipulate the emotion of the voting citizens. External circumstances, moreover, take on a similar role: peace, democracy, and equality, war, *stasis*, and infectious disease are shown to affect profoundly emotional dispositions and the decisions that result from them. In addition to examining how external factors shape collective emotion, I also look at how participation in a collective body shapes emotional and, consequently, social and political experience and action. At significant junctures in political life (such as the *stasis* at Corcyra and deliberation regarding the Sicilian expedition), collective emotion silences thoughtful opposition by individuals who are too timid to articulate their views against the impassioned collective. It also becomes apparent that, despite its being shared by all, powerful collective emotion can also conceal diverse individual motives and goals. This is the case with the Sicilian expedition. Instead of creating deeper attachments among the citizens in the interest of the common good, shared passion in such cases becomes the vehicle for pursuing goals that, in the long run, undermine collective prosperity.

Closely related is the tendency of the crowd to indulge collectively in certain emotions. Fear, pity, desire, and pleasure (of different kinds) figure prominently among them. Cleon famously accuses the Athenians of indulging in the pleasure of the spectacle of competing speakers in the assembly. In addition to the emotional gratification that stems from the spectacle, Thucydides points to the pleasure that is derived from sharing emotion collectively. In this and other instances, the citizens take pleasure in the act of participation that consists of both deliberating and emoting as a group—what I call 'participatory pleasure'.

The problem that the text raises is that such pleasure is not often conducive to responsible decision making. Immersed in the crowd, individual citizens feel comfortable enjoying political debate passively and proceeding with decisions that do not result from the active intellectual and emotional engagement that is necessary for effective policy making. For this reason, Thucydides expresses distrust in the ability of the crowd to self-regulate. Charismatic figures like Pericles are necessary in order to calibrate collective emotion and render it conducive to good policy making. In the absence of such figures, the emotions of the *dêmos* corrupt its leaders themselves: in their pursuit of personal aggrandizement, they gratify and thus cultivate the low pleasures of the crowd as well as their own. In the very act of declaring his distrust in democratic emotion, however, Thucydides once again underlines its motivational power. In this context, I argue, we see that intellectual rigor is necessary for rendering the emotions efficacious within democratic politics. But it does not suffice. It ought to be combined with an understanding of, and the experience of, relating genuinely and closely to others. Identifying such 'others' remains under constant negotiation in Thucydides' text, in order precisely to define which attachments—within Athens and across states—are significant enough to define the public's concerns under changing political circumstances. Informed participatory pleasure can then have the power to foster a renewed sense of relationality and trust among the individuals it connects, and can habituate them to thinking and feeling responsibly together.

My analysis of Thucydides is organized in two sections without always following the chronological order of events. In the first section, *Collective Emotion within the City-State*, I examine how emotion defines the psychology, decision making, and action of the Athenian citizens. I begin with the ideal portrayal of the Athenian citizen and citizen-*erôs* in the funeral oration. In the sub-sections that follow, I turn to events and narratives that question this ideal. More specifically, I analyze the narrative of the plague, the depiction of Pericles as a statesman with a unique charisma to direct citizen-fear, the emotions during the oligarchic coup of 411 BCE as an instantiation of *stasis* within Athens, and the Corcyrean *stasis* as paradigmatic of the emotions (and corresponding ideology) of *stasis* more broadly. I conclude the first section with a discussion of human nature and the relationship between *orgê* and *gnômê* in it. In the second section, I turn to *Collective Emotion in Interstate Politics*. I begin by looking at how fear defines the conceptualization and pursuit of inter-state alliances in the context of the Athenian empire. I then examine the case of Mytilene and the Sicilian expedition and analyze the role of collective emotion in defining international policy. In my analysis of the Mytilenean debate and the Sicilian expedition, I also discuss how the two narratives construct a dynamic between

literal and metaphorical perspective and its role in emotional, moral, and political engagement.[6]

As already mentioned in Chapter 1, my analysis of Thucydides includes a number of emotions. Fear (φόβος, δέος, ἔκπληξις) is prominent among them. I also examine the function of anger (ὀργή, θυμός), *erôs*, and hope (ἐλπίς). Last, I discuss pity/empathy (ἔλεος, οἶκτος).[7] While pity is not explicitly as prominent as the more vehement emotions, it emerges at crucial moments, such as the narrative of the plague and the Mytilenean debate, as central in directing collective psychology and decision making.

2 Collective Emotion within the City-State

Fear motivates action throughout Thucydides' historical account.[8] During the war, alliances and policies are often decided on the basis of fear.[9] In addition to interstate politics, however, the funeral oration, the portrayal of Pericles, and the narrative of the plague in the second book suggest that fear plays a central role in shaping political life within the Athenian state as well. The Athenian citizen—ideal or real—is viewed as operating partly on different kinds of fear. Last, the narratives of *stasis*, both within Athens and at Corcyra as a paradigmatic case, offer insights on both fear and other emotions that shape collective citizen psychology.

2.1 *Ideal Emotion in Athenian Democracy: The Citizen-Lover*

Scholars have often discussed the intricate ways in which Pericles' funeral oration forges an idealized image of the Athenian citizen and Athenian democracy.[10] The role of fear in this image sets a paradigm against which

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6 On the connection between sight and insight in the *History* as a whole and Thucydides' drawing on the visual medium of theatrical culture in the 5th c. Athens and on its prerogative to instruct its audience, see Greenwood (2006) esp. ch. 2, 3, 5.

7 Despite the semantic differences among the terms pity, empathy, and sympathy in English, I tend to use them interchangeably throughout this book to render *eleos* and *oiktos*, which cover various of the nuances of the English terms depending on context. For a discussion and comparison of these Greek and English terms (including identification), see Lada-Richards (1993) 100–102.

8 For a well-argued approach of how "fear is one of the strongest forces shaping political life, from primitive times to the most advanced periods" and Thucydides' call for sublimating fear, see Desmond (2006) 377 and *passim*.

9 See my discussion of interstate politics in Section 3.

10 See, e.g., Crane (1998) 312–325, Wohl (2002) esp. 30–72, and Loraux (2006).

consequent Athenian fears will be thrown into sharp relief. Addressing the gathered *dêmos*, Pericles urges every citizen to become a lover (ἐραστής) of the polis that secures equal opportunity, freedom, and justice to all. As Victoria Wohl has argued, by occluding social differences and practices that perpetuate class disparity, the rhetoric of the *epitaphios* constructs and encourages a unified community that aspires to elite politics. Performing the inspiring and, at the same time, coercive function of hegemonic discourse, the oration creates an ideal that "grants the *dêmos* its very existence as a recognizable, coherent entity. The audience arrives at the funeral as individuals; it leaves as the Athenian *dêmos*".[11] Characteristic of the Athenian conduct that creates a cohesive body politic within the democracy is the absence of anger among the citizens in their private lives and a respectful fear of law and authority in public life:

> ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν.
>
> And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every day life; for we do not feel anger at our neighbor if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence on our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succor of the oppressed and those which, though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognize.[12] (2.37.2–3)

Uninhibited and yet respectful, private behavior conveys gracefulness and generosity. *Deos* for the laws secures avoidance of shameful behavior and helps cultivate and support human dignity. This avoidance of shame stems from a

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11 Wohl (2002) 39.

12 I use Smith's text and translations in the Loeb with modifications. I specify such modifications only when they come from the work of other scholars.

deeply cherished and shared understanding of what constitutes graceful conduct in public life. Absence of anger and suspicion in private life combined with fear of law in public life thus solidifies social and political cohesion. In the process of idealization, Pericles appears to present ideology itself as innate.[13] Respectful civic life stems from and in turn consolidates the self-sufficiency of both individuals and the community of citizens.

Two aspects of this depiction are particularly significant for my analysis: the elimination of pain and the cultivation of trust. Neither (painful) anger nor even the 'pain' of sour looks that can inflict no actual harm is imposed on a fellow citizen. Eliminating the pain inflicted by the unsocial emotions results in also eliminating suspicion and consequently creating a community built on trust. The commonly shared fear of law and freely chosen officials only enhances this trust and strengthens communal bonds. Self-sufficient and reliable in a political community that gives them the opportunity to be the most graceful and just versions of themselves, Athenian citizens also become deeply attached to the city-state itself. It is this attachment that Pericles aims to encourage and perpetuate by inviting the Athenians to become lovers of the city.

The multiple implications of the image of the Athenian citizen as a lover of the city have been analyzed extensively.[14] I would like to emphasize that the invitation to feel passionate *erôs* for the city-state is the only instance in Thucydides' text where *erôs* functions as a political passion that contributes to—rather than undermines—social community. Monoson sees in this *erôs* an ideal relationship of mutuality:

> [...] citizens should view all the things that they actively do in their capacity as citizens—attend meetings, serve on juries, perform ritual obligations, compete in athletic contests, perform military service, pay taxes—as ways in which they ingratiate themselves with the city and which enable them legitimately to expect to receive, in return, certain favors, for example, public recognition, legal protection, the favor of the gods, and the pleasure of living 'freely'.[15]

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13 On the humanism that we can trace in this description, see Edmunds (1975) 58–60. Edmunds points out that the fear of breaking the law is presented as having its source in the citizens themselves as opposed to external coercion. He also compares Pericles' notion of fear with Athena's use of fear in the foundation speech of the Areopagus in the *Eumenides*, which I discuss extensively in the next chapter.

14 See, e.g., Monoson (1994), Ludwig (2002), Wohl (2002), Farenga (2006) esp. 436–438.

15 Monoson (1994) 267.

The invitation for a consistent exchange of favors in the context of democratic *erôs*, is, at the same time, a call "to 'overcode' [these] libidinal longings with patriotic fervor".[16] This gesture of overcoding changes the very conception of the citizen subject: he is "not a corporeal individual but an intersubjective creature who is plural and decorporealized".[17] The pay-off of such a transaction between Pericles and the collective citizen body is grand and hallucinatory—a vision of beauty that "conjures up the imaginary spectacle of the collective freedoms of all Athenians, which culminate in an imperial vision of omnipotence".[18] Idealizing democratic discourse, then, constructs and requires a sublimation of passion that is collectively accepted and collectively performed. Self-sufficient and respectful individuals are (to fall) in love with a political community that creates collective freedom by enhancing and rewarding individual value and independence as well as—and through—passionate participation. In this ideal construction of political passion, sharing in the *erôs* for the polis only enhances equality, solidarity, and collective contentment.

2.2 *Unideal Emotions within the State: The Plague*

When we move beyond Pericles' speech, the rest of the history records multiple challenges to the ideal of the *epitaphios*.[19] Individual and collective passions more often threaten than consolidate self-sufficiency and communal trust. The first attack of the plague in the same year as the delivery of the funeral oration points to the precarious constructedness of the Athenian citizen as an intersubjective creature. By undermining his ability to control his own body, the plague substitutes respectful fear of law and god with the fear of death and leads to utter disorder and moral disintegration. The disease emphatically brings out the precariousness of both self-sufficiency and of the sustainability of collective bonding that was extensively praised in the funeral oration. By indiscriminately attacking the citizens' bodies, the disease also attacks their ability to judge (γνώμη) and their sense of control and hope and reveals bodily and mental feeling to be inextricable:

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16 Farenga (2006) 436.

17 Ibid., 437.

18 Ibid., 438. For the tensions inherent in such imperial vision, see Ludwig (2002). Saxonhouse (1996) 59–86 views this kind of decorporalization and the merging of citizen and city as a kind of uniformity that, in essence, eliminates even productive divisions in the assembly and the possibility for debate and positive variability and change. She sees in Diodotus and not in Pericles Thucydides' praise of democracy as a regime that allows for variability through public debate and understanding.

19 See also Raaflaub (2006) esp. 190–195.

> σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει [. . .] πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀνέλπιστον εὐθὺς τραπόμενοι τῇ γνώμῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον προίεντο σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀντεῖχον.
>
> And no constitution, as it proved, was of itself sufficient against it, whether as regards physical strength or weakness, but it carried all without distinction [. . .] for their minds straightway yielded to despair and they gave themselves up for lost instead of resisting. (2.51.3–4)

As a result, all kinds of interpersonal attachments and communal bonds collapse. Close proximity only leads to infection and massive death as the Athenians die "like sheep" (ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα)—an experience that equalizes them but undermines their sense of community. The alternative is death in utter isolation (ἀπώλλυντο ἐρῆμοι) as friends and relatives avoid nursing their dear ones out of fear of contagion (2.51.4–5).

Self-interest, lawlessness, and disorder take over:

> ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως. νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς ταφάς, ἔθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο.
>
> For the calamity which weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, not knowing what was to become of them, became careless of all, sacred as well as profane. And the customs which they had hitherto observed regarding burial were all thrown into confusion, and they buried their dead each one as he could. (2.52.3–4)
>
> πρῶτόν τε ἦρξε καὶ ἐς τἆλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα. ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἃ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες τῶν τε εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θνῃσκόντων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τἀκείνων ἐχόντων. ὥστε ταχείας τὰς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὸ τερπνὸν ἠξίουν ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τά τε σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως ἡγούμενοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται· ὅτι δὲ ἤδη τε ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν τε ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον κατέστη. θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένους, τῶν δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι βιοὺς ἂν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, πολὺ δὲ μείζω τὴν ἤδη κατεψηφισμένην σφῶν ἐπικρεμασθῆναι, ἣν πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ βίου τι ἀπολαῦσαι.

> In other respects also the plague first introduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For where men hitherto practiced concealment, that they were not acting purely after their pleasure, they now showed a more careless daring. They saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the case of both those who were prosperous and suddenly died, and of those who before had nothing but in a moment were in possession of the property of others. And so they resolved to get out of life the pleasures which could be had speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And no one was eager to take additional pains for what seemed honorable, because everyone thought that it was doubtful whether he would live to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be regarded as at once honorable and expedient. No fear of gods or law of men restrained for, on the one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that piety and impiety came to the same thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he would be called to account and pay the penalty of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that the penalty already decreed against them, and now hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and that before this fell it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment out of life. (2.53)

The narrative of the plague exposes the instability of Athenian *gnômê* as this was presented in the funeral oration, namely an effortless ability to judge and choose ethical behavior that consolidates individual independence and collective cohesion.[20] As already pointed out above, in addition to the ideal of self-sufficiency, the plague poses a threat to the ideal of relationality and bonding. The Athenians have to face the plague while residing in unusually close quarters. Instantiating unexpected, unexplainable, and uncontrollable violence and suffering, the plague leads to a new approach to living with oneself and with others. 'Closeness' in terms of both physical proximity and urgency does not give enough space for perspective-taking. The urgent concern for mere survival displaces considerations about the good democratic way of life. Observing that religious respect, moral values, and just conduct do not secure survival, the Athenians quickly replace their noble fear of law and god with

20 See also Holmes (2010) 27: By subscribing to a worldview that "has imbued concepts of the person with physicality [...] Thucydides is interested in Athenian citizens, for whom the plague poses a specific and unexpected threat, realized through the physical body, to the ideal of autarchy".

indulgence in private pleasure. And the pleasurable becomes identified with the good and the useful.

In this portrayal of collective emotion, two elements stand out: the language of similarity, which raises the question of 'assimilation'; and the rationale behind the sentiments that now prevail. The issue of assimilation is closely connected to a question that I see as all pervasive in the *History*: namely, whether it is possible to shape human nature and, more specifically, to cultivate certain emotional dispositions. Realizing that piety and impiety have the same outcome (ἐν ὁμοίῳ), the Athenians choose not to draw distinctions between (their own) pious and impious conduct. Consequently, by adapting to the circumstances, they come to reproduce in their conduct—and thus resemble themselves—the violent and indiscriminate nature of the *nosos*. Among a number of scholars, Adam Parry has pointed out that the plague is a *pathos* that proceeds in the manner of a military attack and is equated with war.[21] In a different context, the narrative of the *stasis* at Corcyra, Thucydides articulates the famous saying that war is a violent teacher (βίαιος διδάσκαλος). Thus incapacitating disease, war, and *stasis*, all represent circumstances forceful enough to render almost everyone involved similar to the violence they find themselves in. During the plague, the Athenian citizen that would ideally aspire to sublimate even *erôs*, is violently corporealized, and respect fails.[22] Self-interest and indulgence in quick gratification take over. The transitory nature of the human body revealed by the violent attack renders considerations of morality and justice equally transitory.

Indulgence in individual pleasure does not, however, indicate that irrational or unthinking passion overtakes the Athenians. Thucydides emphasizes their awareness that their current conduct is erroneous and unjust: he calls their deeds *hamartêmata* that call for trial.[23] But realizing that there can be no reliable calculation of one's chances to survive, they decide to disregard the potential of being held accountable for their transgressions. Fear of death replaces the fear of law and the gods and leads to *anomia* and absolute disorder. It is not, however, devoid of reason. It is rather based on reasoning that committing injustice will not result in (legal) punishment. The pressing circumstances eradicate intellectual rigor regarding the best ways (both short- and long-term)

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21 Parry (1969) 116 and *passim*. Parry argues that there are literary resonances between the conditions at Athens and the legends of Troy and Oedipus, which must have been intended by Thucydides. Finley (1967) 49 and Morgan (1994) 208 emphasize the moral and social consequences of the disease.

22 See also Saxonhouse (1996) 64–65.

23 See 2.53 quoted above.

to face the disease and lead to rash judgment and thus misguided and more intense fear. Such fear along with the rationale that sustains it leads, in turn, to the collapse of communal bonds and the elimination of all significant attachments—to family, friends, the gods, and the organized state. Collective *anomia* becomes the newly shared ideology, which, by its very nature, undermines social cohesion.

2.3 *Pericles and the Emotions of the* **Dêmos: Phobos, Orgê,** ***and*** **Gnômê**

The narrative of the plague and Pericles' subsequent address to the Athenians set up a framework for looking at the role of emotion in collective decision making in the rest of the history. Before the plague attacks, the Spartans ravage the Attic territory outside the walls of the city for the first time and the Lacedaimonian king Archidamus predicts the Athenian reaction: *orgê* will fall upon them (ὀργὴ προσπίπτει) and they will act following their emotion/emotional faculty (θυμός) instead of their evaluation/rational faculty (λογισμός).[24] Archidamus proves to be right. After Acharnae is invaded, the whole polis is in a state of irritation and anger against Pericles who had recommended that everyone gather within the city-walls: παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον (2.21.3). Assuming that *orgê* rather than *gnômê* would indeed prevail and lead to serious political error (τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, 2.22.1), Pericles avoids convening the assembly. After, however, both the plague and the Peloponnesians have attacked again, Pericles eventually convenes the assembly: ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι (he wanted to reassure [the Athenians], and to move them to greater calm and confidence by dispelling their angry attitude, 2.59.3).[25] He explicitly tells the *dêmos* that he wants to make sure that they do not hold their vehement feelings "erroneously" (μὴ ὀρθῶς, 2.60.1). Emotion is high. At the same time that *gnômê* and *orgê* are set up as opposites, the language that Pericles uses indicates that the two are not easy to separate.[26] By informing the *dêmos' gnômê*, he wishes to calibrate their *orgê* as well as their fear.

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24 See 2.11.7: πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ὁρᾶν πάσχοντάς τι ἄηθες ὀργὴ προσπίπτει· καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται (for with all men, when they suffer an unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and there before their eyes which makes them angry, and when they are angry they do not pause to think but rush into action).

25 Translation by Rusten (1989) 197.

26 See especially the construction τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης quoted above.

In his address to the people, Pericles essentially tries to reinforce the ideal of the funeral oration. By expanding on the interdependence between private and collective interest, he argues that only when a state flourishes as a community (ἁθρόαν) can it pull the individual out of misfortune, and not the reverse (2.60.2–4). By analyzing their emotions for them, Pericles attempts to incite the Athenians to reassess both how they feel and how, as a result, they view the continuation of the war. Pericles points to the fact that their private afflictions (ταῖς κατ᾽ οἶκον κακοπραγίαις) have induced in them a fearful and angry emotional state to a degree that deprives them of the ability to consider communal safety (ἐκπεπληγμένοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀφίεσθε, 2.60.4) and eliminates any capacity they may have for clear thinking and foresight:

> For it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you repent of the consent that you gave me when you were still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose (ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς γνώμης) my advice now appears to you wrong. The reason is that grief is now perceived by each of you (τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἤδη τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑκάστῳ),[27] whereas the proof of the advantages is still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has come upon you without any warning, you are too dejected in mind to persevere in your former resolutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary to all calculation (δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον); and this is precisely the experience you have had, not only in other matters, but especially as regards the plague. (2.61.2–3)

> [...] ὡς οἵτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γνώμῃ μὲν ἥκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοί εἰσιν.

> For those who in the face of calamities show least distress of *gnômê* and in action make most vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether they be states or individuals. (2.64.6)

Pericles spells out what the narrative of the plague brought to the fore. He explicitly applies the terminology of infirmity to the mind and its ability to judge. Their recent and unexpected misfortunes have compelled the Athenians to focus narrowly on their current state. Having allowed pain to afflict not just

27 Translation by Rusten (1989) 200.

their bodies but also their *gnômê*, they have compromised their ability to think and deliberate. Only resistance to pain—this time mental rather than bodily, though the two overlap—will make for a strong individual and state (καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν). The elision between body and mind and between individual and state reflects one of the fundamental principles that Thucydides' Pericles espouses: the co-dependence of individual and public welfare and the dependence of both on sound *gnômê*.[28]

It will soon, however, become apparent that sound *gnômê* is not wholly devoid of fear. Thucydides presents the Athenians' response to Pericles and offers his well-known assessment of him as a leader of the *dêmos*.

> Τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὑτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἔπεμπον ἔς τε τὸν πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐλυποῦντο, ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὅτι ἀπ' ἐλασσόνων ὁρμώμενος ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πόλεμον ἀντ' εἰρήνης ἔχοντες. οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν. ὕστερον δ' αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν, ὧν μὲν περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕκαστος ἤλγει ἀμβλύτεροι ἤδη ὄντες, ὧν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον νομίζοντες εἶναι.

> By such words Pericles endeavored to cure the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to divert their minds (γνώμη) from their present ills. And as regards public affairs they were won over by his arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lacedaimonians, and were more zealous for the war; but in private they were distressed by their sufferings; for the commons, having less to start with, had been deprived even of this, while the upper classes had lost their beautiful estates in the country, both buildings and costly furniture, and above all they had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they did not give over their anger against him until they had imposed a fine upon him. But not long afterwards, as is the way

28 For an extensive analysis of the Periclean notion of *gnômê* (a kind of intelligence based on *technê* and *empeiria*) that is opposed to *tuchê*, see Edmunds (1975) 7–88. Edmunds argues that this Periclean principle of *gnômê* is innovative in three respects: it carries a new humanism and secularism; it asserts the primacy of the city; consequently, it leads to the abandonment of the old aristocratic ideal of *hêsuchia* (76). It also encapsulates characteristics of Thucydides' own rationalism.

with the multitude, they chose him again as general and entrusted him with the whole conduct of affairs. For they were now becoming individually less keenly sensitive to their private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a whole they esteemed him invaluable. (2.65.1–5)

ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι.

At any rate, whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and arrogant, his words would cow them into fear; and, on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. And so Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen. But the successors of Pericles, being more on an equality with one another and yet striving each to be first, were ready to surrender to the people even the conduct of public affairs to suit their whims. (2.65.9–10)

The inability truly to identify private with communal good drives the people's anger.[29] Despite Pericles' encouragement, the Athenians prove incapable of putting private distress and pain (ἐλυποῦντο, ἤλγει) aside, when they decide on policy. Only when the pain dissipates, are they able to reconsider the welfare of the state. Driven by pain, emotion is presented as potentially uncontrollable in the way it influences political decisions. What remains interesting is, first, that the Athenians bring Pericles back to power when their pain over their private losses, and presumably their anger, grows milder. In other words, their emotions are not eliminated but become such that allow for further considerations. This aspect will be brought up again in the Mytilenean debate. Second, it is emotion, in this case *orgê*, that unifies the Athenian citizenry even when their private losses vary in kind and severity. The urgency of their anger motivates them to make a collective decision: to fine Pericles. The judgment behind their *orgê* is presented as flawed but judgment there is, and it motivates the voting population.

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29 See the terms that emphatically bring out the opposition between public and private: δημοσίᾳ vs. ἰδίᾳ, οἱ ξύμπαντες (including ὁ μὲν δῆμος, οἱ δὲ δυνατοί), and ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις vs. (περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα) ἕκαστος.

Accordingly, Thucydides' well-known description of Pericles' exceptional ability as a leader explicitly presents the purposeful direction of emotionality, fear especially, as fundamental to good leadership. Fear plays a decisive role in collective action. But it has to be timely and to the point (not παρὰ καιρόν), and imbued with rationality reflected in accurate evaluation (not ἀλόγως). Well-adjusted fear makes for genuinely expedient decisions. Pericles' charisma involves precisely his ability to perceive the *dêmos'* fear and steer it in the direction that benefits the affairs of the state the most. His successors, on the other hand, promote their individual ambitions by catering to the pleasures of the *dêmos*. They thus cultivate desires (in themselves and in the Athenian people) that are detrimental to collective prosperity. According to Thucydides, then, absence of emotional 'fine-tuning' leads to the breakdown of social cohesion and results in internal *stasis* and eventually defeat in the war. In the narrative of the plague discussed earlier, it is the fear of giving account of one's acts that restrains unlawful and irreverent action. As soon as the possibility of being held accountable vanishes, so does reverent and respectful fear and consequently lawful and humane conduct. Pericles not only knows how to manipulate wisely the *dêmos'* fear; he remains open to giving an account of his own behavior without flattering the citizens. In other words, he becomes the paradigm of the integration of individual emotion and public feeling that he advocates.[30]

By criticizing the volatility of the *dêmos* and its inability emotionally to self-regulate, Thucydides emphasizes the need to regulate and sublimate to a degree collective passion, especially fear and anger. Behind this emphasis, I see a recommendation to capitalize on the motivational force of emotion, which is intensified when collectively felt. Despite their differing private griev-

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30 Yunis (1996) 59–86, on the other hand, emphasizes the cultivation of the *dêmos'* rationality. He sees the instructive element of Periclean rhetoric as its fundamental virtue, which can shape mass political will and keep the Athenians "rational *en masse*" (86). In this case, Pericles' speech "explains policy to the *dêmos* in such a way that they are persuaded to adopt it because they understand it" (85). On Pericles' image, see also Tsakmakis (2006) 182–186 and Raaflaub (2006) 208–209. In Gribble's (2006) analysis, the presentation of Pericles illustrates Thucydides' interest in individuals only in their relation to the city and "their effectiveness as historical actors" (440), namely their contribution to the civic good. When individuation in the narrative turns to private character, as is the case especially with Nicias and Alcibiades as well as with the portrayal of individual behavior within the Athenian *dêmos*, "individual behavior is very much *individualist* or egoistical behavior, typically with a tendency to harm the city" (468). For the argument that the Thucydidean depiction of Pericles—with special emphasis on his ability to exorcise *stasis*—is an attempt to reverse the image forged by the comedians, see Christodoulou (2013).

ances, the *dêmos* and the elite (οἱ δυνατοί) are unified in and by their anger against Pericles and all of them (οἱ ξύμπαντες) come together to vote in support of fining him. By pointing to Pericles' ability to regulate and redefine the *dêmos'* fear, Thucydides suggests that there is a continuous need to transform the cognitive and ideological basis of emotional experience so as to render it conducive to true *philia* within and with the state and to make the best use of its power. Josiah Ober has argued that what differentiates Pericles from both other leaders and the *dêmos* is his deep understanding of the dynamic nature of the new democratic system. "Pericles' nature was entirely human, but his tendency to seek his own interests was framed by his political-moral insight that even (or maybe especially) under the conditions of modernity, the individual's best interests could only be secured in the context of a powerful and flourishing community".[31] Ober suggests that in these conditions the Athenian people have to take rational risks while adapting to the changing political circumstances, and that is an ability that they lose with Pericles' death. Precisely because the Athenians do not truly endorse the congruity between individual interest and state prosperity, they make apparently rational but actually irrational choices, which have catastrophic consequences.[32] Similarly, I suggest, irrational choices are not motivated by anger or fear that are devoid of reason. They rather reflect misdirected anger or fear. The text indicates that it is a narrow perspective, flawed rationality, and defective knowledge that produce excessive emotions. I do not deny a visceral element in emotional experience. This is the element that the insistent opposition between *gnômê* and *orgê*

31 Ober (2006) 151. Regarding the concept of 'modernity', Ober argues that Thucydides "had identified something akin to each of [Anthony] Gidden's three distinguishing factors in fifth century Athens and thus we may legitimately speak of Thucydides' modernity and the modernity of the Athens in which he grew up" (135). The three factors are: "1. separation and zoning of time and space [...], 2. the development of 'disembedding mechanisms' that 'lift out' social activity from localized contexts (including government administration), and 3. the reflexive appropriation of expert knowledge" (135).

32 Ober, ibid., 144. Tsakmakis (2006) too discusses the detrimental effects of the people's polarization and of the instability of public opinion that most of the times stems from passion (esp. p. 173) and argues that "Pericles tries to discourage unwelcome mass action, and to transform a crowd into a totality of responsible individuals" (168). Similar is the case with Farrar (1988) who makes a further distinction. She argues that Pericles' aim is to make the polis act not as 'a collectivity' of individuals but as a coherent 'entity'. Farrar emphasizes the role of *gnômê*: "[Thucydides] acknowledges that reliance on judgment (*gnômê*) was the only way to maintain flexibility, adaptability, and the capacity to respond to changing circumstances" (191). My approach differs in my understanding of how *gnômê* and *orgê* relate to each other and work together.

points to. The ways, however, in which such opposition is immediately and consistently qualified undermines the sharp divide and foregrounds the evaluating processes that sustain emotional experience and expression. In an ideal democratic world dominated by figures like Pericles, fear and anger would stem from assessments that are based on and, in turn, reinforce transparency, mutual trust, and collective interest. Their affective power would thus contribute to social cohesion.

2.4 *The Emotions of* Stasis: *The Oligarchic Coup in Athens*

The shortcomings of democratic sentiment are exhibited in the rest of Thucydides' narrative. The manipulation, however, of the reasoning aspect of the emotions, especially fear, with the aim to undermine social and political cohesion is emphasized during the short-lived oligarchy of the Four Hundred. After the grand failure of the Sicilian expedition, the Athenian *dêmos* experiences intense distress and fear:

> Everything indeed on every side distressed them, and after what happened they were beset with fear and utmost consternation (πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ περιειστήκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή). For, having lost, both each man separately and as a state (καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις), many hoplites and horsemen and the flower of the youth, while they saw none like it left them, they were heavy of heart (ἐβαρύνοντο). (8.1.2)

The congruity between individual and state loss replaces (and confirms) Pericles' ideal of the congruity between private and collective interest and creates a unified response: "In the panic of the moment they were ready, as is the way with a democracy, to observe discipline with everything" (πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν, 8.1.4). The oligarchs then exploit the prevailing fear to create further division and establish their power. Such exploitation is primarily based on sustaining a consistent level of ignorance (ἀγνωσία) and confusion among the members of the *dêmos*.

Even though distressed at the idea of an oligarchic government, the *dêmos* gives in out of fear and in hopes that things will change soon again (δείσας καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκεν, 8.54.1–2). As a result, the oligarchs intensify further such fear. They establish a 'reign of terror'[33] that severely compromises the trust and cohesiveness of the Athenian *dêmos*.

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33 See Hornblower (1991) 944–946.

> ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός· εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει, καὶ τῶν δρασάντων οὔτε ζήτησις οὔτ᾽ εἰ ὑποπτεύοιντο δικαίωσις ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόμιζεν. καὶ τὸ ξυνεστηκὸς πολὺ πλέον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ ἐτύγχανεν ὂν ἡσσῶντο ταῖς γνώμαις, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν αὐτό, ἀδύνατοι ὄντες διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν, οὐκ εἶχον. κατὰ δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τινι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν· ἢ γὰρ ἀγνῶτα ἂν ηὗρεν ᾧ ἐρεῖ ἢ γνώριμον ἄπιστον. ἀλλήλοις γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπόπτως προσῇσαν οἱ τοῦ δήμου, ὡς μετέχοντά τινα τῶν γιγνομένων. ἐνῆσαν γὰρ καὶ οὓς οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τις ᾤετο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὗτοι μέγιστον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ πλεῖστα ἐς τὴν τῶν ὀλίγων ἀσφάλειαν ὠφέλησαν, βέβαιον τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντες.
>
> And no one of the others any longer spoke against them, through fear and because it was seen that the conspiracy was widespread; and if any one did oppose, at once in some convenient way he was a dead man. And no search was made for those who did the deed, nor if they were suspected was any legal prosecution held; on the contrary, the populace kept quiet and were in such consternation that he who did not suffer any violence, even though he never said a word, counted that a gain. Imagining the conspiracy to be much more widespread than it actually was, they were cowed in mind, and owing to the size of the city and their lack of knowledge of one another they were unable to find out the facts. For the same reason it was also impossible for any man that was offended to pour out his grievances to another and thus plot to avenge himself, for he would discover any person to whom he might speak to be either a stranger or, if an acquaintance, faithless. For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, as though every one had a hand in what was going on. And, indeed, there were among them men whom one would never have expected to change over and favor an oligarchy; and it was these who caused the greatest distrust among the masses and rendered the most valuable service toward the few in securing their safety by confirming in the populace this distrust of their own people. (8.66.2–5)

Oligarchy operates on consistently fomenting a fear deeply rooted in the threat of violence, complete absence of transparency, and confusion. Mere survival is thought a gain, legal prosecutions become moot, and accurate information is simply unattainable. Lack of transparency conquers *gnômê* and enhances fear

and suspicion. And widespread distrust results in alienation and dissolution of any type of solidarity even among citizens who share political beliefs. The possibility itself of sharing one's grief (προσολοφύρασθαι)—the one aspect of communal experience that survived even the disaster of the Sicilian expedition—is eliminated.[34]

The lack of transparency and the conscious attempt to keep the majority of the citizens confounded, suspicious, and fearful is encapsulated in the oligarchs' stance regarding the Five Thousand:

> And in fact this was the reason why the Four Hundred did not wish either that the Five Thousand should actually exist or that it should become known that they did not exist—because they thought, on the one hand, that to make so many men partners in the government was outright democracy, and, on the other hand, that the uncertainty would inspire fear in each against his neighbor (τὸ δ' αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν). (8.92.11)

This new fear fundamentally differs from the fear that sustains democratic deliberation and decision making, especially the type of fear that Pericles manages to sustain. Well-informed and respectful fear in the democracy translates into acceptance of shared laws and customary beliefs and forges communal trust both among citizens and between citizens and the polis. By sharing only in uncertainty and suspicion under the new regime, the *dêmos* is inevitably reduced to self-oriented and isolated individuals.

2.5 *The Quintessential Emotions of* Stasis: *Corcyra*

The short-lived *stasis* in Athens in 411 BCE recalls the *stasis* at Corcyra in 427 BCE, which acquires paradigmatic character in the *History* for both the manner in which individuals act in the context of political division within one and the same city-state and a distinct shift in Athenian policy for the remainder of the war. Thucydides states explicitly that while Corcyra provides the first instance of a city-state in *stasis*, "afterwards the whole Hellenic world was convulsed" by similar divisions. The states that later join in the *stasis* that spreads on a panhellenic level take the savagery described at Corcyra to unprecedented levels of 'creative' excess:

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34 7.75.4–7: Defeated, the Athenian army and their allies break into communal lamentation and the sharing of ills brings some, even if limited, alleviation (κούφισιν). See also my discussion below.

> ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ.
>
> And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolutions, and those that fell into this state later, on hearing of what had been done before, carried to still more extravagant lengths the invention of new devices, both by the extreme ingenuity of their attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges. (3.82.3)

The narrative of the Corcyrean *stasis* includes only one explicit reference to fear. It nevertheless remains instructive for our understanding of collective emotionality because it offers one of the Thucydidean reflections on human nature and the justification that emotional states provide for action.

In the context of political division between democrats and oligarchs, murder and deception prevail. The Corcyreans slaughter their fellow-citizens under the pretext that they oppose the democracy while in truth they attack personal enemies. Thucydides identifies political *stasis* with war that has the force to assimilate most people, collectively, to its physical and moral violence:

> ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.
>
> For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have better *gnômai*, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people *orgai* that match their current condition. (3.82.2)

By comparing the *gnômai* of city-states and individuals in time of peace with their *orgai* during *stasis* and war, Thucydides initially seems to reinforce the dichotomy between reason and passion. But on closer inspection of the passage and the events of the *stasis* themselves, the strict dichotomy breaks down. The better judgments or mental states (ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας) maintained under peaceful circumstances give way to emotional states or dispositions (τὰς ὀργάς) that, we must assume, reflect the new *gnômai*, the 'worse' ones. *Stasis* as ideological division and war leads to violent acts and emotion. And violent emotion produces further unparalleled violence. Death materializes in all forms

(πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, 3.81.5). Πᾶσα ἰδέα seems to point not only to the unprecedented variety of murderous acts against fellow-citizens but also to *stasis* as able to generate the very conception of violent action.[35]

In the context of *stasis*, attachments usually held as dear and significant are undermined and hierarchies are redefined. Similarly, opposition to established human and divine law creates a new basis for alliances:

> καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίᾳ αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξίᾳ. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι.
>
> Furthermore, the tie of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur; for such associations are not entered into for the public good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandizement contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law. (3.82.6)
>
> πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον.
>
> The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardor which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry. (3.82.8)

Thucydides sees in *stasis* the circumstances that encourage selfish aggrandizement and greed (πλεονεξία) along with excessive love of honor (φιλοτιμία), on the basis of which collective prosperity or any shared cause is served only in name. The new commonly held value is adherence to *paranomia* and thus the

35 On the changes that *stasis* effects, see 3.82.3 quoted above, which continues: καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. Loraux (2009) translates: "whenever they made a judgment, seditious men exchanged the customary valuation (τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν) applied to actions in words". She argues that Thucydides is interested in 'moral notions' rather than *onomata* themselves and that his narrative shows how *stasis* perverts the assigning of praise and blame. Familiar terms now refer to new attitudes (270–271). Similarly Price (2001) 41–42 had earlier argued that what changes during *stasis* is "the value assigned to [words], that is, how their meanings were enacted in society". Such changes reveal "fundamental transformations in what forms of behavior society holds up for special praise or blame".

very notion of sharing and co-operating is itself redefined. Self-serving party-affiliates commit to precarious and suspect alliances. Oaths of reconciliation have power only momentarily in order merely to facilitate quick advantage. As soon as the opportunity arises even parties bound by such oaths choose to return to deception and violence (3.82.7). Thus in reality individual ambition urges all to factious rivalry and the pursuit of pleasure that go hand in hand with disregard for what is just and expedient for the city as a whole. Moderation and neutrality, at the same time, are simply not an option: τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο (and citizens who belonged to neither party were continually destroyed by both, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive, 3.82.8). Language itself and all expressions of human trust and divine faith break down.[36]

In stark opposition to idealized democracy, *stasis* creates a state of war that eliminates trust and any reliable point of reference whether that be words, laws, conventions, interpersonal relationships and political alliances. As is the case with the plague, the majority of the citizens indulge in the pleasures that their newly acquired power offers. And though indulgence is a shared principle, it also thrives on fierce competitiveness. The eagerness to satiate *pleonexia* and *philotimia* replaces social conventions that traditionally create social cohesion. Even though such eagerness sustains the new ideology that partisans share, it also necessarily leads to ardent rivalry (ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον, 3.82.8) that undermines collective pursuits.

The historian attributes the atrocities that take place during *stasis* and its profound divisive effect to the unchanging character of human nature:

> καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται.
>
> And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human nature is the same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their

36 See previous n. and 3.83.2–3: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὅρκος φοβερός, κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προυσκόπουν ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο (there was no assurance binding enough, no oath terrible enough to reconcile men; but always, if they were stronger, since they accounted all security hopeless, they were rather disposed to take precautions against being wronged than able to trust others).

> manifestations, according as the variations in circumstances present themselves. (3.82.2)

Thucydides' statement on human nature and his depiction of acts and sentiments during *stasis* raise anew two closely interrelated issues that pervade the *History*: the nature and function of emotion for both individual and collectives; and the extent to which it is possible to shape emotional dispositions.[37] Both issues resonate with the fifth century debate about the relationship between nature and culture or human convention (φύσις vs. νόμος). Thucydides pinpoints 'human nature' or the 'human way' (ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, τρόπος) as an element that remains constant irrespective of historical context. At the same time, however, he problematizes the degree to which external circumstances (ranging from political regimes, to conflict such as debate, *stasis*, war, to disease) shape human nature and, consequently, individual and collective feeling and action.

2.6 *Reason, Passion, and Human Nature*

What is precisely 'human nature' in the *History*? The question has been extensively debated. According to one approach, unchangeable human nature is equivalent to violent and irrational passion. For instance, Michael Mittelstadt, following Ernst Topitsch, defines human nature (ἀνθρωπεία φύσις) as the primal elemental side of man that is distinct from his *gnômê*, namely the deliberative, judicious, and rational element in him. *Gnômê* "is frequently eclipsed, as its judgmental powers and discriminatory foresight are often blinded by *orgê*—the aggressive and emotional side of human nature".[38] Scholars have reached similar conclusions by also pointing to analogies between the narrative of the plague and that of the Corcyrean *stasis*. Walter Robert Connor, for instance, suggests that the two episodes form a boundary within the work to create a unit that explores "the inability of any of the conventional restraints to control the powerful drives of nature". A fundamental characteristic that both cases share is that "*logos* is overpowered. [T]he plague surpasses the human faculty for rational discourse [...] Passion dominates the Athenians' minds and resolution; memory is distorted under the pressure of the suffering".[39] At Corcyra, "political anarchy readily symbolizes moral anarchy. Now all the conventions of Greek life—promises, oaths, supplication, obligations to kin and benefac-

37 On the tradition that views civil war as simultaneously a *loimos* and an evil attached to the human condition, see Loraux (2009) 263–264.

38 Mittelstadt (1985) 67.

39 Connor (1984) 99–101.

tor and even that ultimate convention, language itself—give way. It is Hobbes' *bellum omnium contra omnes*".[40] Developing Cynthia Farrar's approach, Vincent Farenga, on the other hand, defines Thucydides' human nature as "a 'psychological structure' dominated by the tension between reasoned judgment (γνώμη) and powerful emotions (ὀργή): a terrain inviting both individuals and citizen bodies to engage primarily in moral reflection and deliberation". As such, human nature is not identified with the emotions only. It rather "underlies man's experience of the constant interaction of reason and desire" and thus renders his dilemmas moral—not (just) epistemological.[41]

Understanding 'human nature' as a 'psychological structure' does more justice to Thucydidean use. By encompassing, however, both judging and feeling, such structure indicates how difficult it is to define them as clearly distinguishable faculties. It rather reveals, I suggest, that the distinction between the two is rarely sustainable. A slippage or tension in Thucydides' own depiction points in this direction. As I hope to have shown, while some of the passages that comment on the workings of human nature initially connect it to emotion construed as an irrational force, it quickly becomes clear that, most of the time, it is impossible to disassociate emotion itself from processes of evaluation and reasoning—and vice versa. Even though not pure reasoning, emotion itself is shown to be a type of evaluation. In addition to the narratives of the plague and the Corcyrean *stasis*, the Mytilenean debate that I will discuss in the context of interstate politics will add significantly to this picture. The representation of *orgê* in the *History* overall facilitates this slippage. Because the same term denotes both anger and passion more broadly and because anger is presented as one of the more vehement and violent emotions and tends to trigger hasty action, the reader becomes inclined to view most emotions—as well as all instantiations of anger—as bearing the nature and characteristics

40 Ibid., 99.

41 Farenga (2006) 441. The second quotation comes from Farrar as used by Farenga. According to Farrar (1988), the historical understanding of human nature is an integral part of the *History*, which, as "a synthesis of accurate reporting and interpretation", underlies and cultivates judgment. By reading the *History*, she suggests, "one picks up relevant principles of analysis, including how to understand human behavior under various conditions, and learns how to apply and, when appropriate, revise them in particular cases" (134, 137). The difference between the two approaches—Mittelstadt and Topitsch, on the one hand and Farenga building on Farrar, on the other—seems to be one primarily of emphasis, since Mittelstadt and Topitsch highlight *orgê* as nature. At the same time, however, they also talk about 'sides' in man, which brings them close to Farenga's idea of psychological structure.

of vehement anger.[42] But different emotions in the text, such as fear, pity, *erôs*, and hope, encompass varying degrees of viscerality, forcefulness, and evaluation. The portrayal of *stasis*, moreover, seems to problematize the issue of origin (in the sense of the Greek *aition*) of the emotions. Do the conditions of *stasis*—and similarly, those of war and infectious disease—bring out the most unreasonable and vehement aspects of human nature, because such aspects are a suppressed characteristic of the human constitution that is always ready to emerge? Or do such realities have the power fundamentally to corrupt human nature by generating violent and immoral ways of thinking and acting? Thucydides' narrative does not point in one direction in any transparent or straightforward manner.[43]

Even so, what remains of central importance is that violent emotion and action reach the highest degrees of excess when individual citizens detach themselves from collectively accepted conceptions of law and resist true cooperation of any kind. A rationale of keen adherence to clearly conceived (even though ill-conceived) self-interest sustains violent passion. Ober argues that Thucydides' presentation of *stasis* reflects his understanding of how intrastate conflict reveals truths about human psychology:

> Freed from the constraints of social structure, people tended by nature to act selfishly. That is, they sought to promote their own interests in competition with others rather than cooperating with people different from themselves on common projects. This tendency to self-aggrandizement contributed to the degeneration of existing social structure and thus of civilization itself. Self-interest could not provide an alternative 'natural' structure (in the form of a libertarian utopia) because people's selfish

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42 E.g., Diodotus constructs an opposition between good counsel (εὐβουλία) on the one hand and hastiness (τάχος) and *orgê* on the other, where the latter is seen as often combined with uncultivated and narrow *gnômê* (μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης, 3.42.1). See also my discussion of the Mytilenean debate in the next section. The adverbial constructions that recur to point to hasty action as a result of *orgê* are ὡς τάχιστα, κατὰ τάχος, and especially εὐθύς. See: 4.11.5, 4.123.3, 5.46.5, 6.57.3, 4.130.4, 5.63.2, 8.27.6.

43 Of course one might object that it is, in any event, human beings that make war. Shorey (1893), for instance, finds throughout Thucydides' text an ethical positivism according to which law and religion constitute artificial conventions that cannot permanently restrain human nature, which remains always essentially the same. Mittelstadt (1985) 65 similarly argues that the accounts of both the plague and the *stasis* gradually make the reader realize that "the drive for acquisition, dominance, and ambition are no mere passing moods or afflictions from outside like the physical plague, but something in the very nature of man".

> actions were guided by a fatally weak inductive knowledge of the complex of factors that were conducive to their actual interests. And so their actions did not consistently result in furthering their real interests. Self-interest in the absence of true knowledge cannot be judged as rational.[44]

From this perspective, it is the absence of true knowledge that constitutes the basis for truly irrational decisions, while such decisions appear rational and beneficial to their unaware agents. This type of irrationality also triggers the vehement emotions and subsequent violent acts exhibited during *stasis*. As we saw, individuals caught up in particularly violent *xuntuchiai* take the violence that they assimilate to new levels of atrocity. And the tendency to self-aggrandizement becomes the one common point of reference among fellow-citizens. If *stasis* as war is a violent teacher, then the teaching works on more than one level: citizens are deeply influenced by the external circumstances they find themselves in but they also perpetuate these circumstances. They thus actively impact each other's manner of feeling and acting. By collectively embracing an ideology of distrust and mutual fear, they collectively instruct each other into transgressive action. The *orgai* that replace their better *gnômai* indeed encompass new ways of both thinking and feeling.[45] And they undermine both the constitution and the preservation of the polis.[46]

44 Ober (2006) 144. Ober's interpretation of Thucydides' views on self-interest overlaps with Krause's understanding of self-interest and is central in understanding the need for expanding the citizens' sympathetic imagination. See Chapter 1, Section 6.

45 See also Loraux (2009) 263–268. Even though 3.84 has been seen as spurious by commentators ever since antiquity, it is clear that it attempts to recapitulate succinctly the essence of *stasis*. Uncontrollable passion leads to utter cruelty and human nature triumphs over the laws. Interestingly the 'raw' behavior of the citizens is attributed to 'ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὀργῆς', thus pointing once again to the possibility of both education and corruption of emotional dispositions.

46 Here I draw from Allen's language (2000). Allen argues that a speaker in the 4th c. Athenian courts operates within an economy of private and public anger. A rhetorician has to use *nomos* judiciously in order to "identify an action deserving of public anger and public judgment" as well as to "show that he had used public institutions—and was trying to rouse public anger—with sensitivity to the ways in which public judgment contributed to the constitution and preservation of the polis" (151). By looking at the dynamic between private and public *orgê* (as anger) and the *dêmos'* role in expressing it, Allen suggests that "the claims to anger and pity were embedded in a language of communal ethical evaluation" (149). For my purposes, this interpretation supports the close connection between *orgê* (as both anger and passion more broadly) and *gnôme* that I argue for and sheds further light to the (ex)changes in the customary valuation of words and deeds that take place during *stasis*.

3 Collective Emotion and Interstate Relations

In the context of the Peloponnesian war, a politics of fear contributes to sustaining the conflict between the different states and their allies, a type of *stasis* that extends through the Hellenic world.[47] Even though Thucydides has often been seen as a realist who advocates a politics based on considerations of self-interest, the discourse that pervades deliberation on state-policy situates political decisions in an emotional and moral frame. While self-interest is the major motive behind the pursuit and preservation of empire, the Athenians explicitly include honor and the fear of letting go of their power as equally powerful motives (1.75).[48] The Spartans, motivated in turn by fear that the Athenians are growing too powerful, vote in favor of the war (1.88). As the different states negotiate their fears and loyalties, the role of justice and customary rules in sustaining interstate bonds comes under scrutiny.

Already in the first book, the Athenians point to two fundamentally divergent ways of conceiving of and exercising power. While they initially take pride in treating their allies as equals, it soon becomes apparent that such equality is tenuous:

> If ever our allies, accustomed as they are to associate with us on the basis of equality (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν), come off second best in any matter, however trivial [...] they are more deeply offended because of their trifling inequality than if we had from the first put aside all legal restraints and had openly sought our own advantage. In that case, even they would not be setting up the claim that the weaker should not have to yield to the stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of injustice than of violence (ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι); for the former, they feel, is overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is coercion by a superior (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δ'ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι). (1.77.3–5)

By pointing to their superiority, the Athenians blatantly expose the discourse of equality as fraudulent. They feel justified to be unjust simply on the ground that demands of just conduct do not apply between non-equals. Alliance, then, does not necessarily constitute an association of equals.

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47 For an extensive interpretation according to which Thucydides sees the Peloponnesian War itself as *stasis*, see Price (2001).

48 On the *alêthestatê prophasis* of the conflict, see, e.g., Moles (2010) esp. 26–30 with further references.

Similarly, when Pericles urges the *dêmos* to take on the war against the Spartans and their allies, he attributes Athenian hesitance to fear, which will necessarily render the Spartans superior, not equal to them:

> If you yield this point [to rescind the Megarian degree] to them, you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first one through fear (φόβῳ); whereas by a downright refusal, you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality (σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσαιτε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν μᾶλλον προσφέρεσθαι). For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbors, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation. (1.140.5–141.1)

Once again, allowing oneself (as a state) to feel fear and accordingly determine policy signifies consent to being treated as an inferior. Consequently claims to equal treatment and justice lose their meaning and effectiveness. Conversely, inspiring fear is a proof of superiority that does not even allow room for charges of injustice. The Mytilenean response to this politics of fear brings out the role of fear in delineating possible types of alliances between states (e.g., ξυμμαχία vs. φιλία) and continues to raise the political and ethical issue of equality. The Mytilenean debate and the Sicilian expedition offer, in turn, particularly rich sources for a broader examination of the role of collective emotion and human nature in determining international policy and action.

3.1 *The Case of Mytilene*

The role of fear in defining the nature of interstate alliances becomes more prominent the more unabashedly the Athenians present their rule as a tyranny.[49] The case of Mytilene, however, which is presented early in the *History*, offers a good example for both the role of fear in interstate politics and the parallelism between individual and state psychology. Explaining to the Spartans in Olympia why they revolted against the Athenians, the Mytileneans give a history of their alliance: during the Persian War they willingly joined the Athenian cause to emancipate the Greeks from the Persians and remained compliant for as long as the Athenians "maintained their hegemony on terms of equality". But it was not long before they, the Mytileneans, became alarmed (οὐκ ἀδεεῖς,

49 On how Athens comes to follow a course of bald imperialism because of the volatile nature of the Athenians, necessity, and unexpected changes of fortune, see Hunter (1973–74).

3.10.5). With the increase of Athenian power, they initially remained independent allies but free only in name (αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι, 3.10.6), since they were essentially also forced into isolation (ἐρημότεροι, 3.11.1):

> τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν· ὁ γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλόμενος τῷ μὴ προύχων ἂν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται· αὐτόνομοί τε ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτά.
>
> Indeed it is only the fear that arises from equality of power that constitutes a firm basis for an alliance; for he that would transgress is deterred by the feeling that he has no superiority wherewith to make an attack. And we were left independent for no other reason than because they clearly saw that with a view to empire they must get control of affairs by fair-seeming words and by attacks of policy rather than of force. (3.11.1–3)
>
> τίς οὖν αὕτη ἢ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν˙ ὅ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μάλιστα εὔνοια πίστιν βεβαιοῖ, ἡμῖν τοῦτο ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν παρεῖχε, δέει τε τὸ πλέον ἢ φιλίᾳ κατεχόμενοι ξύμμαχοι ἦμεν· καὶ ὁποτέροις θᾶσσον παράσχοι ἀσφάλεια θάρσος, οὗτοι πρότεροί τι καὶ παραβήσεσθαι ἔμελλον.
>
> Was this then a friendship or a freedom to put faith in, where we violated our real *gnômê* whenever we treated each other as friends? They courted us in time of war only because they were afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward them in time of peace; and good faith, which in most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our case made steadfast by fear, and it was fear rather than friendship that held us both to the alliance; and whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through a feeling of security was bound to be the first to commit some act of transgression also. (3.12.1–2)

The Mytileneans point to the different types of association possible between states according to the principles on which they are founded: respect for equality and fear. Respect for equality that ensures good will (εὔνοια) and builds trust leads to an alliance based on *philia*. Fear of an ever-changing power dynamic, on the other hand, can only lead to an alliance devoid of good faith. As is the case with individuals within *stasis*, increases in power inevitably lead to transgressions. In the translation of παρὰ γνώμην above (3.12.1), I retained the

Greek term. Interestingly, Smith translates it as "against our feelings"—not, for instance, as "against our judgment"—possibly to align it with the fear the Mytileneans emphasize. But *gnômê* indicates the type of judgment that precisely justifies or triggers fear on both sides. States apply the principles of individual psychology and interpersonal relations to collective psychology and interstate politics. Respectful *philia* as a kind of attachment that motivates politics on the basis of equality and justice is to be preferred to (merely) interest-oriented *xummachia*.

The Mytilenean debate brings together a number of issues that pervade the representation of collective emotion in Thucydides. Coming to regret their decision to punish the whole Mytilenean population for their revolt, since only the island's oligarchic faction bears responsibility for it, the Athenians convene the assembly to reconsider their decision (3.36). Cleon's and Diodotus' respective speeches include reflections on the analogy between individual and collective psychology, concerns of morality and justice in the negotiations of imperial power, and the role of rationality and emotion in defining policy. They also further develop the issue regarding state-cooperation already raised by the Mytileneans themselves: the choice between a *xummachia* for the sake of expedience and a *philia* that entails further obligations and raises the political and ethical issue of equality and justice.

Introduced as most violent (βιαιότατος), Cleon opposes the Athenians' change of heart and accuses them of not understanding the real nature and workings of their empire:

> Πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἑτέρων ἄρχειν, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρᾳ περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελείᾳ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε, καὶ ὅτι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ πεισθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἁμάρτητε ἢ οἴκτῳ ἐνδῶτε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἡγεῖσθε ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι, οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας ἀρχομένους, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπτόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ περιγένησθε.
>
> On many other occasions in the past I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever today, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Mytileneans. The fact is that, because your daily life is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to each other, you have the same attitude to your allies also, and you forget that whenever you are led into error by their representations or yield

> out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a despotism imposed upon subjects who, for their part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule against their will, who render obedience, not because of any kindnesses you may do them to your own hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have established by reason of your strength rather than of their good will. (3.37.2)

Cleon draws a sharp line between the relationship that the Athenians have with each other and those with their allies. Absence of fear sustains trust within the Athenian state, while fear ought to sustain the *xummachia* with the Mytileneans who are their subjects. Cleon essentially reaffirms the reasoning that the Mytileneans themselves earlier presented to the Spartans, when they explained their wish to revolt.[50] The *xummachia* between the two states is no *philia*, but an alliance for the sake of Athenian interest based on Athens' superior power. Given this unequal power-dynamic, Cleon urges the Athenians to adhere to their initial decision and to sustain their anger. Delay for further deliberation can only be to their disadvantage because it renders them less angry and therefore less exact in their response: ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὂν μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν λαμβάνει (the edge of the victim's wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender, whereas the vengeance that follows upon the heels of the outrage exacts a punishment that most nearly matches the offense, 3.38.1). From Cleon's perspective, (collective) anger reflects unerring judgment, and holding on to it with unfailing vehemence can only result in just retribution.

Cleon reiterates this need to hold on to anger at the end of his speech:

> Μὴ οὖν προδόται γένησθε ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, γενόμενοι δ' ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ὡς πρὸ παντὸς ἂν ἐτιμήσασθε αὐτοὺς χειρώσασθαι, νῦν ἀνταπόδοτε μὴ μαλακισθέντες πρὸς τὸ παρὸν αὐτίκα μηδὲ τοῦ ἐπικρεμασθέντος ποτὲ δεινοῦ ἀμνημονοῦντες. κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τούτους τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφὲς καταστήσατε, ὃς ἂν ἀφιστῆται, θανάτῳ ζημιωσόμενον. τόδε γὰρ ἢν γνῶσιν, ἧσσον τῶν πολεμίων ἀμελήσαντες τοῖς ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν μαχεῖσθε ξυμμάχοις.
>
> Do not, then, be traitors to your own cause, but recalling as nearly as possible the *gnômê* that you had when they made you suffer and how

50 See my discussion of 3.10–12 at the beginning of this sub-section.

> you would then have given anything to crush them, now pay them back. Do not become tender-hearted at the sight of their present distress, nor unmindful of the danger that so lately hung over you, but chastise them as they deserve and give to your other allies plain warning that whoever revolts shall be punished with death. For if they realise this, the less will you have to neglect your enemies and fight against your own allies. (3.40.7–8)

In his final attempt to stir the Athenians to angry punishment, Cleon makes clear that it is the evaluation of their suffering as the result of injustice that has evoked their anger. Such sentiment in turn justifies the decision to impose harsh punishment on the Mytileneans. Anger reflects an evaluation (γνώμη) of unjust treatment and holding on to the emotion means holding on to the memory and clarity of that *gnômê*. Vehement emotion, therefore, can ensure punishment that is truly proportionate to the offence. In this case, justice and what is advantageous for the Athenian empire coincide (πιθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε: if you take my advice, you will do not only what is just to the Mytileneans but also at the same time what is expedient for us, 3.40.4).

The role of emotion in delineating inter-state policy remains at the center of Cleon's speech. He brings home the justice and usefulness of the initial angry decision of the *dêmos*, by opposing it to the three emotional dispositions that he sees as most detrimental to empire: pity/compassion (οἴκτῳ/ἔλεος), taking pleasure in eloquence (ἡδονῇ λόγων), and clemency (ἐπιεικείᾳ):

> ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνῶναι ὑμᾶς τὰ προδεδογμένα, μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἔλεός τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς οὔτ' ἀντοικτιοῦντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καθεστῶτας αἰεὶ πολεμίους· οἵ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες ἕξουσι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐλάσσοσιν ἀγῶνα, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡσθεῖσα μεγάλα ζημιώσεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εἰπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ ἀντιλήψονται· καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια πρὸς τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον δίδοται ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἧσσον πολεμίους ὑπολειπομένους.

> Therefore, I still protest, as I have from the first, that you should not reverse your former decision or be led into error by pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three influences most prejudicial to a ruling state. For compassion may rightly be bestowed upon those who are likewise compassionate and not upon those who will show no pity in return

> but of necessity are always enemies. As to the orators who charm by their eloquence, they will have other opportunities of display in matters of less importance, and not where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for fine speaking. And clemency would better be reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful allies than be shown to those who remain just what they were before and whit the less our enemies. (3.40.2–3)

Only the combination of equal power and shared ideology can justify pity. Both pity as an emotion and clemency as a disposition to show sympathy warrant action and, for this reason, ought to be based on a premise of equality and voluntary reciprocity.[51] Therefore, pity toward inferiors is not an option. By asking, in addition, the Athenians not to indulge their desire for competitive political debate, he requires of them to bypass individual 'interest' and focus on the interest of the polis. He thus concludes his argument, according to which a change of mind will display disrespect for the law. While presenting the original decision as more law-abiding than a consequent one makes for a specious argument, Cleon attempts to appeal to democratic sensibilities that ensure solidarity—in addition of course to securing the collectively enjoyed power of empire. As Danielle Allen has argued, anger was not only assumed to be at the root of law itself; it also justified punishment as a cure for the social disruption that anger—as a justified response to injustice—caused.[52] By taking steps to remedy their own anger, the Athenians can justly restore harmony in their political and social relations.

Opposing Cleon's points, Diodotus claims that he is not concerned with issues of justice. He is rather concerned with good deliberation (εὐβουλία) that aims to define how the Mytileneans will prove most useful for both conserving resources and solidifying Athenian influence. Hastiness (τάχος) and anger or passion (ὀργή) are the greatest opponents of such good deliberation (3.42). Advocating a more restrained policy as the most expedient strategy for the present and the future, Diodotus offers an analysis of human nature and behavior, with special attention to its emotional dispositions. According to Diodotus, "all men are by nature prone to err, both in private and in public

51 I thank the anonymous reviewer of my manuscript for his comment on clemency as a disposition to act in a certain way or perhaps as the action itself.

52 Allen (2005) discusses the centrality of anger to the Athenian experience of wrongdoing and punishment and points out the view of anger as a disease that requires cure. She argues that "the wrongdoer transmitted disease because, in angering people, he upset the harmony of social relations. Anger justified punishment because as a disease, it demanded a cure" (382–3). See also Allen (2000) 50–9 and n.46 above.

life, and there is no law that will prevent them" (3.45.3). Certain circumstances are particularly conducive to risk-taking and error. These include poverty (through necessity), power (through insolence and pride), other conditions (ξυντυχίαι) (through anger or passion more generally—ὀργή), desire (ἔρως), hope (ἐλπίς), and fortune (τύχη). Though (or because)[53] unseen and elusive (ἀφανῆ), desire and hope are particularly harmful, because they have the power to prevail over visible, clear dangers (3.45.4–6).[54] Fortune itself urges equally men and states to take risks:

> [...] and the individual, when supported by the whole people, unreasonably overestimates his own strength (καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὑτὸν ἐδόξασεν). In a word, it is impossible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature is wholeheartedly bent on any undertaking (τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι) it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or any other terror (ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ δεινῷ). (3.45.6–7)

In Diodotus' depiction of human nature, the passions either result from extreme circumstances, or are themselves the initial trigger of risk-taking. Because they are devoid of calculation and forward thinking, they cannot be diverted, especially when they are embraced by collective bodies. Human nature at its most visceral rushes forth and, when set on its eagerly passionate course (ὁρμωμένης προθύμως), cannot be stopped. This is as close as we get to an identification of human nature with irrational passion.[55] For this reason Diodotus insists on a less extreme punishment that in the long run will function as a deterrent measure within the Athenian empire. In other words, the decision not to punish Mytilene's innocent population will prove to be more expedient. As a well thought-out policy, it will inspire fear in Athens' enemies, both currently and in the future: ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ' ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιών (for he who is wise in counsel is stronger against the foe than he who recklessly rushes on with brute force, 3.48.2). The one who is able to show *euboulia* in this case stands as the truly more powerful opponent (κρείσσων) in contrast with the one who uses *ischus*,

53 Gomme (1956) 320.

54 I read ὀργῇ with the MSS. See also Gomme (1956) 319.

55 The circumstances that Diodotus includes in his account without expanding on them point, however, to a rationale behind passion, i.e. the type of immoral thinking that comes with poverty, power, etc. On 'human nature' in the *History*, see my discussion in Section 2 above.

here to be identified with both brute force and anger. But is *euboulia* separate from and devoid of emotion?

Both Diodotus and Cleon present collective emotion as leading, in many cases, to irresponsible decisions. Even though in different terms, they describe collective decision making as often driven by pleasure and/or desire for what is absent—as devoid of conscientious deliberation about responsibility for consequent action. Diodotus, as we saw, allows very little room for rational thinking and argues that, absorbed and empowered through collective participation (μετὰ πάντων), the individual makes decisions unreasonably (ἀλογίστως). He also characterizes the Athenians as listeners who make hasty decisions and who, when encountering a reversal, give way to their first impulse/anger by punishing their adviser instead of taking responsibility for communal erroneous decisions.

Cleon, on the other hand, allows for rationality within emotion, namely the *gnômê* that stimulates emotional response. To him, competing emotions reveal competing *gnômai*. It is inability to form sound judgments that results in ill-advised emotional responses and irresponsible action. In his version of the *dêmos'* inability to think and feel responsibly, he accuses the Athenians of being θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων (spectators of speeches and listeners of deeds), who do not care about facts that offer a trustworthy basis for judgment, but are slaves of paradoxes (τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων) (3.38.4–5), as alluded to above. He argues:

> καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα, ζητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς· ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.
>
> You are as quick to anticipate what is said as you are slow to foresee what will come of it. You seek, one might say, a world quite unlike that in which we live, but give too little heed to that which is at hand. In a word, you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators at exhibitions of sophists than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state. (3.38.6–7)

When Cleon advocated holding on to anger, he argued that it would preserve the perceptive judgment that triggered it, the fact that the Athenians suffered undeservedly in the hands of their allies (ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πάσχειν). It would thus result in responsible policy and would counter the *dêmos'* emotional tendency to passive participatory pleasure. Such collective pleasure,

akin as it is to that felt by uncritical spectators in the theater or sophistic competitions, subdues the mind. It weakens or eradicates passionate deliberation that leads to realistic assessment, active decision making, and responsible action on behalf of the city-state and its interest.

In addressing the contribution of emotion to *euboulia*, both Cleon and Diodotus argue against the advisability of invoking pity in order to motivate policy regarding allies in revolt. In the case of Diodotus, however, pity is essentially reintroduced. Diodotus glosses over his call to pity with his discussion of human nature and, consequently, with his proposal to establish a less violent policy that will function as a deterrent in the future. Addressing the politics of pity, Cleon earlier argued that only *homoioi*, equals in power and those who share a common ideology, deserve pity because of their ability and willingness to reciprocate it. Leaving ideology temporarily aside, Diodotus turns to a different type of 'similarity', that of human nature under the compulsion of passion. Building on that, he constructs an argument against harsh punishment as a deterrent policy. The type of responsible action that Diodotus requires of the collective body of the Athenians inevitably results in a more empathetic policy, even if such a policy is pursued for the sake of expedience.[56]

Even as Diodotus argues that the assembly ought to make a decision based on expedient policy rather than to hold a trial about just conduct, he echoes the terminology that the Mytileneans themselves use to define *philia*—as opposed to *xummachia* based on fear. In an earlier address to the Spartans, as discussed above, the Mytileneans had accused the Athenians of masking an attack of (using) force against them (ἐφόδῳ ἰσχύος) with an attack based on policy (ἐφόδῳ γνώμης). In true interstate *philia*, they claimed, it is good will (εὔνοια) that ensures good faith (πίστις). Diodotus now calls for good counsel (εὐβουλία) that would replace an attack of force pursued with lack of understanding or recklessness (ἄνοια): ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ' ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιών (for he who is wise in counsel is stronger against the foe than he who recklessly rushes on with brute force, 3.48.2). He asks, in other words, to substitute an attack of force with a policy that shows good

56 In his discussion of the relationship between pity and politics, Konstan (2005) makes a similar argument by focusing primarily on dramas of supplication as well as looking at historical examples including the Mytilenean Debate. Because pity is based on considerations of whether suffering is deserved, he argues, conventional ideas of what counts as lawful are relevant to the emotion of pity. Since, however, consideration of self-interest is what becomes central in political deliberation, "the only way to introduce a concern for what is right is to argue that defending the *nomima* or conventional laws is itself to the community's interest" (54).

counsel and good will. By voting in favor of Diodotus' proposal, the Athenians opt for a type of alliance that approximates *philia*.[57] The answer, then, to the question whether *euboulia* is devoid of emotion ought to be negative. In my reading, pity informs the good counsel that Diodotus promotes.[58]

Both speakers attempt to direct collective emotion by defining it and analyzing the rationale that it reflects. In so doing, they point to shortcomings in collective decision making that they see as mutually reinforcing and intrinsic to its nature. They both suggest that a) the *dêmos* as a whole tends to be moved by the wrong emotions, and that b) as a member of a collective body, the individual loses sight of his personal responsibility. In this portrayal of emotional disposition, they call attention to a pleasure in and aspiration for what is absent and unseen, stimulated by 'watching' speeches (Cleon) or visualized through the instigation of *erôs* and hope (Diodotus). Aesthetics thus plays a significant role in stimulating the collective imagination and collective feeling, creating a particular perspective, and consequently influencing decisions on policy. As they articulate their acute awareness of the tendency of the *dêmos* to indulge in such pleasure, both speakers demonstrate that they are attentive to it.[59] Perhaps this helps to explain why Diodotus prevails in the debate, with his evocative personification of *erôs* and hope, the former of which is presented as leading the way and contriving a plan for action, while the latter follows along and offers ill-advised encouragement. At the very moment that it denies or explains empathy away, Diodotus' narrative succeeds in evoking it and thereby effecting a more empathetic policy.[60] His highly visual speech wins the day

57 Cogan (1981) argues that with the Mytilenean debate we also have a shift in the politics of the war. From now on, ideology will consistently define policy. The Athenian state will pursue alliances not with governments but with political factions so that "the allies can be kept close to Athens by cultivating the political sympathies which exist between the democratic factions of the subject cities and Athens" (12).

58 For the opposite interpretation, see, e.g., Price (2001) 89–100. Price argues that Diodotus is not being coy about proposing action that fits with a humane sense of justice. Rather, his policy is radical and counterintuitive because it asks a society to violate its own standards of justice, while its leniency does little to soften the difficulty of such violation (100). Lateiner (2005) 80–4 too argues that Thucydides "does not credit the Athenians with impressive pity or mercy" (84).

59 Regarding Cleon's performance, see, e.g., Rood's reading (1998) 147–149 according to which Cleon "is falsely adopting a Periclean pose", actually panders to the *dêmos* while abusing them for their enthrallment to debate, and insidiously appeals "to latent fears and distrust of those who preen themselves on their intelligence".

60 Pelling (2009) 187 argues that Thucydides chooses the speeches that make wider points than just argue in support or against pity but finds other ways to show that pity mattered:

and leads to a policy that claims to be more expedient and certainly is more humane.

The debate, then, indicates that only consistent renegotiation and conscientious deliberation can remedy the lack of responsibility with which the two speakers charge their audience. It also recommends a place for pity by redefining its connection with self-interest. If Diodotus covertly encourages empathy, as I argue, then empathetic involvement results in both a better understanding of self-interest and a more ethical policy. Thucydides' text as a whole, "shows that actual political behavior was much more complex and various than just 'selfish human nature writ large'. The simple realization that humans tend to seek their own interests was only one part of a larger socio-political equation".[61] The degenerative social pathology that prevails during *stasis* and disease does not always persist, since "Athens retained the capacity to act cohesively as a community throughout the plague era and recovered from the revolutionary period of 411".[62] Empathy, I suggest, constitutes the flip side of the social pathology that plays into the sociopolitical equation.

The depiction of pity in the narrative of the plague—the other instance where the workings of pity are addressed explicitly—will help to clarify my argument. During the plague, only the survivors show pity for and assist those suffering or dying, "because they had learned what it meant and were themselves by this time confident of immunity" (2.51.6). They also feel so empowered, that they cherish an empty hope (ἐλπίδος κούφης) that never again will fatal disease afflict them. Pity, then, in both the narrative of the plague and the Mytilenean debate remains ambivalent—and multifaceted. In the former, it encompasses both a deep understanding of the state of those afflicted and a misled sense of empowerment through a belief in everlasting immunity. In the latter, it is glossed over but contributes to the final decision that combines expedience with a more humane treatment of the opponent. This ambivalence indicates that pity consistently involves a sliver of self-assurance, gratification, and benefit for the pitier while remaining invested in helping the sufferer. It thus helps redefine the pursuit of self-interest in terms that create the potential for equal treatment and reciprocity.[63]

"he will remind us of such sentiments again at its conclusion, when the ship of executioners is sailing slowly and unenthusiastically 'to its outlandish task'. [...] speech and narrative setting inextricably combine into a wider, and much more suggestive, whole".

61 Ober (2006) 145.

62 Ibid.

63 My interpretation overlaps with Lebow's analysis of the relationship between ethics and interest. Lebow (2003) 283 argues that "a demonstrable commitment to justice can create

3.2 *The Sicilian Expedition*

When we turn to the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenians are shown to enact Diodotus' portrayal of emotional human nature. *Erôs, elpis*, and intense fear prevail at different stages of the narrative, while pity is both experienced and evoked at the end of the expedition.[64] A notable emphasis on seeing, moreover, takes the aesthetics of Cleon and Diodotus to a new level. The narrative foregrounds the experience of *opsis* and the development of literal and metaphorical points of view. It thus highlights, I suggest, the very process of how different types of rationale develop behind collective passion, and how collective passion, in turn, reinforces or undermines such rationale. By vividly conveying this process, the account of the Sicilian expedition raises a question that recurs in Thucydides' portrayal of democratic processes: how can true emotional (and therefore ideological) cohesion be promoted within and for the democratic community?

When the Athenians gather to deliberate in preparation for the expedition, Nicias attempts to convince them to renounce their original decision altogether. He calls specifically on the older men not to suffer the younger men's disease, their "morbid craving for what is out of reach (δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων), knowing that few successes are won by greed but very many by foresight" (6.13.1). He also asks the president of the assembly to put the issue to the vote again, and thus become a physician (ἰατρός) who can cure the state (6.14). Alcibiades' speech, however, intensifies the *dêmos'* desire for the expedition, as does, paradoxically, Nicias' subsequent exaggeration of the preparation and expenditure that the expedition will require.[65] As Diodotus pointed out in

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and maintain the kind of community that allows actors to translate power into influence in efficient ways". Justice in his argument provides the conceptual framework according to which actors can construct interest intelligently and thus sustain their power and influence. For a reading that turns to Thucydides and primarily Euripidean tragedy to examine altruism as a construct in the Athenian politics of democracy and empire, see Papadopoulou (2011). According to Papadopoulou, even though an altruistic image is related to Athens as a democratic state that helps the oppressed, it is also used as "a fine-sounding pretext" during Athens' development into an empire and its determination to enforce her sovereignty and superiority. Euripides' plays such as the *Phoenician Women* point to the dangers of a foreign policy of expediency and call for genuine devotion to civic interest (403–44).

64 In interpretations that view Thucydides' conception of history as informed by tragedy, the defeat at Sicily constitutes Athens' tragic fall from great prosperity and power, which leads (or fails to lead) to knowledge through *anagnôrisis*. For references, see n. 1.

65 Wohl (2002) 196 argues that Nicias represents Athens's imperial *erôs* as a fever that will kill the polis while Alcibiades sees it as the force that keeps Athens alive. But as the narrative

the Mytilenean debate, when human nature is passionately bent on a course, no terror (δεινόν) can dissuade it. Instead of being discouraged, the Athenians "were far more bent upon it [...] and upon all alike fell an eager desire to sail" (πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο [...] καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι, 6.24.2–3). Thucydides emphasizes the force and contagiousness of collective feeling. The aberrant desire (δυσέρως) to sail that is short-sighted and excessive infects everyone like a disease (ἐνέπεσε). When individuals consider expressing their objections, "on account of the exceeding eagerness of the majority" (διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλειόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, 6.24.4), they refrain out of fear that their motives will be falsely interpreted as disloyalty to the common cause. The majority's passion stifles opposition. This depiction reminds the reader of the conditions of violent *stasis*. During the *stasis* at Corcyra, moderation is eclipsed by outright collective violence (3.82.8). In the current circumstances emotional imposition takes the place of violent acts. Thus the eagerness to take on the expedition spreads like disease and thrives on the passions that sustain political *stasis*.

Passionate desire akin to Diodotus' earlier depiction of *erôs* and hope seem also to combine with an interesting transmutation of *stasis*. While all Athenians are unified by their aberrant *erôs* to sail, different hopes and desires motivate different segments of the population: the older men believe that they will subdue the places they are embarking against or, at the very least, that they will not be defeated. The young ones long for "sight and *theôria*" (πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας), in good hopes that they will obtain a safe return. And the great multitude eagerly desires to make profit in the present and to secure resources for the future (6.24.3–4). Passionate desire and hope indeed lead the way. But they both are misleading, based as they are on false evaluation of the dangers lying ahead.

These differing views regarding the potential rewards of the expedition reveal the absence of a cohesive vision that is overlooked under the disorienting influence of shared passion.[66] Among the goals that Thucydides voices, the desire for *opsis* and *theôria* is particularly telling.[67] The younger soldiers conceive of this military expedition as a theoric journey. Andrea Nightingale

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progresses, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate *erôs* from *thanatos*.

66 Ober (1998) 114 calls this erotic desire "[a] myth of perfect unity [that] possessed the Athenians". See also Said (2013) 216–217.

67 The use of the term θεωρία is certainly marked. With one exception (4.93.1), all other occurences of θεωρία, θεωρός, and θεωρεῖν in Thucydides refer to institutional *theôria*, namely to sending deputies to games and festivals or to consult oracles. See: 3.104.3, 5.16.2, 5.18.2, 5.47.9, 5.50.2, 6.3.1, 6.16.2, 8.10.1.

has shown that, though varied in character (religious, civic, individual), and monitored by political and religious institutions to different degrees, theoric journeys involve detachment from the city and potentially have a profound effect on the *theôros*:[68]

> [T]he defining feature of *theôria* in its traditional forms is a journey to a region outside the boundaries of one's own city for the purpose of witnessing some sort of spectacle or learning about the world. *Theôria* involves 'autopsy' or seeing something for oneself: the *theôros* is an eyewitness whose experience differs radically from those who stay home and receive a mere report of the news. On the journey as well as at its destination, the *theôros* encounters something foreign and different. This encounter with the unfamiliar invites the traveler to look at his own city with different eyes.[69]

The language of *opsis* and *theôria* indicates that the younger soldiers view the expedition as a journey away from home that opens up the possibility of encountering alterity. The lack of familiarity entices them. At the same time, the anticipation of a *theôria*-like experience indicates how misled their perspective is: this is a military expedition that entails high financial and political risks. For this reason, not only will the spectacle be disenchanting; it will inevitably require direct involvement in ways that go well beyond theoric participation. It will thus force upon them a perspective that unifies them with their fellow-combatants and will indeed make everyone look at their city with different eyes.[70]

As *duserôs* builds on and further enhances miscalculation, disorienting emotions only continue to proliferate during the expedition. Fear that leads to disorder dominates a number of episodes in Sicily. Especially in the final battles that result in the retreat of the Athenians, fear and panic take over. The battles at Epipolae and at the harbor and the Athenian retreat become emblematic of the Athenian state of mind and the nature of the war. At Epipolae, most signs of difference lose their efficacy because of the time of the battle and the narrow space in which it takes place. Even though there is a full moon, the Athenians and their allies can see "the sight" of the bodies in front of them but cannot trust the recognition of fellow-soldiers as being their friends

68 Nightingale (2004) 40–71.

69 Ibid., 68.

70 Wohl (2002) 195 views this *theôria* as a type of "imperial speculation" that promises to save the Athenians from the exhaustive struggle of their imperial tyranny.

(τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι, 7.44.2). They make the watchword known to the enemy as they shout in an attempt to reach more of their allies. And every time the Argives, the Corcyreans, or any Dorian contingent of the Athenian army raises the paean, the Athenians become terrified because they think that the enemy is ready to attack. Thus in their own ranks, the Athenians experience *stasis* fraught with fear, disorder, and killing of kin:

> ὥστε τέλος ξυμπεσόντες αὑτοῖς κατὰ πολλὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ἐπεὶ ἅπαξ ἐταράχθησαν, φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο. καὶ διωκόμενοι κατά τε τῶν κρημνῶν πολλοὶ ῥίπτοντες ἑαυτοὺς ἀπώλλυντο.
>
> And so finally, when once they had been thrown into confusion, coming into collision with their own comrades in many different parts of the army, friends with friends and citizens with fellow-citizens, they not only became panick-stricken but came to blows with one another and were with difficulty separated. And as they were pursued by the enemy many hurled themselves down from the bluffs and perished. (7.44.7–8)

The inability to acquire clear knowledge and a unified vision during the decision-making process for the expedition is echoed by its literal instantiation during the battle. The Athenians and their allies prove unable to see who is who on the battlefield: *opsis* itself fails and does not translate into *gnôsis*. Thus they lack the literal vision that would allow for successful collaboration and mutual support.[71]

Great confusion also dominates the final battle at the harbor. The terminology of *opsis* and spectacle becomes prominent, as the Athenians on shore watch the fight at sea. Because the spectacle is now too close to its gathered viewers (δι᾽ ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπούντων: for since the spectacle they were witnessing was near at hand and not all were looking at the same point at the same time, 7.71.3), different perspectives develop that

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71 For a sophisticated analysis of how Thucydides uses vision, perspective, clarity, and similar concepts in this narrative as well as other "theaters of war" to draw "a parallel between the conditions of the military struggle and his own historical endeavor", see Greenwood (2006) 36 and 19–41. Walker (1993) similarly views especially the *mise en abyme* in the scene of the harbor that I discuss below and the representation of the spectator in it as emblematic of the historian at work and his "struggle to attain a 'complete vision' of contemporary history" (372).

elicit different emotional responses and contribute to the spreading confusion. The soldiers able to see only the Athenians who prevail in the battle take heart (ἀνεθάρσησαν). Those who see a portion of the army defeated loudly lament (ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο), as they grow more fearful than the fighters themselves through the mere sight of the events and become "enslaved with regard to their *gnômê*" (ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐδουλοῦντο). And there is a third category of viewers:

> Others, again, whose gaze was fixed on some part of the field where the battle was evenly balanced, on account of the long-drawn uncertainty of the conflict were in a continual state of most distressing suspense, their very bodies swaying, in the extremity of their fear, in accord with their opinion of the battle (καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες ἐν τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διῆγον). (7.71.3)

Thus 'autopsy' through *opsis* is powerful enough to set bodies in motion in a literal sense, at the same time that it shapes points of view (δόξα, γνώμη) and emotional states. The men fighting on board become, in turn, similarly affected.[72] As was the case at Epipolae, the inability to develop a unified perspective reflects both inadequate positioning (in real space) and false perception and evaluation.[73] Defeat, however, eventually unifies the Athenian army's points of view: ὁ δὲ πεζὸς οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὁρμῆς οἰμωγῇ τε καὶ στόνῳ πάντες, δυσανασχετοῦντες τὰ γιγνόμενα (with one impulse all broke forth into wailing and groaning, being scarcely able to bear what was happening, 7.71.6). The collective impulse to grieve replaces the initial collective *erôs*, but the new passion is based on true knowledge. United in defeat the Athenians and their allies can clearly see where their miscalculations lay.

In the rest of the narrative, the emphasis shifts to suffering that creates a truly shared perspective. Such a perspective is not only communal; it is also accurate. As the Athenians depart, each one of them sees things that are painful to both sight and mind (τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι). Pain (λύπη) and fear (φόβος) seize them (7.75.2–3). They come across corpses and the sick and wounded whom they have to abandon despite their persistent entreaties and lamentation, and who cause them more pity and pain than do the dead.

72 de Romilly (2012) 95–97 compares Thucydides' technique in creating *pathos* in the scene with that used in tragedy "to describe the way participants feel themselves affected by events" (95).

73 See also Greenwood (2006) esp. 38–40.

> ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν. κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ.
>
> The whole army, being filled with grief and in such perplexity, found it hard to depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had endured already sufferings too great for tears and feared for the future what they might still have to suffer. There was also a general feeling of dejection and much self-condemnation. For indeed they looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city. (7.75.4–5)
>
> καὶ μὴν ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κούφισιν, οὐδ’ ὣς ῥᾳδία ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφίκατο. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο.
>
> Furthermore, the rest of their misery and the equal sharing of their ills—although there was in this very sharing with many some alleviation—did not even so seem easy at the moment, especially when one considered from what splendor and boastfulness at first to what a humiliating end they had now come. For this was indeed the very greatest reversal that had ever happened to a Hellenic armament. (7.75.6–7)

The disastrous outcome of the Sicilian expedition unites all the soldiers in the suffering that they experience in equal share (ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν). The emphasis on the reversal of Athenian fortune brings home the magnitude of their initial miscalculation and their shared learning through recognition. The army in Sicily of course does not comprise the whole Athenian *dêmos*. But the soldiers represent Athens literally and metaphorically: Thucydides compares them with a city in secret flight, “and that no small city”.[74]

74 In his attempt to encourage the soldiers as they begin to retreat, Nicias too points to the analogy between the army and the citizen-body: he urges them to be brave so as to raise up again the power of their city—“because it is men that make a state, not walls nor ships without men” (7.77.7). On the metonymic relationship between soldiers and city-state and how the spatial contingencies that define Athens “structure both the narrative of the city’s transcendent power and the reality of its eventual defeat”, see Bassi (2007) 196–7.

The grand reversal in Sicily also points to the correspondence between misguided opinion and passion. Though shared, the (*dus*)*erôs* that drives the Athenian assembly passionately to pursue the expedition is also a desire to succeed in diverse goals. At the same time, such *erôs* is not in itself necessarily an irrational passion, as the terminology of disease would initially suggest. To the motives that I have pointed out, David Smith adds ten more reasons that incite the Athenians' collective desire. "The over-abundance of points of view about Sicily and the reasons for invading it given throughout the beginning of Book Six are consciously designed to make the reader feel like [the Athenians] are not sure what the real reason was".[75] This over-abundance reveals that the Athenians rely on knowledge that cannot be trusted. Instead of using systematic observation, they trust in information they have accumulated from hearsay, gossip, and the dramatic stage.[76] Ober similarly argues that Thucydides establishes for his readers "the existence of a fatal structural flaw in the edifice of democratic ways of knowing and doing and this flaw is a key to his criticism of Athenian popular rule".[77] These readings point to the flawed knowledge behind the powerful passions that motivate decision making in the assembly and consequent action. The passages that I discussed above bring to the battlefield itself the habits of the *dêmos* and emphasize its flaws. By presenting this perspective in literal terms, that is, by connecting it with the (in)ability to see while in the dark or in proximity even to fellow-citizens and allies, Thucydides' text undermines the sharp divide between reason and emotion, especially in the context of shared experience. And the causality is difficult to trace: fear does skew the perspective of both combatants and their spectators. But it is their limited view (and already skewed perspective) that instigates and sustains their fear. Thus the narrative of the defeat in Sicily throws into sharp relief the challenges of 'seeing' together—of developing an accurate perspective that allows a collective body competently to judge, feel, and act as a cohesive group.

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75 Smith (2004) 47. Lamari (2013) 296–300 looks at the different focalizers that Thucydides uses to convey the true causes of the Sicilian expedition—what she calls cross-references of diverse focalization—and argues that this narrative technique expands the narratees' interpretive spectrum (300) and contributes to turning them into critical readers (307).

76 Smith, ibid.

77 For Ober (1993) such structural flaw stems from the competitive context of decision making in the assembly. Since speakers compete to win the vote of the *dêmos*, they can be neither objective nor impartial. Therefore Thucydides' own epistemology based on laborious historical investigations is to be contrasted with the epistemologically flawed rhetoric of public speakers. See esp. pp. 90–92 and 97–8.

4 Closing Thoughts: Collective Emotion—Potential and Shortcomings

Thucydides' depiction of collective emotion undermines, I have argued, the sharp divide between reason and passion—*gnômê* and *orgê*. By pointing to the ways in which the *dêmos* acquires, disseminates, and acts on knowledge, the *History* suggests that it is difficult to discern the precise workings of emotional experience: whether it is (unreflective) emotion that leads to ill-advised deliberation and action or misinformed reasoning that produces and perpetuates emotions that further feed shortsighted decisions. Overall, however, emotional responses are shown to be processes that include evaluation based on belief, pleasure or pain, and a sense of attachment that equips emotional experience with motivational force for action.

This sense of attachment refers not only to diverse types of cherished relations but also to membership in a collective group. In addition to the pain or pleasure that accompany emotions such as fear, pity, and *erôs*, Thucydides' text suggests a pleasure experienced through participation in a collectivity. Thus participation in the *dêmos* or the army has an experiential dimension that, partly because of the pleasure it affords, strengthens the bonds among its members and helps to create coherent ideology. Shared decisions and ideology, in turn, can reinforce such an attachment. It is the combination of the cognitive and the experiential aspects of collective emotion that leads to the translation of emotional experience into action, and to the definition of the type of action to be taken in each case. At the same time, however, Thucydides alerts us to the fact that shared emotion can also conceal, intentionally or unintentionally, diverse ideological goals and, in the long run, undermine political cohesion.

Regarding the tragic emotions more specifically, Thucydides attributes to both fear and pity a significant role in communal life within Athens and in international politics. Within Athenian democracy well-balanced fear is thought of as securing respect for law and fellow-citizens and contributing to the cultivation of transparency and trust. Challenging circumstances, however, show that such balance is a hard-won emotional state. It requires openness, continuous contestation, and a sublimation or cultivation of fear itself in order to render it more sensible and conducive to beneficial decision making. In this context, considerations of equal and just treatment both within the state and in interstate politics become central. Negotiating fear consistently brings to the center of political debate ethical questions regarding the nature and cultivation of social and political cohesion.

The case of pity is less explicit and thus more controversial. The narratives of the plague and the Mytilenean debate suggest that, even though human

nature tends to be associated with the more vehement and self-regarding emotions, pity can also be seen as one of the fundamental human propensities. Pity/empathy itself is not shown as wholly altruistic. It does not eliminate altogether self-oriented action. It rather renders self-assurance (because of the empowerment experienced through supporting others) conducive to collective welfare (through the enactment of support) and stronger social attachments. Understood in this way, empathy essentially influences individual and collective action in a manner that renders self-interest of service to the community at large. Scholarly work on pity in 5th c. Athens has pointed out that while pity is often presented as needed or desired, it is also seen as easily manipulated because it lacks a rigorous intellectual basis. If my interpretation of Thucydides' depiction of pity stands, it calls for a cultivation of pity and a realization of its potential to integrate self- and collective interest.

This need to sublimate and cultivate the passions is communicated not only through the explicit praise of leaders like Pericles but also through a choice of language in Thucydides' narrative that communicates the inextricability of literal and metaphorical perspective. I discussed this aesthetic element more extensively in my analysis of the Sicilian expedition but, even though less developed, it is exploited in other narratives as well. In all cases proximity (spatial and chronological) and/or *opsis* define literal and metaphorical perspective, the intensity of emotional response, and action. The *nosos* falls upon the Athenians unexpectedly and while they are constrained to live in close quarters. It is such proximity and inescapability that affects both their bodies and their psychology the most. The *dêmos* subsequently fines Pericles while the pain of personal loss remains too close to home, namely before their anger against him is "blunted" (ἀμβλύτεροι) through time. In the case of Mytilene, the Athenians reconsider their decision to punish harshly the Mytileneans, when they gain some (chronological) distance from their own anger that, once again, renders it "blunted" (ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ). They, moreover, make their final decision after having been spectators of the speeches by Cleon and Diodotus, the latter of which provides a narrative in which the emotions themselves are personified and come to life. Last, the Sicilian expedition is motivated by a desire for what is far and not clearly seen (δυσέρως τῶν ἀπόντων). And the spatial and time-related constraints during the major battles consistently challenge the ability of the participants to see clearly and thus trigger intense fear and misdirected tactics. Thus they also come to revise their perspective on the expedition overall. In all these narratives, what is consistently presented as being at stake is perceiving or creating for oneself as an individual and as a member of a collective group the (real and theoretical) parameters necessary for a well-informed perspective. Or to put it differently, the challenge is to posi-

tion oneself so as to assess both the accuracy of perceived information and the appropriateness of the emotional response that it triggers. While Thucydides is particularly critical of the *dêmos* and the army in the Sicilian Expedition, once again his narrative undermines the dichotomy between *gnômê* and *orgê* and foregrounds 'perspective-taking' as a process that involves—and ought to involve—the fine-tuning and integration of both. This is especially the case for a collective body like the Athenian *dêmos* since its very collectivity and what I have called 'participatory pleasure' profoundly influence the nature and success of such integration. Critical ability and emotional perceptiveness go hand in hand. Emotional response throws erring judgment into sharp relief only because it transforms it into action.

Thus collective emotion in the institutions of the democracy reflects ideas and attachments at the same time that it shapes them. The same is the case for collective emotion in Thucydides' text. By presenting how collective emotion operates as well as the challenges that it poses to political life, the *History* conveys the need both to retain its motivational power and to devise the (aesthetic) distance necessary to render emotion reflective and sensible. For Thucydides only Pericles can meet this need.[78] In 5th c. Athens, a different democratic institution offers the venue for recasting similar concerns regarding the role of emotion in public life: tragic choruses collectively enact powerful emotion in plots that replicate the challenges raised by war, disease, and *stasis* that we find in Thucydides. As will become apparent in the following chapters, the choruses that I examine effect an expansion of affective sensibilities (both their own and those of their interlocutors) that leads to various types of sublimation and institutionalization of collective emotion within the plays. They thus offer alternate paradigms for incorporating and thinking about emotion in public life—within and outside the fictive world of the plays. The Thucydidean call for the expansion of individual and collective perspective is taken to a different level.

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78 As Ober (1998) 121 and other scholars point out, it is worth noting that despite the historian's criticism of democratic practices and his conviction about the unsustainability of Athenian democracy, the democracy was restored after both 411 and 404 and endured for eighty more years.

CHAPTER 3

Emotion in Aeschylus' Active Choruses

1 Defining Active Choruses

I begin my study of choral discourse by focusing on active choruses and primarily fear. I employ the term 'active' in two different ways. First, I use it in the intuitive sense as referring to choruses that participate actively in the dramatic plot. As actors, these female choruses perform a role different from the more common kind of choral participation that consists primarily in responding to the events in the plays. The Aeschylean choruses that I discuss move the action of the plays forward and thus inevitably trigger emotional and other responses. Second, these choruses are active insofar as they specifically (attempt to) instigate fear and perform an extensive discourse about the content and function of this emotion. The choruses of Erinyes and suppliant women in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and *Supplices* respectively are unique in the extant corpus for performing this role intentionally.[1] Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, on the other hand, brings on stage a chorus of Theban maidens that spread fear in the city unintentionally but also choose to elaborate extensively on such fear. In the *Supplices* and the *Seven*, I also examine the choruses' attempt to evoke pity and the close relationship between fear and pity.

Before I proceed to the plays, some clarifications on 'active' choruses are necessary. Despite the apparent overlap of using the concept of the chorus as actor with the well-known Aristotelian statement about the ideal treatment of

1 The Erinyes are also divine, which adds to their uniqueness. The choice of these particular choruses does not imply that all other choruses are passive or take no intentional action. In the *Oresteia* itself, for instance, the choruses of the first two plays are active to different degrees and in different ways. The elders in the *Agamemnon* not only perform lyrics that dominate the play; they also attempt to resist the new regime established by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus in the final scene. The female chorus of the *Choephoroi* contributes significantly (in terms of emotional and motivational support) to the preparation of Orestes and Electra for the murder of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Already these examples indicate that what can be seen as choral action varies from play to play. As I explain in Chapter 1, I view the possibilities of choral action on a spectrum. The choruses examined in this chapter would occupy one end of the spectrum while the choruses of Chapter 4 would each fall in different positions along this spectrum. This study, therefore, aims to examine representative examples of different types of active choruses that offer valuable insights to the tragic emotions. On Aeschylean choruses and choral action, see also Foley (2003) 15–17.

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the chorus, my approach inevitably departs from and contrasts with Aristotle's understanding. In the *Poetics*, Sophocles famously sets the example for this ideal treatment: καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἕνα δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ (and one should treat the chorus as one of the actors; and it should be part of the whole and share in the contest not in the way it does with Euripides but in the way it does with Sophocles).[2] The precise meaning of the statement has been extensively debated.[3] While the chorus' relevance to the issues and action of any given play appears to be part of what Aristotle requires, Stephen Halliwell has systematically demonstrated that mere relevance cannot be sufficient in the Aristotelian theory of tragedy. Since Aristotle emphatically prioritizes the structure and unity of the plot, the demand for καὶ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου "can be seen to prescribe no mere thematic pertinence, but indispensable involvement in the action of the plot".[4] And since nowhere in Sophocles would the removal of the chorus seriously damage the unity of the plot, the chorus, Halliwell concludes, has essentially no place in Aristotle's theory.[5] In other words, the opaqueness of the philosopher's demand and the inability of the Aristotelian theory to explicate choral function stems from "the incompatibility between an identification of the Aristotelian plot-structure as 'the whole' of a drama and the distinctive character of choral lyrics as these are employed in much of the work of all three tragedians. *Melopoiia* is not reducible to the elements and standards of a play's action".[6] Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi, in turn, suggests

2 *Poetics* 1456a25–28. Scholars have debated the meaning of συναγωνίζεσθαι. Citing earlier interpretations, Else (1957) 552–553 argues that we should keep its usual meaning: "Ἀγωνίζεσθαι in the *Poetics*, like ἀγών, always refers concretely to the poets' competition at the Dionysia or Lenaea […] Συναγωνίζεσθαι here has precisely the same reference". Using Aristophanes' *Thesm.* 1060, where the verb has its literal meaning "helped him in the contest", Lucas (1968) 193 suggests that "here the sense must be 'make a positive contribution to the play'". I retain the literal meaning of the infinitive in my translation. Even so, "being part of the whole" remains the most significant part for my reading according to which the chorus, like the actors, has to be organically integrated in the plot of the play. See also Else (1957) 553.

3 See, e.g., Else (1957) 551–560 and Halliwell (1986) 238–252.

4 Halliwell (1986) 243.

5 See ibid., 250: "Aristotle's theory of poetry and tragedy virtually dictate the devaluation and neglect of choral lyric. If that is right, then it is reasonable to conclude that the end of ch. 18 is an inchoate attempt at rationalization, an attempt to bring *melopoiia* into line with the thrust of the theory as a whole, but one whose formulation effectively confirms that the treatise's chief principles implicitly slight the lyric dimension of the tragedian's art".

6 Ibid., 248. For a reading of the chorus in Sophocles that confirms Aristotle's statement about the Sophoclean chorus, see Goldhill (2012) *passim*, and especially his discussion of the *kommos* in the *Antigone, Electra*, and *Philoctetes*. Goldhill concludes his analysis by suggesting:

that "this quite opaque desideratum can be interpreted as Aristotle's way of restoring the chorus' role in the tragic play, which by his time was marginalized to performing musical interludes between the acts".[7] She points out, however, that, even if the chorus is an integral part of the plot just like an actor, Aristotle does not explain how the distinctive choral medium (one of the 'garnishings', the ἡδύσματα, of tragedy) differentiates its very mode of participation.[8] Both of these approaches eloquently bring out that Aristotle may have been particularly uncomfortable with choruses such as the ones we find in Aeschylus' *Eumenides, Supplices*, and *Seven*, where precisely the chorus, speaking or singing and dancing, defines the development of the plot. Whether this discomfort stems from his own experience of the plays and/or the fundamentals of his aesthetic theory, is difficult to determine.[9]

At the same time, the absence of any reference to the Aeschylean chorus in particular requires further attention. Donald Mastronarde's discussion in his study of Euripides is particularly illuminating in this regard. In his reading of the Aristotelian stipulation for the ideal chorus, Mastronarde suggests that the philosopher calls for "a close participation of the chorus in the emotional ups and downs of the plot-sequence".[10] He points out that the term συναγωνίζεσθαι "may suggest either something as active and assertive as joining a contest or battle as an ally with someone else against a third party, or something less active such as providing some form of aid or assistance to a party who is under pressure. The common motif of choral sympathy would suggest that the milder sense is the appropriate one".[11] Euripides' choruses are, consequently, not preferred by Aristotle because they tend to be "less immediately emotionally engaged in the action" while in Sophocles we find "a fuller integration of

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"In each case, the chorus enacts a dialogue which shifts, develops, and plays through a power relation. It is an exchange which redeploys the form of another choral institution to construct a dramatic dialogue of intensity and purpose, central in each case to the plotting of the play and to the evaluation of the characters' behavior. Here is one way we can see what Aristotle meant by saying that Sophocles used the chorus as an actor" (132).

7 Peponi (2013a) 25.

8 Ibid.

9 For the most recent contributions to the debate about the theatrical realities that possibly shaped Aristotle's 4th c. overall perspective on 5th c. (Old) tragedy, see the dialogue between Wise (2008) and (2013) and Hanink (2011) with further references. See also Chapter 1, n.43. Wiles (2011) 45 on the other hand views Aristotle's neglect of chorality in particular as "a stance born of opposition to fourth-century democracy".

10 Mastronarde (2010) 146.

11 Ibid., 147.

the emotional stance of the chorus into the emotional dynamic of the plot as a whole".[12]

Mastronarde seems to suggest that Aristotle begins from a premise that excludes, by definition, the more intuitively active choruses. If choral action for Aristotle equals emotional response, participation that is integral to the dramatic plot can only be defined in terms of the degree of choral response and engagement. From this point of view, even though the removal of the choruses of Erinyes, Danaids, and Theban women from the *Eumenides, Supplices*, and *Seven* respectively would not only damage the unity of the plot but would also deprive the plays of their central actors, their choral function falls outside the Aristotelian definition of choral action as response.[13] The *Poetics*, therefore, necessarily disregards the Aeschylean choruses that I discuss here.[14]

What renders choruses active in the surviving plays thus requires us to step away from the *Poetics*. Helene Foley suggests that choral action varies among

12 Ibid., 150. For this reading of choral emotional participation, Mastronarde also sees in the term *agôn* in the compound *sunagônizesthai* the suggestion of *agônia*, "the tension and anxiety that a chorus (and an audience) shares with the main agents of the drama". With regard to Sophocles in particular, Goldhill (2012), however, redefines what an 'actor-chorus' means. See n.6 above. He argues that in his later plays Sophocles develops a technique that makes for active choruses in new ways by exploring "the interaction of a protagonist and the collective of the chorus from the very first moment in fully dramatic, engaged exchanges, a technique quite different from any extant Aeschylean play" (120).

13 The reasons for this exclusion may vary. As mentioned earlier, Peponi (2013a) points to the fact that Aristotle includes *melos* as one of the 'garnishings' of tragedy; it is possible then that the prominence and nature of Aeschylean *melos* is harder to address. Halliwell (1986) 247 reminds us that Aristotle's approach to the Aeschylean chorus may have to do with his developmental scheme of tragedy. Aeschylus works with the tragic medium before it reaches its maturity, which leads to the paradox that "it is only when the chorus has been reduced in status and subordinated to a plot-structure of spoken scenes that the question of its proper integration into the design of the play can arise".

14 This idea of choral response to or support of the main actors is enhanced by the oft-quoted passage from the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* (19.48) according to which the Hypophrygian and the Hypodorian modes are appropriate only for the individual strong heroes and not for the chorus that is (or represents) the weak mass of the people. For the chorus is an inactive *kêdeutês* who offers its good will to those on stage (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ χορὸς κηδευτὴς ἄπρακτος· εὔνοιαν γὰρ μόνον παρέχεται οἷς πάρεστιν). The precise meaning of κηδευτής is not clear. Barker (1984) 203 translates as "attendant", Foley (2003) 14 n.60 suggests "attendant" or "caretaker", Mastronarde (2010) 146 and n.117 translates as "concerned friend". Foley recommends that we question the validity of ἄπρακτος. Mastronarde, on the other hand, argues that, even though this point may have been exaggerated in the postclassical Greek critics, it is based on a tendency that he sees as typical of the genre.

the three tragedians and has to be redefined in different plays. She argues that it "seems to depend less on a physical or moral incapacity to act than on a need for, or duty or inclination to accept, leadership or commitment in a range of specific contexts".[15] Choral attitudes toward leadership are indeed instrumental to the (emotional) activity of the choruses that I examine in this chapter. As already mentioned, I look at choral action in connection with the particular choruses' attempt or ability to instigate fear and, secondarily, pity. Examining Aeschylus' active choruses and (re)considering what renders a chorus active reveals, I suggest, an interesting range of ways and degrees of choral action and of choral integration in the plays as well as of the potential of choruses to instigate and theorize the emotions. It can thus highlight the creative elasticity of the category of active choruses and choruses more generally and offer unique insights into the workings of the tragic emotions.

2 Aeschylus, *Eumenides*

Justice (δίκη)—the sources, agents, and processes of judgment and punishment—is the central issue in the *Oresteia*. In the *Eumenides*, the Erinyes justify their pursuit of Orestes precisely by claiming that they strive for the establishment of *dikê*. By the end of the play and trilogy *dikê* denotes not only a broad notion of justice but also the enforcement of just conduct by means of a formal civic trial. The foundation of the Areopagus and the eventual reconciliation of the Erinyes with the new court put an end to the cycle of *dikê* as intrafamilial revenge and institutionalize punishment through a legal process that is accepted by all. Danielle Allen has shown some of the ways in which the newly established legal process remains passionate. We do not move from "prepolitical revenge" to "political punishment" that is devoid of passion.[16] "The trilogy models the transition from a situation where no particular method of responding to wrongdoing has authority to a system where one method of responding to wrongdoing can deal conclusively with social disruption".[17] When the transition is complete, the Areopagite style of judgment and the Semnai Theai retain and express anger in judgment. What changes is the legitimization of its use in the new system of justice.

15 Foley (2003) 14–19. Foley, for instance, sees both the capacity to act and engagement in lyric dialogue as different types of 'action'.

16 Allen (2000) 21.

17 Ibid., 23.

The following reading argues that the transition to a still passionate but authoritative judicial system also overlaps with a transition to a new type of fear. In the process of delineating the civic institutions that are to enforce justice and the divine forces that stand for these institutions, we witness a shift in the content and role of fear. The fear of incapacitating delirium that inflicts intense bodily pain and mental confusion and dominates the first part of the play evolves into a type of fear that appears—for lack of a better term—more rational. The belief basis of such fear is founded on a sober awareness of ethical scrutiny by a body of incorruptible, vigilant, and morally exceptional citizens, the members of the Areopagus. Fearing this group and the reformed Erinyes that eventually support it is presented as an ideal emotional disposition that stems from and consolidates respect for Athens' new institutions of justice, judicial and religious alike. With the establishment of the new court and the reconciliation of the hostile chorus, then, an ideal type of fear is also institutionalized and shared by all. The shift from one experience and conception of fear to the other—and it is a shift, not a wholesale redefinition—dramatizes, I suggest, a process of sublimation of fear by reconfiguring the dynamic between its affective and cognitive aspects. The purpose of such reconfiguration is to make use of the motivational power of fear in the legal system while defining the parameters that would make it normative and authoritative. My analysis traces precisely this shift in the content and role of fear.

The Erinyes markedly embody and perform their affective power, as this is consistently communicated through the reaction of the characters that encounter them. The fact that they are divinities enhances such power—and renders them a unique 'active' chorus—precisely by intensifying the impact of their presence. The mere sight of the Erinyes arouses fear that overwhelms perception and sets a tone of extreme emotionality that verges on irrationality. At the first glimpse of them, the Pythia exclaims that they are "terrible to tell and terrible to see" (ἦ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς δρακεῖν, 34).[18] Feeling almost 'annihilated' by her fear (δείσασα γὰρ γραῦς οὐδέν, ἀντίπαις μὲν οὖν: a frightened old woman is nothing—or rather no better than a little child!, 38), she comes out of the temple of Apollo crawling like a baby (39). When exactly the Erinyes become visible to the audience continues to be debated.[19] Even though

18 I use the text in Sommerstein (2008b) unless otherwise stated.

19 For a discussion of the different possibilities and their (earlier) supporters, see Taplin (1977) 369–374. The main staging suggestions can be summarized as: a) appearance of the Erinyes on the ἐκκύκλημα at l. 64, b) entry of the Erinyes at l. 140, and c) presence of the (sleeping) Erinyes on stage from the beginning of the play. To give some of the potential instantiations of these suggestions, e.g., Taplin (1977) argues that the chorus enters at

the textual indications of their first appearance are not conclusive, an early appearance of the chorus lying asleep in view of the audience would be particularly powerful.[20] The idea of initially having their faces (/masks) hidden is also attractive, since the perception of their faces defines the kind of fear they evoke. In this case, the gradual introduction of the Erinyes would powerfully communicate not only the shock and terror they inspire but also the impression that such response remains, to a certain extent, a matter of perspective.

The Erinyes' disgusting, unbearable appearance and their animal-like nature (46–59, 68–73, 192–195), the pursuit they undertake as fierce hunting that withers one away (137–139, 246–247), and their threats (264–268) aim precisely to inflict deranging fear on their victims. It soon becomes clear that the kind of fear that an agent of justice inspires reflects his position in the system of justice he participates in. Only in this first part of the play is the fear the Erinyes evoke emphatically connected with disgust.[21] The Pythia can find no words to describe the members of such "an extraordinary band" (θαυμαστὸς λόχος, 46) that resemble and, at the same time, do not resemble women, Gorgons, winged Harpies:

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l. 140 σποράδην. Until then, we can only hear the Erinyes, a choice that would build up to a highly dramatic moment when they appear in the orchestra. Sommerstein (1989) 93, 109 suggests that the ἐκκύκλημα is rolled out of the central door at l. 64, displaying the interior of the temple with the scene described by the Pythia: Orestes sitting on the floor and the Erinyes sleeping. The audience can see their dark clothing and the snakes in their hair and/or arms but not their faces. The rest of the Erinyes come out of the door of the *skênê* one by one at l. 142 until a full chorus of twelve is formed (ibid., 109). Last, Rehm (2002) 89 suggests that, in a cancelled entry, Orestes and the Furies take up their positions at the center of the orchestra where the *omphalos* is placed. The Pythia 'enters' the temple by walking into the orchestra, but, at the sight of them, she scrambles back upstage to describe a scene that remains visible to the audience but frozen in tableau. It is after Apollo arouses Orestes to leave for Athens that the image of Clytemnestra comes to wake the Furies in front of the audience.

20 Even though each one has a different emotional effect, both Sommerstein's and Rehm's suggestions above seem compelling for a number of reasons: l. 67 makes better sense if the Erinyes are on stage as does their exchange with Clytemnestra's image. An onstage emergence from sleep to violent song-dance and pursuit, moreover, can be as powerful as, if not more than, a late and long-awaited entrance.

21 Later in the play Apollo continues to be offensive but in different terms. See especially l. 644 where he addresses the Erinyes as "utterly loathsome beasts, hated by the gods" (ὦ παντομισῆ κνώδαλα, στύγη θεῶν). Sommerstein (1989) 204 points out that "the vulgarity of Apollo's reaction is without parallel in tragedy".

[...]· ἄπτεροί γε μὴν ἰδεῖν
αὗται, μέλαιναι δ', εἰς τὸ πᾶν βδελύκτροποι·
ῥέγκουσι δ' οὐ πλατοῖσι φυσιάμασιν,
ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων λείβουσι δυσφιλῆ λίβα·
καὶ κόσμος οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν ἀγάλματα
φέρειν δίκαιος οὔτ' ἐς ἀνθρώπων στέγας.
τὸ φῦλον οὐκ ὄπωπα τῆσδ' ὁμιλίας,
οὐδ' ἥτις αἶα τοῦτ' ἐπεύχεται γένος
τρέφουσ' ἀνατεὶ μὴ μεταστένειν πόνον.

[...] these ones, though, it is plain to see, don't have wings, and they're black and utterly nauseating. They are pumping out snores that one doesn't dare come near, and dripping a loathsome drip from their eyes. And their attire is one that it's not proper to bring either before the images of the gods or under the roofs of men. I have never seen the tribe to which this company belongs, nor do I know what country boasts that it has reared this race without harm to itself and does not regret the labor of doing so.[22] (51–59)

The Pythia's description intimates early on what will become explicit in Apollo's hostility toward the Erinyes: the chorus' snores don't allow anyone to approach them (οὐ πλατοῖσι), the drip from their eyes is hostile (δυσφιλής) and their company (ὁμιλία) is so frighteningly unique that it renders it impossible to view them as part of any broader community. Addressing Orestes, Apollo similarly describes the Erinyes as "abominable old maidens, aged virgins, with whom no god ever holds intercourse (οὐ μείγνυται), nor man nor beast either" (68–70).[23] As such, they are hateful (μισήματα) to both men and gods (73). Giving a list of detestable punishments they are associated with (186–190), his address to the Erinyes themselves is harsh, as he insists that beings like them cannot dwell among gods or men. The entire nature and manner of their appearance indicates that (πᾶς δ' ὑφηγεῖται τρόπος μορφῆς, 192–3). The emphasis on the abominable appearance of the chorus renders the fear they inspire a justification for exclusion. Interestingly, Athena too will later express surprise at the appearance of the Erinyes but will resist the language of disgust: "you resemble no race of begotten beings, neither among the goddesses who are beheld by gods, nor is your appearance similar to that of

22 Translations are by Sommerstein (2008b).

23 On the possibility that the Erinyes' appearance resembled that of bats, see Maxwell-Stuart (1973).

mortals—but to speak injuriously of another, when one has no cause to blame him, is a long way from what is right, and propriety keeps far from it" (410–4).

Strong aversion caused by disgust, bound up as it is with fear, points already to the question of what constitutes useful and productive emotionality for the institutions of justice. Contemporary debate about the use and reliability of disgust in defining law and legal practices raises the question of the cognitive, psychological, and social basis of disgust in addition to its visceral, evolutionary nature. Consistently associated with the notion of contamination, disgust becomes easily transferable from the bodily to the moral in order to create social hierarchies. "Most societies teach the avoidance of certain groups of people as physically disgusting, bearers of a contamination that the healthy element of society must keep at bay".[24] More specifically, "[t]hroughout history, certain disgust properties—sliminess, bad smell, stickiness, decay, foulness—have repeatedly and monotonously been associated with, indeed projected onto, groups by reference to whom privileged groups seek to define their superior human status".[25] Apollo's insistence on the disgusting appearance of the Erinyes has a similar function.[26] By foregrounding their hateful nature that confines them to (associating with) the polluted body, madness, and emotionality at its most visceral and irrational, he explicitly attempts to eliminate any respect for them. And by associating the fear they inspire with pollution and disgust, he marginalizes both them and the potential role of such fear in defining just conduct.

The question of who merits respect—*sebas* and *aidôs*—is at the center of the play's concerns and closely connected to the question of who ought to be feared. Implicitly the Pythia and Orestes and explicitly Apollo refuse to grant respect to the Erinyes and threaten to render the fear they evoke inconsequential. Loathsome and disgusting, their anger evokes the fear that consolidates their being shunned. Apollo opts for showing *sebas* to the suppliant Orestes, a type of respect founded on the fear of the suppliant's anger, protected as he is by Zeus Hikesios. Admittedly the Erinyes themselves confirm that they are completely separated by the other gods and hated by Zeus.[27] Despite that,

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24 Nussbaum (2004) 72.

25 Ibid., 107–8. Some of the groups that Nussbaum mentions are Jews, women, homosexuals, untouchables, and lower-class people.

26 The Erinyes are of course not human but Apollo transfers the politics of disgust to the interaction between gods and thus attempts to undermine the role of the Erinyes on both divine and human levels.

27 See ll. 350–1 and 365–6: οὐδέ τίς ἐστι / συνδαίτωρ μετάκοινος (there is not even anyone who feasts both with them and with us); and: Ζεὺς δ'αἱμοσταγὲς ἀξιόμισον ἔθνος τόδε λέσχας /

however, the gods have accepted their function. Separation and even hatred do not reflect that their role is not needed and honored, only that it is not enviable in any way.

But what is fearing the Erinyes about? It is, of course, a fear of punishment but the nature and implications of both—fear and punishment—take on different emphasis depending on whose perception they reflect. Apollo and the Pythia present this fear as stemming from disgust and the Erinyes' association with crude crime, blood, and pollution. The chorus' first full stasimon conveys the particular characteristics of their punishment and fear in action, from the chorus' own perspective and in their very attempt to punish Orestes. A perversion of the hymnic genre, their binding song (ὕμνος δέσμιος) "is an ancient rite which undoes the distinction between words and things".[28] An exemplary speech-act, this song turns words into acts and enacts on stage the process and violence of derangement:

> ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τεθυμένῳ
> τόδε μέλος, παρακοπά,
> παραφορά φρενοδαλὴς
> ὕμνος ἐξ Ἐρινύων,
> δέσμιος φρενῶν, ἀφόρ—
> μιγκτος, αὑονὰ βροτοῖς
>
> And over the sacrificial victim[29]
> this is my song: insanity,
> derangement, the mind-destroying
> chant of the Furies
> that binds the mind, sung
> to no lyre, a song to shrivel men up. (328–333, 341–346)
>
> […]
> δόξαι δ᾽ ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αἰθέρι σεμναὶ
> τακόμεναι κατὰ γᾶς μινύθουσιν ἄτιμοι
> ἁμετέραις ἐφόδοις μελανείμοσιν
> ὀρχησμοῖς τ᾽ ἐπιφθόνοις ποδός·

ἃς ἀπηξιώσατο (and Zeus has held our blood-dripping, odious tribe unworthy of his company).

28 Prins (1991) 187.

29 On the use of the perfect participle, see Podlecki (1989) 328: "in their opinion, Orestes, who is consecrated to them (l. 304), is already as good as dead".

μάλα γὰρ οὖν ἁλομένα
ἀνέκαθεν βαρυπετῆ
καταφέρω ποδὸς ἀκμάν,
σφαλερὰ καὶ τανυδρόμοις
κῶλα, δύσφορον ἄταν.

πίπτων δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδεν τόδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄφρονι λύμᾳ·
τοῖον ἐπὶ κνέφας ἀνδρὶ μύσος πεπόταται,
καὶ δνοφεράν τιν᾽ ἀχλὺν κατὰ δώματος
αὐδᾶται πολύστονος φάτις.

Men's conceit of themselves, however proud while under the bright sky,
dwindles and melts away into worthlessness when beneath the earth,
thanks to our black-garbed assaults
and the angry dancing of our feet;

for I give a great leap
and then bring down my foot
from above with a great crash,
a leg to trip even a runner
at full stretch and cause unendurable ruin.

But when he falls, he does not know this, because the injury has taken away his wits:
such is the dark cloud of pollution that hovers over the man,
and a voice full of grieving
speaks of a murky mist over his house. (368–380)

The violence against kin results in an assault against the mind that is highly visceral. The dance-song of the Erinyes brings home such viscerality as it combines embodiment and self-referential description. "In the binding song, the audience sees a curse both enacted and embodied".[30] The chorus describes

30 Prins (1991) 188. de Romilly (2011) 92 also emphasizes that the Erinyes enact in front of the spectators what they sing about and thus become part of the action itself. At the same time she views this enactment as revealing with unusual force the kind of fear that pervades the relationship between men and gods but also has moral repercussions. In other words, with the Erinyes we have the evocation of a kind of fear that brings together a more arbitrary fear of the gods with moral fear, the kind that we tend to associate with remorse (see also pp. 95–96).

their movements as they actually perform them. At the same time, they provide both the images (by means of both their dance and song) and the metaphors through which insanity and derangement are to be perceived and experienced. The rhythm of their song, especially through the repetition of the same ephymnion (328–333 and 372–6) after the first strophe and antistrophe and the addition of two more ephymnia at unpredictable moments (354ff, 367ff), conveys both their incantatory potential and its disorienting effect.[31] Their angry steps are heavily to land upon Orestes—and any potential victim—and to reduce him into a senseless deranged body. As they heavily tumble over their victims, the unendurable ruin of the Erinyes causes the *doxai* of men to melt and perish beneath the earth (369) even—or especially—when such *doxai* are proud or solemn.[32] The one who falls does not know "this" (τόδ', 377), because pollution has taken over and injury has taken away his wits. Men, then, seem not to know either that the Erinyes have caused their derangement or that they are actually deranged. The act of binding not only makes one literally trip, disoriented as he is; it also takes away the freedom of acting and thinking independently.[33]

The connection between bodily and mental freedom becomes clearer, when we look back at Orestes' experience at the end of the *Choephoroi*. Upon murdering his mother, Orestes himself begins to experience intense fear of the

31 The fourth paeon, as Sommerstein points out (1989) 138, is prominent in the ephymnia and "gives the effect of incantation". For an analysis of the meter, its rhythm, and potential effect of the song as a powerful speech-act that eliminates the distinction between words and acts, see Prins (1991) esp. 186–9. Scott (1984) 122–3 argues that there is no predictable pattern in the hymn. He also suggests that the Erinyes do not even sing together, since there are twelve stanzas for twelve potential speaking roles and this break down indicates that they fail to sing a unified hymn.

32 Commentators often interpret δόξαι σεμναί as opinions that entail overreaching pride or pretense. Sommerstein (1989), for instance, commenting on 368 suggests that δόξαι refers to a person's opinion of himself while σεμναί (see Sommerstein's comment on 383), used of mortals, means 'proud' with a hint that the pride is unwarranted. Podlecki (1989) translates as 'solemn pretensions'. If we retain the ambiguity of the term σεμναί, the beliefs of men can be seen as either excessively proud or (apparently) reverent but misled. In this case, conflicting demands of reverence render the immediate punishment inflicted by the Erinyes all the harsher. This ambiguity may also invite the spectators to consider their own opinions of themselves and/as sources of transgression and crime.

33 See also ll. 333–340. Prins (1991) 185–6 (referring to Lebeck as well) also points to "the simultaneity of cause and effect" in the language of the Erinyes: "δέσμιος φρενῶν is a self-fulfilling phrase that signifies both the act of binding (when read as subjective genitive) and the state of being bound (when read as objective genitive), and the compound adjective φρενοδαλής refers both to the destructive mind of the Furies (when read actively) or the destroyed mind of their victim (when read passively)".

"wrathful bitches" (1054) that threaten with taking over control of his senses: "I am already, as a horse-driver might say, charioteering somewhat off the track; my mind is almost out of control (φρένες δύσαρκτοι) and carrying me along half-powered, and Terror is near my heart, ready to sing and to dance to Wrath's tune (πρὸς δὲ καρδίᾳ Φόβος / ᾄδειν ἕτοιμος ἠδ' ὑπορχεῖσθαι Κότῳ)" (1022–1025). The chorus of the play describes the Erinyes' effect on Orestes as dizzying or distracting—literally twirling or whirling him about (στροβοῦσιν, 1052)—but still urges Orestes not to fear. This is why he hastens to proclaim the justice of his murderous act: "but while I still have my reason (ἔμφρων εἰμί), I proclaim and tell my friends that it was not without justice (οὐκ ἄνευ δίκης) that I killed my mother" (1026–1027). Orestes thus introduces the questions that the chorus of the *Eumenides* (and the play as a whole) take up in their binding song, namely what is just, how one judges it, and what kind of punishment counts as legitimate and authoritative. The terrifying pursuit of the Erinyes results immediately from Orestes' matricide. As Simon Goldhill points out, εὐθυδίκαιοι (*Eum.* 312) may refer precisely to this immediacy.[34] It is this immediacy that justifies Orestes' anxiety to proclaim his just cause, before he loses his mind (*Choeph.* 1026–7) and to demand a different process of judgment, because his claim to just conduct does not involve the commission of the crime but the reasons for it. The distraction of the *phrenes* that the chorus aims to effect with their binding song and that Orestes already begins to experience at the end of the *Choephoroi* emphasizes that physical torment and death are not the primary source of their victim's fear. The state it creates in one's mind, the delirium and derangement of the refrain, deprives the victim of his original understanding of his own motivation and thus the ability subsequently to defend his thought-process and acts. Dancing to the maddening and hateful *mousa* of the Erinyes afflicts the rational faculty of their victim and reduces him to a disoriented body.[35]

In the *Eumenides* as well, the agents of paralyzing fear aim to inspire respect for their ordinance (θεσμός), which they perceive as indistinguishable from the immediate and upright enforcement of *dikê*: εὐθυδίκαιοι δ' οἰόμεθ' εἶναι

34 Goldhill (1984) 228.

35 This argument is supported by Faraone (1985). Faraone argues that the audience would understand the binding song of the Erinyes as a judicial curse because it is related to a kind of curse tablets that was used as early as the 5th c. in Athens to affect the outcome of law cases. "[Judicial curse tablets] are attempts at binding the opponent's ability to think clearly and speak effectively in court" (151).

(indeed, we believe we practice straight (and immediate) justice, 312).[36] With the next choral song we already witness a slight shift in the chorus' performance of the discourse of fear on two levels: first, the values that define punishable crimes are expanded. In addition to the killing of kin, disrespect for parents and guests invites harsh punishment.[37] Second, the Erinyes explicitly draw an analogy between individual and collective psychology. Fear defines the healthy mind and motivates the respect of justice not merely of individuals but of communities as well: "What man that does not at all nourish his heart on <fear>—or what community of men (πόλις βροτῶν), it makes no difference—will still revere Justice (ἔτ' ἂν σέβοι Δίκαν)?" (522–525).[38] This is a significant shift because the Erinyes have just entrusted Athena to be the final judge of Orestes' case. As such Athena decides to establish a new *thesmos* and the Erinyes perform their response to Athena's new ordinance.

Even though the Erinyes have accepted Athena's new *thesmos*, they do not appear ready to allow for a new approach to justice. Only if the new *thesmos* has the same conception of justice and of the role of fear in it as the Erinyes, will justice and communal prosperity be upheld.[39] If not, they will

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36 See also 264–275: the Erinyes claim that Orestes must be punished by having his blood sucked and going to Hades where mortals who are disrespectful of gods, host/guest, and parents end up because Hades is μέγας εὔθυνος βροτῶν (273). The term εὔθυνος has further associations with the enforcement of justice in fifth-century Athens. See Podlecki (1989) 152, Sommerstein (1989) 130, and Bakewell (1997a) 298–9 who suggests that the term refers particularly to the process of εὔθυνα; "εὔθυνοι were those who presided over the accountability proceedings all magistrates underwent at the end of their term in office" (298).

37 In his discussion of the chorus in Aeschylus and its integration in the action, Conacher (1996) 170 sees the *Eumenides* as offering the "most striking and original dramatic use of the Chorus in the trilogy and possibly all his extant plays". In the second stasimon, more specifically, he finds the clearest example where the individual 'dramatic voice' of the Chorus (that which is consistent with its dramatic character) and the conventional 'choral voice' meet, while the poet attempts to bring together the general ethical themes of the play (172).

38 Even though the text is uncertain, there is consensus that the missing term refers to fear, especially through comparison with ll. 698–9. See Podlecki (1989) 172 and Sommerstein (1989) 176.

39 The interpretation of this ode depends to a great extent on the reading of the first line. Sommerstein emends the manuscripts' νέων and prints νῦν καταστροφαὶ *νόμων* / θεσμίων (490–1). He argues (2008b) 173 that "a warning of the possible collapse of a new institution would fit neither with the general attitude of the Erinyes towards the old and the new, nor with what follows in this ode." They see the ancient laws that they have consistently supported—and especially the law under which they punish the murderers of parents—as

stop performing their function and, with nobody fearing immediate punishment, crime will take over. Eventually the unjust will be forced to utter destruction while the *daimôn*—most likely referring to the Erinyes themselves—takes pleasure in his punishment: γελᾷ δὲ δαίμων ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ θερμῷ, / τὸν οὔποτ' αὐχοῦντ' ἰδὼν ἀμηχάνοις / δύαις λαπαδνὸν οὐδ' ὑπερθέοντ' ἄκραν (the deity laughs at the headstrong man, seeing him powerless, the one who boasted it could never happen, in helpless distress, as he fails to surmount the crest of the wave, 560–2). It seems that the Erinyes acknowledge and fear the possibility of what they would see as a fallacious decision by the new institution. But their judgment, they claim, will inevitably be validated in the end. In the previous stasimon, punishment involved and foregrounded the derangement of the individual victim that loses control over his very perception and life. In this stasimon, absence of such punishment is shown to have detrimental effects for the community that comes to experience what the individual criminal ought to suffer: plague spreads through the community and resists remedy (503–7). Thus a *thesmos* that fails to inspire the fear of immediate punishment eliminates health and balance on both the individual and the communal level.

If the *daimôn* of the last stanza indeed indicates the Erinyes themselves, the pleasure they seem to take in the overthrowing and confusion of their victim recalls their attitude during the binding song. Most importantly, they still identify themselves with Dikê. They see their thrones as the house of Dikê: ὦ Δίκα, / ὦ θρόνοι τ' Ἐρινύων (511–512). Even if *to deinon* (517) already refers to (a new) political authority, the chorus performs this stanza right after the description of their own punishment, the confusion of their victims. The praise of the mean as the prerequisite for prosperity also introduces statements of conventional morality and points to moderate politics, more specifically; but their insistence on a very graphic punishment of the unjust (552–565) is particularly characteristic of their pride in their role and its necessity for sustaining healthy minds that contribute to a moderate polity. They thus present their destructive task as absolutely indispensable, if not more instrumental than that of the new

being in danger by the current innovations. Dover (1957) 230–2, on the other hand, argues for the transmitted text. Since the Erinyes themselves have asked Athena to decide the case, the new court's fate depends on how it will judge the present case. It is the acquittal of Orestes that will actually overthrow the new court, in whose creation they have acquiesced. Dover claims that the whole stasimon involves the Areopagus and that in this context τὸ δεινόν (517) refers to political authority. I follow the reading νέων θεσμίων, which points to the complications of the Erinyes' position after they have appointed Athena as the ultimate judge of Orestes' case. Even if Dover rightly believes that this stasimon refers to the Areopagus, at this stage the Erinyes can only view the new institution from the perspective of their own conception of justice and the role of fear in it.

thesmos for the upholding of Dikê. The Erinyes accept the new institution insofar as it espouses the same ideas of just conduct as they do. As mentioned above, such conduct stems from a twofold fear: the fear of individual punishment and the communal fear of chaos due to disrespect for justice.[40] The chorus explicitly advocates the fear of distress:

> ἔσθ᾽ ὅπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ
> καὶ φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον
> δεῖμ᾽ ἄνω καθήμενον·
> ξυμφέρει
> σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει.
> τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν †φάει†
> καρδίαν ἀνὴρ τρέφων
> ἢ πόλις βροτῶν ὁμοί-
> ως ἔτ᾽ ἂν σέβοι Δίκαν;
>
> There is a proper place for the fear-inspiring,
> and for fear to sit high
> in the soul as its overseer:
> it is beneficial
> to learn good sense under the pressure of distress.
> What man that does not at all nourish his heart on <fear>—
> or what community of men, it makes no difference—
> will still revere Justice? (517–525)

In other words, the Erinyes call for a *thesmos* that is fearsome, quick, and vehement like themselves.

And this is what Athena will provide. The role of fear and (or as) respect in the process of establishing justice and the connection between the two become central in Athena's introduction of the Areopagus. Scholars invariably note the similarities between the goddess' speech and the preceding choral song.[41] Athena justifies the necessity of founding the new jury in the terms

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40 δεῖμα, φόβος, and τὸ δεινόν are used interchangeably. This becomes clearer in Athena's speech discussed below. This interchangeability seems to stem from the fact that in this play all terms refer to the fear that either divinities or morally exceptional humans like the jurymen of the Areopagus inspire.

41 E.g., Dover (1957) 233–235; Conacher (1974) 340: "These two passages, though descriptive of two very different bodies (the Furies and the Areopagus), provide the dramatic preparation for the reversal at the end of the play. Indeed the 'replacement' of the Furies by

that the Erinyes used to defend their role in punishing the irreverent. With the new institution, "the respect (σέβας) and inborn (or kindred) fear (φόβος τε ξυγγενής) of the citizens will prevent any wrong being done" (690–691).[42] The right type of fearful conduct secures the balanced behavior that is the prerequisite for a well-ordered society: τὸ μήτ' ἄναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον / ἀστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλεύω σέβειν, / καὶ μὴ τὸ δεινὸν πᾶν πόλεως ἔξω βαλεῖν· / τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν; (I counsel my citizens to maintain, and practice reverently, a system that is neither anarchic nor despotic, and not to cast fear completely out of the city; for what mortal respects justice, if he fears nothing?, 696–699). And the characteristics of the new *bouleutêrion* will ensure the implementation of Athena's conception of fearful respect and justice: κερδῶν ἄθικτον [...] / αἰδοῖον, ὀξύθυμον, εὑδόντων ὕπερ / ἐγρηγορὸς φρούρημα γῆς (untouched by thought of gain [...], reverend, quick to anger, a wakeful sentinel for the land to protect those who sleep, 704–706). The new *thesmos* essentially responds to the Erinyes' conception of themselves and their demands for the enforcement of *dikê*. A body of exceptional mortal jurors will, from now on, evoke the combination of reverence and fear (σέβας, φόβος, τὸ δεινόν) that the Erinyes claimed as necessary for just conduct and prosperity. Athena clearly appropriates their language and transfers (a civic version of) their fearsome characteristics to the members of the Areopagus. The attributes of the jury recall characteristics which the Erinyes not only exemplify but, more

the Areopagus will appear less of a 'replacement' if, as we listen to Athena's propitiation, we remember that the new Court itself embodies those qualities which, if Athena's plan succeeds, the reconciled Eumenides will help sustain. Allen (2000) 22 emphasizes the emotional aspects of the Areopagite style of judgment, which is not coolly distant from anger. Pointing out the similarities between Athena's speech and the preceding stasimon, she argues that Athena draws a parallel between the two institutions: the 'punishing' Areopagus takes over the work of the 'avenging' Erinyes and is assimilated to them. They also take over their tasks of anger without actually being enjoined to heel to the laws. The relationship of the Areopagus to law is at best ambiguous.

42 On the ambiguity of the genitive ἀστῶν, see Sommerstein (1989) 215–6 and note below. Regarding ξυγγενής, the preference tends to be for "inborn". Sommerstein, ibid., 216 explains that "Through the generations the Athenians will become so accustomed to respect and fear the Areopagus (and/or vice versa) that what was at first an acquired characteristic will become innate and hereditary, just as in common Greek belief acquired physical characteristics could be inherited". Podlecki (1989) 180 gives the alternative "kindred fear", that is, "akin to Reverence". This particular passage seems to require both meanings to resonate with the audience, since Athena asks for the ordinance to remain unchangeable and thus for the acceptance, fear of, and respect for the new system of justice to become second nature to the Athenians. *Sebas* and fear are also connected throughout the play so as to be kindred notions and have overlapping functions.

importantly, strive to have acknowledged as part of their identity.[43] At this point, the Areopagus takes on the role of the Erinyes and replaces them while retaining some of their fundamental characteristics.

Athena's transfer of fear to the new institution of justice, however, also signals a difference between the two fearsome bodies. A significant shift in emphasis emerges. Though both the Erinyes and the judges evoke fear of punishment, with the new court the focus shifts to a fear of judgment. A process that involves scrutiny of motives replaces the immediate punishment of derangement. The Areopagus is a deliberative body (βουλευτήριον) that inspires fear and respect precisely through the deliberative processes on which it is founded. Its very creation is a deliberative act (βουλεύω) on the part of Athena in contrast to the angry dance-song of the Erinyes. With this shift, fear is presented as having a more rational grounding, one that becomes clearer during the cross-examination of the two sides. At the same time, the respectful fear for the new body of jurors is based on the fact that they are citizen men who combine the attributes of the female Erinyes (except their disgusting appearance) with (male) moral virtue: they are the finest men of Athens, incorruptible, reverend, quick to anger, and wakeful. Overseen by such men, the process of argumentation that leads to deliberation replaces the painful process of binding one's *phrenes* that inflicts terror and destroys the mind. The citizens of Athens will fear being held accountable for their motives and acts in front of exemplary fellow-citizens. Motives now matter.[44] Athenian citizens also come to understand that it is beneficial to live with this fear. Therefore, the new criminal court encourages—or forces—the citizens to develop a moral and political consciousness that will secure the safety of the city-state. The analogy between individual and collective psychology is taken to a new

43 See, e.g., μὴ θυμοῦσθε (do not be angry, 801), μηδ' ὑπερθύμως ἄγαν / θεαὶ βροτῶν κτίσητε δύσκηλον χθόνα (and do not yield to excessive anger and, goddesses that you are, afflict mortals with an evil canker on their land, 824–825), when Athena urges the Erinyes not to show their immediate and excessive anger, a reaction in which the Erinyes themselves took pride in their preceding stasima. At the same time, the attributes of respect and vigilance that are given to the jurymen are the ones which the Erinyes have been aspiring to throughout the play.

44 Orestes extensively talks about his "many motives" in the *Choephoroi*, the πολλοὶ ἵμεροι that come together to recommend the murder (299) but only in the context of the new court can such motives be brought up again and have value for his future. On the consideration of motivation in judging guilt or innocence in the new system of trial by jury, see also Helm (2004) esp. 50–51.

level.[45] Institutionalized judgment and the fear of accountability in public add an outward-looking perspective to the conception and experience of fear that encourages both self-reflection and consideration of one's relations with the community at large.

The shift in the content and role of fear, however, will be complete only at the end of the play, when the Erinyes themselves agree to be incorporated in Athens with its new court. After Orestes' acquittal, they threaten to breathe upon the city their anger (κότος, 840) and to send upon land and people polluting and murderous blight, a reaction that Athena sees as excessive since the split vote of jurors indicates that the city honors them.[46] They change their mind only after Athena gradually convinces them to show reverence to *peithô* and offers them a share in the land, honor, respect and, consequently, friends.[47] Athena, in other words, integrates them in the city. But while the Erinyes

45 See also MacLeod (1983) 135–136. MacLeod, however, views the new "enlightened" fear that the Areopagus embodies for the benefit of the community as a conscious fear of punishment which stems from knowing the gods' power.

46 Scholars have discussed extensively the issue of the voting—how many jurors vote and what the result of Athena's vote is. Sommerstein (1989) 222–226 presents in detail the different points of view and gives the relevant bibliography. He believes with Gagarin (1976) and Kitto (1954) that Athena's vote is cast in the urn—thus resulting in the tie—and not added later after the count of the votes of the jurors. Thus the unity and solidarity of divine and mortal elements in the polis are emphasized. Even though the exact nature of the voting does not affect my discussion of fear, if Sommerstein is right, the Erinyes' eagerness for revenge that will primarily devastate the humans of the polis is shown as even more irrational and unjustifiable, given that the voting of the jurors proves their support of the Erinyes' cause. On the other hand, the solidarity between Athena and her people, a solidarity that will, in the end, win over the Erinyes themselves contributes to the fear that the jury of the Areopagus will inspire in the future.

47 See ll. 885–7 and 890–1: If you have reverence for the awesome power of persuasion, the charm and enchantment of my tongue—well, anyway please do stay. [...] for you have the opportunity to be a landholder in this country, and be justly honored for ever". As soon as the Erinyes accept (900), Athena responds: "That means that you are going to stay in this land and gain new friends (ἐπικτήσῃ φίλους)" (901). For the role of *peithô* here, see, e.g., Buxton (1982) 111 who argues that both in the carpet scene in the *Agamemnon* and here *peithô* works almost uncannily; we are not given detail about the psychological motivation behind it. Buxton suggests that this is an instance where Aeschylean drama displays "a confidence in the power of *peithô* to heal disputes and soothe anger" (ibid., 114). Peradotto (1969) 20–21 argues that Athena's *peithô* replaces superstitious cledonomancy: "The *Eumenides* concentrates upon the secular, civilizing efficacy of language. After an ineffectual bout of mutual verbal abuse by Apollo and the Erinyes, we are presented with Athena's *peithô* as a parading of language free of superstitious dread and capable of accomplishing the union of opposing forces without which the community cannot exist". Even though Athena's brief but poignant (potential) threat (827–8) adds an element of

accept co-residency and, in their new role, sing of their blessings for the land and citizens of Athens, Athena reintroduces their retributive role: "And he who meets with their enmity does not know whence come the blows that fall upon his life; for the sins that come from his ancestors hale him before them, and silent destruction, loud boaster though he may be, crushes him because of their hostile wrath" (932–937). The Semnai Theai in fact retain their most fearsome function.

How far then have we come with respect to the role of fear in the establishment of justice? Clearly no character questions the necessity of fear. There is general agreement that justice depends on it: fear reflects and, in turn, cultivates reverent respect for law and custom and therefore constitutes a necessary characteristic of the citizens' moral psychology. Helen Bacon suggests that:

> The Furies agree to become guardians of the court and accept a cult and a home in Athens because [Athena] finally persuades them that the court neither supersedes nor bypasses them but affirms the utility of fear and reaffirms and extends their function. [...] Like Orestes and Perseus, with the help of Athena, [the Athenians] find the resources to confront the face of fear and are rewarded with the discovery of its protective nurturing power.[48]

The idea of 'extension' is important. By negotiating with the Erinyes and establishing the precise sources of fear that can most benefit the state and their position in a hierarchy of enforcers of justice, Athena extends and redefines the experience and perception of fear. In the process, fear becomes significantly—but not fully—rationalized and sublimated.[49]

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violence to her use of *peithô*, the substitution that Peradotto refers to works *in tandem* with the new conception of fear that I see in the play.

48 Bacon (2001) 59.

49 Belfiore (1992) also sees a change with regard to fear in the play, but defines it in different terms. She argues that the Erinyes and the fear that they inspire change by the end of the trilogy only in so far as they come to be perceived differently by the spectators. Belfiore identifies this change in perception with emotional catharsis: "As their perception changes, the audience members experience an emotional catharsis in some respects like that undergone by Orestes in the play, in which fear resulting from pollution is cast out and replaced by reverence and respect, which prevent pollution and wrath. If Aeschylus succeeds in drawing the audience into the play in this way, he has created an extraordinarily effective drama that at the same time serves a serious social and religious purpose" (28). From a different point of view, Walsh (1984) 62–79 examines the language of the trilogy and talks not about rationalization but simplification. He sees in the *Eumenides* a

The eventual establishment of the new court and its decisions as final and uncontested renders, according to Allen, the Areopagus legitimate and authoritative. By defining fear as respect for the new institution of punishment and justice, Athena institutes fear itself at the center of the Areopagus but renders it more sensible, though no less vehement. Making the case that revenge should be incorporated in contemporary law, Robert Solomon argues that inherent in revenge is a kernel of rationality that allows and calls for its sublimation "not in terms of suppression by the more respectable forces of reason but in terms of its own growing awareness of its nature and its needs".[50] Such awareness is all the more recommended since "the point of law is to make the passions more coherent, more consistent, more articulate, more perspicacious, more reasonable, more subject to scrutiny, more civilized. The law, like culture, shapes as well as expresses emotions".[51]

The *Eumenides*, I suggest, stages a similar type of sublimation of fear through the choral discourse and its appropriation by Athena. As mentioned earlier, the elements of deliberation and/through cross-examination shift the focus and conception of fear. With the Areopagus, a more self-aware fear of scrutiny of character and moral, social, and political motives replaces the fear of punishment as derangement that is immediate and unmediated.

This process of rationalization overlaps with entrusting judgment and punishment to state institutions. The movement from the *oikos* to the polis in the *Oresteia* has often been pointed out. Examining the role of *aidôs* in Aeschylean drama, Douglas Cairns argues:

> Aeschylus [...] transforms *aidôs* and *sebas* from responses to persons (or gods envisaged as persons) who enjoy some claim to *timê vis-à-vis* oneself to an acknowledgment of the *timê* of an impersonal entity, a civic institution, and the transcendence of the personal and the partial demonstrated by the institution of the homicide court is mirrored in the move from personal to impersonal *aidôs* and *sebas*. The utility of *aidôs* in Aeschylus' political theory is thus rather different from that accorded the concept in other theories [...] which tend to take *aidôs* in a much more traditional way as a social entity, active in interpersonal relationships within the community rather than in the relationship between the individual and the state.[52]

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simpler world that comes with the simpler style of the play. By means of this simplification, the poet frees his audience "from the fearsome world governed by metaphor" (79).

50 Solomon (1999) 142.

51 Ibid., 129.

52 Cairns (1993) 214.

Even though I do not view the Areopagus as wholly impartial, respect as an aspect and source of fear indeed renders it an institutionally useful emotion in ways that transcend the personal. The major moral dilemmas of the trilogy that lead to homicide emphatically point to the need for assessment of motivation by a public institution that embodies shared values and is thus authoritative and normative. It is the representational character and power of such an institution that render the stance of fear itself more reasonable, civil, and civilized.

The sublimation of fear continues through the role that the reconciled Erinyes take on at the end of the play. In this case, however, it is not the nature and experience of fear that changes. As we saw, when the Semnai Theai inflict punishment, their violent attack will not differ from the effect of the binding song. The shift is located in their own motivation and place in the hierarchy of enforcers of justice. Their disorienting punishment is meant to contribute to the health of the land that they will come to love with passion (γῆς τῆσδ᾽ ἐρασθήσεσθε, 852). Athena thus assures the chorus that they will feel *erôs* for Athens and will make friends in it (901), while the citizens will, in turn, benefit from the Erinyes' fearsome faces (990–1). Incorporated in Athens and its rituals, the Erinyes become emotionally attached to the city and the language of disgust is eliminated altogether from the discourse of fear.[53] Even in its new expression that is not very different from the old, a 'cleaner' kind of fear of the Erinyes is established because it is inflicted from the right place, that is, from a position dependent on the authority of the Areopagus and the Athenian state.[54]

The integration of the new criminal law-court and the new religious ritual has a number of implications. First, there is a clear hierarchy of enforcers of justice that is closely related to the gender-dynamic developed in the trilogy. The proper use of emotion overlaps with properly allocated gender roles.

53 Tzanetou (2012) 64 suggests that "The panegyric tenor of Athena's speech, as she promises the Furies that in time they will grow to love and desire this foreign land (851–852), echoes Pericles' later charge to the Athenians in the funeral oration to become 'lovers of their city' (Th. 2.43.1)". At the same time, however, the Semnai Theai are defined as metics. See 1010, 1018 and the fact that they are given crimson robes for the final procession. Sommerstein (1989) 275 suggests that the ending of the play implies an honorable status for the Athenian metic, while the reality in the city was different, if we consider Whitehead's (1977) evidence. Bakewell (1999) argues that the integration of metics in the polis in the *Eumenides* as well as in *The Children of Heracles* and the *Oedipus at Colonus* portrays metics as saviors and thus indispensable for the city. By so doing, the plays unite citizen and metic in a harmonious whole (60) and thus "enact on stage a reconciliation of some of the city's disparate and often competing constituencies" (63).

54 There are, however, residual affective elements that complicate this idealizing picture, for which, see below.

Goldhill asks: "Is the fear of transgressive disorder, embodied in the female, Clytemnestra, and leading to her murder, a vivid, intensely felt emotion, part of the paradox of tragic pleasure? Or is it a politicized element of the (gendered) discourse of *dikê* enacted before the polis?". He suggests that probably both are the case. I would add that the rationalizing process of fear that I have argued for is also a process of male appropriation and overlaps with the enforcement of male authority. The Erinyes who defended Clytemnestra's cause in the trial lose the case when Athena casts the deciding vote. As a goddess with no mother, Athena justifies her support for Orestes by arguing that she identifies, by nature, with male sensibilities. Only when it is removed from the (absolute) power of the deities that value the death of a murderous wife higher than that of her husband, can fear be redefined and rendered beneficial in the institutions of the polis.[55] Such removal is of course temporary and will be qualified: it lasts as long as it takes for the Erinyes to acquiesce to where authoritative judgment will come from.[56]

Second, the foundation of two different institutions points to the need for multiple sources of justice that encompass both religious and sociopolitical realms. Different agents of fearful *dikê* work in congruence and ensure that properly fearful citizens can prosper with their healthy minds and a sense of civic responsibility that renders them respectful toward the institutions of the

55 See ll. 736–740: "There is no mother who gave birth to me, and I commend the male in all respects (except for joining in marriage) with all my heart: in the fullest sense, I am my father's child. Therefore I shall not set a higher value (οὐ προτιμήσω) on the death of a woman, when she had killed her husband, the guardian of her house".

56 On the complex gender dynamic developed in the trilogy and its politics, see, e.g., Goldhill (2000), quoted above, and Zeitlin (1978). Zeitlin sees in the trilogy a depiction of the evolution of civilization that places the polis at the center of its vision while its cornerstone is the control of the male over the female, which subsumes all other conflicts (Olympian vs. chthonic and Greek vs. barbarian). According to Zeitlin, Athena and the Erinyes "both agree that female will be subordinate to male within the family in patriarchal marriage and that the family itself will be subordinate to the city" (114–5). Castellani (1989) 6–7, on the other hand, sees the final compromise as one that "recognizes and *conspicuously honors* the female role in a male-dominant system" while the female has both an ideology that must be heard and a function that "must be brought to bear—literally, to *bear*—if human society is to prosper". For an interpretation according to which the Erinyes are actually corrupted by accepting bribes and abandoning their initial function—a development that the audience members do not perceive, moved as they are by patriotic emotion at the end of the play, see Vellacott (1984) 116–127.

state.[57] And third, the shift of emphasis that I have argued for in terms of rationalization and sublimation is significant but not a wholesale redefinition of the emotion that would deprive it of its affective power. The choral discourse emphasizes that and so does the final reconciliation of the Erinyes. Fear (like anger), in other words, is not radically rationalized or 'sanitized'.[58] It is not rendered an utterly rational consideration of the potential of scrutiny of one's motives that demands accountability and threatens social standing.

Despite its idealizing ending, the play does not thoroughly eliminate the tensions that led to the need for the Areopagus in the first place. After founding the ideal institution of punishment, anger, and fear, Athena herself bases her final decision in the trial of Orestes on her attachment to the male cause. Her vote points to the element of individual attachment as a fundamental component of emotional experience and consequent decision making. It is this attachment that gives momentum to the judicial process and results in practical action, Orestes' acquittal. The reformed Erinyes at the end of the play come to be emotionally attached to the city, as mentioned above. But the disorienting punishment that remains in their power will likely enforce the judgment of the Areopagites, which can only remain, to some degree, partial. The collective identity of the jury, its members' virtue, and state-support construct their judgment as trustworthy. As the trial of Orestes indicates, however, even though judgment can be (better) informed, its partiality is not—and cannot be—eliminated. This constitutes an additional source of respectful fear: understanding that this is a necessary and beneficial fear while retaining awareness of the limitations of the institutions that enforce it.[59] Harnessing

57 de Romilly (2011) 104–114 also suggests that a certain rationalization and taming of fear takes place within the context of the state. Her emphasis, however, is on the fact that such 'good fear' is never wholly secularized but remains related to respect for the gods.

58 See also Easterling (2008) 233 on the way we are to view the Erinyes by the end of the play: "we must note that the Furies are not going to be neutralized or imprisoned, nor are they going to be domesticated or sanitized. They can continue to be generated by any individual or collective wrongdoing and will contribute to new acts of madness if provoked. Nor will they be rejuvenated or beautified. They will however be honored". Accordingly, Easterling suggests that the question whether the Erinyes change may not really be the question to ask, because "they do and they don't", showing drama's power to enact contradiction (234).

59 The ambiguous genitive in Athena's foundational speech seems to enforce this idea. Ἀστῶν (φόβος) in l. 691 can be taken as subjective (the citizens fear) or objective genitive (the court fears the citizens). The former is what I see as the prominent meaning. But the

and sublimating fear is about informing, channeling, and capitalizing on its momentum for the benefit of the community at large.

At the time of the performance, as is well known, the Areopagus had been stripped of powers that associated it with aristocratic membership and was turned exclusively to a homicide court. There is no consensus regarding the precise politics of the play, namely whether it reflects support of Ephialtes' reforms of the Areopagus, even though the setting of the trilogy in Argos instead of Mycenae and the triple reference in the play to the Argive alliance seems to indicate endorsement of the democrats.[60] Tzanetou suggests that the play's audience was preoccupied with the workings of hegemony, precisely because of the recent reforms and their dividing consequences in Athens. She sees Athena's reception of the Erinyes as "a paradigmatic case of conflict and resolution" that establishes a reciprocal relationship between her and the Erinyes.[61] Tzanetou argues:

> [T]he element of reciprocity also carries ideological weight insofar as it allows Athena to script an idealized relationship between the Furies and her city that is both consensual and mutually advantageous. [...] Athena takes stock of the Furies' opposition and subsequently defines the Furies' civic functions by placing them in charge of civic peace and prosperity. The crisis and resolution therefore defines the play's hegemonic discourse by acknowledging the dissonance between ideology and reality. The Furies' role as guarantors of civic concord provides a resolution, albeit a fictive one, to the problem of internal strife, enabling Athens to advertise her civic unity through the paradigmatic reception of the Furies as partners in the city's hegemonic enterprise.[62]

possibility of the latter meaning may point to an awareness and attempt on the part of the jurors to minimize or justify their partiality out of respectful fear for the citizens.

60 For a discussion of the different positions, see, e.g., Podlecki (1999) 80–100.

61 Tzanetou (2012) 64.

62 Ibid., 65. For a different approach to the ideal vision presented in the play, see Chiasson (1999) who argues that in the *Eumenides* we witness the establishment of a unique mutuality between man and god, that is, between the Athenians and Athena as well as Zeus. This mutuality that remains contingent upon the Athenians' piety and justice secures the prosperity of the community and is projected onto the limitless future. In this context, the Areopagus functions as a guarantor of civic justice and helps us see "how Athenian wisdom (σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνῳ, 1000) surpasses the wisdom (σωφρονεῖν, *Ag*. 181) imposed upon men in the Zeus Hymn" at the beginning of the trilogy (152). Bowie (1993), on the other hand, traces the mythic and ritual imagery and references in the trilogy and argues that, despite their ambiguity, they offer diverse ways of looking at contemporary reality and coming to terms with Ephialtes' changes. Lardinois (1992) moves beyond internal

Tzanetou thus articulates a major tension that remains unresolved behind the play's resolution. Other scholars have seen such a tension as stemming from a focus in the *Eumenides* on the new court and on restoring the civic fabric at the very cost of personal and emotional issues that are central to human life.[63]

The conclusion of the trilogy does not eliminate the complexity and inherent tensions of the issues of *dikê* that the trilogy has shown to require an authoritative response to. The end of the *Eumenides* celebrates exemplary democratic processes and passionate participation in the institutions of the polis in their most heteronormative and beneficial versions: male citizens come to inspire well-founded fear by taking over judicial judgment and wise anger; female deities support this kind of judgment through religious rituals that ensure prosperity.[64] Such discourse is clearly idealizing. But it carries particular weight, as it attempts to reflect and encourage concord and harmony.[65] With

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politics and sees an element of imperialism in connecting the (panhellenic) Erinyes with the Semnai Theai and turning them into local guardians of justice: "Athens presents itself as the inheritor of the power of the Erinyes and, consequently, as the moral leader of Greece" (327).

63 See Porter (2005) 8. Strauss (2013) 16–35 argues that the play—and all tragedy—returns to the prehistory of the city in order to justify its legitimacy and "the rightness of its laws through a reconciliation with those whom the city had excluded as irremediably hostile to it: the Eumenides, the family, women, the hero" (35). The main figure of exclusion, however, is that of the individual and tragedy, according to Strauss, evinces the desire for and the possibility of individual subjectivity—to be seen most clearly in Sophocles' *Antigone*—in a democratic state that gives birth to the legally responsible individual while suppressing the autonomous individual. Straus seems to suggest that the *Eumenides* performs this function through the notion of subjective agency that emerges with Orestes and the intentionality of his crime. The tensions that remain unresolved at the end of the trilogy would also be reconsidered through the experience of the *Proteus*, the satyr play that followed the *Oresteia*. Griffith (2002) 250 suggests that after the *Proteus* the audience would end up being "both more confused and more comfortable, as a result of its romantic and depoliticized revisions", a double vision that works well with the requirement of Dionysiac consciousness.

64 Griffith (1995) views the *Oresteia* as a component of a different type of hegemonic discourse. Such discourse is "produced by the elite, but licensed and approved by the citizen masses, and contributing richly to their shared sense of value, interdependence, and entitlement/subjection". He sees this as a process of "mutual mystification by elite and mass" that reaffirms familiar values and smoothes away troubling contradictions. The trilogy thus exemplifies the way in which tragedy as a genre participates in producing "solidarity without consensus" (111).

65 According to Dodds (1960a) 31 and *passim*, the play shows that moral and political concerns are integrated and reflects the fears and hopes of the poet at a historical moment of both high hope and grave danger for Athens. At such a moment, everything is shown to depend on the *agathê dianoia* of the people.

regard to the role of fear in particular, the trilogy ends in a celebratory and confident note for the synergy of the civil aspects and residual affect of fear. The *Eumenides* seems to communicate trust—or hope—that the (reformed) court and the ideology that defines it can minimize partiality by expanding the rational basis of the emotions involved in judgment, and direct the motivational force of fear so as to render attachment conciliatory and valuable for the community as a whole.

3 Aeschylus, *Supplices*

Aeschylus' *Supplices* dramatizes a circulation of fear that evolves in the play and, most likely, in the Danaid trilogy as a whole. Initially overwhelming fear leads to impulsive but partly justified action. As such, it initiates a process that leads to its being addressed through the political, ritual, and possibly judicial institutions of the polis. Fear in this process compels intense debate, reveals the needs, desires, and demands of all parties involved, and thus becomes itself more transparent and gradually tamer and more sensible. This expression and circulation of fear is of particular interest because of the affects and concerns that it reveals and the kind of communication that it generates, especially in its performance and instigation by a collective group, the chorus of the play. As in the *Eumenides*, the chorus of Aeschylus' *Supplices* is one of the main actors in the play. It consists of Danaus' daughters who flee from Egypt and take refuge in Argos in order to avoid marriage with their cousins, the sons of Aegyptus. Very likely performed in 464/3 BCE as (most probably) the first play of a tetralogy,[66] the *Supplices* was followed by the *Aegyptioi*, the *Danaides*,

66 Scholars have often argued that the *Supplices* must stand near the beginning of Aeschylus' career. As Garvie (1969) 88 points out "since Aristotle says that it was Aeschylus who τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε, it has generally been assumed that the *Supplices* must stand somewhere near the beginning of this development". For an early dating of the play in the 490s, see, e.g., Earp (1948) 7 and (1953), Lesky (1954), Yorke (1954), and Diamantopoulos (1957). I agree with the reconstruction of *POxy*. 2256.3 that puts the play in 464/3 BCE. See, e.g., Lloyd-Jones (1964) 356–374, Garvie (1969) 141–162, Friis Johansen and Whittle (FJW in following references) (1980) 21–29. For supporting a later dating of the play based on historical allusions, see Podlecki (1999) 52–62. He finds in the play a reminder of the good services of Argos to Themistocles when he fell under attack by Cimon and the Spartans and an exercise and theorizing of democratic practice that "served as a useful watchword and rallying cry" for Ephialtes and the democratic reformers. Sommerstein (1997) 78 too argues that, by recalling recent events involving Cimon and Athenian-Spartan relations, Aeschylus attempts to strengthen feeling against him before the ostracism vote.

and the satyr play *Amymone*.[67] According to the most commonly accepted reconstruction of the trilogy, in the second play all of the Danaids except Hypermestra kill their husbands/cousins but are, in the third play, reconciled to marriage and reintegrated in the civic community.

Scholars tend to agree that the trilogy ends with the foundation of the Thesmophoria.[68] In addition, the institution of a new law court is also a possibility. This court would transform the acts of pursuit and flight (διώκειν, φεύγειν) into the meanings of prosecution and defense.[69] Alternatively, a reminiscence of the wedding-song, which we can trace at the end of the *Supplices*, may foreshadow its institution at the end of the trilogy. The antithetical character of the wedding-song can thus be seen as resembling the choral discourse in the play.[70] In all cases, we move from coercion and violence (βία) against the Danaids, to proliferation of violence by the Danaids themselves, to persuasion (πειθώ) and social integration of these disruptive female figures in the civic

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He, however, argues for 461 BCE, which he further supports on production grounds—the need for a third actor in the final play. Last, Carpenter (1991) 41 brings in a different type of evidence. He suggests that iconography on vases of the Danaid Amymone appearing for the first time in the late 460s may reflect influence by Aeschylus' satyr play in the Danaid trilogy. For a summary of the debates on the trilogy's date, see Papadopoulou (2011) 15–17.

67 For the sequence of the plays with references to previous discussions of the reconstruction of the trilogy see, e.g., Winnington-Ingram (1961), Hose (2006) 91–98, Mitchell (2006) 208–9, and Papadopoulou (2011) 17–24.

68 See, e.g., Robertson (1924) 53, Thomson (1966) 308, Detienne (1988) 173, Zeitlin (1996) 164–169, Belfiore (2000) 60–61, Sourvinou-Inwood (2003) 216–217. Detienne, ibid., 172 and Belfiore, ibid., 58 suggest that the end of the play may also include an etiology of the Argive Heraia.

69 Zeitlin (1996) 169.

70 According to Seaford (1987), the *Supplices* ends on a note of anxiety comparable to the ending of the *Agamemnon* or the *Choephoroi*, except that here the anxiety is enriched by the subtle evocation of a familiar process which would normally, outside the theatre, end with the acquiescence and incorporation of the bride, namely the wedding-song and the transition of the bride to the groom's household. He also suggests that, if the trilogy concluded with the remarriage of the Danaids and the institution of the wedding-song, it would provide the *aition* for the negative tendency of the ritual: "In the trilogy pitiable events and female reluctance and lamentation are expressed in songs which *resemble* formal wedding-songs. The antithetical character of these songs, which arises naturally out of the story, may, in the context of the successful hymenaial transition at the end of the trilogy and the foundation of the formal wedding-song, have been adduced to explain the antithetical character of the formal wedding-song" (116). For hymenaial allusions at the end of the *Supplices* and their implications in the trilogy as a whole, see also Swift (2010) 279–297.

community through ritual.[71] The similarities with the *Oresteia* in this movement are noticeable and often discussed.[72]

My interest remains in the content and implications of the choral discourse of fear. From my perspective, the similarities between the Danaid-chorus of the *Supplices* and the chorus of Erinyes of the *Eumenides* are significant on two levels. First, they may point to consistent aspects in the concept of fear and its social function in Aeschylean drama.[73] And second, they may reflect a particular reliance on the efficacy and effectiveness of the chorus in its ability actively to trigger and communicate the tragic emotions. The *Seven* adds to this picture, even though a number of issues remain unresolved at the end of the play. Both suggestions have to remain tentative primarily because of the sparseness of our extant evidence. But they are worth entertaining, if we are to approach more comprehensively the chorus and emotional expression as two quintessential aspects of tragedy.

In my analysis, I examine the ways in which fear is depicted and communicated in the *Supplices*. Female fear, defined as fear both experienced and triggered by the female chorus, leads to political decision making despite, and because of, its ambiguous belief-basis. The chorus of Danaids experiences intense fear and initiates the circulation of the same emotion in Argos, which thus becomes a motivational force for action—the chorus' own action and that of others. This fear undergoes change both within the *Supplices* and in the trilogy as a whole. By highlighting a spectrum of experiences of fear—from ambiguous or ill-conceived, to comprehensible, to respected fear—and their effect on decision making and the life of the community, the choral discourse brings out potential effective uses and shortcomings of fear as a medium of communication in the polis. In the process, the chorus in the *Supplices* also

71 Additional connections with ritual have also been suggested. Zeitlin (1996) 163 brings up the possibility of the Danaids bringing water to thirsty Argos (especially if we take into account the hypothesis of the *Amymone*) and of the introduction of a ritual from Egypt. Bachvarova (2009) expands on this possibility and argues that the threats that the Danaids utter in the supplication scene "allude and invert themes proper to nymph cult", especially in connection with Amymone and the Inachid nymphs who made Argos arable and "symbolized moist female fertility" in local Argive cult (290–1).

72 E.g., Winnington-Ingram (1961), Moreau (1985) 247–301, Zeitlin (1990a), Porter (2005).

73 de Romilly (2011) esp. 100–102 and *passim* sees in Aeschylus' work a unique and valuable moment in the development of how fear is perceived and represented after Homer. In Aeschylus, she suggests, we find the unification and reconciliation of two types (and conceptions) of fear: fear of the divine that is more arbitrary and inexplicable and a type of fear that stems from moral consciousness and the judgment of one's actions and responsibility.

draws attention, I suggest, to the relationship between fear and freedom and its role in rendering civic interactions conducive to trust and collective prosperity. Thus the challenges, discussed in Thucydides, of creating a shared perspective in the polis that can lead to responsible collective judgment and feeling and, therefore, contribute to emotional and political cohesion are recast with intensity in the *Supplices* and with special focus on fear.

The Danaid-chorus oscillates between the emotions it attempts to evoke, namely pity and fear. The two emotions are not exclusive of each other. On the contrary, the demands of the chorus in their capacity as suppliants almost immediately makes clear that they aim to evoke both. Fear will come to be the emotion that moves the action of the play forward. Initially, however, the Danaids aim to instigate pity for being unjustly and violently pursued by their cousins. While displaying their anxiety and its causes in detail, they also communicate a certain self-confidence that stems from seeing their flight as just and pious.[74] They emphasize that they have not been exiled by others but have fled by their own will (αὐτογενῆ φυξανορίαν, 8), following their father's plan (11–13), in avoidance of the Aegyptiads' impiety: γάμον Αἰγύπτου παίδων ἀσεβῆ τ' / ὀνοταζόμεναι <διάνοιαν>, (abhorring marriage with the sons of Aegyptus and their impious thoughts, 9–10). The chorus repeatedly portrays the Aegyptiads as impious and transgressive.[75] A hubristic swarm (ἑσμὸν ὑβριστὴν Αἰγυπτιογενῆ, 30), they have undertaken a lustful pursuit against unwilling cousins (σφετεριξάμενοι πατραδελφείαν / τήνδε ἀεκόντων, 38–39) that violates *themis* and *to dikaion* and calls for divine punishment.[76]

While communicating the frenzied pursuit that renders their state pitiable, the Danaids also take care to produce reliable proof (ἐπιδείξω πιστά τεκμήρια, 52–3) of their Argive origin in order to strengthen their suppliant demands.

74 Scott (1984) 166 suggests that the orderly marching anapaests and the long balanced strophic song are part of the ordering power of the chorus. "They are harassed but not frantic; they can present their sorrow effectively but are quite purposeful and even calculating in seeking their own safety" (219, n.45).

75 I use the text and translation in Sommerstein (2008a). On αὐτογενῆ φυξανορίαν, see FJW (1980) 12–15 for the textual and interpretive issues with the phrase; and Conacher (1996) 81 n.15 with references to earlier interpretations, FJW included. Conacher translates with "by their own self-chosen avoidance of men" but convincingly suggests that the choice of αὐτογενῆ by the poet is meant "to keep the 'kin-element' in the abhorred marriage before our minds as well".

76 See esp. ll. 36–39: ὄλοιντο / πρίν ποτε λέκτρων ὧν θέμις εἴργει, / σφετεριξάμενοι πατραδελφείαν / τήνδ' ἀεκόντων, ἐπιβῆναι (may they perish before ever mounting the beds from which Right bars them, appropriating us, who belong to their father's brother, against our will!).

By indicating their awareness that, as suppliants, they inevitably are on trial for just conduct, they consistently use terms that mean to emphasize what they perceive as the justice of their case. They call on the gods to see what is just (τὸ δίκαιον ἰδόντες), not to allow a marriage against what is proper (παρ᾽αἶσαν), and thus to show that they truly hate hubris (ὕβριν δ᾽ἐτύμως στυγόντες) (79–81). Such hubris is the sign of ever-growing delusion:

ἰδέσθω δ᾽ εἰς ὕβριν
βρότειον, οἷος νεάζει πυθμὴν
δι᾽ ἁμὸν γάμον τεθαλὼς
δυσπαραβούλοισι φρεσὶν
καὶ διάνοιαν μαινόλιν
κέντρον ἔχων ἄφυκτον, †ἄ-
τᾳ δ᾽ ἀπάτᾳ† μεταγνούς.

Let him [Zeus] look on this human
act of outrage, on the kind of youthful stock that is sprouting:
the prospect of marriage with me makes it bloom
with determination hard to dissuade;
it has frenzied thoughts that goad it on implacably,
having had its mind transformed <to love a ruinous delusion>. (104–111)

Lack of clarity, derangement, and delusion are reminiscent of the Erinyes' binding song. The state of mind that murderous men are to fear as their punishment in the *Eumenides* resembles the regular state of mind of the Aegyptiads. As hubris has taken over their mind, no counsels can effect any change (δυσπαραβούλοισι). It will soon become apparent that this maddened violent pursuit causes their victims' uncontrollable and violent fear.

In the process of communicating their fears (δειμαίνουσα, 74), at this stage the Danaids focus on earning their listeners' pity. This first song that makes a case for the just cause of their supplication is also performed as a lament.

τὼς καὶ ἐγὼ φιλόδυρτος Ἰαονίοισι νόμοισι
δάπτω τὰν ἁπαλὰν εἱλοθερῆ παρειὰν
ἀπειρόδακρύν τε καρδίαν·
γοεδνὰ δ᾽ ἀνθεμίζομαι
δειμαίνουσ᾽, ἀφίλου τᾶσδε φυγᾶς
Ἀερίας ἀπὸ γᾶς
εἴ τίς ἐστι κηδεμών.
[. . .]

τοιαῦτα πάθεα μέλεα θρεομένα λέγω
λιγέα βαρέα δακρυοπετῆ,
ἰὴ ἰή, ἰηλέμοισιν ἐμπρεπῆ·
ζῶσα γόοις με τιμῶ.
ἱλεῶμαι μὲν Ἀπίαν βοῦνιν—
καρβᾶνα δ' αὐδὰν εὖ, γᾶ, κοννεῖς—
πολλάκι δ' ἐμπίτνω ξὺν λακίδι λινοσινεῖ
Σιδονίᾳ καλύπτρᾳ.

So I too, fond of lamenting in Ionian strains,
rend my soft, sun-baked cheek
and my heart unused to tears;
I cull the flowers of grief,
in apprehension whether these friendless exiles
from the land of Mists
have any protector here.
[…]
Such are the sad sufferings that I speak and cry of,
grievous, keening, tear-falling sufferings—
ié, ié!—made conspicuous by loud laments:
I honor myself with dirges while I still live.
I appeal for the favor of the hilly land of Apia—
you understand well, O land, my barbaric speech—
and I repeatedly fall upon my Sidonian veil,
tearing its linen to rags. (69–76; 113–121)

The Danaids perform the ritual gestures of lamentation, as they concede, to render their sufferings conspicuous (ἐμπρεπῆ) and thus raise the pity of the land of Apia so that its people may grant them protection. Their particularly piteous appeal stems not only from the fact that, even though alive, they lament themselves as if they were already dead (ζῶσα γόοις με τιμῶ, 116),[77] but also from the lament's resemblance to the song of the nightingale (οἶκτον, 59; πενθεῖ μὲν οἶκτον, 64), mentioned just before the lines quoted here. The parallel, however, has further implications. In addition to mentioning Procne's pitiable fate, the Danaids sing of her cunning schemes that bring pitiful misery (μήτιδας οἰκτρᾶς ἀλόχου, 61), an unmotherly angry killing of her own will and choice (αὐτοφόνως, 65), which echoes their own self-willed exile (65–68) and foreshadows further violence against kin. Even though the immediately

77 See also ll. 70–3 for the ritual gestures of lamentation.

perceived reference is to the impending killing of their husbands in the next play, the Danaids are capable of other types of violence against (distant) family, as their exchange with Pelasgus will soon reveal.[78] Thus presenting themselves in a state comparable to death, the Danaids already hint at the potential of turning violent. Someone who knows the song of the birds (57), a seer, would discern such a threat, especially given the context of this nightingale-like lament: the Danaids perform while holding the suppliants' emblems, or else, daggers (σὺν τοῖσδ' ἱκετῶν ἐγχειριδίοις, 21). Undergoing and singing of sufferings and emotions (πάθεα) that are sad, grievous, keening, tear-falling, and made conspicuous (ἐμπρεπῆ) precisely by means of their lament (113–5), they conclude by warning the gods that they will commit suicide, if they do not receive protection (154–175).

As is well known, Solon in the 6th c. introduced to Athens legislation against lamentation that continued to be revised and reinforced in the classical period.[79] Some of the restrictions targeted the excessive and disorderly performance of women. Scholarship on the reasons for such legislation view it as an attempt to curb aristocratic and private ostentation as well as the display of emotion that has the power to foment vengeful behavior between families and thus threaten public unity. These restrictions have further political import during the Peloponnesian War, when seen against the introduction of the public funeral oration and the collective glorification of the war dead.[80] That tragedy

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78 Reading Μήτιδος instead of μήτιδας, FJW (1908) II. 64 see in this comparison a reference to the execution of the sons of Aegyptus, which is here hidden even to the Danaids themselves and discernible only by a seer: "Its [the comparison's] true significance, hidden as yet to themselves, concerns events still to come: as Metis took vengeance for the wrong done to her as a wife and sister by Tereus' brutal lust, so will the Danaids avenge their persecution and sexual subjugation by their male cousins, only in their case the 'kindred' on whom the αὐτοφονία is executed will be the husbands themselves. Hence no ordinary bystander, but a *seer* (58), has been specified as the hypothetical listener to their lament; only a person gifted with special powers of discernment and prophecy can perceive the full extent of the resemblance between their situation and that of the nightingale, whose past will be their future".

79 For the Solonian legislation, see Plutarch, *Solon* 12.4 and 21.4.

80 The bibliography on lamentation itself as well as on its role in tragedy is extensive. Here I include representatives who offer extensive discussion of the relevant evidence and have been particularly influential for the way we view lamentation in tragedy. The evidence and questions are introduced in a systematic way by Alexiou (2002) and extensively developed by, e.g., Holst-Warhaft (1992), Foley (2001), Seaford (1994), and more recently the contributions to Suter (2008). On connections between contemporary lamenting practices and vendetta in Mani that help us reassess the classical evidence, see Seremetakis (1991). Foley and Seaford offer the two main lines of approach which trace in tragic

consistently stages rituals of death and lamentation raises political questions that are to be examined in the context of each play.

While the *Supplices* was most likely produced before the First Peloponnesian War started in 460 BCE, the performance of lamentation by the barbarian, yet Argive, Danaids who arrive at Argos to demand protection and political asylum contributes to their potentially disruptive presence. Not only does their lament enact grief by themselves and for themselves while they are still alive. It also explicitly aims to render their grievance and emotion conspicuous both through its language and, most likely, passionate performance, a public undertaking that can be seen as highly controversial for a group of maidens despite the support of their father. And it culminates in a threat of violence through suicide. By incorporating the gestures of lamentation in their supplication, the Danaids already convey a mixture of power and vulnerability that characterizes them in different ways throughout the play. This combination will thus emerge as both underlying their emotional tendencies and expression and defining their social interactions.

A certain aggression that counterbalances the expression of vulnerability is integral to the suppliant position as well, as a number of scholars have pointed out.[81] "The display of powerlessness exhibited by the suppliant actually functions as an operation of power such that the vulnerable becomes powerful by the very display of vulnerability. The suppliant literally inflicts his vulnerability upon his host".[82] The gestures of debasement and the acknowledgment of need are meant to evoke pity while they cannot but inspire fear as

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lamentation a politics that relates to the democratic context in which the plays are staged. Foley argues that we cannot be certain what the issues are to which the "increasingly self-conscious re-problematizing of funerary lamentation is designed to respond". Even so, "the plays use traditional motifs from the past to raise questions about similar issues in the democratic society. Above all, these plays demonstrate that lamentation, a ritual form that may well have played a central role in the origins of tragedy, as often divides as unites the stage world in which it is performed. A mourning woman is not simply a producer of pity, but dangerous. Yet the message her lament carries is never fully suppressed" (55). Seaford, on the other hand, views lament in tragedy as part of a process through which the emergent democratic polis appropriates and transforms practices that used to enhance the solidarity of individual aristocratic *oikoi*. The polis, in this case, turns such practices (funerary rituals included) into public rituals that now contribute to the solidarity and *homonoia* of the citizen body. For a view that sees in tragic lamentation a way to collapse the boundaries between communal and individual spheres, transcend politics, and thus appeal to the spectators as members of the 'race of mortals', see Loraux (2002).

81 See Gould (1973), Belfiore (2000) 42–45, Naiden (2006), Brill (2009) 164–165 and *passim*.

82 Brill (2009) 165.

well, as they powerfully oblige the supplicated one to act on his pity and grant help. "*Hiketeia* is essentially an act which seeks a *reciprocal* act on the part of him to whom it is addressed, above and beyond the concepts of reciprocity which are built into the structure of Greek social relationships".[83] As such, it is also an essentially ambivalent ritual: "a plea for the protection of an acknowledged and magnanimous superior but also a threat to the integrity of the person supplicated".[84] The Danaids capitalize on this ambivalence. By combining the performance of supplication and lamentation that associates them with the pitiful but violent nightingale and concludes with the possibility of suicide, they justify their self-pity and evocation of pity but also offer a first warning of their willingness and ability to become violent.[85] It has been suggested that they go so far as to pervert *hiketeia* itself.[86] At the same time, the language of hubris and violation that they attribute to their suitors already reveals the source of their own fear, which will become more explicit and gradually pronounced in the play. Thus this first song sets the stage for the circulation of fear of violence that will soon affect all significant actors in the play.

Particularly interesting for my purposes is the open-endedness with which the Danaids construct their case, which will become more apparent and controversial during their supplication of Pelasgus himself. By presenting the Aegyptiads' wooing as hubris that violates *themis* and *to dikaion*, the chorus articulates how they view their case but do not clarify why their perception is accurate and justified. Danaus, whom they call their leader (στασίαρχος, βούλαρχος, 11–12), seems to be partly responsible for their perception and emotional state. When he gives them advice regarding how appropriately to supplicate the king of Argos, he reiterates that their position is justifiably pitiful. But he does not offer any clear insights into what renders a union with the Aegyptiads unjust: "How could a bird eat of another bird, and not be polluted? How could a man marry the unwilling daughter of an unwilling father (γαμῶν ἄκουσαν ἄκοντος), and not become unclean?" (226–8). While a father's will

83 Gould (1973) 75.

84 Ibid., 100.

85 For a reading that traces multiple ambiguities in the language of the Danaids especially but not exclusively during their supplication, which point to their future aggression against their cousins, see Gantz (1978).

86 Turner (2001) 34 argues that the Danaids actually "have reversed the usual power dynamic between suppliant and protector, and all reciprocity is lacking". This is because "they amazingly threaten to be their own agents of retribution if the Argives disregard their supplication".

indeed decides his daughter's marriage,[87] the motivation of such unwillingness remains obscure.[88]

This lack of precision becomes a primary concern for the king of Argos. While the Danaids' fear grows all the more palpable, the exact rationale behind it does not. During his exchange with the chorus, Pelasgus asks them precisely to define the reasons of their aversion toward the Aegyptiads and, therefore, the reasons that render their suppliant demands legitimate:

> P. Why do you say you are supplicating me in the name of these Assembled Gods, holding these fresh-plucked, white-wreathed boughs?
> D. So that I may not become a slave (δμωΐς) to the sons of Aegyptus.
> P. Is this because of hatred (κατ' ἔχθραν) or are you talking about something wrongful (τὸ μὴ θέμις)?
> D. Who would love (φιλοῦσα) someone whom she was buying as an owner?[89]
> P. That is how people increase their strength.
> D. Yes and when they fall into misfortune they're easily got rid of.
> P. Well then, how can I act piously (εὐσεβὴς ἐγὼ πέλω) towards you?
> D. By not giving us back into the hands of Aegyptus' sons when they demand us.
> P. That's a hard thing you are asking—to provoke an outbreak of war.
> D. But Justice (ἡ Δίκη) stands by those who fight for her.
> P. She will, if she was a partner (κοινωνός) in your cause from the beginning.
> D. Respect (αἰδοῦ) the poop of the ship of state, garlanded as it is.
> P. I shudder (πέφρικα) to see this divine abode in shadow: the wrath of Zeus god of suppliants is certainly heavy. (333–347)

87 This is the case according to Athenian law, which would resonate with the audience, despite the origin of Danaus and his daughters.

88 This brings up the highly disputed question of the Danaids' motivation. I turn to this question below. On the language used by Danaus and its ambiguities, see Conacher (1996) 87–88 with further references to work on the use of bird-imagery. Even though we do not hear why Danaus rejects the Aegyptiads, Macurdy (1944) 96 argues that "What Danaos says of the madness of the attempt to force the marriage is fully supported by the Attic law by which a father has the right to give his daughters in marriage to the man of his own choice, not necessarily to one who is next of kin. For a relative to attempt to marry a girl by force while her father is living is an act of hubris and against *dikê*".

89 I follow the emended text (φιλοῦσ' ὠνοῖτο), as accepted in Sommerstein. For a discussion of the alternatives, see Ireland (1974) 19–20.

The harder Pelasgus tries to comprehend the legal basis of their case, the less accurate information he receives and the more terrified he becomes. Demands of *themis, dikê*, and piety, and political obligations are mingled and customary, legal, religious, and political realms become blurred as the Danaids resist becoming more specific. For this reason, Pelasgus is unable to reconcile the demands of piety toward Zeus Hikesios with the (possible) demands of Justice in its expression in local laws and customs. His fear grows: ἀμηχανῶ δὲ καὶ φόβος μ᾽ἔχει φρένας (I am at a loss—fear grips my mind, 379). While the Danaids insist on the hubris of the Aegyptiads and their own suppliant rights, Pelasgus, in turn, insists on asking whether the Aegyptiads have rights on them according to the laws of their own country.[90] But they continue to plea in terms of a general concept of justice presumably supported by the gods: ξύμμαχον δ᾽ἑλόμενος Δίκαν / κρῖνε σέβας τὸ πρὸς θεῶν (choose Justice as your ally, make the judgment that the gods approve, 395–6). As Pelasgus persists in his resistance to judge this case (οὐκ εὔκριτον τὸ κρῖμα· μή μ᾽αἱροῦ κριτήν, "the judgment is not easy to judge; don't choose me to judge it", 397–8), the Danaids eventually threaten him with suicide by hanging themselves from the statues of the gods. It is at this point that the king accepts to help, explicitly out of fear for Zeus Hikesios (478–9).

Pelasgus' initial fear of not knowing how to act (ἀμηχανῶ δὲ καὶ φόβος μ᾽ ἔχει φρένας / δρᾶσαί τε μὴ δρᾶσαί τε καὶ τύχην ἑλεῖν, "I am at a loss—fear grips my mind whether to act or not to act and to take my chances", 379–380) gives way to a fear that necessitates action: one must, by necessity (ἀνάγκη), revere the wrath (κότον) of Zeus Hikesios, "for the fear of him is the greatest fear a mortal can have" (ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος, 479). Zeus' *kotos* recalls the wrath of the nightingale and points to the Danaids' claims to righteous anger. It is this fear that eventually compels Pelasgus to take the chorus' demands to the assembly: "I will go put these plans into action: may persuasion, and the fortune of success (τύχη πρακτήριος), go with me!" (522–3). Interestingly, before the Danaids resort to their threat and manage fully to involve the king in their case, Pelasgus expresses a preference to remain ignorant of what they are going through. He states: "I declare I have completely stepped aside from this dispute; I would rather be ignorant (ἄιδρις) than knowledgeable about these troubles" (452–4). Clearly, such knowledge does not refer merely to information. Pelasgus is already informed about the Danaids' troubles. He rather

90 See ll. 387–391: "If the sons of Aegyptus have power over you by the law of your state (νόμῳ πόλεως), saying they are your nearest kin, who would be willing to oppose that claim? You must plead your case (φεύγειν), you see, under the laws of your home country (κατὰ νόμους τοὺς οἴκοθεν), to show that they have no authority over you".

resists the kind of learning that would stem from empathizing with them and their cause and would require his active input. Only when he is made to experience a fear about himself and all he deeply cares about (his people and his state), does he come to 'know' their misfortunes. And this affectively grounded knowledge compels him to take action. To use Krause's terms, it is not sufficient for Pelasgus to find out what the Danaids' concerns and claims are in order to introduce them to his state's deliberations. They must become his own or come to be understood as integrally connected with his existing concerns.[91] Only by threatening his land and people with mass pollution do these female suppliants succeed in instigating the fear that brings together religious propriety, political responsibility, *and* emotional investment and thus leads to action.

But does the Danaids' position merit that such urgent political action be taken on their behalf? This raises the question of the maidens' motivation for resisting marriage with their cousins, which remains controversial and unresolved. As we saw, the chorus insists in equivocating while using highly charged moral and religious terms. Scholars have attributed the Danaids' ambivalence partly to the double role of the chorus in the play, namely their being a main actor that also has collectively to perform "through the stasima, much of the emotional content of the play".[92] While this double role indeed contributes to the ambiguity, I see this effect not as unavoidably stemming from formal constraints imposed on the chorus but, on the contrary, as purposefully created through the particular use of the chorus. The chorus' lyrics, in other words, could clarify their motivation further, but the poet chooses otherwise. Regarding the Danaids' actual motives, the question revolves around whether they detest marriage in general or marriage specifically with their cousins because of the latter's violence and/or because such marriage is felt to be incestuous.[93] Numerous scholars agree that the ambiguity cannot be fully resolved. Winnington-Ingram's formulation is particularly insightful:

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91 See Chapter 1, p. 40.

92 Ireland (1974) 17. See also, ibid., 22: "As a chorus proper the Danaids are not merely a continuation of their role of protagonist, and we cannot rightly expect them to be so. True they are the same persons, caught in the same dramatic situation, but their function must of necessity grow wider so as to produce the backcloth as it were against which the action is highlighted". Ireland argues for ambiguity regarding the Danaids' motivation throughout the play. But since it is their role as protagonist that is at the central interest of the play (as opposed to their choral function), their objections are to be seen as specifically against marrying the cousins (28–29).

93 The debate on the Danaids' motivation goes back to Wilamowitz (1914) 15 who reads αὐτογενεῖ φυξανορίᾳ in l. 8 and interprets it as "aus angeborener Männerfeindschaft". I include some of the representatives of the debate who also offer reviews of previous

> [H]atred of a forced marriage and hatred of marriage as such cannot be pressed too far, since, in the dramatic situation, force is the only guise under which marriage presents itself to the Danaids [. . .] But there are passages in which the language of the Danaids suggests a horror of male contact in any form. [. . .] If we want a formula that will cover all the facts, we cannot do better than say that the violent approach of the sons of Aegyptus has warped the feminine instincts of the Danaids and turned them against marriage as such.

As previous discussions foreground, it is the element of violence (βία) that calls for our attention. "The Danaids' conception of marriage will be colored throughout the tragedy by its varying proximity to violence".[94] And such violence opens up broader questions regarding the use of power (κράτος). Froma Zeitlin, for instance, agrees with Jean-Pierre Vernant that the play is an interrogation of the nature of power, its sources, and ways to organize different types of relationships.[95] The Danaids never entertain the possibility of a consensual union with the Aegyptiads. They rather conceive of their antagonistic relationship with their cousins as a war, with Justice on their side (344). In the context of this war, not only do they fear the use of power and violence against them. Such fear, as we saw, also motivates them to supplicate Pelasgus and eventually threaten him by using their own power potentially to exercise violence.[96]

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approaches. On the Danaids' objecting to marriage a) as an institution, see Turner (2001) esp. 28–32; b) because they view endogamy as impious, see Thomson (1941) 298–309; c) because of the violence of the suitors, see MacKinnon (1978); d) because they fear that their father will be killed by one of the grooms because of an oracle, see Sicherl (1986) and Rösler (1992). For a refutation of the arguments by the two scholars under (d), see Conacher (1996) 109–111. Zeitlin (1996) 125 connects both aversion to their cousins' violence and viewing such union as incestuous with a "virginal aversion to the idea of marriage itself as a form of violence and subjugation". For a survey of the different approaches with further references, see Papadopoulou (2011) 59–64. It is worth noting that, by pointing out that the Danaids remain "notably evasive when pressed by Pelasgus for specific facts to support their case" (129), Gagarin (1976) suggests that we should hesitate to accept their confidence that they are supported by Zeus and *dikê*, especially since subsequently the Aegyptiads will win the war against the Argives. Robertson (1936) is one of the representatives of the view that the opposition between the Danaids and their suitors is one between *dikê* and hubris and that, with regard to marriage, the contrast is between "civilized marriage based on *dikê* and primitive forced marriage" (107).

94 Brill (2009) 166.

95 Zeitlin (1996) 126.

96 For an interpretation of the Danaids' threat as also ambiguous in the play, itself depending on both the audience's interpretation of their motivation and on the preconceptions

The case of the Danaids presents an instance of the experience of fear transmuted into fearsome assault. The Erinyes in the *Eumenides* fear that Athena's new court and Orestes' acquittal will deprive them of their *timai*. The Danaids similarly fear first and foremost their suitors and that their suppliant rights will not be respected. Both collective bodies use the only power they possess: they threaten their potential benefactors with dreadful pollution as the result of their own wrath and/or the wrath of the god they represent. In the case of the Erinyes, this threat is a potent act of violence as, being divinities, they themselves have the power to enact it, inflict pollution, and avenge what they see as an affront to their long-held and indispensable divine function. Their own revenge reflects and threatens to continue the kind of unmediated justice they represent before their reconciliation with Athena. The Danaids' threat also comes as the culmination of an exchange that alerts Pelasgus of the potential of equal payment. Having asked Pelasgus not to "tolerate seeing the suppliants dragged away from divine images, in defiance of justice (βίᾳ δίκας)" (429–30), they forewarn him: "know this: whichever decision you make will hereafter affect your children and your house: matching justice must be paid in full (δεῖ 'κτίνειν / ὁμοίαν θέμιν)" (434–7). The king's *amêchania* triggers the use of their threat of suicide that would only cause further and detrimental *amêchania* by means of dreadful pollution. This emphasis on pollution, the lack of resources to remedy it, and the discourse of fear and punishment that recalls revenge augments and accentuates the Danaids' violence.[97]

It is worth considering further the friction between Pelasgus and the Danaids. Aristotle's definition of pity helps us look at Pelasgus' inability to sympathize with the Danaids. According to Aristotle's definition in the *Rhetoric*, we pity others when they undergo sufferings that they do not deserve and that we fear can happen to ourselves. Such empathetic response is facilitated if we share characteristics with them as well (age, character, habits, position). The assault of aggressive suitors does not resonate with Pelasgus, especially since the nature of their violence remains ill-defined to him and renders the question of desert unanswerable. It is the threat to the wellbeing of his city that forces him to reconsider his stance toward the Danaids. As Peter Burian puts it, considering Pelasgus' decision to bring the issue to the assembly:

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they bring to the theater according to their familiarity with previous versions of the Danaid myth, see Bednarowski (2010).

97 As Burian (2007) 206 points out, the Danaids "conceive of power as essentially coercive, and so they use the power of their perverted ritual". The use of power in this way reveals their limited, self-absorbed, and barbarian mentality, which is in sharp contrast with Pelasgus' Greek approach to the tragic dilemma.

> The unrelenting, indeed unscrupulous, pressure that the Danaids bring to bear on Pelasgus turns the proud autocrat into a constitutional monarch. What appears at first sight to be a contradiction is in fact a reflection of Pelasgus' understanding of the situation and of his role in it. As he becomes aware of the dangerous consequences of any action he might take, he assesses his *kratos* anew and realizes that it is inadequate to such a responsibility as now lies before him.[98]

In place of sympathy, fear of the Danaids prevails. And it is this fear that will, in turn, translate into an act of sympathy, that is, Pelasgus' proposal in the assembly to vote on the Danaids' case while supporting their cause. Thus the Danaids' threat triggers the kind of fear that renders their case not just a political issue but one that demands urgent collective input.

Before he leaves to convene the assembly, Pelasgus suggests that Danaus spread the sacred boughs on other altars through the city so that the citizens take pity on him and his daughters (481–9). We know, however, that such a gesture did not, in itself, work in Pelasgus' case. In the assembly too, he is the one who persuades the *dêmos* to protect the suppliants. In his speech, he never makes a case for the justice of their cause. He thus attempts to eliminate the possibility of emotional reactions that may stall political action. Rather he emphasizes the "double pollution" that would be "an irremediable (ἀμήχανον) breeder of grief" for the city (619–620). The hastiness of the *dêmos* to reach a final decision (621–2) and escape such pollution and grief indicates the overpowering fear that motivates them. Pelasgus also never mentions the possibility of war which threatens Argos upon undertaking the protection of the Danaids, a concern that he raised to the Danaids themselves. And the Argive people do not show the good judgment necessary to consider it. Thus king and *dêmos* base their decision on fear of pollution and respect for Zeus Hikesios.[99] As noble as the motive of reverence may be, the play also foregrounds it as fear of divine wrath that lacks further—and much desired—justification in legal and social terms. The absence of such justification imbues the interaction and agreement between the Danaids and Pelasgus and his city

98 Ibid., 204.

99 I am not implying that Pelasgus is presented with an easy decision. I agree with Burian (2007) 209 that the Danaids force a terrible choice upon him. I mean to emphasize that the way in which he chooses to persuade the *dêmos* foregrounds precisely the overpowering fear of pollution that does not allow for a more balanced consideration of options even in order to eliminate them. See also Couch (1942) 280 who views Pelasgus' moral problem as the kind of dilemma that the finest tragic heroes are faced with.

with a consistent undercurrent of forcefulness. As mentioned above, such forcefulness is communicated through the Danaids' language of potential punishment that recalls revenge. This language is also adopted by Pelasgus himself in his wish not to "cause a vexatious lodger to dwell with us, the god of Vengeance (Ἀλάστορα)" (415).[100]

At the same time, the tensions that condition the relationship between the Danaids and Pelasgus become perceptible partly through the language of emotional excess. Before Pelasgus leaves for the assembly, he advises the Danaids regarding how to act next. But they are too agitated and scared: οὔτοι τι θαῦμα δυσφορεῖν φόβῳ φρένας (It's not surprising if my mind is distraught with fear, 513). Pelasgus responds: ἀεὶ <γυναικῶν> ἐστὶ δεῖμ᾽ἐξαίσιον (women are always unreasonably frightened, 514).[101] It becomes explicit now—as will be the case, when the Egyptian men are about to arrive—that overpowering fear consistently motivates the Danaids. It is, to a great extent, this aspect of excess that makes such fear translatable into violence in what I see as a circulation of forceful fear in the play.[102] Overwhelming fear motivates the Danaids who, in their turn, use overwhelming fear to motivate Pelasgus and his people. Collaboration becomes possible only when fears are shared, since fear appears to exert an equalizing power: the Danaids fear the impious conduct of the Aegyptiads while the Argives fear the consequences of their own potential impiety. Because of the ambivalence regarding the justice of the Danaids' demands, however, the vision behind the collaboration that fear facilitates remains unclear and thus not fully shared. The absence of—or resistance to—a legal understanding of their own case on the part of the chorus points to the need for a common language and conception of what fear is and ought to be about. The Danaids force, as it were, on Pelasgus an expansion of the sympathetic imagination that, as such, remains full of tensions. When it is primarily this kind of fear that triggers decision making and consequent action, violence remains inherent, if not prevalent.[103]

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100 The chorus later reaffirms that it was this fear of vengeful Zeus that motivated the Argives in the assembly too: "they heeded Zeus' avenger (πράκτορα), ever on the watch, hard to combat" (646–7).

101 The emendation γυναικῶν is not universally accepted. See, e.g., FJW (1980) II. 399–400.

102 Fletcher (2007) 32 sees the emotional power of the Danaids as stemming from their nascent sexuality as virgins. She also suggests that the language and performance of the chorus is orderly when under the guidance of a male *chorêgos*, Danaus or Pelasgus.

103 Interestingly, even when the Danaids rejoice at the *dêmos'* decision to offer them protection and a place in the city, the language of 'recompense' (ἀγαθῶν ποινάς, 626) that introduces their blessings keeps the idea of 'pay-back' (here as gratitude but potentially as violence too) at the forefront.

From the primarily implicit fear experienced by the Danaids and the explicit fear experienced by Pelasgus, we move to a vivid expression of the Danaids' fear of the Aegyptiads. At their impending arrival, the chorus enacts on stage what their experience must have been before they fled Egypt. The Danaids cannot contain their fear. Incapable of controlling themselves, they are overwhelmed by it (πάτερ, φοβοῦμαι, 734; περίφοβόν μ' ἔχει τάρβος, 736; παροίχομαι, πάτερ, δείματι, 738; οἴχομαι φόβῳ, 786). Their performance becomes overly agitated.[104] They are certain that the Aegyptiads will show no respect for the altars, impious animals that they are (757–8, 762–3). The language of brutal behavior, hubris, and violence proliferates: περίφρονες δ' ἄγαν, ἀνιερῷ μένει / μεμαργωμένοι, κυνοθρασεῖς, θεῶν / οὐδὲν ἐπαΐοντες (they are so arrogant, maddened by their unholy rage, as shameless as dogs, turning a deaf ear to the gods, 757–9). The Danaids describe them as fearsome, disgusting, venomous animals—spiders, snakes, vipers—in the very act of hubris: "May great Destiny avert the monstrous outrage that you are committing (ὑβρίζοντ' [...] ἄητον ὕβριν)" (880–1). In a continuous enactment of paralyzing fear, they wish for death, the only kind of freedom that can counteract the violence of "a killer marriage" (δαΐκτορος γάμου, 798–9) and a force that compels much (βία βιᾶται πολλά, 863).[105]

The arrival of the Egyptian herald concludes the circulation of overwhelming fear that I see as central in the play. By bringing on stage the violence that the Danaids have been intensely fearing, the herald and his men bring to life the fear that motivated the chorus' threat of pollution. Their earlier inability to explicate to Pelasgus the legal status of their case back home and their invocation of all-encompassing *themis* can now be seen as pointing partly to an inability to explicate and face their own fear under the pressure of violence. At the same time, their interaction with the herald dramatizes another aspect of the Danaids' psychology, often brought up in considerations of what motivates their aversion to marriage. Their experience of erotic pursuit is inextricably connected with fear. Bred, as it were, in fear, they choose to use fear to motivate others as well. Their fear of violence and violation leads them to inspire fear of violence as pollution in a cycle that resembles the cycle of retribution of like for like, even when the cycle opens up to implicate the Argives. As is the case with acts of revenge, this kind of fear—even if justified—

104 For the unusual structure of this *amoibaion*—every stanza is preceded by two iambic lines most likely spoken by the coryphaeus and followed by two iambic lines spoken by Danaus—see FJW (1980) 92.

105 The latter is the herald's affirmation of violence. On the Danaids' part, the experience of violence and fear is coupled with an emphasis on desired freedom and release, see esp. ll. 802–807.

cannot contribute to any kind of genuine trust and cooperation within the new community that receives the Danaids.

The pressing need to overcome this type of fear is already apparent at the end of the play with Pelasgus' address to the herald and the choral exchange that follows it. The only alternative Pelasgus offers the Aegyptiads is persuasive respectful *logos* that will turn the unwilling Danaids to willing brides: ταύτας δ᾽ἑκούσας μὲν κατ᾽εὔνοιαν φρενῶν / ἄγοις ἄν, εἴπερ εὐσεβὴς πίθοι λόγος (you may take these women so long as they consent with friendly heart, if pious words of yours should persuade them, 940–1). Subsequently, he offers the Danaids residence in Argos, which inspires a praise of the city and evolves into a consideration of the role of Aphrodite in women's life. Two choral voices are heard at the end of the play. The second voice repeatedly suggests moderation in the Danaids' statements against "Cytherea's consummation" (τέλος Κυθερείας, 1032),[106] especially since Aphrodite and Hera come second only after Zeus. This chorus singles out Pothos, Peithô, and Harmonia and "the whispering paths of love-making" as Aphrodite's portion (μοῖρα) (1035–1052) in an attempt to "charm" the Danaids (1055). In response, the Danaids become more open to instruction: "what are you instructing me is the right choice?" (τίνα καιρόν με διδάσκεις; 1060) and start to modify their approach to marriage. They now wish that Zeus keep away a particular kind of marriage, "a hateful marriage to men who are foes" (γάμον δυσάνορα δάϊον, 1064–1065), and give power to women (καὶ κράτος νέμοι γυναιξίν, 1068–9); and that divine contrivances bring freedom (λυτηρίοις μαχαναῖς θεοῦ πάρα, 1072–3).

Scholars have reached no consensus regarding who forms the second chorus. The candidates are handmaidens of the Danaids who are (possibly) mentioned once before (977), the men of Pelasgus' bodyguard, or half of the Danaids, as they now split in two semi-choruses.[107] If a group of handmaidens forms the second chorus, young unmarried women who have witnessed both the whole trajectory of the Danaids' encounter with *erôs* and Argos' generous offer eagerly point to the virtue of moderation and the power of Aphrodite, Desire, and Persuasion. In this case, their mistresses would join them to sing the final lines (1062–1073), which convey a mixture of confidence and

106 See especially 1059 and 1061: μέτριόν νυν ἔπος εὔχου (then make your prayer a moderate one) and τὰ θεῶν μηδὲν ἀγάζειν (not to ask too much of the gods).

107 I mention briefly the problems raised by the text and suggested solutions without rehearsing the debate in detail. McCall (1976) 117 includes a table that summarizes the scholarly approaches for the different solutions in the years 1902–1972 and is representative of the different approaches taken subsequently as well.

hesitation with regard to their absolute aversion to marriage.[108] The remaining two candidates, however, offer more compelling alternatives. Between the two, the choice of a second chorus of Argive soldiers seems more attentive to the textual evidence and a more attractive solution in the context of the plot.

In the case of two semi-choruses, Marsh McCall's reconstruction sounds, for the most part, compelling:

> The differences of attitude between the two groups are perfectly recognizable. For the one, their only trust now is in the land of Argos and the protection of chaste Artemis. An Egyptian marriage, meaning an enforced marriage, in turn meaning marriage itself, is to be abhorred. Zeus cannot be known, nor does his will inspire hope. For the other group, recognition has come, at least for the moment, that Aphrodite represents a higher obligation than Artemis, and that beyond Aphrodite is the mind of Zeus. An Egyptian marriage must be shunned if possible, but Zeus' will may well include what is not at present comprehensible.[109]

My objection has to do primarily with the lines that describe Cypris and her enchanting partners (1034–42). Even if the Danaids have already started to change their mind, their experience so far does not equip them with such a subtle perception of things erotic. Open to 'instruction' though they may be (1060), they have not been instructed in *erôs* in any significant way yet.

Argive soldiers, on the other hand, are addressed more than once in the final part of the play. Even if ὑποδέξασθε (1022), one of the terms that address them, only means accept (and not respond), as McCall argues, the soldiers would not necessarily have to refrain from responding to the Danaids' song.[110] Furthermore, whether we read ἑσμός or θεσμός εὔφρων in l. 1034, either reading would be appropriate for a group of Argive men who are about to protect the

108 See also Lloyd-Jones (1964) 366: "If the handmaidens have no special function, there is no reason why they should be explicitly introduced at l. 975f; and it is hardly possible after the passionate unanimity of the Danaids against marriage that has been maintained throughout the play, for half of them suddenly and temporarily to defend Aphrodite's function".

109 McCall (1976) 127.

110 See also Swift (2010) 280 n.91 who conversely argues that the phrase actually indicates that another group will take over the song. Swift offers a compelling argument for an exchange between the Danaids and a chorus of Argive soldiers. She sees them as a mixed chorus that is meant to recall the mixed choruses of the hymenaios. As such, they perform a song rich with perverted hymenaial allusions that contributes to the play's treatment of the violation of social conventions. See pp. 279–297.

Danaids in their move to the city. The former would portray them in opposition to the Aegyptiads: as men, they too may be seen as an ἑσμός, but unlike the Aegyptiads, the soldiers form a wise or friendly swarm. The latter would introduce the advice they then give. The difficulty in this case would be what McCall reads as "the genuine dramatic embarrassment of a band of stolid soldiers disputing with the Danaids over the deep and subtle feelings, internal and external, which should be exhibited toward Cypris".[111] But if the song is to recall the hymenaios in content and form, the male chorus appropriately picks up on the female chorus' language "in order to cap it".[112] Furthermore, in his address to the Egyptian herald, Pelasgus earlier introduced the need that men use persuasive *logos* to change the Danaids' perception of Aphrodite. The Argive men may be taking on the task as they are welcoming the Danaids into their city.

The different identities of the second chorus would not fundamentally alter my interpretation but a choral exchange between the Danaids and a group of male soldiers would better contribute to the first stages of what I see as a long process of sublimation and rationalization of fear that begins at the end of the *Supplices*. In this trilogy the sublimation of fear is directly related, I suggest, to the openness to shared risk that promotes the cultivation of trust on multiple levels. Pelasgus' address to the Egyptian herald, the Danaids' incorporation into the Argive state, and the choral dialogue at the end of the play indicate that this process is under way. The Argive *dêmos* voted earlier to offer them "the right of residence in this land in freedom, with asylum and protection from seizure by any person" (609–10). Pelasgus' exchange with the herald reaffirms this decision despite the risk of impending war.[113] By granting the Danaids (political) privileges, freedom from the 'slavery' of marriage, and respect, this incorporation creates the circumstances for the cultivation of trust. The exchange between the two choral voices indicates precisely the need for such cultivation, now that the circumstances are conducive to it. Much graver transgressions will take place before the Danaids come to accept the institution of marriage

111 McCall (1976) 125.

112 Swift (2010) 286.

113 Pelasgus' support through protection and incorporation into Argos also responds to the Danaids' overwhelming fear of isolation. When Danaus informs them of the impending arrival of the Aegyptiads and the need to leave them temporarily to seek help, they plead: "Don't leave me alone (μόνην δὲ μὴ πρόλειπε), I beg you, father! A woman on her own (γυνὴ μονωθεῖσα) is nothing: there is no fight in her" (748–9). Fletcher (2007) 32 sees in the admittance of the Danaids to Argos a transfer of custody over them, which "resembles marriage negotiations, while it simultaneously seems to refer to the bestowal of new citizen rights".

and become trusting and trustworthy themselves. But the need for well-functioning and commonly accepted institutions that have the power to effect the sublimation of fear that I am arguing for is already emphasized through both Pelasgus' initial insistence to find out the legal and social status of the Danaids back home—and hence the validity of their claims regarding marriage—and his creating an unambiguous status for them in Argos.[114]

Before I expand on this idea of the expression, use, and sublimation of fear for the cultivation of trust, I digress briefly to a recent study of the role of a different emotion, anger, in transitional justice. In her work on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sonali Chakravarti offers a model for understanding the role of anger in victim testimony. The expression of anger during the testimonies creates a much needed opportunity for victims and their communities to face reparable and irreparable grievances and attempt to relate on a level that may promote the transition to equal citizenship and a political environment of trust. According to Chakravarti's model, there are three dimensions to anger: the cognitive-evaluative, the confrontational, and the kinetic dimension. Though necessarily reductive, the following points give us an idea of the effect of anger as Chakravarti defines it through these complementary dimensions. The cognitive-evaluative dimension reveals the complex causes of anger, which include desires for status and power. Having access to such causes is critical, since "the potential for uptake also provides an opportunity for a tangible response to anger, which may be the best indicator of shared risk necessary for the development of trust".[115] The confrontational dimension "may occupy a space between demanding recognition as a victim and wanting to be seen as a citizen, even when one is unsure of what that means".[116] Being often difficult to respond to, this dimension "does not necessitate immediate uptake, but demands a type of attention that shows acknowledgment of the risk taken in its expression".[117] Last, the kinetic dimension "refers to anger's significance as a source of energy for political life [...] [and] operates on the level of visceral experience and the recognition of shared humanity".[118] Here Chakravarti draws attention to the voice and both the uniqueness and the relationality that it communicates. This focus on the voice emphasizes the

114 See also Zeiltin (1996) 141: "The numerous juridical references throughout the play suggest, over and above the specific legal problems of cousin-marriage in Egypt or Argos, the broader significance of a polity guided by law and institutional procedure".

115 Chakravarti (2014) 142.

116 Ibid., 145.

117 Ibid., 149.

118 Ibid.

role of attentive listening during victim testimony. Perceived through these three dimensions, anger can promote civic interactions that generate trust. By engaging with the difficult and, potentially, disruptive nature of anger during the truth commission, the citizens develop an expansive repertoire of affective connections with each other, which can develop into trust and foster participation in the new *dêmos* after the end of the commission.[119]

Without drawing too facile a parallel, Chakravarti's incisive delineation of the workings of anger can help shed light on the workings of fear in the *Supplices* and the Danaid trilogy overall. All three dimensions of anger in the truth commission are operative, to a significant extent, in the case of fear primarily for two reasons. First, the move from Egypt to Argos and their suppliant role situate the Danaids in an ambivalent and transitional social and legal position. Second, because of this transitional position the experience and instigation of fear in the play call for the creation of both new affective connections and immediate uptake that affect—and will continue to redefine in the subsequent plays—the social and political map of Argos. In the context of the negotiations that the chorus instigates, the circulation of fear, I have argued, is instrumental: it instigates—and reveals—a development in the terms of communication between all parties involved and especially between Pelasgus and his city on the one hand, and the Danaids on the other.

More specifically, Pelasgus initially does not comprehend the Danaids' fear of marriage. The Danaids, in turn, do not comprehend Pelasgus' fear of legal sanctions (in case he supports them in their opposition to their cousins), of war, and of the Argive *dêmos'* potential anger precisely for risking engagement in war. The fears of each reflect their concerns and values and their desire to define their status accordingly. The Danaids desire to remain unmarried while being protected and respected in Argos, their ancestral land. They demand to be incorporated into the community and thus develop a sense of belonging, while retaining freedom from conventional expectations for women. Pelasgus desires to protect his state and shun war for the sake of women who do not sufficiently justify their aversion to marriage. These distinct fears and desires initially cannot be shared. By triggering the fear of Zeus Hikesios' wrath and of consequent pollution, the Danaids impose on Pelasgus an emotional experience that commands more attentive listening and uptake. As mentioned earlier, Pelasgus is forced to undergo an experience of fear that, briefly, almost equalizes him with the Danaids. His initial exasperation at his lack of resources (ἀμηχανία) in his state of fear puts him in a position that echoes the

119 Ibid., 160–163, esp. 162.

state of the Danaids when they relive their fear of the Aegyptiads' violence.[120] Only through the threat to his city's health can he share the Danaids' fear. As soon as the Danaids threaten him with potential suicide, he exclaims: ἤκουσα μαστικτῆρα καρδίας λόγον (I hear words that flay my heart, 466). The Danaids confirm: ξυνῆκας· ὠμμάτωσα γὰρ σαφέστερον (You understand! I have opened your eyes to see more clearly; or, literally: I have furnished you with eyes to see more clearly, 467). Forcing him to share their fear of violation through the fear of pollution is the only way to enable him to see with new eyes and with an intensity—here put in terms of physical torture—that motivates him to take action. The confrontational and kinetic dimensions of Chakravarti's model seem to be particularly at play here. The sharper the pain of fear that he experiences, the clearer his perception becomes.

Thus the experience of intense fear motivates both the Danaids and Pelasgus to take on risks that not only communicate their respective fears but also gradually transform them and create the possibility for new civic interactions. The Danaids risk through the very act of supplication.[121] The transformation I am referring to becomes clearer at the end of the play, as I argue below. Pelasgus convinces the *dêmos* to offer protection to the suppliants and attends to the collective decision to do so during his encounter with the Egyptian herald. By accepting the Danaids' demands because of the confrontation that fear necessitates, Pelasgus and his people take on the risk of war and of expanding their own citizenry. They thus initiate a series of interactions with the Danaids that begin to generate a degree of trust and a transformation of fear itself.

At the end of this first play, significant tensions remain unresolved. Being only partly and ambiguously justified, the Danaids' fear of marriage cannot be perpetually respected. More importantly, the type of fear they evoke instigates action primarily through its urgency, while it eliminates, as we saw, the possibility of reflecting further on its consequences. The Argives' fear of pollution is justified as an indication of reverence. At the same time, it is also unsustainable since it essentially fails to reconcile religious and political concerns.[122]

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120 See esp. the Danaids' fear of the Aegyptiads' arrival in comparison with Pelasgus' fear in ll. 734–738, 376–380, also discussed above.

121 See Pelasgus' astonishment at their fearlessness: "And how you dared to come to this land so fearlessly (ἔτλητ᾽ἀτρέστως), under the protection neither of heralds nor of native sponsors, and without guides—that is astonishing (θαυμαστόν)" (238–240).

122 As discussed above, here I refer to the fact that their decision to protect the Danaids is reverent but rushed and based on not thoroughly clear legal premises. It will also most likely result in war and tyranny in Argos, in the following play. For the questions around Pelasgus' decision, his ability as a leader and how he might have been perceived by the Athenian audience, see, e.g., Gagarin (1976) esp. 128.

The positive results of the circulation of fear will, therefore, be short-lived. But the tensions dramatized in the *Supplices* are presented as valuable in themselves: feeling fear forces one to think otherwise and act accordingly.[123] For such action to become socially and politically more grounded and responsible, there needs to be a higher degree of transparency, trust, and sublimation. In the first play of the trilogy, the circulation of fear and its gradual sublimation are under way and give the action momentum.

The idea of sublimation requires further explication, especially since I see it as promoted at the end of the play.[124] But before I look at the end of the *Supplices*, I turn briefly to the end of the trilogy. It has been convincingly argued that in the final play Aphrodite, very likely in the context of a trial of Hypermestra or the rest of the Danaids, uses the paradigm of the union of Gaia and Ouranos to defend erotic desire and marriage.[125] Aphrodite's 'myth' offers the authoritative *logos* according to which mutual desire connects Gaia and Ouranos in a sacred marriage that celebrates Gaia's fertility. As Zeitlin points out, the sacred marriage of Heaven and Earth eventually supersedes Io's misleading model of human sexuality,[126] and persuades the Danaids to accept marriage. Io's story, her torment by Hera, and her release by Zeus, her lover and

123 This confirms Aristotle's statement in the *Rhetoric* that "fear makes men deliberate" (ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, 1383a8–9). Konstan's (2006) 133 comment on how Aristotelian fear works (both as a process itself and in the community) resonates with my reading of fear in the *Supplices*: "[F]ear, for Aristotle, was not an instinctive aversion but a socially conditioned response in which relations of power and judgments concerning the status and attitudes of others play a crucial role—a subject of 'sociophobics', if you like". Konstan sets such sociophobics in the context of intense competition and struggle for dominance. For a discussion of the anthropology of fear and 'sociophobics' more broadly, see the contributions in Scruton (1986). Scruton himself, ibid., 7–49, discusses the role of emotion in encouraging conformity to behavioral and attitudinal norms in situations that are viewed as significant in a society.

124 I use 'sublimation' primarily as partial rationalization and cultivation without its Freudian baggage. For a psychological interpretation of the play, see, e.g., Murray (1958) and especially Caldwell (1994).

125 Aphrodite's role is reconstructed through fr. 44 (Radt), the most substantial fragment surviving from the rest of the trilogy. I include here Zeitlin's (1996) 159 translation of it: "Now the pure Heaven desires to pierce or wound the Earth. Now desire grips the earth for her marriage. The rain showering from the mating sky impregnates her, and for mortals she gives birth to flocks of sheep and to the life-giving wheat of Demeter. And from this moist wedding, the season of trees' blooming comes to fulfillment; of these things I am an immanent cause".

126 Zeitlin (1996) 159.

father of her son Epaphus, is the mythic paradigm that the chorus returns to in their odes. This paradigm reflects an idealization that appears to be partial, if not misconceived. By foregrounding the gentle touch and breath of Zeus as the gestures that define his relationship with Io, they downplay erotic pursuit and sexual union.[127] They rather focus on liberation and freedom from the tortures of Hera's jealousy that result in the birth of noble offspring. There is, however, no institutional structure to counterbalance or recalibrate the version of the myth that the Danaids view as authoritative.[128] Even if the violence of the Aegyptiads (as represented by the herald) justifies the Danaids' aversion to them, looking up to Io's ideal appears to contribute to their overwhelming fear of marriage. Their absolute rejection of marriage will have to change, especially since it compromises the function of other institutions as well. By threatening Pelasgus instead of winning him over solely through the justified cause of the *hiketês*, they pervert, as we saw, *hiketeia* itself.[129] Additionally, the subsequent murder of the sons of Aegyptus (except Lynceus) will not only undermine the bonds of marriage and kinship but will also violate the rules of *xenia* upon which the Danaids themselves based part of their claims to Argive protection. Aphrodite's etiological myth and the ritual(s) founded at the end of the trilogy come to provide authoritative narratives and institutions that sublimate both violence and the fear of sexual union and marriage. Even more importantly, they are most likely presented as accepted by all freely.

127 A detailed discussion of the odes on Io and her union with Zeus are beyond the scope of my analysis, because of my particular focus on fear. Io's story is the mythic paradigm that recurs in the Danaids' songs as they justify their demands to Argos partly through their Argive descent. At the same time, they use Io's union with Zeus as the only paradigm of erotic union they aspire to. Belfiore (2000) 47 has argued for the consistent benevolence of Zeus towards Io in the play, which contrasts with his portrayal in the *Prometheus Bound*. She also argues against a number of scholars who see the relationship as involuntary on the part of Io and non-sexual. Building on this interpretation and arguing that the wife was also conceived of as a suppliant, she sees the Io story "as a mythological prototype of the ideal Greek marriage in which the bride is a suppliant and *xenê* of her husband" (62). Belfiore is right to point out that there is indeed sexual union in the story as the Danaids convey it (and the lines that she points to are 295 and 300) but they do not dwell on it. It is the element of release that the Danaids foreground.

128 Danaus' role in cultivating this particular version of the story remains ambiguous. See n.93 regarding the possible existence of an oracle foreseeing his death at the hands of one of the grooms.

129 Turner (2001) argues that they are already perverting *hiketeia* in the *Supplices* itself. See n.86. For the increasing importance of Zeus Xenios already in the *Supplices*, see Belfiore (2000) 45–47. For the hypothesis that Zeus Xenios presides over the second play, the *Aegyptioi*, see Winnington-Ingram (1961) 146.

The issue of freedom and voluntary choice is central and directly connected with the experience of fear. It recurs throughout the *Supplices* and is also brought up at the conclusion of the play. By means of the mythic paradigm of Io and their expressed aversion to marriage, the Danaids demand release and freedom throughout the play. They initially ask for release from marriage to the Aegyptiads, which they identify with slavery (334). They wish that Hermes will bring good news to them in freedom (ἐλευθέροις, 221). Terrified at Danaus' warning that the Aegyptiads are about to arrive, they wish for death, because "he who dies is freed (ἐλευθεροῦται) from evils that cry to be bewailed" (802–3). They thus inquire into the right path that will release them from wedlock (γάμων λυτῆρα, 807). Their wish is granted through the rights of residency (μετοικεῖν) that they receive from Pelasgus—who proudly claims to be of free speech (ἐλευθερόστομος, 948)—and his people, which will secure for them a life in freedom (ἐλευθέρους), with asylum and protection (609–610). They conclude the play by invoking Zeus and his liberating powers: "May Lord Zeus deprive us of a hateful marriage to men who are our foes—he who gave Io a good release from her sufferings (πημονᾶς ἐλύσατ᾽εὖ), restraining her with his healing hand, making force kindly (εὐμενῆ βίαν κτίσας)" (1062–7). Such "divine contrivances that bring freedom/release" (λυτηρίοις μαχαναῖς θεοῦ πάρα, 1072–3) would establish justice. In the case of Io, freedom is inseparable from the burden and stability that results from birth-giving (ἕρμα Δίον, 580). In the case of the Danaids, such stability results from their incorporation into the Argive city but, in this first play, they resist further commitments.

Even though the Danaids insist on invoking the freeing power of Zeus till the very end, they come finally to revise their objection as one not to all men but specifically to men who are their foes. The chorus of Argive men has already encouraged them to show moderation by pointing out the role of Desire, enchanting Persuasion, and Harmony (Πόθος, θέλκτωρ Πειθῶ, Ἁρμονία) in Aphrodite's affairs, who, furthermore, is presented as being at the side of Zeus and Hera. Thus the gradual modification of both fear and the conceptualization of freedom (and hence marriage) is, modestly, under way. The security granted through incorporation in the Argive state creates the circumstances for the exchange with a group of non-violent men and hints at the possibility for new attachments. In their blessings for Argos earlier in the play, the Danaids wish for "a government acting with craft and foresight for the common good" (προμαθίς εὐκοινόμητις ἀρχά, 700). Such common good starts being pursued through the first steps of using persuasion and cultivating trust. Peithô will offer shared ideological grounds and understanding while Pothos will generate shared desires. Thus the willingness of Pelasgus and his people to protect the suppliants and the invocation of Peithô in *erôs* and marriage initiate new

attachments that are based on consensus and have the potential of being both steadying and liberating at the same time.[130]

At the end of the trilogy, the foundation and endorsement of shared institutions ensures the full incorporation of women in the polis. As mentioned earlier, the most prominent candidates for such institutions are the Thesmophoria, a new law court, and the wedding-song. Both the Thesmophoria and the hymenaios acknowledge, sublimate, and circumscribe the fear of marriage. In so doing, I suggest, they also sublimate the fear of the (female) fear of marriage. A new law court would possibly show the understanding and negotiation of fears to be a valuable part of judgment. To reach a final resolution, the role of *peithô* will be crucial as is already apparent in the *Supplices*: the Danaids "must be restored to normality and made freely to accept their destiny of marriage".[131] In the *Supplices* we witness the transitional moment that reveals some of the reasons for endorsing such necessity. The chorus, as we saw, forces Pelasgus to share their experience of fear. Even if the cognitive dimension of each one's fear differs in its specifics, they overlap in one way: they both fear the loss of freedom—through imposed marriage or incapacitating pollution respectively.[132] The fact that a female, barbarian-looking, yet native collective body brings such fear to center stage dramatizes the need to entertain the possibility of expanding the polis' affective horizons and relationships to retain freedom. By forcefully making their fear of violent marriage a political concern, the chorus, I have argued, initiates a process of communication in which sharing, clarifying, and negotiating fears becomes inevitable and necessary for the continuous function of the community. In this context emotional communication initiates the development of new possibilities for dialogue. Not only does Pelasgus' polis expand its public horizon of concern. The Danaids themselves, as metics in Argos, reluctantly begin to reevaluate their own fears and attachments.

130 Zeitlin (1996) 142 sees Pelasgus himself open to persuasion. Even though I see Pelasgus as forced into accepting the Danaids' demands, I agree that by so doing, he also takes the risk of "admitting other values represented by the suppliants that may challenge civic definitions of the body politic".

131 Winnington-Ingram (1961) 144.

132 See esp. 415–6, where Pelasgus sees that the Danaids' threat of pollution will inevitably instigate divine vengeance, which threatens to eliminate freedom even in Hades.

It is true that the trilogy concludes with Aphrodite's authoritative myth and ritual institutions that reinforce male hegemony.[133] But in this context, "the ideal sexual union is one between two persons both of whom are not merely consenting but *eagerly desirous* parties".[134] Even though an ideal that sets up a normative paradigm, eager mutual desire does not merely enforce the norm. It also reflects an aspiration to cultivate mutual, even if not equal, dependence and trust. In the *Supplices*, such aspiration is gradually set in motion through the fear of violence and uncontrollable (ritual or political) power and the visceral reactions, new considerations, and acts that it compels—on all sides. As Pelasgus' experience suggests, witnessing the power of the chorus' own paralyzing fear and confronting the paralyzing fear that they instigate shows attentive listening to fear to be a compelling political choice and a prerequisite for the cultivation of trust in matters that both include and transcend the realm of Aphrodite.

4 Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*

With Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, we turn to the earliest of the plays examined in this book. Produced in 467 BCE as the third play in a trilogy after *Laius* and *Oedipus*, the *Seven* brings to the stage a chorus of Theban maidens. This is yet a different and interesting instantiation of an 'active' chorus. As Michael Gagarin has observed, the play "does not present a conflict within Eteocles himself, but between him and the chorus".[135] The circulation of the chorus' fear within Thebes is what triggers this conflict. In the central scene of the play as well—the well-known description of the signs on the Argive warriors' shields and Eteocles' reversal of them—"one of the things the shields do is to focus our attention on the problem of knowing what is really to be feared".[136] Last, after Eteocles' decision to face his brother at the seventh gate and during the disputed lamentation at the end of the play, the chorus expresses yet different fears, of the Erinys and the pollution stemming from fratricide. Different articulations of fear, then, are juxtaposed and reveal the content, circulation,

133 See Zeitlin (1996) 159, who discusses how Aphrodite's myth of Gaia and Ouranos naturalizes sexual relations and compensates for female grievance by emphasizing woman's reproductive powers.

134 Sommerstein (2006) 243–4.

135 Gagarin (1976) 125.

136 Bacon (1964) 27.

and effects of fear to be a major focus in the play. The chorus' experience and expression of fear is, at the same time, closely related to the expression of self-pity and the evocation of pity, in the first stasimon and the closing choral lament most prominently. Even though I discuss the interrelation between the two tragic emotions throughout the play, my primary focus remains fear especially in the first part of the play.

The choral discourse of fear and pity in the *Seven* offers further insights into a number of issues that I have addressed so far in both Thucydides and Aeschylus: the question of perception, perspective, and accuracy in emotional expression; the divide between *orgê* and *gnômê*; the contagiousness of emotion; the role of emotion in motivating action; the role of attentive listening and how emotion can contribute to creating a hierarchy of attachments in the polis. Partly because of our uncertainty about the ending of the play, as scholars often admit, ambiguities and tensions remain unresolved in the *Seven*. Choral emotion remains, similarly, unconfined at the end of the play and trilogy. Irrespective of the difficulties posed by the state of the text, the maidens of the chorus address realities and express emotions—especially fears—that the male characters in the play express as well. It is through this juxtaposition that the forceful and, at times, audacious choral expression brings to the fore the issues mentioned above.

Because of the impending attack against Thebes by Polyneices and the Argives, the emotional state of the Thebans is at issue from the very beginning of the play. Addressing the citizens of Cadmus (1), Eteocles explicitly invites them to aid the city and its gods (10–16) and attempts to inspire confidence in them: "have good confidence (εὖ θαρσεῖτε) and don't be too afraid (ταρβεῖτ' ἄγαν) of this horde of foreigners" (34–5). Right afterward, the Scout arrives to give an account of the enemy's preparation. Taking pride in the clarity and accuracy of his information, he reports that the Argives swear by Ares, Enyo, and blood-loving Terror (φιλαίματον Φόβον, 45). He emphasizes the urgency of the situation, since the enemy is already approaching, like a loud roaring wave ready to rush down against the city with its squalls of war (πρὶν καταιγίσαι πνοὰς / Ἄρεως - βοᾷ γὰρ κῦμα χερσαῖον στρατοῦ, 63–4). And he promises that he will continue to update Eteocles with accuracy: καὶ σαφηνείᾳ λόγου / εἰδὼς τὰ τῶν θύραθεν ἀβλαβὴς ἔσῃ (and through my clear reports you will know what is happening outside and not come to harm, 67–8). By invoking the gods in response, Eteocles asks them never to bind the polis of Cadmus "with the yokestrap of slavery" because "when a city enjoys success, it honors its gods" (77). This initial interaction sets the stage for the prominent role of fear in the play: at the very moment that war is about to begin, fear—both of the attackers who swear by Phobos and of the potential outcome, slavery—has to be kept in

check. For this reason an accurate and sober perspective is seen as serviceable to the polis and vital to its freedom and its healthy relationship with the gods. Such a perspective, encapsulated in and communicated through a clear and rational account (λόγος), is presented as offering access to knowledge that can ensure safety.

As soon as the chorus of maidens appears on stage, their perspective—literally and metaphorically speaking—contrasts sharply with that of the Scout. Their knowledge comes primarily not from witnessing the enemy but from hearing the sounds of their preparations. Instead of controlled *logos*, they utter agitated cries. The primarily dochmiac meter of their entrance emphasizes their agitation, especially if they reach the orchestra *sporadên*.[137] They "cry for great sufferings" as the army has begun to approach. Such sufferings are *phobera*, an articulation that carries the double meaning of "fear-provoking" and "fear-filled" (θρέομαι φοβερὰ μεγάλ᾽ἄχη, 78).[138] The chorus initially communicates the latter meaning but it soon becomes apparent that the former effect is also at play. Since they cannot be eyewitnesses up close like the scout (κατόπτης, 41), they declare: αἰθέρια κόνις με πείθει φανεῖσ᾽ / ἄναυδος σαφὴς ἔτυμος ἄγγελος (the dust I see in the air shows me it is so, a voiceless messenger, but true and certain, 81–2). But it is mostly the sounds and noises of war that render the perception of the approaching enemy clear (89–91). "Reiterated aural images accumulate to create the impression of a continual, maddening cacophony, so permitting the audience to experience the terrifying quality of the siege".[139] As the chorus perceives it, the noise (βοάν, 84) of the horses resembles the roaring sound of an irresistible mountain torrent (βρέμει δ᾽ἀμαχέτου δίκαν / ὕδατος ὀροτύπου, 85–6). Their bits sound like a piercing lamentation (μινύρονται) that tells of slaughter (122–3). The clatter of shields and numerous spears is so loud and clear, that the chorus can 'see' it: ἀκούετ᾽ἢ οὐκ ἀκούετ᾽ἀσπίδων κτύπον; [...] κτύπον δέδορκα· πάταγος οὐχ ἑνὸς δορός (Do you hear, or do you not, the clatter of shields? [...] I see the noise—it is the clatter of many spears!, 100, 103). They thus envision clearly what they hear and give voice to what they see, conveying lucidly their synesthetic experience. They return to the imagery of a wave of

137 Taplin (1977) 141–142 suggests that a scattered entry "would make a striking end of the prologue, the disorganized terror of the women in contrast to the silent bravery and discipline of the citizens at the beginning. He bases his suggestion on the internal evidence of the dochmiac lyrics which are astrophic till l. 108 and possibly till l. 149. As these are divided in many short asyndetic sections, they could be easily distributed to single chorus-members or to small groups. See also Scott (1984) 160.

138 Benardete (1967) 23. For text and translations I use Sommerstein (2008a).

139 Haldane (1965) 36.

men that "breaks loudly over the city, raised up by the blasts of war" (111, 115), as they supplicate the gods to save them from slavery. And they continue to describe the sounds of war while punctuating them with their own cries of fear (150, 158): the rattle (ὄτοβον, 151) of chariots and the squealing of their heavy-laden axles (ἔλακον ἀξόνων βριθομένων χνόαι, 153), the clashing (κόναβος, 161) of the shields by the gates. "The sounds both outside and within the city combine to give a total picture of the confusion wrought by war".[140] Being overwhelmed by the fear of these spreading sounds, they turn to Athena and Poseidon to ask for release from their fears (ἐπίλυσιν φόβων, 135) and to all the gods to entreat them to hear (κλύετε, 171) their prayers of supplication. They conclude on the same note as Eteocles—by reminding the gods of their reciprocal relationship with the city of Thebes: "and be mindful, I beg you, of the city's loving sacrificial rites" (180–1).

The juxtaposition of the two scenes that report the state of war in Thebes invites the audience to consider how perspective and emotional response are shaped and communicated. Even though based primarily on hearing, the chorus' perception appears to be truthful and accurate. The imagery of the threatening approaching wave and the urgency of the situation that they convey recall and expand the Scout's report. Their request of the gods appears valid and appropriate, since they ask for the kind of reciprocity that Eteocles himself implied at the end of his speech.[141] The fundamental difference clearly lies in their manner of expression. By means of prayer and supplication, by screaming and flustered dancing, and by reproducing the loud overwhelming sounds of the warriors outside the walls, they communicate a degree of urgency to respond to the Argive threat and an intensity of fear that are absent in the male discourse that precedes the parodos. At the same time, the chorus-women experience fear with such intensity that they act on it: they perform ritual supplication to request divine support and thus present themselves as representatives of their city.[142] Even though female participation in ritual is

140 Thalmann (1978) 57.

141 For the opposite approach according to which the difference between λιταὶ θεόκλυτοι, the chorus' prayers that accompany their supplication, and εὐχή, Eteocles' prayer, lies in the fact that the former lack reciprocity, see Giordano-Zecharya (2006) 63–65. For Podlecki (1964) 289, who sees Eteocles' religious attitude as offensive to the gods, the final choral exhortation to the gods is simple, sincere, and even naïve: "The innocence of the sentiment here only points up the insincerity of Eteocles' words".

142 Kranz (1933) 108 suggests that the chorus imagines the enemy attack. See also Rosenmeyer (1962) 55–56, who interprets the chorus' perception of the war as emotional 'fancies' and their perspective as self-involved in opposition to Eteocles' other-thinking reasoning mind: "the mind of Eteocles works on the level of reason, while the women give

customary and honored, the aggressive symbolic significance of their ritual act resides in the fact that these maidens undertake a public role on behalf of the city without having been asked to.[143]

It is precisely in terms of aggression and violation of female appropriateness, that of seclusion within the *oikos*, that Eteocles reacts vehemently against the chorus. Calling them insufferable creatures (θρέμματα οὐκ ἀνασχετά, 182), Eteocles harshly condemns them along with the entire female race.[144] According to Eteocles, the fear the chorus experiences urges them to a public role not only unsuitable for women but also dangerous for both the *oikos* and the polis (190). Their cries and howling (αὔειν, λακάζειν) become representative

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themselves over to the emotions and their violent fancies. This is only another way of saying that it is Eteocles' role to think of others and for others, whereas the members of the chorus are wrapped up in their own fears and specters. At any rate this is true of Eteocles and the chorus who are presented to us in the first half of the play. That the women should be so concerned with their own fate and their own sufferings instead of helping to support high strategy is only to be expected. It is not for nothing that the chorus consists of women. This is a play about war, and war's destructive power is felt most sharply by women."

143 In *Iliad* 6. 242–296 conversely, Hecuba and the women of Troy go to supplicate Athena and offer her the most beautiful robe in Priam's palace after Hector has urged Hecuba to do so according to Helenus' advice.

144 Scholars are divided regarding whether Eteocles' reaction is excessive or justified. To give a few examples: Podlecki (1966) 28 finds "a surprising harshness" in Eteocles' character but, he argues, "it is perhaps justified by his motive: he fears that the frenzy of the chorus may infect the rest of the citizens and sink them so deep in despair that they will take no thought of practical means of defense". Kirkwood (1969) 18 suggests that "Throughout this confrontation there is a good deal of harshness in what Eteocles says and in his manner; perhaps Aeschylus intended it to prepare us for his later complete intransigence on the question of combat with Polyneices. But the main point of the debate is to establish Eteocles as the firm defender and the man of action, against the fluttering terror and prostrate supplications of the women". In addition to the fact that "aggressive dislike of women is almost a commonplace in Greek literature", Jackson (1988) 290 argues that there is also strong provocation on the part of the women: "Between the threat posed by the Chorus' behavior and the typical Greek posture of animosity towards women, whether justified or not, there is scarcely room to find fault with Eteocles for the violence of his reaction". Orwin (1980) 191, on the other hand, interprets Eteocles' character as an assailant of the private realm. As such he can give no space to women: "The city as Eteocles would wish it supplants the family as the primary human association and constitutes itself as the standard and arbiter of right. There is no place for women or the family in it. [...] His noble dedication to the city is the obverse of his fatal indifference to the family. He shares with the other Labdacids something in common with the city's attackers. All are assailants of the private realm".

of female behavior at large and can only be objects of hatred to sensible people (σωφρόνων μισήματα, 186):

> μητ᾽ ἐν κακοῖσι μήτ᾽ ἐν εὐεστοῖ φίλῃ
> ξύνοικος εἴην τῷ γυναικείῳ γένει·
> κρατοῦσα μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁμιλητὸν θράσος,
> δείσασα δ᾽ οἴκῳ καὶ πόλει πλέον κακόν.
> καὶ νῦν πολίταις τάσδε διαδρόμους φυγὰς
> θεῖσαι διερροθήσατ᾽ ἄψυχον κάκην,
> τὰ τῶν θύραθεν δ᾽ ὡς ἄριστα ὀφέλλετε,
> αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔνδοθεν πορθούμεθα.
> τοιαῦτα τἂν γυναιξὶ συνναίων ἔχοις.
> [. . .]
> μέλει γὰρ ἀνδρί, μὴ γυνὴ βουλευέτω,
> τἄξωθεν· ἔνδον δ᾽ οὖσα μὴ βλάβην τίθει.
> ἤκουσας ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσας; ἢ κωφῇ λέγω;

> Whether in trouble or in welcome prosperity, may I not share my home with the female gender! When a woman is in the ascendant, her effrontery is impossible to live with; when she's frightened, she is an even greater menace to family and city. So now, with you running around in all directions like this, your clamor has spread panic and cowardice among the citizens; you are doing your very best to advance the cause of the enemy outside—the city is being sacked by its own people from within! That's the sort of thing you'll get if you live with women!
> [. . .]
> Out-of-door affairs are the concern of men; women are not to offer opinions about them. Stay inside and do no harm.
> Did you hear me or not? Or am I talking to the deaf? (187–195, 200–202)

Describing fearful women as a great menace to both family and the polis renders the current situation only one instantiation of female character. With their clamor and running through the city, the women reproduce and bring within the walls of the state the wave of war and thus inevitably pass on to the citizens their own fear. While the scout's sober report claimed to support future safety (ἀβλαβὴς ἔσῃ, 68), the chorus' involvement in "out-of door affairs" can only bring harm (βλάβην, 201). The implied precariousness of male courage when exposed to intense female fear is particularly interesting. While Eteocles accuses the women that they will cause the sack of the city from within, men would of course be the ones to cause such a defeat through their inability to control their own fear. This is not to push the reading to its literal limits. But it

seems crucial that Eteocles shows fear to have a force that equalizes men and women at the prospect of war and raises the question of the manner and the extent to which its expression ought to be allowed.

Thucydides' Pericles, as we saw in Chapter 2, is also particularly observant of the citizens' fear and consistently attempts to maintain it at the right levels, especially at demanding moments during the war. Similarly, Eteocles strives to be the one who controls the circulation of fear in Thebes. In his attempt to silence the expression of the chorus' fear, he attempts to change its object. He tries to replace the fear of enslavement with the fear of death as punishment for disobedience (199). Under the current circumstances, however, such a threat loses its efficacy. To his question whether they heard him or not, the women respond "I was frightened when I heard the sound of the rattle, the rattle of chariots", and continue to describe the sounds of chariots and horses (203ff.). His threat of punishment and his accusation that the city is being sacked from within prove to be hard to 'hear', and therefore, inadequate, when the enemy clatters at the walls and threatens with slavery.

The chorus insists that they only wish to secure the good will and help of the gods. It is not their honoring the gods that Eteocles resents, he insists in turn, but their excessive fear (μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ὑπερφοβοῦ, 238) that threatens to make the citizens lose heart (κακοσπλάγχνους, 237). His terms emphasize the highly visceral grip that the women's fear has on the men of the city.[145] As the sound of the horses and the battle gets louder, the women respond with greater fear. Almost in desperate anger, Eteocles retorts: μή νυν ἀκούουσ᾽ ἐμφανῶς ἄκου᾽ ἄγαν (well, if you can hear them, don't overpublicize the fact, 246). Once again, the chorus' ability to perceive the reality of war and its implications is connected with their ability to (re)present it, to make it appear equally clearly (ἐμφανῶς) to the eyes of the citizens. Their synesthetic capacity has the power both to perceive and create lucid images and compels emotional involvement. Thus their emotional discourse carries a kind of accuracy (σαφήνεια) that rivals that of the Scout in its effect. The only solution that Eteocles continues to see is to silence them:

145 Byrne (1997) 151 argues that the women's emotion does not affect the other citizens only but Eteocles himself as well, that "the presence of the frightened women is a contaminant, an assault upon his composure as well as a bad influence on other citizens". Regarding Eteocles in particular, she sees in him maenadic tendencies (152) and thus, even though he resists, "he may be supposed to have certain physiological susceptibilities in common with women". As will become apparent below, I see the chorus presenting Eteocles and men in general as sharing emotional experiences with women in the context of war, even though I do not trace in Eteocles any maenadic characteristics.

Ετ. οὐ σῖγα μηδὲν τῶνδ᾽ ἐρεῖς κατὰ πτόλιν;
Χο. ὦ ξυντέλεια, μὴ προδῷς πυργώματα.
Ετ. οὐκ εἰς φθόρον σιγῶσ᾽ ἀνασχήσῃ τάδε;
Χο. θεοὶ πολῖται, μή με δουλείας τυχεῖν.
Ετ. αὐτὴ σὲ δουλοῖς κἀμὲ καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν.
Χο. ὦ παγκρατὲς Ζεῦ, τρέψον εἰς ἐχθροὺς βέλος.
Ετ. ὦ Ζεῦ, γυναικῶν οἷον ὤπασας γένος.
Χο. μοχθηρόν, ὥσπερ ἄνδρας ὧν ἁλῷ πόλις.
Ετ. παλινστομεῖς αὖ θιγγάνουσ᾽ ἀγαλμάτων;
Χο. ἀψυχίᾳ γὰρ γλῶσσαν ἁρπάζει φόβος.
Ετ. αἰτουμένῳ μοι κοῦφον εἰ δοίης τέλος.
Χο. λέγοις ἂν ὡς τάχιστα καὶ τάχ᾽ εἴσομαι.
Ετ. σίγησον, ὦ τάλαινα, μὴ φίλους φόβει.
Χο. σιγῶ· ξὺν ἄλλοις πείσομαι τὸ μόρσιμον.

Et. Will you not keep quiet, instead of talking all about it in public?
Ch. Assembled gods, do not betray our walls!
Et. Can't you put up with it in silence, confound you?
Ch. Gods of my city, let me not fall into slavery!
Et. You are putting yourself into slavery, and me, and the whole city.
Ch. Almighty Zeus, direct your bolts against the enemy!
Et. Zeus, what a race you've given us for company, these women!
Ch. A wretched one—just like men when their city is captured.
Et. Saying ill-omened words again, are you, while touching the images?
Ch. Because of my lack of courage, fear seized hold of my tongue.
Et. If you could comply with a slight request I have . . .
Ch. Please explain it right away, and I'll soon understand.
Et. Be silent, you poor fool, and don't terrify your own side.
Ch. I'll be silent; along with the rest I will endure what fate may bring. (250–263)

Having earlier pointed out the destructive *homilia* with women, Eteocles seeks to silence them altogether so that they not pass onto the citizens their own *apsuchia*. He attempts to persuade them by pointing out that it is their friends that they afflict. As soon as he reminds them of the attachment to the city and its people as *philoi*, the women concede their silence and pronounce their solidarity "with the others" (ξὺν ἄλλοις), the rest of the citizens. Before that, however, the chorus points to an equality between men and women that Eteocles resists and possibly fears as accurate. Both the female and the male race would be wretched (μοχθηρόν) in an enslaved city. If captured, men would

share and understand the fear the women currently express and the female condition more broadly.

Sound and silence carry particular significance for the emotional experience as well as the emotional impact of the chorus. By reproducing the sounds they hear, according to Eteocles' accusation, the women bring them into being within the walls of the city. And by vocalizing and enacting the fear such sounds evoke in them, they also generate a similar fear and spread it among the citizens. But the sounds of the enemy *are* within the city, this is how they can reach the chorus. Why are the women, then, presented as the ones who make them pass the walls of Thebes? Burian suggests that "it is paradoxically the women's fears that make evident the full extent of the peril the polis now faces".[146] The women, in other words, give the inarticulate sounds of the equipment of war an almost tangible presence and an audible meaning. Such meaning—what is truly at stake for Thebes—will become even more audible and clearly perceptible in their first stasimon, where they turn their fears into a narrative that explicates them. Eteocles' own request confirms that the reality the chorus perceives is accurate and valid. He never asks the chorus-women not to be afraid. By asking for silence, he only requires that they not publicize their fear, that they conceal certain aspects of reality. Pragmatically and strategically, such a request is justified. But Eteocles' vehemence reveals a fear that the women perceive and communicate the magnitude of the danger that the city faces.[147] The contagiousness of fear, in other words, does not threaten with an irrational passion but with one that reflects an accurate understanding of the current state of things and is thus more unsettling. Exposed to the women's fears, the men of Thebes will be able to 'see' where their own fears should lie and therefore come to life.[148]

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146 Burian (2009) 21.

147 In addition, Stehle (2005) shows that, in his initial prayer as well as in his interactions with the chorus, without realizing it Eteocles spreads *dusphêmia* in the city and cancels both his and the chorus' prayers. On lines 251–9 especially, see pp. 115–6. In Stehle's words, "it is Eteocles' tragedy that his very commitment as leader to policing performative speech endangers the city" (117).

148 Winnington-Ingram (1977) 16 also suggests that silence cannot alter the facts and offers an interesting suggestion regarding Eteocles' own fear as revealed in his vehemence toward the chorus: "It may be suggested, then, that throughout the first part of the play Eteocles is in fear, which is not fear of battle or of death (for in human affairs he is courageous) but fear of the Erinys. This fear, except for one outburst, he conceals in silence, but the excessive character of his reaction to the fears of the chorus derives from his own—and different—fear. This fear is vague and intermittent; it does not prevent him from using

As soon as the women concede their silence, however, Eteocles asks them not to be silent any more. He invites them to perform an "auspicious ululation of triumph" (ὀλολυγμὸν ἱερὸν εὐμενῆ παιώνισον, 268). Most scholars note the juxtaposition of the female *ololugmos* that normally accompanies sacrifice with the male paean in Eteocles' request. Pointing to the tension that the juxtaposition brings out, Foley comments: "Yet the paean is a male war cry, and the *ololugmos* will greet not a sacrifice (a standard role for women) but the coming war (and perhaps male death in war)".[149] Eteocles attempts to script female ritual performance. By partly taking a male intonation, it will counteract—he seems to believe—the emotional effect it has had or has threatened to have so far and instead will "give confidence to our friends and dispel their fear of the foe" (270). But if the *ololugmos* alludes to human death at war, the women's voice will still convey a reality that Eteocles attempts to veil or counteract.[150] At the same time, by entrusting the women with this performance, Eteocles essentially reaffirms the power of the collective female voice to shape the emotions of the citizens, for better or for worse.[151]

Despite their concession to Eteocles to keep silent about their fears, the chorus women proceed to elaborate further on them in the first stasimon. As Kostas Valakas points out, this is not a sign of disobedience but the women "are very careful about which of his words to follow and how to make clear their

words which imply his survival and victory in the struggle or enable him to see the sinister implications of the references to fate. But the words of Aeschylus cannot be silenced".

149 Foley (2001) 47 n.96 with Vidal-Naquet (1988) 281. Hutchinson (1985) 86–7 suggests that the *ololugmos*, "the cheering Hellenic cry", will contrast with the previous manner of the women's prayers that Eteocles forbids. At the same time, by emphasizing the correspondence between the paean—the male cry that is equivalent to the *ololugê*—and the *ololugê* itself, "Eteocles separates the [male] cry from the women's wild ululation".

150 See also Lupas and Petre (1981) 93–94 who point out that, unbeknownst to him, all of Eteocles' suggestions bode negatively for the future as they correspond to or are echoed by negative equivalents later in the play. E.g., this initial demand for an *ololugmos* is echoed in ll. 953–4 and the Curses' cry over the death of the two brothers.

151 Foley (2001) 47 raises a question that applies to the final scene of the play as well (despite Eteocles' death): "Are we then experiencing in Eteocles' violent reaction, his attempt to silence rather than calm the women, the same Athenian attitude to uncontrolled behavior by women in a public context expressed in the sixth-century and later funerary legislation?". For an interpretation according to which Eteocles turns the chorus' barbaric utterances to civic ones, see Giordano-Zecharya (2006) 70–72. She argues that "the dramatic conversion of the Chorus into the speech-regime of the citizen corresponds to the constriction of their emotional voices into recognizable and mastered ritual forms" (72).

own position".[152] Their song combines elements of lamentation and prayer.[153] They thus virtually perform a premature lament at the possibility of the sack of their city and a prayer for its safety and protection (ὀξυγόοις λιταῖσιν, 320).[154] Even though not a paean, their prayer offers a response to Eteocles' accusation that they have caused cowardice (ἄψυχον κάκην) to the citizens, their friends within the walls (192). They now explicitly entreat the gods to "cast upon those outside the walls the cowardice that destroys men (ἀνδρολέτειραν κάκαν)" (313–315). At the same time, they expand on the intense fear they experience and portray what they fear as a pitiful and lamentable state. Seth Benardete suggests: "a settled fear in the stasimon replaces a momentary terror in the parodos" because there is a shift "from imagining the enemy to imagining the imminent condition of themselves and other citizens":[155]

μέλει, φόβῳ δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπνώσσει κέαρ·
γείτονες δὲ καρδίας
μέριμναι ζωπυροῦσι τάρβος
τὸν ἀμφιτειχῆ λεών, δράκοντας ὥς τις τέκνων
ὑπερδέδοικεν λεχαίων δυσευνάτορας
πάντρομος πελειάς.
[…]
οἰκτρὸν γὰρ πόλιν ὧδ᾽ ὠγυγίαν
Ἀΐδᾳ προϊάψαι, δορὸς ἄγραν
δουλίαν, ψαφαρᾷ σποδῷ
ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς Ἀχαιοῦ θεόθεν περθομέναν ἀτίμως,
τὰς δὲ κεχειρωμένας ἄγεσθαι,
ἒ ἕ, νέας τε καὶ παλαιὰς
ἱππηδὸν πλοκάμων, περιρ-
ρηγνυμένων φαρέων· βοᾷ δ᾽
ἐκκενουμένα πόλις
λαΐδος οὐλομένας μειξοθρόου.
βαρείας τοι τύχας προταρβῶ.

152 Valakas (1993) 60.

153 On elements of lament in the first stasimon, see also Byrne (1997) 147–148.

154 For a famous parallel in the *Iliad* where Andromache and her maids lament Hector's death while he is still alive, see Bk. 6, 495–502.

155 Benardete (1967) 23.

κλαυτὸν δ᾽ ἀρτιτρόφους ὠμοδρόπους
νομίμων προπάροιθεν διαμεῖψαι
δωμάτων στυγερὰν ὁδόν.
καὶ τὸν φθίμενον γὰρ προλέγω
βέλτερα τῶνδε πράσσειν.
πολλὰ γάρ, εὖτε πτόλις δαμασθῇ,
ἒ ἕ, δυστυχῆ τε πράσσει·
ἄλλος δ᾽ ἄλλον ἄγει, φονεύ-
ει, τὰ δὲ πυρπολεῖ· καπνῷ
χραίνεται πόλισμ᾽ ἅπαν,
μαινόμενος δ᾽ ἐπιπνεῖ λαοδάμας
μιαίνων εὐσέβειαν Ἄρης.

I heed your words, but terror will not let my soul sleep:
close to my heart
thoughts are kindling fear
of the host around the walls,
as a dove, all trembling,
fears the snakes that make evil companions
for the chicks sleeping in her nest.
[. . .]
For it is pitiful that so ancient a city
should be cast down to Hades, the enslaved plunder
of the spear, contemptuously ravaged
and turned to flaky ashes
by an Achaean man, with divine permission,
while the women are taken captive and led away—
ah, ah!—young and old together,
dragged by their hair like horses,
their clothes being torn off, and the city
cries out as it is emptied
of this wretched plunder from which rises a mingled clamor.
Grievous indeed is the fate I fear.

And it is lamentable when those just reared are plucked unripe
and traverse, before the lawful time,
a hateful path away from their homes:
I declare that even the dead
fare better than they do.

For a city when it is conquered—
ah, ah!—suffers many disasters.
One man leads another captive, or slays,
or ravages with fire; the whole city
is besmirched with smoke,
and over it blows the blast of the raging subduer of hosts,
Ares, defiling piety. (287–294; 321–344)

This song is particularly rich in the layers of meaning of choral fear. Explicit fear-terms pervade the stasimon and make clear the causes of the women's emotional state.[156] Fear also constitutes the basis of the women's self-pity and the pity they invite. Their premature laments and cares (μέριμναι) only make for further and more intense fear. While the chorus' fear expectedly concerns the fall of Thebes, the terms in which the fall is envisioned are revealing. The women dramatize the enslavement of the city as all encompassing: its women are taken away, dragged by their hair, their clothes torn; its men get slaughtered; and its crops and earth are destroyed and wasted. The polis is identified with its women: as they are taken to captivity the polis itself cries out (329–330). Along with this emphasis, however, the stasimon conveys how captivity equalizes men and women. The polis is tamed (338) like its women; but Ares is the tamer of hosts (λαοδάμας, 343) as he is defiling piety. *Mania* and *miasma* take over (343–344). This dynamic pervades the stasimon that presents Ares, plunder, and loss in action (see especially the use of the present tense). The vivid depiction of the potential siege and the self-pity and fear that are presented as endemic to experiencing it defy Eteocles' request for an "auspicious ululation of triumph" and for appearances that silence and thus may eliminate fear.

In their vision of the city, the women, moreover, appropriate elements of Eteocles' imagery. The king earlier accused the women of running through the city (τάσδε διαδρόμους φυγάς) and afflicting the citizens with cowardice. The chorus uses his term to introduce and recast the movements of men within the city under siege:

ἁρπαγαὶ δὲ διαδρομᾶν ὁμαίμονες·
ξυμβολεῖ φέρων φέροντι
καὶ κενὸς κενὸν καλεῖ
ξύννομον θέλων ἔχειν,
οὔτε μεῖον οὔτ᾽ ἴσον λελιμμένοι.

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156 See: φόβῳ (287), τάρβος (289) and προταρβῶ (332), ὑπερδέδοικεν (292), πάντρομος (294).

And Pillage is there, sister to Rampage:
plunderer meets plunderer
and plunderless calls to plunderless
wanting to have him as a colleague—
they desire neither a lesser nor an equal share. (351–355)

Diadromai join the act of pillaging (and/or rape) that inevitably redefines the relationships between citizens, now based on loss and greed.[157] Such are among the many disasters that the city suffers: "one man leads another captive, or slays, or ravages with fire; the whole city is besmirched with smoke" (340–2). The Theban women not only articulate emphatically their fear, they also substantiate their female perspective, which they earlier called equivalent to that of men. As we saw, when Eteocles exclaimed "Zeus, what a race you've given us for company, these women!" (256), the women responded that the female race is wretched (μοχθηρόν), just like men whose city is captured (257). They thus suggested that "[the women's] position would become intelligible to men, only if men imagined themselves in the polis ruled by conquerors".[158] The chorus' narrative produces the (aesthetic) circumstances necessary for such intelligibility, before—if ever—the narrative itself materializes (see προταρβῶ, προλέγω). While their perspective is characteristically female as they emphasize rape and the enslavement of women, they also point to how loss of status eliminates differences—of status and morality alike.[159] The chorus thus subtly presents the divide between men and women in the context of war as more permeable and unstable than Eteocles would allow for. Benardete argues that going from the parodos to the stasimon, "the movement seems

157 With regard to l. 355 "they desire neither a lesser nor an equal share", Sommerstein (2007) n.45 asks: "Compared with the successful plunderers of 352, or compared with each other?" Byrne (1997) 147 argues that *harpagê* is Greek for rape and translates: "the roving bands of rapists are all brothers". In this case, *homaimones* has a metaphorical sense. Thus rendered, the lines "explicitly express the chorus' fear of rape". This layer is indeed present, given especially the end of the stasimon, but the idea that "the correlation between slavery and marriage developed by the chorus in the first stasimon suggests an antipathy to marriage even by consent" (146) is difficult to support. Cameron (1971) 82–84 discusses two other passages (326–9 and 454–6) with horse imagery and argues that the stasimon overall "deals with the irony of marriage and captivity". In this case, the force of captivity and rape is contrasted with consensual marriage.

158 Valakas (1993) 62.

159 Here I refer especially to ll. 351–5 quoted above with the emphatic use of *homaimones* that creates a family of pillage (and rape) and rampage as well as through pillage and rampage. *harpagai de, diadromân homaimones*, cannot but ironically also allude to the two brothers themselves, the two *homaimones* who desire neither an equal nor a lesser share.

to be from fear outside to fear inside the heart".[160] As a result, the choral discourse becomes more psychological in tone and more general, and "sexual differentiation disappears in the stasimon along with the names of the gods".[161] A resonating and distinctly emotional feminine voice, then, challenges gender differentiation at the moment when Eteocles most insistently attempts to maintain it.

The equalizing gesture of the choral performance is supported by the mythic elements of the song that point in two different directions. Scholars invariably note the mythological parallels the stasimon evokes: through the use of epic language and elements of lament, it is reminiscent of the fall of Troy as well as of the tradition of lamentation for the fall of cities.[162] Valakas, on the other hand, makes an interesting argument about 'demythologization' that is worth mentioning in some detail. Despite the epic elements in the chorus' song, he suggests, there remains an essential difference between the Iliadic references and the stasimon: "the Homeric heroes express by means of elaborate images their anxieties for the future of their relatives, who are also heroic figures of Troy, whereas the women of the chorus in the *Seven* present by means of images what always happens to anonymous groups and individuals of a polis which is conquered".[163] Valakas points out that this anonymity brings out the "chorus' consideration for any polis as a community". It is the collective dimension that the maidens emphasize as opposed to "either the impersonal or the human dimension of the groups in question".[164] Such demythologization, however, does not continue beyond the first stasimon. Even so,

> [...] by demythologizing the capture of a polis both as an epic subject and as a heroic act, the stasimon indicates the view-point of a group of women from the polis, who have taken the initiative to play a ritual role in the question of the siege as a mass character on behalf of the polis, and find themselves in an ironic conflict with the epic myth, in which they do not take part in the same way as women do not take part in the political organization of the spectators' polis.[165]

160 Benardete (1967) 22–23.
161 Ibid., 25, 26.
162 Hutchinson (1985) 89ff, Foley (2001) 46–48, Valakas (1993) 62–66 and especially n.38 for correspondences between lines in the stasimon and epic lines. For the lament of fallen cities, see Alexiou (2002) 83–101.
163 Valakas (1993) 65.
164 Ibid., 66.
165 Ibid., 76.

It is precisely this female collective view-point that allows us to see the crisis of the play as resulting from Eteocles' power-game.[166] The kind of demythologization that Valakas argues for brings out the political content and implications of the chorus' fears. As discussed earlier, in addition to the particularly feminine fear of rape and enslavement, the chorus-women enact the power of war to shape men's desires. They fear both collective suffering and collective corruption. If this reading stands, Eteocles' attempt to silence the public expression of their fear can now also be seen as an attempt to conceal a concern with the morally corrosive power of war that implicates Eteocles himself. Because listening to the chorus' fears would necessitate—or at least invite—a different way of envisioning the politics of war.

Through the elements and tone of lamentation, the women also invite pity (explicitly with οἰκτρόν in l. 321 and its corresponding κλαυτόν in l. 333) and perform their self-pity. David Konstan has argued that "[the Greeks] did not normally speak of pitying oneself". In the few cases that individuals express pity for themselves, "one must imagine oneself divided in two: one self is in torment, while the other stands by as an observer, itself unharmed".[167] The intense fear of war makes the women envision the fall of the city and pity themselves and their city as they enact their vision. The choral persona is particularly apt for communicating these emotions and the concerns and ideas that trigger them. They can flexibly move between the first person singular and first person plural and thus facilitate envisioning the self in a different state of being and feeling by drawing from and reshaping existing mythic paradigms. When twelve voices sing "I fear for myself in advance", each chorus-member both experiences and witnesses the experience of fear by someone else who is just like her in terms of social position and potential fate.[168] At the same time, the aesthetic distance that the narrative creates allows for self-pity and communication of intense emotion, as the women move flexibly between the description of the city's fate and their own fate and emotional state. Such movement indicates that this aesthetic distance remains conscious and cannot be overstated.[169] The second strophe—also discussed above—offers a vivid example of this flexibility. The chorus sings: "it is pitiful that so ancient a city should be

166 Ibid., 84.

167 Konstan (1999) (http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/ElAnt/V5N2/konstan.html). Konstan mentions that lament is different but does not explicate how.

168 Kaimio (1970) 61 points out the naturalness of expressing emotions in the first person singular, since emotions are felt by individuals.

169 Such self-consciousness suggests that we ought to reconsider the category of self-pity altogether.

cast down to Hades". Having described the enslavement of women, that is, the enslavement of the female population that includes themselves, they conclude the strophe: "Grievous indeed is the fate I fear (προταρβῶ)" (332). Fear and pity for their city is fear and pity for themselves, expressed in the first person singular that emphasizes both the deeply felt fear as well as the commonality of the experience.

The chorus-women continue to describe the state of the rest of the city, how the conquerors drag and murder citizens, the fire and smoke, the "bloody screams" of infants, men's greed and lack of piety, the destruction of everything that the earth provides, and once more their own pain as concubines of happy conquerors (338–368). Through their detailed portrayal of the besieged city, these inexperienced maidens display an ability to perceive more than their own suffering, as if their psychic state results in mantic skills.[170] They show that "[the] visionary quality in Aeschylean theater is assigned to women" and links up with their associations with myth and ritual.[171] The chorus communicates this vision of both the crude reality and ethics of war with great clarity, I suggest, not despite but because of their emotional state. The experience of fear and (self-)pity appears to be the premise for such communication. The *Seven* then provides an interesting instantiation of an active chorus that both participates in the action—as limited as it is in this play—and voices reflections of the kind frequently associated with (later) choruses that function primarily as commentators.[172] Through these different performative elements—their implication in the action, their use of myth, and their emotional discourse—these maidens offer a complex and highly evocative performance of the call for the expansion of sympathetic imagination.

170 For the mantic abilities of mourners see Martin (2003) 126. Martin convincingly establishes Helen in the *Odyssey* as a keener and suggests that "[her] mantic abilities can be understood if we retroject to archaic Greek times a belief found today concerning modern Greek lament experts. The modern Greek lore on lamenters makes them also consistently adept at interpreting signs that warn of imminent death. In the view of Seremetakis and others, they are the modern equivalent of diviners".

171 Zeitlin (1990) 111.

172 Looking at the play as a whole Cameron (1971) 97 sees the chorus as having two distinct roles in the two parts of the play, so much so that the shift puts a strain to the unity of the play: "In the first half they constitute a real character of the drama like the chorus of the *Suppliants* which really is the protagonist of that play. The women of Thebes are concerned with their own safety and terrified of the threat of violence to their own persons. But after the outburst of Eteocles at line 653 they become suddenly the uninvolved yet interested bystanders who give advice to the hero and comment upon the action—the sort of behavior we tend to expect from the ordinary Greek chorus" (97).

Even though the chorus will express different kinds of fear later, it is in this first part of the play that we find the extensive choral articulation of fear. A number of scholars have interpreted the fundamental difference between Eteocles and the women regarding their emotions and consequent acts as one between different religious attitudes. To give some representative examples, Andrew Brown sees their difference as an opposition between a pragmatic religious attitude and an emotional one. As the play raises the question "How far is it possible to be both pious and practical?", Eteocles stands for "a somber realistic fatalism" while the chorus-women represent "a trusting intuitive feminine piety".[173] More recently, Manuela Giordano-Zecharya interprets Eteocles' stance as a positive, "virile and civic" religious attitude; such attitude reflects belief in reciprocity and expresses control. The chorus' attitude, on the other hand, is dangerous, negative, and marginal. Because it reflects submission, it is constructed as inappropriate and deviating.[174] Podlecki and Jackson offer two opposing understandings of Eteocles' character that also reflects his religious attitude. Podlecki traces Eteocles' utterances that refer to the gods and the curse and reconstructs an attitude that he sees as one-sided and offensive. As such, it justifies his death as not just the fulfillment of the curse but also as ironic retribution that Eteocles brings upon himself because of his overbearing self-sufficiency.[175] Jackson, on the other hand, views Eteocles in a much more positive light. He sees in the chorus' action that starts with the supplication an "assertion of the gods as the only real power [which] entails a denial of the value of human endeavor". Eteocles, conversely, "argues for the value of human power", since it is the gods who have given certain means and powers to men which they ought to use to the best of their ability.[176] Last, Eva Stehle compares the chorus and Eteocles in terms of their ability to maintain *euphêmia*. In the parodos, she sees the chorus moving from distraction and despair and therefore inability to exhibit *euphêmia* to controlling their fear and thus offering a prayer that is appealing to the gods. "It is as though the chorus stands in for the city in rising to meet the crisis, their success an omen of the city's survival".[177] Eteocles, conversely, interrupts their ritual and "risks corrupting it". Throughout the play, he appears mistakenly to believe that he has a better capacity to communicate with the gods on behalf of the city. In reality, he is consistently oblivious to the dysphemic utterances in his speech and the

173 Brown (1977) 303, 316 and *passim*.
174 Giordano-Zecharya (2006) 65, 71–2.
175 Podlecki (1964) 287, 295 and *passim*.
176 Jackson (1988) 289–290.
177 Stehle (2005) 108. See also n.147.

fact that he endangers the city. This inability truly to control speech (his own included) is shown to be the working of the curse that operates from the beginning of the play.[178]

The interpretation of Eteocles' attitude as pragmatic seems more accurate as it accounts for Eteocles' preparation for war and reaction to the women and his attempt to control himself emotionally. At the same time, such pragmatism verges, at times, on offensive excess as his fierceness against the women in the first part of the play and, as we will see, his indulgence in the *erôs* to meet his brother in battle in the second part indicate. His assertion that the gods desert a conquered city (217–218) combined with his vehemence against the chorus and the female race at large and his unconscious dysphemic utterances constitute a passionate reaction in its own right: he exhibits his own inability for moderation in his attempt to be dispassionate and pragmatic. Thus a dichotomy between pragmatism (as rational and devoid of passion) and emotionalism (as irrational and vehement) is inaccurate since pragmatism itself is informed by and reveals strong emotions. The divide between *orgê* and *gnômê* is, as in Thucydides, unsustainable. The chorus' performance, on the other hand, is openly passionate and purportedly induces anxiety in the citizens and undermines their preparation to defend the city. Through its openness, the chorus' fear is truthful and compelling. Beyond considerations of its righteousness and authority or lack thereof, by being realistic, clear, and forceful, the choral voice is significant and influential for what it reveals. As my analysis of the parodos and the first stasimon suggested, this voice reveals a difference between Eteocles and the chorus-women that the shield-scene will also confirm. Eteocles does not necessarily resent the experience of fear *per se* but its public expression and (potential) effect. His own attempt, both by scripting female ritual and by later interpreting the signs on the shields, is to divert such fear in ways that mute it, because he believes that silencing fear will be beneficial for the polis.

The juxtaposition of these discourses of and attitudes toward fear—as well as the consequent self-pity—raises a number of questions about the possibility and, most importantly, the value of (not) silencing fear. Is silencing fear altogether attainable? Is it desirable—or should it be? Would eliminating the expression of fear silence concerns that tend to be constructed as strictly individual and private but are in reality shared and should inform public decisions and acts? In other words, through the resonating and unsettling voice of the chorus-women, the question becomes: whose fears deserve a hearing and ought to be taken into account, carry authority, and motivate public action?

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178 Ibid., 120 and *passim*.

As soon as the women conclude their imaginary fears, the Scout once again arrives to declare "I can state from accurate knowledge the disposition of the enemy" (375–6). From the interpretation by the chorus of sounds as signs of the attacking army that induce fear the play moves to the interpretation by Eteocles of the fearsome signs on the shields of the Argive enemies. It is beyond the scope of my study to offer an interpretation of the shield-scene and how Eteocles reverses the signs.[179] But I would like briefly to point out the language that makes explicit and consistent the purpose of the signs to evoke fear in the opponents that face the bearers of the shields: the bells of Tydeus' shield "make a terrifying clang" (κλάζουσιν φόβον, 386). Referring to Capaneus, the scout wonders, "who will await without panic (μὴ τρέσας) the onset of this braggart man?" (436). He admits that he shuddered (ἔφριξα, 490) at the sight of Hippomedon's shield and concludes: "he is possessed by Ares, and he rages for a fight like a maenad, with a fearsome look in his eyes (φόβον βλέπων). You need to guard well against the attack of a man like this: Terror itself (Φόβος) is now vaunting at the gate" (497–500). It is now the shields that spread fearsome signs and sounds and "all have voices".[180]

By producing "a grotesque distortion of music", the shields seem to be symbolically juxtaposed to the chorus' agitated music and song. While, however, the women are not silenced, the signs on the shields are reversed.[181] That is the case for all of them except one. Describing pious Amphiaraus who "desires not the appearance of excellence but the reality" of it (οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι θέλει, 592), the Scout concludes: "formidable (δεινός) is he who reveres the gods" (596). The absence of a sign only contributes to Amphiaraus' awe-inspiring presence. And the contrast between appearance and reality points to the fact that, whether silenced or not, certain fears retain their validity and power. Endowed with a clear vision and accurate knowledge, Amphiaraus is the only hero that inspires the kind of fear that is usually evoked by divinity or divine characteristics and combines awe and terror (δεινός). In his respectful response to the Scout's description of the seer, Eteocles remarks: φιλεῖ δὲ σιγᾶν ἢ λέγειν τὰ καίρια (his habit is to be either silent or accurate, 619). In both cases, Amphiaraus' stance remains eloquent. In this play the characters that evoke fear are the ones that perceive true dangers and ought to be heard,

179 See, e.g., Bacon (1964), Cameron (1970) 100–109, Zeitlin (1982).

180 Bacon (1964) 33.

181 According to Burnett (1973) 349 the scene represents symbolic action that imitates a successful defense of the city through "six duels [which] are fought by proxy". As such it is a response to the potential sack of Thebes that the spectator was made to witness through the chorus' earlier performance and testifies to Eteocles' effectiveness in saving the city.

either through selective silence or resonating utterance. Even though, unlike Amphiaraus, the chorus-women will be proven wrong insofar as they will not be enslaved, their insights regarding the mentality (and fear) of war will remain *kairia*.[182]

The male discourse of fear in which Eteocles rigorously engages triggers his own lament and its instantaneous cancellation, a move that is consistent with his earlier reaction to the chorus. To the announcement that Polyneices has been stationed on the seventh gate with a shield on which Dikê declares that she will bring him home, Eteocles responds: "O my family driven mad and greatly hated by the gods, my family so full of tears (πανδάκρυτον), the house of Oedipus! Ah me (ὤμοι), my father's curse is truly now fulfilled! But it is not proper to cry or lament, lest that give birth to grief even harder to bear (ἀλλ᾽οὔτε κλαίειν οὔτ᾽ὀδύρεσθαι πρέπει, / μὴ καὶ τεκνωθῇ δυσφορώτερος γόος)" (653–7). Even though his immediate response is to grieve, he stops short from performing fully-fledged lamentation. Stuart Lawrence suggests that Eteocles "seems emotionally numb to the implications of the fratricide and generally anxious to avoid emotionalism".[183] For Eteocles the articulation of emotion can only make such emotion proliferate, render it out of control, and thus have it validate and prolong the reality that it communicates. He earlier asked the women of the chorus not to appear excessively timid, because the appropriate appearance would contribute to the appropriate reality, that is, citizen-courage. By currently resisting expressing grief, he believes that he will be able to avoid the proliferation of greater grief.[184]

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182 Vellacott (1980) 217 views Eteocles' reflections about Amphiaraus as "an inverted diagram of himself as the reckless and impious man allied with six modest and upright champions" and thus as an indication of his moral guilt.

183 Lawrence (2007) 349.

184 What Eteocles refers to here remains, however, ambivalent. Winnington-Ingram (1977) 40 suggests that Aeschylus leaves the meaning of the line intentionally elusive, as we wonder whether Eteocles refers to the deaths that will attend the fall of the city. He points out (n.83): "γόος *can* be used of sufferings other than death, and so Eteocles might be thinking of the pain of disgrace, but, since it is most commonly used of lamenting the dead, he might be thinking of his fellow-countrymen. Which is it? In any case, the γόος which actually ensues (and τεκνωθῇ is a carefully chosen word) is that lamentation for the πανδάκρυτον Οἰδίπου γένος which we find in the *exodos*". Podlecki (1964) 297 as well considers the obscurity of *dusphorôteros*: "It may mean, as Rose *ad loc.* paraphrases, 'Eteocles has no time to lament the misfortune of his line, to the neglect of provision against his brother' attack, or there will be more to lament, namely the fall of the city'. A likelier explanation is that it implies 'a groan more difficult to bear than the one which I just suppressed among you'. Before, he did not want the populace to be infected with the

Even though Eteocles' choice appears to claim dispassion, it soon reveals itself to be utterly passionate. By denying the expression of emotions that the situation warrants, Eteocles does not eliminate emotion. He displaces grief in order to indulge in other passionate desires that motivate destructive action while grievous lamentation itself is only postponed till the end of the play. The chorus urges him to avoid becoming like his brother with regard to his passion (ὀργὴν ὅμοιος, 678). With affection, they ask: τί μέμονας, τέκνον; μή τί σε θυμοπλη- / θὴς δορίμαργος ἄτα φερέτω· κακοῦ δ' / ἔκβαλ' ἔρωτος ἀρχάν (Why this mad passion, child? You must not let yourself be carried away by this spear-mad delusion that fills your heart. Cast out the root of this evil desire, 686–8). This *erôs* that motivates him to fratricide is "an all too harshly stinging lust" (ὠμοδακής σ' ἄγαν ἵμερος ἐξοτρύνει, 693–4). As it is now seething (ζεῖ, 708), the wind of Eteocles' spirit replaces the earlier uncontrollable wave of war. Eteocles does not deny his passionate determination: τεθηγμένον τοί μ' οὐκ ἀπαμβλυνεῖς λόγῳ (I am whetted and your words will not blunt me, 715). Lawrence suggests that "it is not a matter of being unable to resist the desire, but rather of choosing not to do so and on rational grounds".[185] Rather than revealing Eteocles' exceptional moral awareness, however, this choice confirms that strong emotion in the play, choral and individual alike, indicates strong moral and religious convictions. In what has been seen as a reversal of roles between the chorus and Eteocles, no *logos* can temper his *orgê*.[186] He earlier accused the chorus of excessive fear that, brought to public view, would spread broadly and enslave the polis from within. Now it is his intense desire that threatens to enslave Thebes from within by rendering him a mirror image of his brother,

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women's laments; now, even though the terrible force of the curse is at last manifest, he must suppress a groan in himself for the same reason. In neither case does the line support the theory of *Opfertod*, as Dawe maintains". Podlecki's last interpretation seems indeed likelier, given especially the birthing metaphor and the idea of the uncontrollable spread of emotion.

185 Lawrence (2007) 351.

186 Winnington-Ingram (1977) 21, for instance, points out the parallelism in terms of both form and content: both are epirrhematic scenes between Eteocles and the chorus and dramatize appeals for the restraint of ungoverned emotion. But in the second one, the roles are reversed. Vidal-Naquet (1988) 224 also argues that the relationship between Eteocles and the women is reversed after l. 653 and points to a political role for the chorus: "Now it is the women—the women whom the messenger, after the death of the two brothers calls 'children, women, too much daughters of your mothers' (792)—it is the women who take a direct hand in politics, proffering advice to Eteocles". Through this reversal the women now embody the city's values of order.

instantiating conflict at its most perverse, and potentially establishing in the city a source of perilous pollution.[187]

From the second stasimon onward the choral expression of fear and pity shifts focus together with Eteocles' decision to face Polyneices at the seventh gate. After their unsuccessful attempt to prevent him from fratricide, the chorus performs their fear of the Erinys. Beginning and concluding their performance with the explicit expression of such fear, they sing of the history of the house of Laius. Their shiver at the Erinys and her workings is a fear for Eteocles and his house (πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον θεόν: I shiver at the house-destroying god, 720–1) upon fulfillment of the curse (νῦν δὲ τρέω / μὴ τελέσῃ καμψίπους Ἐρινύς: now I fear a Fury swift of foot may fulfill it [the curse], 790–1).[188] At the same time, they never lose sight of the city itself: δέδοικα δὲ σὺν βασιλεῦσι / μὴ πόλις δαμασθῇ (I fear lest together with the princes the city may be laid low, 764–765).[189] Given our difficulty to reconstruct the oracle originally given to Laius, it is not clear whether their fear concerns the destruction of the city irrespective of whether the brothers kill each other, or the pollution that the fratricide might bring about.[190] In either case, in this

187 For an interpretation of this desire in Freudian terms, that is, as a desire for the mother see Caldwell (1973) esp. 217–223. Lawrence (2007) 349, who views Eteocles' moral awareness as exceptional, argues: "We cannot criticize Eteocles for his devotion to the warrior ethic, for it is his performance as a warrior that contributes to the defeat of the Seven and the salvation of Thebes. Nor can we find fault with his readiness to kill his brother, for there is no alternative. We can only criticize perhaps an insufficient sensitivity about fratricide, but then such sensitivity could only disable him". On Eteocles' mirroring his brother, see also Bacon (1964). In this reading, the mirroring culminates with Eteocles' arming himself with a shield that depicts the Erinys as the counterpart of Dikê on Polyneices' shield. On the possibility of pollution, see below.

188 See especially the characterization of the Erinys as ὠλεσίοικος and the chorus' focus on the pains of the house (πόνοι δόμων, 740).

189 The chorus here connects more directly the opposition between the two brothers as the result of Oedipus' curse to the recurring image of the wave of the enemies that we saw in the parodos. This is a new wave of troubles (κακῶν κῦμ'(α), 758) to break upon the city and raises new fears, namely whether the fate of the brothers will be identical with the fate of the city. Wilamowitz (1914) 80 saw here a certain reference that the city will fall together with the brothers. Other scholars, however, suggest that it may be the case that, as soon as the line of disobedient Laius perishes, the city itself will no longer be in danger. See, e.g., Manton (1961) 80.

190 The two references to the oracle appear in 745–750: "ever since Laius defied Apollo, who bade him thrice at Pytho's earth-centered shrine, from which come oracles, to die childless and save the city"; and 801–802: "but the seventh [gate] awesome Apollo took, Captain of Sevens; on Oedipus' house he fulfilled Laius' ancient act of folly". Only the first

stasimon the women are moved to fear not only for the enslavement of themselves and the city, recalling their first stasimon, but also specifically for Eteocles and the royal *oikos* as well. When the former fear, that of enslavement, is eliminated,[191] the latter one remains. At the messenger's announcement of the mutual killing of the brothers, the women experience new overpowering fear: τίνες; τί δ᾽εἶπας; παραφρονῶ φόβῳ λόγου (Who? What did you say? Your words are frightening me out of my mind, 806). They wonder whether they should rejoice at the salvation of the city or lament its leaders. Even though the choral experience of fear does not take the intensity and extent we saw in the first part of the play, its recurring expression impresses on the audience that the perspective of the chorus is never exclusively self-oriented. It rather reflects concerns that involve all, the individual, the royal *oikos* and the family more generally, and the polis.

Before I look at the chorus' closing lament, it is necessary to address briefly the question of interpolation at the end of the play, namely whether the play ends with line 1004 or with 1078 in which case one has also to decide on the possibility of Antigone appearing for the last scene.[192] In his edition, Gregory Hutchinson characterizes lines 1004–1078 an "inopportune appendage" that destroys the structure of the play and the trilogy as a whole.[193] Being aware of the possibility of interpolation, I concur with scholars who retain the last scene as an exchange between the chorus, not Antigone, and the herald.[194]

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version explicitly involves the city's fate. In the second mention, however, as Hutchinson points out (1985) xxviii, the death of the two brothers and the destruction of their family seems to fulfill the oracle without implicating the city.

191 See ll. 792–3: θαρσεῖτε, […] πόλις πέφευγεν ἥδε δούλιον ζυγόν (have no fear, […] this city has escaped the yoke of slavery).

192 I turn to the final scene here, taking ll. 861–874 as an interpolation. See Hutchinson (1985) 190–1 with further references on 209. Brown (1976) 206–207 also offers a good summary of the reasons for expelling the lines.

193 Hutchinson (1985) 210 and xliii, where he argues that the play was revived in the 4th or 3rd c. BCE at which point the addition of a scene adapted from the popular *Phoenissae* rendered it more acceptable to contemporary taste that favored Euripides.

194 See, e.g., Brown (1977) 317, where she succinctly offers the argument of her extensive (1976) treatment of the end of the play. Brown argues that ll. 1026–1053 are a later interpolation while we ought to keep the rest of the ending as an exchange between the chorus divided in two semi-choruses. Brown, however, does not see the chorus as performing a public role. Regarding the earlier exchange between the Herald and the chorus, she sees a continuation of the pattern that we saw in the first part of the play: "we shall once again have a representative of the state displaying a pragmatic religious attitude (by forbidding the burial of Polyneices) and the Chorus displaying an emotional one (by saying that they cannot bear not to bury him)". Rosenmeyer (1962) 76 and Gagarin (1976) 126 believe that

This solution, tentative though it must remain, is consistent with the chorus' tendency to take on a public function and circumvents the difficulty of introducing a new major character at the end of the play.[195] If the decision of the *probouloi* of the people is indeed announced (1005ff.), in the last part of the play the chorus responds by extending their initial lament so as to include both brothers, a position that Eteocles himself would reject.

My discussion of the final lament will be brief and will aim primarily to point to the connections between the lamenting voice of the chorus and the choral discourse of pity and especially fear that I have analyzed so far. To return to the chorus' response to the news of the fratricide, the women wonder whether they ought to express joy or grief:

> ὦ μεγάλε Ζεῦ καὶ πολιοῦχοι
> δαίμονες, οἳ δὴ Κάδμου πύργους
> τούσδε ῥύεσθαι < >,
> πότερον χαίρω κἀπολολύξω πόλεως ἀσινεῖ †σωτῆρι†,
> ἢ τοὺς μογεροὺς καὶ δυσδαίμονας
> ἀτέκνους κλαύσω πολεμάρχους,
> οἳ δῆτ᾽ ὀρθῶς κατ᾽ ἐπωνυμίαν
> <ἐτεοκλειεῖς> καὶ πολυνεικεῖς
> ὤλοντ᾽ ἀσεβεῖ διανοίᾳ;

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the play most probably ended with the chorus' lament for the death of the brothers. For readings that accept the presence of the sisters, see, e.g., Orwin (1980) and Foley (2001) 52–53. Foley specifically suggests that, if we are dealing with interpolation, the text would still reflect the culture in which it was produced (139). Even though I do not support the introduction of Antigone, I agree with a number of Foley's points about the role of the chorus, as will become clear below. Last, Taplin (1977) 169–176 offers a review of the arguments for and against the authenticity of the passage since Wilamowitz. Taplin himself, 176–180, doubts the authenticity of the text but discusses the possibility of its staging as it comes to us with the two sisters present.

195 This choice would contribute to the unity of the play as well, which, however, my analysis does not address further. The unity of both the play and the character of Eteocles in the two parts of the play—the dividing line being 653—are the issues that have primarily driven scholarly interest ever since Wilamowitz saw in the *Seven* an unsuccessful dramatic attempt to bring together two different poetic/mythological traditions. For a succinct summary of the views on the unity of the play, see Winnington-Ingram (1977) 8. Cameron (1971) combines elements of some of these views and argues that the play manages to withstand the violence done to its unity by being clearly split in two sections through the person of Eteocles, the curse of Oedipus, and its recurrent and developing imagery.

O great Zeus and you gods of the city,
who <have shown your concern> to save
these walls of Cadmus,
shall I hail with shouts of joy
the unharmed salvation of the city,
or shall I weep for the wretched, ill-starred,
childless warlords
who have verily perished in a manner appropriate to their names—
with 'true glory' and with 'much strife'—
because of their impious thoughts? (822–831)[196]

These initial anapaests introduce aspects of a stance that the chorus will maintain and develop in the lament proper and through the end of the play. They take on to speak for both the house of Laius and the polis of Thebes;[197] they conceive of their lamentation as the only appropriate response to an atrocious deed such as the fratricide: ἦλθε δ᾽ αἰακτὰ πήματ᾽ οὐ λόγῳ (sufferings have come that cannot be talked about, only bewailed, 846–7); and they both grieve for and criticize both brothers. The chorus' criticism begins here with the mention of "their impious thoughts" and is developed later in the chorus' reflections on the fratricide and Oedipus' curse as well as in their opposition to the decision of the *probouloi* to leave Polyneices unburied, if the text was indeed part of the original.

A tension between the form and the content of the choral lament has often been noted. In his edition, Hutchinson characterizes it (which he sees as ending at 1004) as relatively restrained and sober. He suggests that, by reducing its emotional intensity, the poet "can mingle the poignant with the ironic, and can develop and combine his themes with the greatest variety and richness".[198] Foley similarly calls this an "unusual and even perverted lamentation" that challenges Eteocles' leadership and the views he voiced earlier in the play:

196 For the deletion of these lines as spurious, see Hutchinson (1985) 184–8 with further references.

197 See also l. 843: μέριμνα δ᾽ ἀμφὶ πτόλιν. Sommerstein (2008a) 241 and n.125 translates "there is lamentation throughout the city". He suggests that the alternative would be "there is anxiety concerning the city" in which case the next line would mean that the oracle of Laius may still be fulfilled by the destruction of the city. With the former rendering, on the other hand, the following line would express a reflection for the present as opposed to apprehension for the future.

198 Hutchinson (1985) 179–180.

> [T]he women of the chorus of *Seven* apparently describe themselves as *philoi* of the brothers (909) and claim the grief of the house as their own (1069–1070; they are not in fact relatives). Yet their lament lacks features characteristic of lamenting *philoi*: the excited cries, the evocation of the dead person's individuality, the expressions of affection, and the self-pity evoked for the survivors. Described as a *humnon Erinuos* and an *Aida t' echthron paian'* (a hymn to the Erinys and a hateful healing song to Hades, 867–870), the choral song apparently has the form but not the spirit of a more normal lamentation.[199]

Even though the final lament does not communicate the emotional intensity expected of laments and of which the chorus has shown itself capable, the chorus women self-referentially emphasize their grief. They refer to their lament as "the wailing of a miserable heart that rejects all joy, truly pouring tears from a heart that withers" (919–920) and point to their mourning "madness" and their groaning heart.[200] Their emotional investment remains, I believe, crucial especially because they represent the city and they will continue to do so in opposition to the decision of the *probouloi* in the disputed ending of the play. [201] Despite their grief, I agree with Hutchinson and Foley that elements anticipated in lamentation are conspicuously absent. For my purposes, the absence of self-pity becomes particularly poignant, combined as it is with a consistent criticism of the brothers.

Holding both accountable in the eyes of their friends (οὐκ ἀμεμφεία φίλοις, 908–9) that include the chorus itself, the chorus-women present the two brothers as "having done much" (ὡς ἐρξάτην πολλά) to both the citizens of Thebes and the ranks of the Argives, many of whom were destroyed in battle (922–925), and do not refrain from judging the fratricide as impious (831). Equal grief and honor through burial and lamentation comes with equal attribution of responsibility.[202] The women of Thebes distinguish the impiety of fratricide from its final service to the polis. Thebes benefits from the mutual killing

199 Foley (2001) 50. Even though lines 867–70 come from the section that I see as spurious, the overall observation still stands.

200 See ll. 967–968 divided between the two semi-choruses: μαίνεται γόοισι φρήν. / ἐντὸς δὲ καρδία στένει (My mind is maddened with grief. Within me my heart is groaning).

201 See, e.g., ll. 900–902: διήκει δὲ καὶ πόλιν στόνος· / στένουσι πύργοι, στένει / πέδον φίλανδρον (Grieving has spread right through the city: the walls groan, and so does the soil that loved these men).

202 On the lamentation seen as blurring the moral distinction between the two brothers and the mixture of praise and blame for Eteocles, see Foley (2001) 49–50.

because "it has escaped the yoke of slavery" (793). But the question of pollution afflicting the city remains unresolved.[203]

If we read this final lament as "a form of social resistance to those in power",[204] the closing choral performance complements, in an assertive tone, the chorus' initial lament-like prayer and supplication. Through ritual acts that are highly emotional, the chorus-women present themselves as representatives of the city,[205] a transgressive role for which Eteocles has already charged the whole female race. At the end of the play, they present themselves not only as the members of the city who survive the war-threat but also as the ones who can better represent the interests of Thebes. Since they do not belong to the Labdacid family, their decision to mourn both brothers points to their ability to pity and invite pity through a perspective that transcends considerations of personal loss but remains judicious and, at times, critical. Even though vilified and discounted for its excess, their earlier expression of fear and, through it, their portrayal of the city under conquest points, as we saw, in a similar direction. It transcends the concern for the loss of personal freedom and dramatizes the reality and moral psychology of both the male and female participants of war. In both cases, the maidens of the chorus express an ability and willingness to see what equalizes—and potentially unites—rather than what divides citizens, precisely through the experience and expression of fear, self-pity, and pity. While the final lament for both brothers and the parodos and first stasimon differ significantly in the emotions that they communicate

203 For the suggestion that pollution will not threaten the city, if both brothers are killed, see Cameron (1970) 109–115. An uncertainty, however, seems to remain in the play as to whether the mutual shedding of blood itself will be the source of pollution, see esp. ll. 681–2. Foley (2001) 51 offers a compelling suggestion for an ending in which the double burial of the brothers would lead to the foundation of hero cult, in a vein similar to other etiological conclusions in tragedy, given that Pausanias mentions a shared cult for the two heroes (*Description of Greece* 9.18.3). "Because hero cults seem to have been designed to cope with the ambivalent violence and pollution of heroes, the founding of this cult could have resolved the threat of pollution posed to Thebes by the reciprocal fratricide and brought family and city once more into a mutually reinforcing alignment. The distorted and ambivalent lamentation of the chorus would then neatly establish the brothers as appropriate candidates for hero cult".

204 Foley, ibid.

205 Thalmann (1978) 102: "The chorus are not just a group of panic-stricken virgins. [...] they represent Thebes as a whole, and they embody much that is fragile and precious in the city's life. Their reactions to the events of the play not only are those of young girls but also stand for the effects of those events on the entire city. They thus provide an effective foil to Eteocles".

(pity for the brothers' death in the former and fear of attack and enslavement and self-pity in the latter), they all undermine fundamental distinctions and appearances that Eteocles wished to maintain.

One such major distinction that scholars have pointed out is the separation of private and public domains through Eteocles' extreme devotion to the city-state and the sharp differentiation between polis and *genos*. In Bacon's terms the main issue of the play, an issue that comes with the exceptional family of Oedipus, is "the problem of knowing where the danger really is—who is really the stranger, the enemy, the outsider [and it] haunts the play in many forms".[206] The strict divide between polis and *genos* crumbles in the final part of the play, as we witness Eteocles' change: from fully applying himself to the state at war, he passionately turns to the fulfillment of the family's curse by meeting his brother at the seventh gate. With the final lament, the chorus performs and advocates a perspective according to which the two brothers are equal and equally afflicted, while *genos* and polis are understood as coextensive.[207] Through the assertiveness of the choral voice, "the women, who appeared so fearful and fragile at the beginning of the play, seem vindicated in their prescience and we are left wondering how the Athenian audience would have viewed their triumphant lament".[208] Literally speaking, the chorus-women are

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206 Bacon (1964) 29.

207 Orwin (1980) 196, who accepts the presence of Antigone at the end of the play, eloquently argues for a particularly "feminine justice" that unites the polis and the family in ways that are necessary for the survival and well-being of both. Her reading holds, even if we only have the chorus performing the closing lament: "The maidens, unlike Eteocles, have understood from the beginning that it is not man's citizenship which he must hold most sacred. In the course of the drama they have learned, however, the fragility of the private and its inevitable dependence upon the public. [...] it is only with this [last] scene that the dispensations of Dikê are accomplished and the drama thereby brought to its conclusion. [...] it is only the Chorus which, in assuring Polyneices' burial not by his natural sister only but by a train of his compatriots assembled as a family, finally accomplishes the prophecy [that Polyneices will also regain his city]. [...] it is the common verdict of Dikê and the Chorus that Polyneices has no more forfeited his place in the city by his crime against it than Eteocles his place in the family. The play concludes with the restoration of Polyneices to home and city, a restoration accomplished by anthropomorphic Justice through the agency of (in the person of) that half of the city whose form she shares". Regarding the choral lament that presents the two brothers as equals, see esp. 961–1004 with the prominence of symmetrical expressions that express and reflect the equal or complementary fate of the two brothers, who are presented as "both so much afflicted in every way" (πάντα πολυπονώτατοι, 1000). See also Vidal-Naquet (1988) 282–3.

208 Holst-Warhaft (1992) 135.

not vindicated, since their fears of enslavement do not materialize.[209] Their lamenting voice, however, commands political attention, as it brings out the equalizing and corrosive power of war from a new perspective that, once again, the polis would attempt to silence or punish.[210] This female voice, compassionate and exacting at the same time, is vindicated so long as it is meant to resonate.

To recapitulate and conclude, Eteocles starts passionately pragmatic in wishing to silence the women's fears and leaves the stage passionately self-involved and madly desiring to meet his brother in single combat. Critics have extensively discussed the questions of freedom of choice and fate and Eteocles' morality as a member of the Labdacid family. From the perspective of emotional expression, my analysis has attempted to show the king's inflexibility as endemic to the politics of war. Both the chorus' interaction with Eteocles and the closing lament accentuate the fact that Eteocles can only mirror his brother and is unable and unwilling to envision himself in a different position, even as his desire to face Polyneices in battle may threaten the city with pollution. The choral description of the equalizing power of war through captivity, discussed earlier, is echoed in the closing antiphonal lamentation between the two semi-choruses, which presents the brothers as having suffered and inflicted equal pains and perpetrated equal and reciprocal transgressions (961–1004). From the choral perspective, then, the fratricide represents the most perverse instantiation of the single-mindedness required or habitually adopted at war and the violations against institutions such as the family perpetrated in its context and name. As Eteocles prepares to meet his brother in battle, the chorus-women attempt to hold him back by asking him to redefine the very concept of honor:

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209 For a different kind of vindication, see Byrne (1997) 157, who interprets Eteocles' death as a metaphorical form of violation, which provides "a climactic fulfillment and proper closure for the predictions of the chorus [in the first stasimon]". Byrne reaches this conclusion by tracing what she sees as a consistent interconnection between rape, marriage, and death in the play that creates an impression of similarity between the chorus and Eteocles.

210 The maidens' choice to mourn both brothers opposes the decision of the *probouloi*. Even if the text is not genuine, such choice would still oppose Eteocles' position in the play irrespective of whether it is openly proclaimed or not. Already at the beginning of the play, in his attempt to curtail the fear the women spread in the city, Eteocles urges them: "if you learn of men wounded or dying, don't greet the news with wailing" (242–3). See also Cameron (1971) 68–70, who focuses on the imagery of water and ships throughout the play and, here, on how it connects the ship of state that Eteocles has been trying to control and save with the movements of the women's lamentation as they 'conduct' him to Hades.

"yet the gods respect even an inglorious victory" (716), if that means refraining from shedding a brother's blood. Eteocles, however, holds on to the demands of hoplite-honor and what he claims to be the evils given to him by the gods (717, 719). The curse and the operative political ideology work together to preempt a redefinition of what constitutes honor, victory, and harm.

In contrast, in the first part of the play, by expressing their fear for the city's capture and their own enslavement, the chorus-women enact an ability to envision themselves and their fellow-citizens in fundamentally different states of being, thinking, and feeling. Even though intense and almost uncontrolled, their emotional discourse is not devoid of critical acuity. It rather calls attention to its own perceptiveness, accuracy, and power. By expressing self-pity and inviting pity that facilitate empathizing with and understanding their fears, the chorus points to the need to reconsider male and female experience in a conquered city. They enact the corrupting morality of war by dramatizing the division of the population into greedy, competitive, violent individuals during occupation, enslavement, and collective suffering. Such suffering equalizes and divides at the same time. They thus call for a reevaluation of what constitutes harm (βλάβη) at war and, therefore, what ought to factor into strategic and political decisions. And they are particularly apt to show the false divide between private and public, *oikos* or *genos* and polis and invite consideration of their fears as consequential for the well-being of both.

This idea of a vision that can open up to take on the perspective of the self and other when afflicted and thus envision different emotional and, therefore, moral and political positions is, I have argued, one of the central concerns in the play. It is emphasized through a passage that may not have been in the original but reflects the preoccupations of the play as a whole. As the two semichoruses depart in different directions at the end of the play, they sing: καὶ γὰρ γενεᾷ / <τῇ Καδμογενεῖ> / κοινὸν τόδ᾽ἄχος, καὶ πόλις ἄλλως / ἄλλοτ᾽ἐπαινεῖ τὰ δίκαια (for the loss is the loss of all the race of Cadmus and the city approves different things at different times, 1068–1071). Precisely through their emotional discourse throughout the play, the chorus-women point to changing conceptions of what is just (τὰ δίκαια) and invite self-awareness and a critical approach to this ἄλλως. As they entail a kind of sensibility and perception that is not permissible in war decision making, fear and pity (self-pity and pitying others) find their way into the public realm through their 'invalidation' as feminine, excessive, and, strictly speaking, apolitical. But the Theban women, eager to supplicate the gods of the polis at the beginning of the play and to offer communal mourning at the end of it, recommend attentive listening to the articulation of fear and the experience of pity for the insights they reveal regarding the political community at war in its entirety.

To reiterate Gagarin's statement with which I began, the play presents a conflict between Eteocles and the chorus. To a significant extent, this conflict is shown to revolve around who is to direct and define the community's emotions. In the first part of the play, such conflict is explicitly about defining the citizens' fears, specifically the fear of facing the enemy and all that the war entails for Thebes. Subsequently, it continues to regard the city's safety but it is closely connected with the fear of Oedipus' curse and considerations of the fratricide as a potential source of pollution. In the final part of the play the women of the chorus oppose the city of Thebes by taking on to lament both brothers and thus delineate legitimate pity, grief, but also discontent. Regarding fear in particular, it becomes apparent that the one who defines the content and degree of fear defines the community's perception of itself and its power as well as its perception of others and its power over them. When fears are articulated, they can lead to new pragmatic and moral considerations. The public role of the chorus through supplication and the fact that they are left as the only representatives of the community at the end of the play brings home that, despite Eteocles' claims, their emotions have gravity outside the private sphere and thus ought to be heard. At the same time, the women's lack of political power combined with the absence of clear resolution at the end of the *Seven*—as well as the absence of institutionalization or sublimation of emotion,[211] examples of which we saw in the Danaid trilogy and the *Oresteia*—indicate that the play does not call for the endorsement of fear, self-pity, and pity in any direct way. It seems, however, to point to a need for institutional structures that allow for such fears to be expressed and transformed for the benefit of the polis. Eteocles himself proves that there is no deliberation for action without strong emotion—veiled or explicit. The chorus, in turn, foregrounds both the interconnections and the analogous function of private and collective emotion and calls for public dialogue that is honestly preoccupied with collective well-being.

The chorus' loud voice in the first part of the play and its resonating voice at the end invite its audiences to listen to choral emotion and the insights that it provides. Listening attentively to more—meaning both more numerous and more intense—emotional voices can help create healthier hierarchies of what *erôs* in the polis should be about and thus face demanding and changing social and political circumstances. Silence of fear, pity, or *erôs* in their diverse expressions is not presented as a viable political option, since it would conceal what the citizens, individually and collectively, care most deeply about.

211 Unless of course Foley is right in her suggestion regarding the etiological foundation of a hero cult for the two brothers. See n.203.

CHAPTER 4

Enacting Choral Emotion: Sophocles and Euripides

1 Defining Enactment

In Chapter 1 I suggested that we can view choral action as a spectrum ranging from active participation in the dramatic plot (similar to that of individual actors) to a kind of participation that consists mainly of verbal response to the dramatic events. The choruses in Aeschylus' *Eumenides, Supplices*, and *Seven* that I examined in the previous chapter were viewed as occupying the active end of the spectrum. Even within this group, however, the degree and intensity of action varies, as we saw, from chorus to chorus. In contrast, choruses of captive women such as the chorus in the *Trojan Women*, for instance, might be considered to represent the responsive end of the spectrum. In this chapter, I examine two choruses that fall on different positions on the spectrum of action, yet close to its active end and 'enact' the tragic emotions: the chorus of sailors in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the chorus of Asian Bacchae in Euripides' *Bacchae*. I use the term enactment to refer to choruses that emphatically perform the tragic emotions while actively participating in the action to various degrees. The notion of enactment can of course be attributed in different ways to all choruses in the surviving plays: all choruses react to the dramatic events and enact how they feel. A comprehensive examination of such enactment transcends the scope of this book. To delimit the scope of my analysis, I have chosen two choruses that I see as offering notable examples of enacting the tragic emotions in the surviving corpus. These choruses not only occupy a position close to the active end of the spectrum of action, as I mentioned, but they also perform and theorize extensively the experience of the tragic emotions, pity in the *Philoctetes* and fear in the *Bacchae*. Enactment in these cases, then, indicates a marked and expansive performance of the tragic emotions in terms that draw attention to them and renders them central issues in the respective plays.

The chorus of sailors in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* directly influences the action of the play by agreeing to unscripted participation in Odysseus' deception plot that aims to trick Philoctetes into returning to Troy. In this context, not only do they take on the role of an actor; they also often perform their pity by expressing their own experience of pity and expanding on its nature and appropriateness as a response to Philoctetes' condition. Such enactment is marked: it is prominent in the first half of the play and gradually diminishes until the sailors

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grow silent during the final exchange between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. The chorus' emotional discourse is juxtaposed with that of Neoptolemus and brings out significant differences in the emotional experiences of the individual and the group. It is thus instrumental in raising what I see as one of the central concerns in the play: the premises that (can) render pity a desirable motive for action and a co-operative value for the community.

In the case of Euripides' *Bacchae*, enacting Dionysiac fear (*deinon*) takes a different form of choral expression. Strictly speaking, the chorus of Asian Bacchae occupies a position farther away from the active end on the spectrum of action than the chorus of sailors in the *Philoctetes*. In this play, however, which famously builds on doubles and manipulates perception and illusion, the dramatic space is essentially expanded and the enactment of emotion is enhanced and emphasized in a novel manner. The Theban maenads perform Dionysiac worship and literally act as agents of Dionysus on the mountain. The tragic chorus that consists of Asian Bacchae in the orchestra mirrors, contrasts, and interacts—notionally and then literally upon Agave's return—with the 'chorus' of Theban maenads, and theorizes Dionysiac worship. By facilitating complementary manners of enacting and theorizing Dionysiac fear, this chorus, I suggest, helps delineate the fear of Dionysiac chorality in the play as well as its function in the institutions of the polis.

2 Sophocles, *Philoctetes*

The chorus of sailors in the *Philoctetes* constitutes an often-noted innovation of Sophocles. While Aeschylus and Euripides used choruses of locals in their earlier dramatizations of Philoctetes' story, Sophocles' version depicts Lemnos as uninhabited and Neoptolemus' sailors agreeing to participate actively in Odysseus' and Neoptolemus' deception plot.[1] This is precisely why they have

1 Dio Chrysostom compares the three versions of the Philoctetes story as dramatized by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. He makes clear that Aeschylus and Euripides made their choruses consist of Lemnians. In Euripides in particular, Dio points out, the chorus apologizes for their neglect of the hero (*Oration* 52.2). Having mentioned that Sophocles' chorus consisted of those who sailed in the ship with Odysseus and Neoptolemus (52.16), he concludes that "the lyrics of Sophocles do not contain the didactic element to any great extent, nor any incentive to virtue such as we find in the lyrics of Euripides, but a marvelous sweetness and magnificence" (52.17). Translation by Crosby (1976). In *Oration* 59, Dio reproduces in prose part of the dialogue between Odysseus and Philoctetes, when the former arrives at Lemnos disguised with the help of Athena in Euripides' *Philoctetes*. For a discussion of the literary background of Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, see Hoppin (1981) 1–6.

all arrived on Lemnos. The chorus' input in the *dolos* has often raised questions about the nature and function of the choral voice in the play. To mention only two recent approaches, Simon Goldhill sees this Sophoclean chorus as an 'active' chorus, in the Aristotelian sense: because "the audience in the theatre has to respond to the chorus as it would to an actor, [...] Aristotle's celebrated comment that Sophocles made the chorus an actor finds its fullest embodiment in the *Philoctetes*".[2] Margaret Kitzinger, on the other hand, argues:

> That the choral odes do not play a prominent role in the *Philoctetes* cannot be denied. Nor is there any doubt that this chorus is involved in the plot to return Philoctetes to Troy. But this closeness and the relative insignificance of its song do not necessarily mean that the chorus participates in the action *as an actor*, or that the chorus does not have a distinct dramatic presence. Rather we might conclude that the failure of the chorus to establish its own perspective is part of the dramatic action.[3]

Like Goldhill, I view this chorus as indeed inviting engagement with its 'acts' in the way that an individual actor would, but I examine what such engagement entails within and for the dramatic action. This role, moreover, includes the chorus' (choice of) virtual withdrawal or silence as well, which calls for a different kind of response. In my reading, it is through all the different aspects of such 'action' that the chorus establishes its distinct dramatic presence and significance. The sailors' participation in the deception plot not only brings out aspects of collective choice and responsibility, but also occasions their extensive enactment of pity. The sailors express explicitly their pity for Philoctetes' suffering and elaborate on why such response is justified. The play dramatizes the connections and tensions between these aspects of choral performance, namely the enactment of pity and collective conduct within and outside the frame of the *dolos*.[4]

Pity itself is markedly instrumental in the development of the dramatic events. The young Neoptolemus and the chorus respond to Philoctetes' *nosos*

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2 Goldhill (2012) 131. Schein (1988) also views the chorus in the play as fulfilling the Aristotelian prescription. My reading of Aristotle on the chorus as actor is different: see Introduction to Chapter 3.

3 Kitzinger (2008) 73.

4 Kittmer (1995) sees the chorus as straddling two realms, the realistic and the conventional. At the same time, "Sophocles archly merges them, so that his deployment of the chorus throughout the play will constantly frustrate the audience's ability to decodify its stance and meaning" (20–21).

with different expressions and degrees of pity. As the play "extends the vocabulary of health and disease to encompass both emotional states and moral stances",[5] the choral and individual discourses of pity are emphatically juxtaposed with each other, reflecting divergent moral and social preoccupations, and foregrounding the demands that the experience of pity can have on collective and individual agents. It also raises the question of the pertinence of pity in defining civil (and civilized) interactions. In my analysis, I examine the cognitive and affective aspects of pity. I look at what is evaluated as undeserved suffering and, therefore, worthy of pity; how pity relates to experience, perception, and perspective; and how different kinds and levels of attachment condition the experience of pity, and vice versa. As with the case of fear in the previous chapter, I am particularly interested in what renders pity a motive for action and how institutional structures work with—relate to, shape, or validate—the potential of pity to function as a co-operative power and value.[6] It is the juxtaposition of choral and individual pity that offers insights into these questions. I will analyze this juxtaposition throughout the play.

The chorus members will be the first ones to perceive Philoctetes' condition as pitiful. After Odysseus has convinced Neoptolemus to undertake the task of deceiving Philoctetes (τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ / ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων: you must beguile the mind of Philoctetes by your words, 54–55), a task that according to Odysseus will show him to be both *sophos* and *agathos* (119),[7] the sailors enter to participate in the plan (135–143).[8] Within the overarching context of the deceit (δόλος), Neoptolemus agrees to help Odysseus and the chorus agrees, in turn, to help Neoptolemus. Both will have to improvise as needed. Neoptolemus asks the sailors: πρὸς ἐμὴν αἰεὶ χεῖρα προχωρῶν / πειρῶ τὸ παρὸν θεραπεύειν (advance as I signal to you from time to time, and try to render the aid the present time requires, 148–149). By allowing flexibility, Neoptolemus' request provides the suitable occasion for the chorus to make

5 Worman (2000) 6.

6 Excellent readings of the play have examined questions about the function of the chorus, ethics in the play, and the role of pity in such ethics, with different emphasis each time. Among them, my work is particularly in dialogue with Hawkins (1999), Kitzinger (2008), Nussbaum (2008), Prauscello (2010), Goldhill (2012). My approach differs from theirs primarily in its focus on the contribution of the choral perspective to our understanding of pity and on the characteristics and role of pity in connection especially to action.

7 As Blundell (1988) 138 points out in her discussion of Neoptolemus' *phusis*, Neoptolemus is convinced because *agathos* is especially appropriate to the son of Achilles, while *sophos* suits Odysseus better "but need not be scorned by one who has been brought up like Achilles to be a speaker of words as well as a doer of deeds (*Il.* 9.443)".

8 I use Lloyd-Jones' and Wilson's (1990) text and Lloyd-Jones' (1994) translation.

free choices and renders the chorus partly responsible for the success of the deception. Significant among such choices is the explicit expression of how they feel about Philoctetes.

With the chorus' entrance not only is the emotional terminology of the play introduced, but it is also connected with what I see as a central question in the play, namely, what renders pity a transformative experience or, at the very least, an emotional experience powerful enough to affect action. This question is directly connected with (sensory) perception and the kinds of contact and communication or lack thereof that result from it. When Odysseus first asks Neoptolemus to deceive Philoctetes because neither force nor persuasion will work in his case, Neoptolemus retorts by asking whether Odysseus does not consider lying shameful. For Odysseus, however, lies that result to safety (σωθῆναι, 109) are legitimate. Neoptolemus insists: πῶς οὖν *βλέπων* τις ταῦτα τολμήσει λακεῖν (*with what kind of face* will one be able to utter such words?, 110). Even though he soon accedes to Odysseus' demands, Neoptolemus' reaction introduces the significance of direct contact, perception, and communication. What each one sees in front of him in the play and how he interprets what he sees shape his pity and its effect on decision making. Such views are shown to change as the dramatic events unfold. Different levels of literal and metaphorical proximity define sensory and intellectual perception and have changing effects on emotional involvement and action.

The exploration of these effects begins with the entrance of the chorus. Neoptolemus invites them to see for themselves Philoctetes' dwelling: "now—for you may wish to see (προσιδεῖν) the place out in the wilds where he reposes—you can look (δέρκου) with confidence" (144–146); "you see (ὁρᾷς) here his home" (159). At the same time, though without expressing pity yet, the manner in which he communicates information about Philoctetes' life, already shows a certain sensitivity to his torment: Philoctetes hunts beasts for food "painfully in his pain" (σμυγερὸν σμυγερῶς) and has no one to heal his afflictions (164–8). With this information, as soon as they see Philoctetes' cave and its surroundings, the sailors are moved to pity.

The chorus of sailors immediately performs their emotional response and begin to envision in their parodos what renders Philoctetes' daily life pitiful:

> οἰκτίρω νιν ἔγωγ', ὅπως,
> μή του κηδομένου βροτῶν
> μηδὲ σύντροφον ὄμμ' ἔχων,
> δύστανος, μόνος αἰεί,
> νοσεῖ μὲν νόσον ἀγρίαν,
> ἀλύει δ' ἐπὶ παντί τῳ

> χρείας ἱσταμένῳ. πῶς ποτε πῶς δύσμορος ἀντέχει;
> ὦ παλάμαι θεῶν,
> ὦ δύστανα γένη βροτῶν,
> οἷς μὴ μέτριος αἰών.
>
> οὗτος πρωτογόνων ἴσως
> οἴκων οὐδενὸς ὕστερος,
> πάντων ἄμμορος ἐν βίῳ
> κεῖται μοῦνος ἀπ᾽ ἄλλων
> στικτῶν ἢ λασίων μετὰ
> θηρῶν, ἔν τ᾽ ὀδύναις ὁμοῦ
> λιμῷ τ᾽ οἰκτρός, ἀνήκεστ᾽ ἀμερίμνητά τ᾽ ἔχων βάρη.
> ἁ δ᾽ ἀθυρόστομος
> Ἀχὼ τηλεφανὴς πικραῖς
> οἰμωγαῖς ὑπακούει.

> I pity him, in that with none among mortals to care for him and with no companion he can look on, miserable, always alone, he suffers from a cruel sickness and is bewildered by each need as it arises. How, how does the unhappy man hold out? O contrivances of the gods! O unhappy race of mortals to whom life is unkind!
>
> This man, inferior, perhaps, to none of the houses of the first rank, lies without a share of anything in life, far from all others, with beasts dappled or hairy, and pitiable in his pain and hunger he endures afflictions incurable and uncared for. And she whose mouth has no bar, Echo, appearing far off responds to his bitter cries of lamentation. (169–190)

In this initial enactment of choral pity, the aspect of evaluation is clear. Philoctetes deserves pity because he has been left in absolute isolation. He is deprived of seeing and hearing anything human: no human 'face' keeps him company: μηδὲ σύντροφον ὄμμ᾽ἔχων (with no companion he can look on—literally: with no eye as a companion, 171). Echo herself responds to him from afar (188–190), and the loud and pitiful sound that Philoctetes himself makes is his only companion (κτύπος σύντροφος, 202–203). By pointing to his savage disease (νόσον ἀγρίαν), the sailors indicate that the disease not only causes him unbearable pain but also necessarily turns him into a wild being that cohabits with animals (183–187). Thus the view of his cave and the surrounding landscape triggers their imagination about Philoctetes' pitiful life without

having yet met the man himself.[9] "They, unlike Neoptolemus, are most able to sympathize with Philoctetes when he is least real to them".[10] In the context of such sympathy, they interpret the first utterance they hear from him from a distance as a clear cry of lamentation (διάσημα θρηνεῖ, 209). This loud sound, heavy (βαρεῖα, 208) like the crawling Philoctetes himself, "strikes" them (βάλλει, 205) with its weight and power. It is also a cry that they perceive as *deinon* (προβοᾷ τι δεινόν, 218) either because he stumbles under constraint (ὑπ᾽ἀνάγκας) or because he has seen their ship (215–218). The terminology of *deinon* will become particularly suggestive later in the play, with reference to the experience of pity. Already here, it points to the power of the emotion that Philoctetes evokes: his dreadful cry seems to communicate something uncanny as Philoctetes straddles the world of men and animals, both pitiful (οἰκτρός, 186) and almost terrifying for the suffering that he endures.[11]

From the choral perspective then, Philoctetes is to be pitied. Even though Neoptolemus remains, at the moment, emotionally distant (see 191: οὐδὲν τούτων θαυμαστὸν ἐμοί: none of these things is a surprise to me), the chorus' initial reaction sets the emotional tone of the play. As they perceive Philoctetes' condition with clarity, their evaluation will prove to be accurate and their pity well-aimed.[12] At the same time, their pity is and will continue to be

9 See also Halliwell (2002) 209 on how pity comes into play as soon as the chorus imagines the nature of Philoctetes' life. "And once the basic impulse to pity is given, it can be developed into a more concentrated judgment".

10 Nooter (2012) 138.

11 Neoptolemus has already described Philoctetes as a traveller who is *deinos* (δεινὸς ὁδίτης, 147). Kitzinger (2008) 85 sees *deinon* here as revealing either helplessness or isolation, in contrast to the song of the shepherd. On the brutal immediacy of the emotion that Philoctetes' voice communicates in the all-natural environment of Lemnos, see Carlevale (2000) 36–37.

12 Hawkins (1999) 347 argues that the 'pathetic imperative' that operates in Neoptolemus later and transforms his moral character is already felt in the choral utterances. By connecting the choral expression of pity with Neoptolemus' emotional experience from the very start, she also offers an explanation for the inconsistencies of the chorus: "from this point on until the scene of πάθος, the chorus repeatedly and insistently voices the inherent pitiableness of Philoctetes' condition. But their first expression of pity comes as an answer to Neoptolemus' evocation of Philoctetes' misery: they are taking their cue from him, and it is the sympathy they sense in Neoptolemus that gives them permission, in a sense, to put pressure on him—and us—to feel compassion for Philoctetes. They articulate what is latent or submerged in Neoptolemus, speaking almost as a part or extension of him. This view of the chorus as representing or expressing the mind of Neoptolemus may help explain their often-noted inconsistency. It is not surprising that various choral

conditioned by different degrees of distance. In the parodos it is the imaginative reconstruction of Philoctetes' life that triggers their expression of pity—in his absence.

Philoctetes' first appearance confirms the chorus' description. He also explicitly asks for pity: ἀλλ' οἰκτίσαντες ἄνδρα δύστηνον, μόνον, / ἐρῆμον ὧδε κἄφιλον κακούμενον (but take pity in an unhappy man, alone, afflicted like this without a companion or friend, 227–228). Philoctetes' demand for pity expressed in action becomes all the more imperative when he gives an account of the kind of sympathy he received in the past. The Achaeans were the first ones to show no pity for his *nosos*: "I have been miserably perishing now for nine years, in hunger and distress, feeding the insatiable disease. That is what the sons of Atreus and the mighty Odysseus have done to me, my son" (311–15). Subsequently, the strangers who chanced upon the island from time to time showed pity only in words:

> οὗτοι μ', ὅταν μόλωσιν, ὦ τέκνον, λόγοις
> ἐλεοῦσι μέν, καί πού τι καὶ βορᾶς μέρος
> προσέδοσαν οἰκτίραντες, ἤ τινα στολήν·
> ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐδείς, ἡνίκ' ἂν μνησθῶ, θέλει,
> σῶσαί μ' ἐς οἴκους, ἀλλ' ἀπόλλυμαι τάλας [...]
>
> These people when they come show pity in what they say, and sometimes they have been sorry for me and have given me a little food, or some clothing; but one thing nobody will do, when I make mention of it, and that is to take me home. No, I have been perishing miserably [...] (307–311)

Philoctetes' implicit criticism of the strangers introduces the transition from the experience of pity to its expression in action. By describing the different acts that (can) spring from experiencing pity, he points to the moral demands inherent in the evaluation of what one deserves that constitutes the basis for pity. The sailors who stray to Lemnos before the play takes place are shown to

utterances conflict with one another if they reflect the different and conflicting thoughts, feelings, and attitudes that characterize the impressionable young man". Even though the sailors often take their cue from Neoptolemus, they also agree to contribute to the deception as they see appropriate and they develop a relatively independent stance. They also do not share Neoptolemus' *phusis* and moral struggle regarding the deception. For this reason, I argue below, their inconsistency appears to stem, to a great extent, from their own experience of pity.

have no real desire to help Philoctetes. By offering temporary relief through the easy provision of food, these strangers essentially perpetuate Philoctetes' torment through seclusion. Their pity fails to activate any sense of obligation to alter his condition.

The question of responsibility and its connection with the experience of deserved pity will be gradually foregrounded as a moral concern in the play, particularly through the contrast between the emotions and actions of the chorus on the one hand and those of Neoptolemus on the other. In their eagerness to express their sympathy, the chorus like the earlier sailors may already be revealing their unwillingness or inability really to act on their pity. They comment: ἔοικα κἀγὼ τοῖς ἀφιγμένοις ἴσα / ξένοις ἐπικτοίρειν σε, Ποίαντος τέκνον (I think that I too, like the strangers who came here, feel pity for you, son of Poeas!, 317–8).[13] When, however, Philoctetes asks Neoptolemus to take him on board, they encourage him to take pity on Philoctetes—actively so:

> οἴκτιρ', ἄναξ· πολλῶν ἔλε-
> ξεν δυσοίστων πόνων
> ἆθλ', οἷα μηδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν τύχοι φίλων.
> εἰ δὲ πικρούς, ἄναξ, ἔχθεις Ἀτρείδας,
> ἐγὼ μέν, τὸ κείνων
> κακὸν τῷδε κέρδος
> μέγα τιθέμενος, ἔνθαπερ ἐπιμέμονεν,
> ἐπ' εὐστόλου ταχείας νεὼς
> πορεύσαιμ' ἂν ἐς δόμους, τὰν θεῶν
> νέμεσιν ἐκφυγών.

> Take pity on him, my lord! He has spoken of the ordeal of many troubles, hard to bear; may such attend none of my friends! And if you hate the odious sons of Atreus, my lord, I would make their evil actions a great benefit for him, and would convey him home, where he longs to go, upon the well-appointed swift ship, escaping the righteous anger of the gods. (507–518)

13 For an interesting approach to the use of *oiktos* and *eleos* terminology in the play, see Prauscello (2010). Prauscello argues that *eleos* is a specialized subset (a hyponym) of *oiktos* which indicates an experience of pity that is expected to lead to action. We thus see Philoctetes asking for *eleos* and often offered *oiktos*. Thus paying attention to the pity-terminology used each time, "deepen[s] our perception of the failure of communication between characters" in the play (210).

The chorus suggests that if pity for Philoctetes stems from a correct evaluation of his condition, then acting against his enemies who caused his suffering is the appropriate way for Neoptolemus to show his pity.[14] The pitier ought to establish a bond of *philia* that will transform the evil deed of his friend's enemies into benefit for his new friend (511–517). One's expression of pity is, therefore, to reinforce the principle of helping friends and harming enemies.[15]

Regarding this choral expression of pity, Goldhill asks:

> How, then, does this call to pity relate to their earlier statement that they pitied Philoctetes (169)? Is this a 'lie like the truth', as Homer's Odysseus proffers? Merely an opportunistic piece of acting that happens to echo their transparent emotions of before? Their encouragement to Neoptolemus to pity Philoctetes will also bear strange fruit, however. For it will be precisely the growing pity of Neoptolemus that will derail the deception.[16]

The chorus seems to follow their leader's initial request to assist him in any way that appears advantageous. This indeed seems to be an opportunistic piece of acting; but it is particularly powerful and convincing precisely because it is consistent with their initial and, likely, current emotions. Even though the chorus makes this suggestion within the context of the *dolos* against Philoctetes, the persuasive power of their proposal stems from both their justified pity and the justifiable principle that it is based on, namely solidarity against shared enemies. At the same time, this scene will bear fruit in ways that will reveal divergent workings of pity. As Goldhill points out, Neoptolemus' growing pity will derail the deception. The sailors' own pity, on the other hand, will prove to be short-lived and ineffectual. Responding to their current suggestion actively to pity Philoctetes, Neoptolemus forewarns them: ὅρα σὺ μὴ νῦν μέν τις εὐχερὴς παρῇς, / ὅταν δὲ πλησθῇς τῆς νόσου ξυνουσίᾳ, / τότ᾽ οὐκέθ᾽ αὑτὸς τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις φανῇς (take care that for all the indulgence you show now you do not appear a different person when you have had enough of contact with the sickness, 519–21). Operating within the *dolos*, Neoptolemus refers to sharing with

14 According to Prauscello, ibid., 209 "the choice of οἴκτιρ᾽ at 507 is another hint that the chorus is trying to further the success of Neoptolemus' deception".

15 For the ethics and operation of the Help Friends/Harm Enemies principle as well as the clashes that it produces with other moral norms, see Blundell (1989) 1–53. For a reading that contests Blundell's interpretation of the play as a critique of this principle, see Heath (1999) 155–9.

16 Goldhill (2012) 122.

Philoctetes the same space aboard their ship. His own warning, however, will take effect in a different way when the chorus will later be left on stage alone with Philoctetes with the task to persuade him to go to Troy. They will indeed appear "a different person", unable to show pity after having had enough experience with Philoctetes' obstinacy that stems from his *nosos*. While the *dolos* is premised on secrecy regarding its final aim (Philoctetes' return to Troy), the need to persuade Philoctetes to sail results in raising genuine questions regarding the nature and effectiveness of pity. One such question concerns the kind of contact and attachment that render pity powerful enough to form the basis for action and, even more emphatically, for sustained beneficial action.

At the moment, the connection established through Neoptolemus' willingness to act on his pity in solidarity with Philoctetes against the Atreidai allows for the expression of additional emotions that are genuine. The two men articulate their desires. Neoptolemus wishes to look at Philoctetes' bow up close (κἀγγύθεν θέαν), to hold and kiss it (βαστάσαι, προσκύσαι) (656–7). He feels *erôs* for it: καὶ μὴν ἐρῶ γε· τὸν δ᾽ἔρωθ᾽οὕτως ἔχω· / εἴ μοι θέμις, θέλοιμ᾽ἄν· εἰ δὲ μή, πάρες (well, I desire it, but this is the nature of my desire; if it is right for me, I would like it; but if it is not, let it go, 660–1). Upon Philoctetes' assurance that he will soon have the opportunity to hold it, Neoptolemus admits: "I am not sorry to have met you (ἰδών) and got you as a friend (671). Philoctetes, in turn, asks him to go into the cave with him because his sickness desires him as a companion and bystander: τὸ γὰρ / νοσοῦν ποθεῖ σε ξυμπαραστάτην λαβεῖν (my sickness requires me to get you to stand by me, 674–5). By pointing to the powerful connection that begins to develop between the two men, the strong affective language offers an early instance of what pity can 'do'. Pity can become the basis for recognizing needs and desires, developing the trust to articulate them openly, and feeling compelled to help meet such needs and desires.[17]

When Neoptolemus and Philoctetes withdraw into the cave—after the disguised merchant has brought the false news about Neoptolemus' and Philoctetes' imminent pursuit by the Achaeans—the sailors perform their last stasimon. Scholars have often noted the significant position of this ode at the very center of the play before a major turning point in the plot.[18]

17 For a reading that examines Neoptolemus' viewing of the bow and traces allusions to the blessed sight and view of the initiates in the Eleusinian Mysteries, see Lada-Richards (1997).

18 See, e.g., Davies (2001) esp. 47–48 on how this one ode "operates as a very emphatic point of punctuation" as it looks backward to Philoctetes' suffering and forward to Heracles' appearance at the end of the play.

λόγῳ μὲν ἐξήκουσ᾽, ὄπωπα δ᾽ οὐ μάλα,
τὸν πελάταν
λέκτρων <σφετέρων> ποτὲ
κατ᾽ ἄμπυκα δὴ δρομάδ᾽ < Ἅιδου >
δέσμιον ὡς ἔλαβεν
παγκρατὴς Κρόνου παῖς·
ἄλλον δ᾽ οὔτιν᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ οἶδα κλύων οὐδ᾽ ἐσιδὼν μοίρᾳ
τοῦδ᾽ ἐχθίονι συντυχόντα θνατῶν,
ὃς οὔτε τι ῥέξας τιν᾽, οὔτε νοσφίσας,
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσος ἐν ἴσοις ἀνήρ,
ὤλλυθ᾽ ὧδ᾽ ἀναξίως.
τόδε <μὰν> θαῦμά μ᾽ ἔχει,
πῶς ποτε πῶς ποτ᾽ ἀμφιπλήκτων
ῥοθίων μόνος κλύων, πῶς
ἄρα πανδάκρυτον οὕτω
βιοτὰν κατέσχεν·

ἵν᾽ αὐτὸς ἦν, πρόσουρον οὐκ ἔχων βάσιν,
οὐδέ τιν᾽ ἐγ-
χώρων, κακογείτονα,
παρ᾽ ᾧ στόνον ἀντίτυπον <νό-
σον> βαρυβρῶτ᾽ ἀποκλαύ-
σειεν αἱματηρόν·
οὐδ᾽ ὃς τὰν θερμοτάταν αἱμάδα κηκιομέναν ἑλκέων
ἐνθήρου ποδὸς ἠπίοισι φύλλοις
κατευνάσειε, <σπασμὸς > εἴ τις ἐμπέσοι,
φορβάδος τι γᾶς ἑλών·
εἷρπε γὰρ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἀλλ<αχ>ᾷ
τότ᾽ ἂν εἰλυόμενος,
παῖς ἄτερ ὡς φίλας τιθήνας,
ὅθεν εὐμάρει᾽ ὑπάρχοι
πόρου, ἁνίκ᾽ ἐξανείη
δακέθυμος ἄτα·

οὐ φορβὰν ἱερᾶς γᾶς σπόρον, οὐκ ἄλλων
αἴρων τῶν νεμόμεσθ᾽ ἀνέρες ἀλφησταί,
πλὴν ἐξ ὠκυβόλων εἴ ποτε τόξων
πτανοῖς ἰοῖς ἀνύσειε γαστρὶ φορβάν.
ὦ μελέα ψυχά,
ὃς μηδ᾽ οἰνοχύτου πώματος ἥσθη δεκέτει χρόνῳ,

λεύσσων δ' ὅπου γνοίη στατὸν εἰς ὕδωρ,
αἰεὶ προσενώμα.

νῦν δ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν παιδὸς ὑπαντήσας
εὐδαίμων ἀνύσει καὶ μέγας ἐκ κείνων·
ὅς νιν ποντοπόρῳ δούρατι, πλήθει
πολλῶν μηνῶν, πατρίαν ἄγει πρὸς αὐλὰν
Μηλιάδων νυμφᾶν
Σπερχειοῦ τε παρ' ὄχθας, ἵν' ὁ χάλκασπις ἀνὴρ θεοῖς
πλάθη θεὸς θείῳ πυρὶ παμφαής,
Οἴτας ὑπὲρ ὄχθων.

I have heard, though I have never seen, how he who drew near to the god's own marriage bed was bound and placed upon a deadly revolving wheel by the all-mighty son of Cronus. But there is none other among mortals whom I have heard of or have looked upon who has met with a more hateful destiny than this man, who having done nothing to anyone, done no murder, but being a just man among just men, is perishing thus undeservedly. But at this I wonder, how, how did he listen alone to the waves that beat the shore around him, and endure a life so full of tears?

Where he was alone, having no one walking near him, nor any inhabitant, a neighbor in his troubles, beside whom he could have lamented the sickness that cruelly devoured him, with groans inviting a response; nor any to lull to sleep with healing herbs the burning flux oozing from the ulcers of his louse-ridden foot, if a spasm should come over him, taking something from the nurturing earth. And he moved this way or that, crawling, like a child without a loving nurse, searching for his need to be supplied, when the plague that devoured his mind abated.

He never gathered food from the sowing of the sacred earth, never the other things that we mortal men enjoy,[19] except when with the winged

19 I agree with Ussher's (1990) 124 preference regarding νεμόμεσθ' ἀνέρες ἀλφησταί. He translates with "we mortal men enjoy" (adopted here) and explains ἀνέρες ἀλφησταί as either 'men who earn their living' or 'men who <as their staple food> eat grain' (*Od.* 13. 261, with Stanford) and sees the latter explanation as more appropriate since "Philoctetes has not shared mankind's enjoyment of 'anything in the nurturing earth's bounty' (1162)". Webster (1970a) 113 also points to *Od.* 6.8 and takes the phrase to mean 'men in a civilized society'.

> arrows from his swift-shooting bow he could acquire the food he needed. Poor soul, who for ten whole years lacked even the pleasure of the wine cup, and would ever look to find a stagnant pool and make his way to it!
>
> But now he has met the son of noble men, and will attain happiness and greatness through them; and he is bringing him in a ship traveling over the sea, after many months, to the haunts of the nymphs of Malis, native to him, and to the banks of Spercheius, where the man with the brazen shield joined the gods as a god, blazing with fire divine, beyond the hills of Oeta. (676–729)

From the choral perspective, the need for Neoptolemus' active pity becomes more emphatic and urgent. The sailors expand on the reasons why Philoctetes deserves pity by repeating some of the thoughts they expressed upon their entrance and developing further the conditions of Philoctetes' absolute isolation. In this stasimon, the sailors stand as representative of men (see the first person plural in l. 709) who have access to the fundamentals of civil and civilized life of which Philoctetes has been emphatically deprived. Philoctetes' utter isolation is envisioned in terms of exclusion from the civil practices and institutions that ensure human interaction and mutual support and pleasure. He has no one with whom to share his lamentation and no one to provide healing or help. He has been able to enjoy neither the cultivated fruit of the earth nor wine. And he is thus reduced to a helpless child. When they first entered the stage, the sailors called Philoctetes' *nosos* savage. Having met and listened to him, they visualize his *nosos* as having a life of its own and taking control of his body and mind: they call his foot ἔνθηρος (literally "inhabited with beasts", 697) and his *nosos* an *atê* that devours his mind (706).[20] Philoctetes' inescapable 'cohabitation' with his *nosos* thus replaces human interaction and affects him physically, emotionally, and mentally. The sailors' final reference to Philoctetes' lacking the pleasure of wine concludes their description with a

20 On ἐνθήρου see Jebb (1898 [2004]) 116: "ἐνθήρου refers to the angry appearance of the ulcer which has not been assuaged (ἡμερώθῃ) by proper treatment". Stephens (1995) emphasizes that the reality of Philoctetes' wound should not be ignored in favor of metaphorical interpretations. On the connection between bodily and internal distress, see Worman (2000) 12–13: "The importance of the adjective lies in its power to invoke the beast itself, to provide an image of infestation all the more horrifying for its lack of distinct physical boundaries between the beast and its victim. [...] Philoctetes' bite inscribes on his body his internal disturbance, signaling his status as one invaded by a demonic disease and thus caught between human and animal states".

particular emphasis on how it is not the pleasure within institutions of social interaction among males that has been at stake for Philoctetes for the last nine years but pure survival.

As was the case with their first brief song, the chorus is shown to have a developed imaginative capacity. Their initial description of Philoctetes' isolation in the parodos proved to be accurate. In this second song, not only do they elaborate further on what such isolation entails. They also offer the first description of the attack of the *nosos*, which will also soon prove to be accurate: Philoctetes' screams will resound and his oozing foot will take a brutal uncontrollable life of its own. Thus the chorus can accurately envision how he lives and what he misses, because they have seen and listened to him—and they have empathized with him. And such interaction only contributes to their pity being real or 'realistically' performed. At the same time, it is worth noting, that every time the chorus has enacted pity so far, they have done so in the absence of Philoctetes himself. They did invite Neoptolemus to pity him (like they do) in Philoctetes' presence; but both of their more expansive songs take place in the absence of the object of their pity. They thus (can) combine participation in the *dolos* with emotionally engaged and engaging 'spectatorship'. As willing actors in the *dolos*, they seem to be discerning spectators who respond appropriately to the events developing in front of them and invite similar emotional responses.

As discerning spectators, the chorus-members also declare Philoctetes' sufferings uncalled for and undeserved (680–685). They refrain, however, from making any explicit judgment against the Atreidai and Odysseus, despite the vilification of the Greek generals in the preceding scene and the chorus' emphatic turn to the here and now (νῦν δ', 719) in the last strophe to rejoice at the difference that noble Neoptolemus will make to Philoctetes' condition. This choice may already indicate their ability to experience pity for Philoctetes while remaining attentive to their military duty and thus withholding judgment against their leaders. This ability questions the validity and value of their own pity and pity more broadly; and allows for their sustained contribution to the deception.

Concluding their detailed description of Philoctetes' state with the change that will soon take place, the chorus claims that Philoctetes has finally met the noble man who will take him back to Oeta. This last statement presents an interpretive problem that has been vigorously debated, since the sailors do not need to maintain the deception at a moment when, as far as we can tell, they perform alone onstage. Scholars have suggested a number of interpretations ranging from the staging solution that Philoctetes and Neoptolemus already reemerge from the cave before the end of the song and thus the chorus members need to return to their deceptive role; to a misunderstanding on the

chorus' part that Philoctetes will go back home but Neoptolemus will conquer Troy with the bow; to the suggestion that the chorus ought to crystallize in lyric the sentiments Philoctetes expressed in the previous *epeisodion* so that the audience can share his emotional state through the chorus.[21] The fact that

21 E.g., Jebb (1898 [2004]) 119 suggests: "As Philoctetes and Neoptolemus are now seen to be leaving the cave, the Chorus once more speaks a language designed to support Neoptolemus' plan". Robinson (1969) 46 comments only on the insistence of the sailors that Neoptolemus take the bow and leave even after he has made clear that the oracle requires both Philoctetes and the bow for the capture of Troy: "Sophocles clearly wished to prolong the period of tension during which it is uncertain whether or not Philoctetes will be abandoned. The sailors evidently do not regard Neoptolemus' report of the oracle as conclusive. They still think he ought to take what he can, that is to say the bow, while he can. Moreover Sophocles could evidently expect his audience still to have some fears that the sailors had a strong enough point for there to be danger that Neoptolemus would yield to their persuasion. [...] What [the sailors] are most probably reflecting is precisely the attitude of practically minded men when faced with the kind of dilemma that oracles often produced". Burton (1980) 237–238 presents Müller's approach and discusses its virtues. According to Müller, the sailors have been misled into believing that Philoctetes and Neoptolemus have reached a compromise whereby the former will be taken home and the latter will go to Troy with the bow. Burton suggests that this theory "preserves the inherent irony of the situation, takes into account the effect on the chorus of the developing relationship between the two men, and treats them as a character in the play subject to the limited insight of the average man and therefore liable to make a wrong diagnosis of the future course of the plot" but leaves unexplained the sailors' behavior in the Sleep scene. Burton suggests: "[Philoctetes' exaltation at his upcoming return home] must be crystallized in lyric utterance so that the feeling is shared alike by chorus, actor, and audience". He sees the stasimon as remarkable "for the way in which it depicts the transition from one emotion [pity] to another [hope], so that the whole song is a unity directed towards the single purpose of creating in the audience a mood of hope at a moment of crisis in the play". With the end of the song, hope is cancelled and we return to pity and horror (239). The assumption behind Burton's reading is what he sees as the function of the Sophoclean chorus. Sophocles is seen as using "his choruses as an instrument with which to guide the mind and emotions of his audiences in any direction required by the immediate dramatic context" (238). Gardiner (1987) 36 accepts the suggestion that Philoctetes and Neoptolemus return before the final antistrophe: "The first three stanzas are intimately connected both by grammar and by content; the fourth is so distinct from them that a physical distraction such as an entrance would easily fit in. [T]he chorus' increased participation in the duplicity, each artifice more clever and unorthodox than the last, has prepared for this final display of cunning". Davies (2001) 57–58 argues for a careful crafting of the one stasimon of the play; as it opens and closes with allusive mythological references (to Ixion at the beginning and Heracles at the end), the ode has the task to look backward and forward. Even though he accepts that "the last stanza's role is complicated by its problematic acceptance of the terms of Odysseus' deception and

the sailors develop their initial assessment of Philoctetes' pitiful life, the characteristics of which they first conjectured and then had Philoctetes himself confirm, suggests, I believe, the honesty of their expression of pity. If we do not make the assumption that they perform the last strophe for Philoctetes as he reemerges with Neoptolemus from the cave, other interpretive possibilities open up: either the sailors let themselves perform as if the *dolos* were reality because they are fully drawn into it; or they are not certain whether Neoptolemus has actually changed his mind and intends to take Philoctetes home. I believe that we are meant to vacillate between these two possibilities. None of these possibilities challenges their pity; but also none of them requires them to consider its implications and act on it.

Irrespective, therefore, of the dramatic 'truth' that seems inaccessible to the audience at this point, the pity that both Neoptolemus and the sailors experience appears honestly felt, appropriate, and justified and thus convincing—and perplexing. Neoptolemus has succeeded with the deception so far because it gives him the freedom to express feelings that accord with his nature and morality, in this case honest pity. A similar case also holds for the chorus. The collapse of the deceptive frame, however, will challenge their commitment to pity (and truth). It will also reveal how differently Neoptolemus and the chorus define the obligations that stem from the experience of pity.

A fierce attack of the *nosos* tests everyone's ability for pity and initiates a chain of events that leads to this challenge. Neoptolemus and his sailors witness on stage the savage disease they have only envisioned so far. The sailors also witness Neoptolemus engage with Philoctetes' demands, as Philoctetes

intrigue" (ibid.), he sets that issue aside and concludes: "These two heroes who ascended to Olympus symbolize the best and worst of human capacities. Ixion with his never-ending torment directs our attention back to the first part of the play, with its emphasis on the physical agonies, thus far only reported, of Philoctetes. Heracles, the man become god, directs our gaze forward, to the end of the play" (58). Last, both Kitzinger (2008) 98 and Goldhill (2012) 123 raise questions about the stability and authority of the choral voice itself. Kitzinger argues that the anomaly of the song shows choral performance here unable to offer a vision that can be trusted, deepen understanding, or make things happen. Goldhill suggests that this is a destabilizing scene for the audience since "the very authority of the chorus' voice *qua* chorus seems uncomfortably at stake. The audience, that is, becomes enmeshed in the doubts about truth and communication, hearing and overhearing, being the master or victim of the deceptiveness and persuasion of language, which the characters on stage experience. The stasimon sung alone on stage is exactly when we might expect the chorus to reach towards the voice of traditional authority. Sophocles, in this play where the chorus is most like an actor, makes this the moment when the audience is most unsure about the status of the chorus' voice".

now directly asks Neoptolemus to show pity (οἴκτιρέ με, 756), just like the sailors earlier asked him to do so (οἴκτιρ᾽, ἄναξ, 507). As soon as the *nosos* attacks, Philoctetes attempts to resist it, even hide it. But its fierceness is overpowering: it is *deinon*.

N. δεινόν γε τοὐπίσαγμα τοῦ νοσήματος.
Φ. δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν· ἀλλ᾽οἴκτιρέ με.
N. τί δῆτα δράσω;
Φ. μή με ταρβήσας προδῷς.
ἥκει γὰρ αὐτὴ διὰ χρόνου, πλάνης ἴσως
ὡς ἐξεπλήσθη, νόσος.
N. ἰὼ δύστηνε σύ,
δύστηνε δῆτα διὰ πόνων πάντων φανείς.
βούλῃ λάβωμαι δῆτα καὶ θίγω τί σου;

N. The burden of the sickness is *deinon*.
Ph. *Deinon* indeed, and indescribable! Come, take pity on me.
N. What shall I do?
Ph. Do not take fright and betray me! It has come in person after a time, perhaps because it is weary of wandering, the sickness.
N: Ah, unlucky one! Unlucky you are found to be in every kind of trouble! Do you wish me to take hold of you and hold you? (755–761)

The exceptionally fierce burden of the disease defeats verbal communication. The term *deinon* conveys a fearsome quality that transcends accurate definition and description. Philoctetes instantly asks for pity and Neoptolemus' question "what shall I do?", the tragic question *par excellence*, communicates the urgency for pity to translate into action. Philoctetes' concern that the force of the *nosos* may drive pity away because of too intense an experience of fear indicates the grievousness of his suffering that proximity may render unbearable. Neoptolemus, however, denies such a possibility. He both articulates his grief for Philoctetes and he offers physical contact instead to support him against the burden of the disease. Philoctetes refuses at the moment the elimination of all physical distance. It seems that a certain, even if minimal, distance is necessary for pity to continue to operate. Thus Neoptolemus offers in action what the sailors sang about when they expressed their pity in song: the σύντροφον ὄμμα that Philoctetes had been missing for nine years. They also sang about his having no one "beside whom he could have lamented the sickness that cruelly devoured him". As Philoctetes is about to entrust his bow to him, Neoptolemus falls silent and soon admits: ἀλγῶ πάλαι δὴ τἀπὶ σοὶ στένων κακά (I have been in pain long since, lamenting for your woes, 806). The physical

and emotional support that he now offers to Philoctetes provides the outward expression and extension of a mental pain that he has been sharing with him *palai*.[22] Sharing Philoctetes' suffering on stage solidifies Neoptolemus' emotional distress as well as the connection between the two men. For Neoptolemus the distress that results from pity can only lead to action. He thus pledges not to abandon Philoctetes and to safeguard his bow.

As soon as Philoctetes falls asleep, the chorus first sings a hymn to Sleep and then urges Neoptolemus to think about their next step and act promptly: πρὸς τί μένομεν πράσσειν; / καιρός τοι πάντων γνώμαν ἴσχων / <πολύ τι> πολὺ παρὰ πόδα κράτος ἄρνυται (Why do we delay to act? The choice of the right moment, which decides all things, wins a great victory, one great indeed, by a prompt stroke, 836–838). As numerous scholars have pointed out, the transition is jarring.[23] Initially it is not clear whether the sailors invoke Sleep because they care for Philoctetes' recovery or for the advancement of the deception and their suggestion for prompt action remains indirect but potentially merciless. Neoptolemus interprets their suggestion as advice to take the bow and leave Philoctetes behind but explains that the bow will be useless without him. The chorus then concludes by suggesting a fearless, if unspecified, undertaking:

> ὅρα, βλέπ᾽ εἰ καίρια
> φθέγγῃ· τὸ δ᾽ ἁλώσιμον
> ἐμᾷ φροντίδι, παῖ, πόνος
> ὁ μὴ φοβῶν κράτιστος.

22 On Neoptolemus' mental pain as part of the "feelings which alert him to the demands of his *phusis*", see Blundell (1988) 140 and *passim* and Nussbaum (1976–7) 33.

23 The hymn to Sleep reads: Ὕπν᾽ ὀδύνας ἀδαής, Ὕπνε δ᾽ ἀλγέων, / εὐαὴς ἡμῖν ἔλθοις, εὐαίων, / εὐαίων, ὦναξ· ὄμμασι δ᾽ ἀντίσχοις / τάνδ᾽ αἴγλαν, ἃ τέταται τανῦν. / ἴθι ἴθι μοι, Παιών (Sleep, ignorant of anguish, ignorant of pains, come to us with gentle breath, come bringing felicity, bringing felicity, lord! Over his eyes hold this brightness that now extends before them! Come, come, Healer!, 828–832). On the juxtaposition of the hymn with the chorus' spurring Neoptolemus to action, see, e.g., Reinhardt (1979) 181 who sees in the prayer to sleep "anything but a lullaby, [...] rather a song of gentle enticement to deceit, all the more forceful for its gentleness". Reinhardt, however, does not see lack of honesty in the changing responses of the chorus—"at one moment, it harmonizes, at another it contradicts" (182). See also Winnington-Ingram (1980) 287: "[The prayer to Sleep] is very beautiful—and lasts for half a stanza only, being followed by one of the harshest discords one could find in Greek poetry. The sleep they pray to visit the suffering Philoctetes is something to be *used*. Now, they think, is the time to make off with the bow. These are plain, practical men"; and Goldhill's (2012) 125–127 discussion in which he emphasizes the insecurity of interpretive mistrust within the play and within the theater.

> Look, see if your speech suits the moment! The thing my mind can grasp, my son, is that the work attended by no fear is best! (862–865)

The previous advocates of pity and active sympathy now opt for expediency with the least pain possible involved. Πόνος ὁ μὴ φοβῶν is particularly perplexing. If they refer to abandoning Philoctetes, even though difficult (a πόνος), the task will be effective if unfeeling (specifically without fear).[24] Neoptolemus, however, silences them (σιγᾶν κελεύω, 865). The chorus encourages him to deceptive action at the moment when one would most expect an expression of pity. Having witnessed both Philoctetes' physical suffering and Neoptolemus' emotional torment, they have no words of sympathy—for the first time in the play. Moreover, their suggestion for action would not merely replicate what the Achaeans did nine years ago. As Philoctetes has explicitly stated, it would lead to his actual death.[25]

At the same time, the chorus once again offers the terms that will subsequently be developed and taken in new directions. Even though they suggest action that Neoptolemus turns down, they add: "if you maintain your present purpose toward this man, there are *pathê* to see in this that are perplexing (ἄπορα πάθη) even to the wise/subtle" (853–4).[26] The perplexing *pathê* that the chorus refers to will arise from disobedience to Odysseus. The choral terminology is soon echoed in an exchange between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. As Neoptolemus ponders what to do (895), he wonders:

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24 On the possible meaning of the choral utterances, see also Jebb (1898 [2004]) on 862: " 'See whether thy words are reasonable' means here, 'We fear that thy counsel (839ff.) is unreasonable'. We miss our καιρός, if we stay here with Philoctetes, instead of escaping with the bow"; and on 863ff. "They mean that it is best to depart noiselessly with the bow, and so avoid the risk involved in taking Philoctetes". Burton explains the chorus' role as contributing to the tension of the scene (1980) 243: "The scene (730–867) from the end of the stasimon until Philoctetes awakes is one of the most powerful in extant Greek tragedy for its portrayal of extreme physical agony. Moreover, in addition to the pity and horror aroused by the sight and sound of the hero's suffering, doubt and suspense must be created and sustained in the audience: what will Neoptolemus do after listening to his sailors? Will he obey the oracle, yield to the persuasion of his crew, or reveal the plot to Philoctetes? To raise these questions and keep tension alive is the principal function of the chorus in this scene".

25 On how Philoctetes felt when he first woke up and found himself abandoned on Lemnos, see ll. 268–284. In ll. 772–4, Philoctetes forewarns Neoptolemus that giving the Achaeans his bow would result in death for both of them (μὴ σαυτόν θ' ἅμα κἄμ'(ε)[…] κτείνας γένῃ).

26 I read ταύτην in line 853 with Jebb, which refers to Neoptolemus' purpose to convey Philoctetes to Troy.

N. I don't know where to turn my words in my perplexity (τἄπορον ἔπος).

Ph. But what perplexes you (ἀπορεῖς δὲ τοῦ σύ;)? Do not say these things, my son!

N. But that is the point I have now come to in my trouble! (τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους κυρῶ). (897–9)

The choral perspective, on the one hand, consistently turns out to be circumscribed or inadequate for action. The choral discourse, on the other, especially when it pertains to *pathos* (as both trouble/suffering and emotion), provides the terms that recur and require redress and expansion. The choral perception, in other words, is fundamental for establishing the different levels of emotional and moral engagement in the play and dramatizing the content and repercussions of pity.

In the scene that follows, Neoptolemus faces precisely the results of his perplexing *pathos*, namely the dilemma of where he should take Philoctetes, who is now willing to follow him. His cry παπαῖ· τί δῆτ' <ἂν> δρῷμ' ἐγὼ τοὐνθένδε γε; (*papai*, what am I to do next?, 895) and his repeated question "what shall I do?" express his internal struggle, a struggle with his own *phusis* (902–903) over the right decision.[27] Neoptolemus finally reveals to Philoctetes that he must take him to Troy, because he has to obey his commanders in accordance with both justice and expediency (τό τ' ἔνδικον and τὸ συμφέρον, 926). The chorus makes clear that the whole weight of responsibility falls on their leader by

27 Regarding the effect of Philoctetes' cries on Neoptolemus and consequently Neoptolemus' own cries, scholars invariably point out the parallel between Philoctetes' physical pain and Neoptolemus' moral pain. See, e.g., Segal (1981) 335: "As Neoptolemus repeats such syllables at his own points of spiritual crisis later in the play, he reaches an agony almost equivalent to that which extorts these cries from the sick outcast. [...] Where Odysseus' wily rhetoric fails, the nonverbal persuasion of the disease succeeds" (336); Hawkins (1999) 352: "Philoctetes' physical agony induces an answering moral crisis in Neoptolemus. He breaks out in the same cry of anguish παπαῖ (895)—that we heard from Philoctetes. But for Neoptolemus, this emotional outburst springs not from bodily pain but from the knowledge of his moral failing"; Worman (2000) 27: In Neoptolemus, "Sophocles locates the emotions and mental states that correspond to Philoctetes' condition. Neoptolemus tends to echo Philoctetes' vocabulary of disease, often associating it with emotional reaction or responding to Philoctetes' tendency to personify it". See also Aultman-Moore (1994) 309–310 who argues that this response to Philoctetes' statement in the previous line that his usual manner will literally set him (Philoctetes) upright again after the attack of the disease is an indication that Neoptolemus is wondering whether he will be able to do the same metaphorically, namely to recover who he is.

asking him: τί δρῶμεν; (what are we to do?, 963). The language of tragic dilemma and indecision pervades the scene and is interlocked with the language of pity. Neoptolemus responds: ἐμοὶ μὲν οἶκτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωκέ τις / τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι (as for me, a strange (or terrible) pity for this man has fallen upon me, not now for the first time, but since long ago, 965–966). And under pressure by Philoctetes to act on his pity and avoid shame (967–968), he remains at a loss (οἴμοι, τί δράσω; 969; τί δρῶμεν, ἄνδρες; 974) until Odysseus appears onstage.

Neoptolemus' experience of pity is burdensome, fierce, and fearsome, like Philoctetes' *nosos* itself. The verb ἐμπίπτω combined with the adjective δεινός that Neoptolemus applies to his experience of pity signifies a violent attack that renders him (mentally) weak and requires him to hold up and evaluate the justice of his feelings so that he can act on them.[28] Thus his pity both reveals his noble nature and questions its strength and moral expression in real action. The intensity with which Neoptolemus experiences such pity seems also to be reflected in Philoctetes' address to Odysseus, when he presents the young man as visibly in pain: δῆλος δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ἀλγεινῶς φέρων / οἷς τ' αὐτὸς ἐξήμαρτεν οἷς τ' ἐγὼ 'παθον (and you can see how he is pained by his crime and by my suffering!, 1011–1012). This emotional torment contrasts sharply with the choral experience and expression of pity. The sailors' performance of *oiktos* now appears to have been too facile.[29]

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28 Hawkins (1999) 352 understands the use of δεινός in similar ways but also sees in Neoptolemus' expression of pity his true emotions which were earlier displaced on the chorus. Worman (2000) draws further connections between the similarities in the language that the two characters use. On her understanding of Neoptolemus' tendency to echo Philoctetes' vocabulary of disease, see also previous note. For Worman this tendency points to and creates the companionship that will contribute to Philoctetes' cure which she calls a "conversational cure" (28). She sees companionship "manifested most importantly in conversation; its absence is made consonant with the presence of disease. And, more disturbingly, the disease can affect intention, causing one to break one's word by means of its noxious presence" (29). Worman eloquently brings out the contagious power of the disease. Companionship is indeed manifested in conversation but need to be consolidated through beneficial action.

29 See also Blundell (1989) 193: "Their actions are determined solely by loyalty, and they defer to Neoptolemus' judgment in almost everything. They appear to act on the principle suggested to Neoptolemus by Odysseus, that loyal obedience to orders removes responsibility from the subordinate. This will be confirmed later by their claim to have had no part in the deception (1117f.), and their defense of Odysseus (1143–5). Unlike their master, however, they are troubled by no moral scruples. They provide a foil to Neoptolemus' developing awareness that obedient loyalty to *philoi* may be challenged by other principles". Schein (1988) 202 sees the chorus as "Odysseus' men to the end".

As the frame of the *dolos* collapses and no human pity is available to him, Philoctetes turns to the gods. He asks them to show their pity (οἰκτίρετε· / ὡς ζῶ μὲν οἰκτρῶς) by punishing everyone involved in his deception (1040–4). Active divine pity will then reflect the gods' care for justice. Philoctetes goes so far as to claim that the ruin of Odysseus and the Atreidai will feel like a cure of his disease (1036–1044). By essentially identifying his extreme physical pain with the commanders' corruption, Philoctetes insists that pity for someone who deserves it *must* lead to the punishment of the ones who caused his pitiful state. In this trial of pity and desert, Danielle Allen's understanding of anger and pity as part of the judicial power in classical Athens sheds light on the loaded significance of the discourse of pity in the play: "pitying one party [at a trial] required being angry at the other [...] Each speaker couched his argument about 'desert' in terms of the claims that he could make on the jury's pity and anger. These concepts and phenomena were thoroughly contestable in their definitions, and the claims to anger and pity were embedded in a language of communal ethical evaluation".[30] From this point onward in the play, it becomes clear that precisely the terms of communal ethical evaluation require redefinition so that anger and pity be channeled appropriately or according, at least, to a more broadly accepted understanding of what constitutes appropriate conduct. The conflict about the kind of action that pity for Philoctetes might (or might not) lead to becomes a conflict about the moral and social values that pity ought to reflect and enforce.

In his desperate need for active pity, Philoctetes also turns to the chorus:

Φ. ἦ καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν ὧδ' ἐρῆμος, ὦ ξένοι,
λειφθήσομαι δὴ κοὐκ ἐποικτερεῖτέ με;
Χ. ὅδ' ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ναυκράτωρ ὁ παῖς. ὅσ' ἂν
οὗτος λέγῃ σοι, ταὐτά σοι χἠμεῖς φαμεν.

Ph. Shall I be left here by you also, strangers, and shall you have no pity for me?
Ch. This boy is our captain; what he says to you, we also say to you. (1070–1073)

The chorus openly refuses independent responsibility and action. Interestingly, here the sailors do not concede pity even in words. This is, furthermore, the first time they are asked to express or enact pity while Philoctetes is present (and awake) and they refuse to do so. Neoptolemus, however, makes his first

30 Allen (2000) 148–149. See also Chapter 1, p. 4.

concession, in response to the chorus—and indirectly to Philoctetes' demand for choral pity. Admitting that he may seem too full of pity (οἴκτου πλέως, 1074) to Odysseus, he suggests that the sailors stay with Philoctetes. He entrusts them with changing Philoctetes' mind while he leaves the stage with Odysseus.

During the *kommos* that follows, we witness varying degrees and attempts by Philoctetes and the chorus to approach each other and establish a connection and effective communication. Initially Philoctetes refuses even to address the sailors. Rather he laments his fate on the island without the bow and curses the cunning mind that beguiled him with cunning words (1111–1112). To all references of deception, the chorus responds as if Philoctetes refers to them. In doing so, they seem consistently to conflate themselves with Neoptolemus. At first, they claim no participation in the deception:

> πότμος σε δαιμόνων τάδ', οὐδὲ σέ γε δόλος
> ἔσχ' ὑπὸ χειρὸς ἐμᾶς· στυγερὰν ἔχε
> δύσποτμον ἀρὰν ἐπ' ἄλλοις.
> καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοῦτο μέλει, μὴ φιλότητ' ἀπώσῃ.
>
> This is fate sent by the gods; it was not treachery to which I lent a hand that came upon you; direct the hatred of your baneful curse at others! For I am concerned that you shall not reject my friendship. (1116–1121)

Philoctetes, however, ignores their claims and envisions his bow as looking at him and at the shameful deceptions of his enemy with the kind of pity that he deserves (1128ff). He turns to the chorus only after they ask him once more to draw near the *xenon* and *pelatan* (1163–4), which Philoctetes interprets as referring to themselves:

> πρὸς θεῶν, εἴ τι σέβῃ ξένον, πέλασσον,
> εὐνοίᾳ πάσᾳ πελάταν·
> ἀλλὰ γνῶθ', εὖ γνῶθ'· ἐπὶ σοὶ
> κῆρα τάνδ' ἀποφεύγειν.
> οἰκτρὰ γὰρ βόσκειν, ἀδαὴς δ'
> ὀχεῖν μυρίον ἄχθος ᾧ ξυνοικεῖ.[31]

31 On the syntactical difficulty of the two clauses see Jebb (1898 [2004]) 183: "The only source of obscurity here is that in the first clause (οἰκτρὰ γὰρ βόσκειν) the κήρ is the disease itself, while in the second (ἀδαὴς δ') it is identified with the patient. The sense is: 'thy disease is dreadful, and no length of time could inure thee to the countless other ills that accompany it' (hunger, hardship, solitude)".

> I beg you, if you have any regard for your friend, draw near to him; he draws near in all loyalty to you. Come, know it, know it well! It is in your power to escape this deadly fate. For it feeds upon you cruelly, and he who lives with it cannot learn to sustain the countless pains it brings. (1163–1168)

Jebb suggests that "the word πελάταν gives a certain tone of deference", since it was familiar in Attic as 'dependent'.[32] The chorus attempts, on the one hand, to minimize the distance between themselves and Philoctetes with the emphatic repetitition of *pelasson* and *pelatan*, which would establish a reciprocal relationship of *xenia*. In the process they blur their identity with that of Neoptolemus in order to capitalize on the bond that was earlier developed between the two men. The very language that they use, on the other other hand, only maintains a certain distance: they refer to themselves as *xenon* and *pelatan* but not as *philon*.[33] Moreover, "the claim of *eunoia* is a self-aware strategy of persuasion, an act of self-presentation, and not simply the standard performance of choral good will".[34] More importantly, their only expression of pity in their only one-to-one interaction with Philoctetes himself is communicated in the least intimate way possible, especially when compared with their previous expressions of pity (e.g., οἰκτίρω). They personify Philoctetes' fate and refer to it as *oiktra boskein*, expanding their earlier characterization of his *nosos* as a cruel and independent creature with a will of its own. As such, of course, it continues to render Philoctetes' life pitiful but the chorus also introduces this statement by pointing to Philoctetes' option to free himself from his pitiful fate. For this reason, pity for a fate that is self-inflicted can only be limited, if not eliminated. *Oiktra*, moreover, can be seen as an invitation to self-pity: by asking Philoctetes to look at his own pitiful deadly fate, they encourage him to feel self-pity and take action to break the cohabitation with the disease.

The imagery of the burdensome cohabitation with the disease may, however, work on more than one level. The sailors may also allude to their own inability and unwillingness to learn how to live with it (see ἀδαής). When

32 Ibid., 182.

33 For a discussion of *xenia* in the play, see Belfiore (1993–1994). Belfiore, 126, sees more sympathy in this address by the chorus (where ξένον refers to a ritual friend) than in their earlier reference to Philoctetes as a "burdensome stranger" (βαρὺς ξένος, 1045). I agree that 'ritual friend' is the prevalent meaning but I see the absence of further *philia* terms as indicative of the ambivalent relationship between the chorus and Philoctetes and thus the meaning 'stranger' remains also resonant.

34 Goldhill (2012) 130.

Philoctetes oscillates between asking them to leave him alone and urging them to stay with him (1177–1185), they eagerly endorse his suggestion to leave as *phila* (1177).[35] According to Goldhill "the chorus here follows on from Odysseus and from Neoptolemus in attempting to persuade Philoctetes to leave off his rage and come to be cured at Troy; they engage in a protracted and intricate scene of persuasion, and end by making a move to leave (as Odysseus and Neoptolemus have done)".[36] Thus, on the one hand, they attempt to persuade Philoctetes by fostering a relationship that resembles his relationship with Neoptolemus. On the other, their language and movements reveal them to be less emotionally involved and invested in accomplishing their task. The lyric exchange results in no persuasion or welcome resolution: Philoctetes retreats to his cave.

The *kommos* then emphatically brings out the differences between individual and choral pity. Extended interaction with Philoctetes and unmediated exposure to his suffering increases Neoptolemus' pity so as to render it *deinos*. The chorus, on the other hand, seems to move in the opposite direction. Their witnessing of Philoctetes' suffering in the attack-scene along with Neoptolemus' profound emotional involvement and their direct interaction with Philoctetes afterwards leads to their gradual disengagement in terms of pity. Even when Philoctetes expresses the wish to commit suicide, the sailors show no pity or emotional struggle. The *kommos* as a whole also brings out the chorus' feeble commitment. The relative ease with which they change positions contrasts them with Neoptolemus' tormenting experience of pity and internalization of the moral obligations that both such experience and his *philia* with Philoctetes entail.

After this scene, the chorus does not perform another ode again nor does it participate in the dialogue until their exit lines. They remain silent from the point when Neoptolemus comes back to return Philoctetes' bow and correct his deed which he has come to see as performed shamefully and unjustly (αἰσχρῶς κοὐ δίκῃ, 1234). At Odysseus' reproach for his lack of σοφία, he calls his return an attempt to correct his ἁμαρτία (1248–1249). Arguing that a sense of shame has to accompany just conduct, Neoptolemus eventually refutes Odysseus' claim that one can be shameless briefly for the sake of expedience and then be just forever after. His experience of pity and his bond with Philoctetes have made

35 Kitzinger (2008) 133 suggests that the term "unmasks the emptiness of [the chorus'] earlier appeal to the supposed friendship that draws them together and that provided a reason for Philoctetes to accompany it". See also her overall discussion on the distance between chorus and Philoctetes in the scene.

36 Goldhill (2012) 103.

clear to him—unlike the chorus—that a justified feeling of pity ought to result in the active reestablishment of justice. Turning from deception to persuasion, he attempts to convince Philoctetes to follow him, now a real friend, to Troy. Going to Troy not only accords with the gods' desire; there Philoctetes will find healing and will win unsurpassable glory (κλέος). As Philoctetes remains unyielding, Neoptolemus questions whether he continues to deserve pity:

> [...] ἀνθρώποισι τὰς μὲν ἐκ θεῶν
> τύχας δοθείσας ἔστ' ἀναγκαῖον φέρειν·
> ὅσοι δ' ἑκουσίοισιν ἔγκεινται βλάβαις,
> ὥσπερ σύ, τούτοις οὔτε συγγνώμην ἔχειν
> δίκαιόν ἐστιν οὔτ' ἐποικτίρειν τινά.
> σὺ δ' ἠγρίωσαι, κοὔτε σύμβουλον δέχῃ
> ἐάν τε νουθετῇ τις εὐνοίᾳ λέγων,
> στυγεῖς, πολέμιον δυσμενῆ θ' ἡγούμενος.
>
> The fortunes given them by the gods men are obliged to bear; but those who are the prey of damage that is self-inflicted it is wrong that any should be sorry for or pity. You have become savage and will not accept a counselor, and if anyone tries to teach you, speaking with good will, you turn your back on him, thinking him an enemy and an ill-wisher. (1316–1324)

Once again Neoptolemus develops notions first introduced by the chorus. Self-inflicted suffering does not warrant pity; and a (proven) friend's good will (εὔνοια) should be heeded.[37] At this point in the play, however, when used by characters with different levels of commitment to Philoctetes, terms that communicate the same ideas become suspect and lose their gravity and persuasive power because of the profound corruption effected by the Odyssean plot and the ideology that it represents. Just conduct itself can be viewed from different perspectives: Neoptolemus sees justice in Philoctetes' healing and glory in Troy, Philoctetes sees justice in returning home and frustrating Achaean victory.

Pity itself—or more accurately, active pity, namely the kind of pity that leads to action—is rendered as controversial as the divergent claims to just conduct. Philoctetes insists that neither Neoptolemus nor he should engage with evildoers and begs him to abide by his earlier promise to convey him to Oeta. Neoptolemus eventually gives in even though he could have questioned

37 See ll. 1095–1100 and ll. 1163–4 quoted and discussed above.

an obligation based on a lie, namely the Atreids' refusal to give Neoptolemus the arms of Achilles.[38] Neoptolemus' final consent to give up the Trojan War may indicate that his earlier experience of *deinos oiktos* contained a kernel of truth regarding what he deeply values and is worth salvaging. The fact that Philoctetes can be cured and does not, strictly speaking, deserve pity does not cancel out Neoptolemus' emotional experience and its real consequences. It takes the appearance of Heracles as *deus ex machina* to secure the final turn of the plot, namely that Philoctetes and Neoptolemus will return to Troy and, after Philoctetes' is healed, the two of them, like two lions, will take the city.

The end of the play raises a number of questions about the efficacy of human communication. With regard to pity in particular, the question is whether Heracles' intervention demands a reassessment of the content and effects of pity. In other words, does the end of the play show pity to be essentially inconsequential or even misleading? In what follows I sum up the main aspects of choral and individual pity that I traced in the play and conclude with possible answers for these questions.

The juxtaposition between individual and collective expressions of pity, I have argued, brings out aspects of the psychology of pity and its role in motivating action. More specifically, at the heart of the *Philoctetes* is the question of what renders pity a motive for action and whether such a role is valuable and sustainable. The sailors of the chorus introduce and expand on the kind of evaluation that triggers pity. The terms in which they define desert can be seen as generalizable: it is Philoctetes' isolation from all human contact and deprivation of even the basic supplies of human life that render him an object worthy of pity.[39] Their lyrics indicate their imaginative ability to expand their perspective and sympathize with Philoctetes' plight. Thus as participants in Odysseus' deception, they actively contribute this perspective which establishes the emotional tone of the play. Surprisingly, their commitment to the deception does not create any emotional or moral conflict in them. They are able to pity Philoctetes because he deserves it. They are also equally able to consider leaving Philoctetes behind without his bow without addressing how that would aggravate his pitiful state. They do not seem to see or be concerned with the contradiction that is inherent in these two stances. The play renders

38 On this uncomfortable reminder of Neoptolemus' lie, see Blundell (1988) 146: "Philoctetes remains unaware of the truth, but the audience is reminded that Odyssean corruption cannot so easily be erased, and may have more far-reaching consequences than any of the characters foresees". Blundell sees a similar undercurrent in Heracles' allusion to Neoptolemus' future violence and impiety.

39 See also Halliwell (2002) esp. 209–210 and Nussbaum (2008) 158–161.

the absence of such conflict poignant and invites us to ask what facilitates it. The answer seems to be twofold. The sailors' sense of duty supersedes their feelings of pity. They also do not develop a strong attachment to Philoctetes—as the *kommos* makes particularly clear. The latter condition only enhances the former. In the absence of *philia* with Philoctetes, their sense of duty renders their false prayers and (cruel) decisions effortless and free of moral struggle. In other words, their *oiktos* for Philoctetes fails to trigger a reevaluation of the *dolos* itself and, consequently, their own sense of duty and commitment to it. Thus even though initially vivid and moving, their experience of pity proves to be short-lived and ineffectual.

The chorus' emotional and ethical shortsightedness contrasts with Neoptolemus' struggle and change of heart, which are in accord with his Achillean *phusis*.[40] As the action progresses, the chorus' and Neoptolemus' pity develop in inverse proportion and intensity: the chorus starts by expressing and expanding on their pity and grows distant and silent. Neoptolemus initially appears emotionally disengaged and progressively reveals his growing and intense experience of *oiktos*. That both Neoptolemus and the chorus respond with pity to Philoctetes indicates that the encounter of suffering inevitably triggers some kind of sympathetic response. Neoptolemus' experience, however, dramatizes what is necessary to render pity more than just a recognition of suffering.[41] His interaction with Philoctetes shows pity to be an experience stemming from both an evaluation of desert and the development of intimacy. The former is based on a shared conception of justice, reverence, and duty. In Neoptolemus' case such conception relates to his Achillean *phusis*, which is inseparable from a commitment to honesty, directness, and justice in contrast to Odysseus' adaptability. *Philia* in turn develops from sharing these principles through intimate contact. Such contact in the play has its literal

40 See also Blundell (1989) 200–201: "In *Philoctetes* both the chorus and Odysseus fall short according to this standard [to elevate pity into an instrument of justice according to which failure to act on one's pity and hard-heartedness or lack of pity become reprehensible], the chorus by failing to live up to their feelings of pity, and Odysseus by failing to have any. Neoptolemus, by contrast, though he devotes fewer words to it than the chorus, both develops feelings of pity and is eventually willing to act on them. His compassion for Philoctetes is an essential catalyst both in the formation of his friendship with Philoctetes and in the development of his moral character".

41 Nussbaum (2008) does not consider the differences between choral and individual experiences of pity in the play but our readings share the interest in the role of pity in motivating action. For Nussbaum, "the play suggests that there is something about the sheer vividness of seeing another person's plight that powerfully contributes to forming emotions that motivate appropriate action" (162).

counterpart in Neoptolemus' offer to support Philoctetes physically during the attack of the disease, a gesture that contrasts sharply with the Achaeans' revulsion and inability to bear his presence. The intimacy between the two men is also emphasized through the visceral grip of Neoptolemus' emotional experience: Neoptolemus' *oiktos* is *deinos* like Philoctetes' *nosos*. The inextricability of *orgê* (as emotion) and *gnômê* that we saw in Thucydides takes an interesting expression here. Shared moral commitments lead to strong pity and attachment and, vice versa, the experience of deeply felt pity strengthens both such attachment and reinforces the commitments that sustain it. This complex of conditions renders pity conducive to trust and a sense of responsibility that leads to co-operation in order to eradicate suffering. It renders pity, in other words, powerful enough to motivate action.

The play's 'first' ending (Neoptolemus' agreement to take Philoctetes back home), however, points to the fact that a relationship built on pity still runs the risk of remaining isolated and isolating. In Aristide Tessitore's words, "even though Neoptolemus' refusal to renege of his promise is admirable from one point of view, it is equally true that it is in no one's best interest".[42] It takes Heracles' appearance, often called a 'second' ending, to accomplish the final resolution and reintegrate both Neoptolemus and Philoctetes in the heroic society of Troy. This second ending has been variously interpreted. The spectrum of approaches ranges from seeing in Heracles a persuasive friend that affirms the value of compassion and interpersonal trust and/or succeeds in reintegrating Philoctetes in heroic society to viewing his appearance as an ironic or highly problematic ending that reveals distrust in any type of reconciliation and the continuation of war in the political climate of 409 BCE.[43]

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42 Tessitore (2003) 82.

43 For a summary and discussion of interpretations of the *Philoctetes* as a whole, its double ending included, see Easterling (1978). I include here some representative approaches. Defining as the central issue of the *Philoctetes* "the problem of the volitional freedom of the individual in society" (171), Whitman (1951) suggests that Heracles does not bring any new information; rather he represents Philoctetes' internal change which reveals his arrival at a unique kind of consciousness. Bowra (1960) argues that Heracles brings calm and reason to Philoctetes' disordered mind, especially because he speaks with divine authority and, at the same time, comes as a friend that Philoctetes can trust. Winnington-Ingram (1980) too argues for a double role of Heracles as both a spokesman of Zeus and a persuasive friend and points out that Philoctetes' reintegration remains a difficult issue. Hawkins (1999) 357 argues that "read as ethical drama, the *Philoctetes* teaches us that we can err—sometimes in grievous ways—but that through compassion and loyalty to others we can come to terms with our errors, overcome them, be forgiven, and be restored to goodness. But tragedy makes us pitifully aware of the fragility both of the good life and of goodness itself". For readings that focus more on Athenian politics, see, e.g.,

I see in Heracles' appearance a positive, even if not unproblematic, ending. Pat Easterling seems right about what the audience most likely wants: reintegration and cure for Philoctetes, fulfillment according to his true *phusis* for Neoptolemus, and great heroic deeds performed by the two of them in true *philia* and co-operation.[44] Heracles secures this development while addressing Philoctetes both as a friend and with divine authority. At the end of a play in which language has consistently frustrated all attempts to discern the truth, Heracles introduces, as Charles Segal has argued, an absolute effectiveness of words: "Divinely sponsored *muthos* resolves the impasse in the social and moral order caused by faithless and deceitful *logos*." In order for this type of divine *muthos* to emerge, however, the strong friendship between the two human protagonists has first to develop. And the rest of society will, in turn, come to benefit from this friendship, which is built on integrity and compassion.[45] If one of the major issues of the play is, as I argue, the role of pity in

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Jameson (1956) 221 who suggests that "in applying the images of sickness and savagery to Philoctetes, [Sophocles] depicts neither the *polis* nor the political man but the individual at odds with such society. For the future the characterization of Philoctetes promises deep distrust of all schemes for reconciliation, return to war, and swift and glorious victory—in sum, a refusal to come to terms with the dominant mood of the Athens of this day". Jameson also proposes that Neoptolemus may recall young Pericles and the hope that he may be able to complete what his father did not live to accomplish (223). Jameson concludes that "Sophocles offers no practical solutions; he is not dramatizing a policy. His comments, in terms of morality and character, do not suggest that unity and victory will automatically result from an impotent Odysseus, a restored and respected Philoctetes, a reformed Neoptolemus, but these are necessary conditions" (224). Rehm (2002) argues that the Athenians would not celebrate the end of the play. "We might find in the ending of the play, where only a *coup de théâtre* can force Philoctetes to join in the sack of Troy, a reflection of the contemporary view that renewing the war with the Spartans would prove—at best—a glorious disaster" (155). Last, Calder III (1971) offers a unique interpretation by arguing that Neoptolemus deceives Philoctetes throughout the play and has no change of heart at any point. In Philoctetes, he sees Sophocles himself in 409 BCE offering an *apologia* for his political mistakes.

44 Easterling (1978) 36–38. Easterling suggests that "the prophecy can be seen to have more truth to tell than the value of φιλία: it also asserts the possibility of right action" (38). Blundell (1989) 223 adds a significant observation regarding the necessity of divine intervention: "Neoptolemus' agreement to take Philoctetes home, followed by the intervention of Heracles, is necessary to guarantee the purity of his motives". She argues that Heracles ratifies Neoptolemus' decision to do as Philoctetes asked and thus show his willingness to sacrifice self-interest, a sacrifice that is necessary "for it was he who sabotaged *philia* by stooping to deception" (225).

45 Segal (1981) 338–340 connects the issues raised in the play with the political atmosphere in 409 BCE and argues that the corruption of *logos* in the *Philoctetes* reflects a mistrust in the declining democracy.

action, Heracles' divine *muthos* points to the need for an authoritative frame of reference that renders the co-operative value of pity recognizable and worth upholding.

Heracles' *muthos* and his own friendship with Philoctetes then provide such necessary frame of reference that ensures Philoctetes' social reintegration and validates the work of pity. The fact that Lemnos is an uninhabited and isolated land on which Odysseus claims that shameful behavior can take place just for one day and be forgotten in the name of justice and piety for the rest of time further indicates the need for institutional structures that are collectively recognized and endorsed.[46] The operation of such structures can render pity conducive to action that is also communally endorsed and does not remain limited to narrow interpersonal support—as fundamental and cherished as such support may be. The chorus does not merely provide a collective foil to Neoptolemus' profound experience of pity. Their implication in the deception and their commitment to it renders their silence in the last part of the play a prominent absence. While Neoptolemus and Philoctetes are redefining the basis of their friendship, not only is there no sympathetic collective voice to be heard; there is no collective voice to be heard at all. The civic or just communal grounding that a choral voice tends to provide even in the case of marginal choruses is conspicuously absent. The play thus foregrounds both the value of active pity and the need to create the contextual and institutional parameters that contribute to its cultivation.[47]

Stephen Halliwell's discussion of pity helps us consider further this idea. In examining the psychology of pity, Halliwell turns to Neoptolemus' experience:

> Might it be that pity lends itself especially aptly to theatrical experiences, not only in strict relation to dramatic performances but also in the broader, but also etymological, sense of experiences in which we occupy

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46 See Odysseus' famous lines at the beginning of the play, when he urges Neoptolemus to participate in the deception: νῦν δ᾽ εἰς ἀναιδὲς ἡμέρας μέρος βραχὺ / δός μοι σεαυτόν, κᾆτα τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον / κέκλησο πάντων εὐσεβέστατος βροτῶν (Now give yourself to me for a few hours of shamelessness, and later for the rest of time be called the most dutiful of mortals, 83–85).

47 Some scholars see in Odysseus a representative of political organization or ideology that needs to be redefined or qualified. E.g., Nussbaum (1976–7) 39 sees his position as "a form of utilitarianism, a consequentialism that aimed at promoting the general welfare" but failed to give weight to considerations of personal integrity. Tessitore (2003) 72 views Odysseus as a representative of an extreme position that "there is no intelligible world beyond politics" and argues that at the end of the play we have a qualified vindication of Odysseus (85–88).

> an observer's or spectator's, rather than a participant's role—the role of an onlooker or witness rather than an agent?
>
> [W]e might think that the force of pity in *Philoctetes* overcomes Neoptolemus partly because he finds himself in a kind of agonized suspension between the roles of agent (in the first instance, as servant of Odysseus' plan and the army's needs) *and* observer (as witness of the harrowing suffering, both physical and mental, of his father's former friend). Pity works its way, as it were, into the space between these two psychological stances vis-à-vis the wounded abandoned hero.[48]

The choral enactment of pity supports Halliwell's suggestion. As we saw, the terminology of the play constructs the sailors as spectators of suffering at the same time that they are actively advancing the deception plot. They are able to retain a certain spectatorial distance and thus experience and theorize pity without feeling compelled to act on it. The play, I have suggested, makes the choral enactment of pity prominent in order to foreground the uses and limitations of such pity. On the one hand, aspects of the chorus' emotional perceptiveness seem to be commended as they provide the terms that are developed through Neoptolemus' experience. There is value in the choral articulation of pity. Being direct and explicit, it contributes to the expansion of Neoptolemus' sympathetic imagination and his openness to considering what Philoctetes deserves. The prominence of the choral enactment of pity in the first part of the play may even indicate that Neoptolemus' emotional receptivity is significantly shaped by his exposure to it. On the other hand, choral pity eventually proves to be circumscribed and inconsequential. Its juxtaposition with Neoptolemus' pity shows active pity instead to be far-reaching and weighty in terms of both psychological effect and action. The play then presents the transition from the spectator- to the agent-psychology of pity—the two psychological stances that Halliwell articulates—as desirable and valuable.

The *Philoctetes* is indeed "the pity play *par excellence*".[49] Intense undeserved suffering is shown to (tend to) trigger pity. It is, however, when pity is combined with shared ethical values and concerns as well as a strong affective relationship that it becomes a compelling motive for action. Since emotions inevitably

48 Halliwell (2002) 212. For a metatheatrical reading of the play that does not relate pity with taking action but discusses how Neoptolemus, Heracles, and especially Philoctetes himself offer paradigms of the workings of tragic empathy and the benefits of opening oneself up to tragic 'deception', see Falkner (1998).

49 Nussbaum (2008) 149.

factor into individual and collective decisions, the *Philoctetes* makes the case for the cultivation of pity as an emotional disposition that enhances attachment, develops trust, and leads to concerned and concerted action. The play shows the power of pity to help redefine significant relations both between individuals and between individuals and institutions of authority. Heracles' final warning about piety (1440–1444), at the same time, shows active pity to be a hard-won and worthy value that requires institutional support. In the heat of war and the glory of victory, Neoptolemus will fail to sustain the sense of justice and ability to show pity that he achieves in the *Philoctetes*. War exerts a corrupting force more powerful than Odysseus' instruction and renders the definition of friends and enemies easier but also morally problematic.

Institutional support, the play seems to suggest, can help reassess and maintain shared criteria of desert and justice in changing circumstances as well as strengthen attachments that are deemed significant. As in the case of the Mytilenean Debate in Thucydides, examined in Chapter 2, the cultivation of pity does not reflect a demand for pure altruism. The expansion of the sympathetic capacity reveals interests and concerns that are shared with affected others and thus the display of pity in action comes to serve both self and others. In the *Philoctetes*, Neoptolemus' pity results eventually in Philoctetes' cure, Neoptolemus' glory, and victory at the Trojan war. Thus active pity is shown to be both humane and expedient in the long run because of its contribution to achieving (and integrating) individual and collective goals. With active pity we can move from recognizing undeserved suffering to promoting what is deserved within a frame that is accepted by all—here through the Heraclean *muthos*. For this reason, "pity is needed to prompt the creation of good institutions and, once they have been created, to sustain them".[50] The play does not provide any direct or easy answers regarding how to create and maintain such institutions.[51] Perceptive and well-aimed at the beginning but eventually unfeeling and ineffective, the choral enactment of pity emphasizes this need, especially since the sailors offer the only collective perspective available in the play.

50 Nussbaum (2008) 167. Applying the suggestions of the play to our times, Nussbaum argues that one of the greatest moral problems today is how to generalize pity. As a solution, she proposes the building of global institutions.

51 This is probably because of the political climate in 409, with the Sicilian expedition and the oligarchic coup being very recent. See, e.g., Segal (1981) and Rehm (2002), also mentioned above.

3 Euripides, *Bacchae*

With Euripides we return to fear and to questions regarding its institutionalization that were also central, as we saw in Chapter 3, especially in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and *Supplices*. The *Bacchae* complicates the notion of fear itself and the process of rationalizing or sublimating fear for its incorporation into the institutions of the polis. As is well known, the fact that Euripides brings on stage the patron god of drama, wine, and ecstatic ritual, while following the so-called Aeschylean dramatic model, has inspired wide-ranging interpretations that include broader anthropological readings, ritualist, psychological, metatheatrical, and historical or historicist approaches, among others.[52] My analysis focuses on the construction of fear in the play. In the *Bacchae* fear is part of the notion of Dionysiac *deinon* that encompasses awe and terror. A thorough examination of Dionysiac *deinon*, however, is beyond the scope of my goals. I am interested in the elements brought out by its enactment by the chorus, namely what such enactment reveals about the content of Dionysiac fear and how political structures can make use of this fear for collective wellbeing. In the process of exploring these questions, it will also become apparent that the chorus provides the ideal medium for an expansion of the imagination that makes comprehending—and endorsing—Dionysiac *deinon* possible.

The question, subsequently, is: which chorus? Dionysus, as he declares in the prologue, manifests his divinity by means of setting everyone and everything to dance. After setting things in Asia a-dance (τἀκεῖ χορεύσας, 21), he has arrived in Thebes to do the same. The dramatic chorus in the orchestra

52 Mastronarde (2010) 151–152, however, believes that the role of the chorus fits the tendencies of late Euripides. Regarding the many and various interpretations of the play, a few representatives can be listed here. E.g., anthropological approach: Girard (1977) 119–142, Vernant (1988c); psychological approach: Devereux (1970) 35–48, Segal (1978a) and (1978b), Wohl (2005); metatheatrical approach: Foley (1980) and (1985) 205–98, Goldhill (1986) ch. 10–11, Segal (1997a) 215–271, Barrett (1998); historical approach: Atkinson (2002). There are of course overlapping elements in these readings. These broad categorizations also omit other influential work on the *Bacchae*. For instance, see: Henrichs (1978) and (1982), Rosenmeyer (1983), Seaford (1981) and (1994) ch. 7–10, Seidensticker (1979), and Zeitlin (1982), on aspects and issues of Dionysiac ritual; Winnington-Ingram (1969a), on emotion, understanding, and insight in the play as a response to Verrall's (1910) reading of the *Bacchae* as a Euripidean rationalistic account of miraculous events (for his discussion of Verrall's approach, see esp. 1–13 and 180–185); Rehm (2002) 200–214, on the dimension of space (actual, bodily, imagined, evoked) and its meaning. For the most recent approach to theatrical space and tragic performance in Athens and the use of the *Bacchae* as a case study, see Powers (2014).

is a group of female Lydian followers of Dionysus. Even though no character in the play expresses fear at encountering the Lydian women, they act as an agent of fear throughout the play mainly because of two of their characteristics. First, they function as Dionysus' representatives on stage. Addressing them as his "companions in rest and march" (παρέδρους καὶ ξυνεμπόρους, 57) and acting as their *chorêgos*, the Stranger invites them to raise their tambourines "so that the polis of Cadmus may see" (ὡς ὁρᾷ Κάδμου πόλις, 61).[53] In his mission to 'show' himself, Dionysus introduces the Lydian women as agents of his divine manifestation. Since his divine manifestation will foreground his terrifying attributes, the Lydian women themselves communicate aspects of Dionysiac *deinon*. Second, the Lydian chorus is doubled by a chorus that Dionysus leads offstage, that of Theban maenads. This doubling has not gone unnoticed. In Winnington-Ingram's words, "the Theban Bacchanals act, the Asiatic Bacchanals explain how it is that they come so to act. Both reveal the nature of Dionysus and his religion—and the revelations are complementary and mutually consistent".[54] Dionysus forces the women of Thebes through madness to perform his rituals so that, as in the case of the onstage chorus, the city may "learn completely" (ἐκμαθεῖν, 39) his divine nature. After he invites his *thiasos*, the chorus of Lydian maenads, on stage, he leaves to join the other chorus(es) on the mountain: ἐγὼ δὲ βάκχαις, ἐς Κιθαιρῶνος πτυχὰς / ἐλθὼν ἵν' εἰσί, συμμετασχήσω χορῶν (but I will go to the folds of Mt. Cithairon, where the bacchants are, and join in their dances, 62–63). The chorus on Cithairon—not a dramatic chorus, technically speaking—is literally active. Choral performance on stage mirrors the performance on the mountain in various ways. The Lydian chorus replays or preplays the acts of Dionysus and his converts or participates indirectly in them.[55] Given Dionysus' nature, this doubling can be neither straightforward nor unproblematic. But the similarities and tensions that it brings out indicate the shared function of the two choruses, namely the revelation of Dionysus' divinity, and renders them co-agents of Dionysiac *deinon*. In my analysis, I use the term 'chorus' for both groups.

The Dionysiac *deinon* that the choruses convey is part of the *deinon* discourse and performance of Dionysus himself. For this reason, Dionysus' own language of his terrifying/awesome side will provide the context of my discussion of the choruses as agents of fear. The conflict between the god/Stranger and Pentheus, the king of Thebes, develops as an opposition between two

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53 I use Diggle's (1994a) text and Seaford's (1996a) translation unless otherwise stated.

54 Winnington-Ingram (1969a) 155.

55 See Foley (1980) 112 and 125. In the act of replaying or preplaying, however, Foley sees the Lydian chorus functioning as one of the multiple audiences within the play.

types of fear: fear of the divine that encompasses elements that resist common rational explication; and fear of the tyrant as a figure of authority who vehemently resists such irrationality and its political implications. The leader of Thebes opposes Dionysus as he sees in maenadism a threat to the good sense and morality of the female population. The issue of good sense (σοφία and σωφροσύνη) figures prominently in the conflict between Pentheus and Dionysus: Pentheus views good sense as rigidly defined and circumscribed in terms of both its reasoning and its politics. To undermine such perception, Dionysus makes clear that it is precisely good sense that the king lacks, and enforces Dionysiac madness on him. Lack of good sense results in imposed Dionysiac madness by means of a convenient semantic slip that underscores the nature of the fear that Dionysus brings to Thebes. "Pentheus fails not only to see and interpret symbols, but he remains unaware or fatally resistant to the fact that linguistic signs can refer to more than one valid level of meaning at once. Unlike Dionysus (or the audience) he has no sense of irony or metaphor."[56] While Pentheus sees in the madness of maenadism a literal threat to good sense and corruption of morality, Dionysus and his choruses prove that 'turning mad'—consciously accepting and performing maenadism—in fact requires and reaffirms good sense.[57]

Dionysus' affliction of the women of Thebes and his decision to establish his divinity through maenadic practice, the king's resistance to the possibility of virtuous maenadism, and the correlation between good sense and Dionysiac madness which pervades the play all suggest, I argue, that Dionysus brings to Thebes a counterpolitical element which he insists on, and eventually

56 Foley (1980) 124.

57 There is significant overlap between the meaning of *sophia* and that of *sôphrosunê* in the play; they both signify 'good sense', which is primarily expressed in respecting the gods and thinking mortal thoughts. Different forms of the terms *sôphrosunê* and *sôphroneô* appear 12 times (314, [316], 318, 329, 504, 641, 686, 940, 1002, 1150, 1341) while forms of *sophos* and *sophia* appear 22 times (179, 186, [203], 266, 395, 427, 480, 641, 655, 656, 824, 839, 877=897, 1005, 1151, 1190). The two terms are explicitly connected in 641 and 1150–1151. In the case of *sophia*-related terms, there is a difference between *to sophon* and *sophia* (see esp. 395). The former refers to cleverness expressed in speech—often sophistic-like speech—which neither stems from nor reflects real understanding. The latter, on the other hand, seems to entail true wisdom, the attribute of the man who, being *sophos* and *sôphrôn*, shows good sense through his reverence for the gods and his understanding of human limitations. At the same time, the competing definitions of *sophia* and *sôphrosunê* offered by the different characters in the play and communicated through highly sophisticated and/or sophistic language point to the difficulty in both defining and acquiring 'good sense'.

succeeds in, incorporating into the city. The victory of Dionysiac *deinon* through two different maenadic groups suggests that a major concern in the play is the place and necessity of the extraordinary and the counterpolitical in the political structure of the state. The extraordinary is literally what is outside the ordinary because possibilities for its practice have yet to be entertained. Similarly, by counterpolitical I do not refer to wholesale opposition to political order and structure. Rather I define it as an alternative conception of the political, which emphasizes a kind of perceptive sensibility that does not neatly map onto established ways of thinking and acting. As such, it opposes the tendency of political behaviors to become entrenched and invites consistent questioning and reconsideration of what the polis collectively values.[58] Inherent in this notion is openness to alternative conceptions and practice of order (or *eukosmia*) within and for the polis.[59] Such openness requires a different type of trust that, in this play, is cultivated within the chorus and through choral activity. My reading of Dionysus' language of *to deinon* and the related choral discourse will propose that the two choruses inspire fear of this element. I will first discuss the terms in which the opposition between god and king is constructed. Then I will turn to the function of the double chorus as agents of Dionysiac *deinon* in the context of this opposition.

In his pursuit of the maenads and the Stranger, Pentheus moves through a transformation from a tyrannical figure who aims to inspire fear to an instrument of Dionysiac terror. Even though only twice is he explicitly associated with tyranny, he embodies characteristics that scholars have identified as tyrannical.[60] Opposing interpretations that see in Pentheus a martyr of enlightenment, Dodds argues that Euripides invests him "with the traits of a typical tragedy-tyrant: absence of self-control; willingness to believe

58 I thank Helene Foley for her comments on an earlier version of the chapter and for pointing out the caution necessary when discussing the politics of the Dionysiac. For lack of a better term, I use 'counterpolitical' in the particular sense defined above. My analysis and concluding thoughts on the play will further clarify this notion.

59 Schlesier (1993) 89–114 does not connect maenadism with a counterpolitical element but sees Bacchic madness as a puzzling thing that is related to the mask and the fact that tragedy presents "two (or even more) truths that are simultaneously operative and equally valid" (96).

60 According to Dionysus, Cadmus handed over to Pentheus γέρας τε καὶ τυραννίδα (the prerogatives of tyranny, 43), while the Lydian chorus-women express their fear in speaking freely in front of the tyrant: ταρβῶ μὲν εἰπεῖν τοὺς λόγους ἐλευθέρους / πρὸς τὸν τύραννον (775–6).

the worst on hearsay evidence or none; brutality towards the helpless; and a stupid reliance on physical force as a means of settling spiritual problems".[61] More recently, Seaford identified three consistent characteristics in tyrannical figures in a variety of texts including Herodotus, tragedy, and Plato: impiety, distrust of one's closest associates (φίλοι), and greed—especially as control over money—all used as instruments for tyrannical power.[62] In addition to these attributes, Pentheus' behavior toward women, his self-righteousness, and his autarchic rule resemble Creon's conduct in Sophocles' *Antigone*.[63] In the *Bacchae* too, Pentheus strives to enforce his laws and what he conceives of as political order with a series of threats through which he aims to present himself as a fearsome ruler.[64]

Pentheus' behavior regarding the new religion, however, is not thoroughly unjustifiable. In Athens at least, a formal process decided the acceptance of new gods and their cults.[65] The Athenian audience would have understood Pentheus' skepticism about the new deity and his hesitation to establish

61 Dodds (1960b) xliii with additional bibliographical references in n.2. Diller (1955) agrees with Dodds' characterization of Pentheus.

62 Seaford (2003) 102.

63 Euben (1990) 142–143 offers an extensive treatment of the tyrannical temperament that Pentheus and Creon share. Other readings of Creon as a tyrannical figure that help us see the similarities with Pentheus include Knox (1964) 108 who suggests that, even though Creon initially speaks as the representative of the polis, he turns into an outright tyrant because of the opposition he has to face, and Griffith (1999) 33 who suggests that "Creon's 'tyrannical conduct' contributes directly to his downfall" and identifies his tyrannical traits as: "his identification of the 'city' with himself; his obsession with his own authority; his harsh and high-handed threats; his unreasonable suspicion of others".

64 Pentheus threatens with punishment Teiresias, the Stranger and his followers, and, indirectly, the Theban maenads. The messenger admits that he fears his reaction (τὸ γὰρ τάχος σου τῶν φρενῶν δέδοικ', ἄναξ: for I fear the speed of your mind, king, 670–1); the women of the chorus fear the imprisonment he threatens them with like hunted animals (φοβερὰν θήραν, see 862–876) and rejoice when they are free from such fear (οὐκέτι γὰρ δεσμῶν ὑπὸ φόβῳ πτήσσω: for no longer do I cower under fear of chains, 1035). Last, during his lamentation for the dismembered king, Cadmus himself calls him the terror of the city (πόλει τάρβος, 1310).

65 See Garland (1992) 19–22: "According to the available evidence from c. 460 onwards the introduction of new gods lay chiefly in the hands of the Boule and the Demos, which alone had the right to recommend and implement religious change; the Boule, after a petition for the establishment of a new cult, would set its claims to vote at the Ecclesia. Between recommendation and implementation there could be consultation with an oracle".

maenadism in the city.[66] It is his insistence to maintain his limited perspective and the blind confidence in his power that develop into expressions of transgression. When Pentheus first encounters the Stranger, the two of them articulate their conflict in terms of the different types of fear they represent. Already mocking Pentheus' self-confidence and reliance in his mortal power, the Stranger asks him what kind of *deinon* he, the king, will inflict on him (492). When Pentheus responds by enumerating a series of punishments including fettering, the Stranger warns him: αὐδῶ δὲ μή δεῖν, σωφρονῶν οὐ σώφροσιν (I, who have sense, tell you, who have no sense, not to bind me, 504). What Dionysus presents as a conflict between good sense and lack thereof, Pentheus counter-presents in terms of political power: ἐγὼ δὲ δεῖν γε, κυριώτερος σέθεν (and I, who have more authority than you, say to bind you, 505). This becomes the starting point for Dionysus' performance of *deina*: Pentheus attempts to fetter the Stranger but he finds himself binding a bull. Soon after, as the Stranger reports, Bacchus shakes the palace and makes fire blaze up on Semele's tomb, sends a *phasma* for Pentheus to pursue, and razes his palace to the ground (616–633). Under the impression that the Stranger has escaped, Pentheus exclaims that he has suffered "terrible sufferings" (πέπονθα δεινά, 642), only soon to find out that other *deina* have been taking place at the same time on Cithairon. The messenger arrives to announce: "I have come wanting to tell you, my lord, and the polis that they are doing things strange (δεινά) and greater than wonders (θαυμάτων τε κρείσσονα)" (666–667). The king attributes the wrong meaning to *deinos*. The messenger refers to unprecedented and awe-inspiring deeds but Pentheus understands 'terrible' and expects 'perverse'. The messenger, moreover, juxtaposes the wonder of the deeds he has come to report with the fear of Pentheus' expected angry reaction and asks permission to speak freely: "for I fear (δέδοικ') the speed of your mind, king" (670).

The conflict between Stranger and king develops as an opposition between two types of fear and foregrounds the double meaning of the term *deinos*. Pentheus refuses to recognize the wondrous aspect of Dionysus' and his followers' deeds and insists on interpreting the *deinon* of Dionysiac practice as terrible in the sense of unbearable and inappropriate. The animal *sparagmos* which the Theban maenads practice and the war they wage hint at the latent meaning of Dionysiac *deinon*. Pentheus' inability to interpret the miracles in his palace (616–637) and the events that the messenger reports to him (677–774) points to his lack of good sense, which cannot be seen independently from his autarchic political perspective. "His imagination is limited by his own

66 Atkinson (2002) 11.

lack of self-knowledge, and the frame of the cultural order in which he exists".[67] His adherence to this cultural and political order that he continues to see as empowering does not allow for any genuine expansion of his imagination and his ability to assess new and unfamiliar situations. He acts as a *theomachos* even when he receives various signs of Dionysus' divinity.[68] Since his perspective does not allow him to perceive the complexity of Dionysiac *deinon*, the god will force him to encounter the side of his *deinon* that is genuinely terrible and terrifying.

The double chorus conveys the double meaning of Dionysiac *deinon*. With his report (677–774), the first messenger rounds off the part of the play in which the two choruses emphasize the wondrous aspects of Dionysiac *deinon*. The Theban maenads perform acts that the Lydian Bacchae praised in the parodos. The *thiasoi* of the female choruses on the mountain (680) are presented as a wonder of good order (θαῦμ᾽ἰδεῖν εὐκοσμίας, 693). They wake up from a peaceful sleep, fix their maenadic attire, breast-feed wild animals, make the rocks flow with water and the ground flow with wine and milk, and dance and sing in honor of Bromius in an orderly fashion.[69] This first narrative of actual maenadic practice also includes the first instantiation of the violence that the maenads are capable of. When the Theban women become aware of their spies, they start a war with their *thyrsoi* (733): they tear animals apart, attack towns and snatch children from their mothers, and with bare hands put armed men to flight (734–764). This war is their reaction to the messenger and his companions who decide to hunt them down at the instigation of someone who is a slick speaker (τρίβων λόγων)—and such speaking is an instantiation of *to sophon*—and wishes to win favor with the king (714–723).

The punishment of the intruders is a first enactment on the mountain of the potential punishment that the dramatic chorus has already sung about in their first stasimon. Having listed the domains of Dionysus against whom Pentheus commits hubris (371–385), they sing:

67 Foley (1980) 122.

68 Pentheus opposes divinity *per se* as different characters point out (45, 1255). For the punishment of θεομάχοι, see Mikalson (1991) 177–178 who argues that in literature they are always punished. In the one real case we know of, the offender, the Melian poet Diagoras who scoffed at the Eleusinian Mysteries of Demeter and attempted to turn people away from them, was indeed condemned to death but managed to flee the city before the sentence was carried out.

69 For the parallelism with the parodos, see esp. 135–167.

ἀχαλίνων στομάτων
ἀνόμου τ' ἀφροσύνας
τὸ τέλος δυστυχία·
ὁ δὲ τᾶς ἡσυχίας
βίοτος καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν
ἀσάλευτόν τε μένει καὶ
ξυνέχει δώματα· πόρσω
γὰρ ὅμως αἰθέρα ναίον-
τες ὁρῶσιν τὰ βροτῶν οὐρανίδαι.

τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία,
τό τε μὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν
βραχὺς αἰών· ἐπὶ τούτῳ
δὲ τίς ἂν μεγάλα διώκων
τὰ παρόντ' οὐχὶ φέροι; μαι-
νομένων οἵδε τρόποι καὶ
κακοβούλων παρ' ἔμοιγε φωτῶν.

> Of unbridled mouths and lawless folly the end-result is misfortune; whereas the calm life and good sense remain untossed (by storms) and hold together households: for even though they dwell far away in the air of heaven the heavenly ones see the affairs of mortals. Cleverness is not wisdom, and to think non-mortal thoughts means a short life. Given that, who would by pursuing great things not obtain (i.e. lose) what is available? These are the ways of men who are, in my view, mad and of bad counsel. (386–401)

The Lydian women perform the first stasimon as a response to Pentheus' rejection of maenadism, his quarrel with Teiresias, and his decision to put the Stranger to death (esp. 343–357). The unbridled mouths, lawless folly, and the ways of madmen who are of bad counsel, all describe Pentheus' hubristic conduct (ὕβριν, 375) and express the chorus' longing for his punishment. These generalizing statements also articulate the rationale and moral code that justify the Theban maenads' attack against Pentheus' men. The Theban *thiasoi* on the mountain act out the beliefs of the willing onstage devotees of Dionysus. At the same time, the messenger's description of maenadic practice seen against the background of the first stasimon points to the type of *to deinon* that the two choruses represent and inspire: calm life, *sophia*, and thinking mortal thoughts constitute the opposite of *anomos aphrosunê* (387) according to the dramatic chorus. These statements, as most commentators note, have the

ring of conventional wisdom. Such conventional thinking follows a stanza that lists the activities of the province of Dionysus: fair-crowned festivities, laughter at the pipe, wine drinking that gives an end to anxiety at gatherings shared with the gods but also participation in the dances of the *thiasos* (θιασεύειν τὲ χοροῖς) with all the supernatural or inscrutable elements that they include (375–385). The messenger later confirms the presence of calmness, serenity, and especially order and peace within the world of the *thiasos*. The Theban maenads are a spectacle that is wondrous and pleasurable to watch (θαῦμ᾽ἰδεῖν εὐκοσμίας, 693) because of their orderliness, even as they occupy themselves with astounding practices. The combination of the ecstatic and the quietist that inspires awe in their witnesses creates a tension that defies rationalization in familiar conceptual, social, or political terms. As soon as one accepts the unconventional frame of belief and practice, conventional wisdom can make sense within it. But it is the premise that is, clearly and vehemently, contested in the conflict between the tyrant and the god. This may be the reason why the dance in the *thiasos* is juxtaposed with the more easily accepted or comprehensible practices such as wine-drinking that are not a subject of contestation in the play. Accepted and celebrated as they are, other Dionysiac practices point to the need for approaching maenadism through more imaginative analogies.[70]

The chorus also equates the state of *mania* or madness (μαινομένων) with bad/evil counsel (κακοβούλων) (399–401). In this case, *mainomenôn* refers to lack of *sophia* and not to maenadic practice. But the choice of the term points to the fact that the new system of belief manipulates meaning in a way that requires a re-conceptualization of *nomos, euphrosunê, sophia*, and the 'bridling' of mouths and thoughts, namely a renewed or expanded approach to old values. Conventional as it may sound, the law that the maenads evoke at this stage does not stand for the laws of the polis.[71] Their attachment to a god

70 For a different approach that sees a sharp distinction between the Theban maenads and the Lydian chorus as sustained throughout the play and reflected in the Lydian women's dancing on stage, see Powers (2014) 56–63. Looking at the notion of *sôphrosunê* in order to reconstruct what choral performance would have looked like, she suggests that, through an ironic twist, the only way to embody *sôphrosunê* in the play is to perform gestures that are not typically characterized as *sôphron*, that is, to perform voluntarily for Dionysus. Consequently, the Theban maenads are to be perceived as frenzied and violent while the Lydian chorus is never violent (even if vengeful) and its movements would reflect the calm of *sôphrosunê*.

71 Arthur (1972) 152 on the other hand sees the chorus as "the representatives of a bourgeois morality peculiar to and necessary for civilized life as the Greeks knew it" and as it developed with the rise of the polis and of Greek democracy. In her reading, this stasimon dramatizes "a complex integration of the notion of a tempered, Athenian Dionysus with

who loves Peace (φιλεῖ Εἰρήναν, 419–420) but also hates (μισεῖ) the immoderate man (424ff.), and their association with the extraordinary power of their fellow-*thiasos* renders them a wondrous and potentially terrifying group as the representatives of an awesome and potentially terrifying god. Their statement at the end of the stasimon "whatever the mass, the ordinary people, have taken as normal, and practice it, this I would accept" (430–431) only emphasizes the tension. Everyone would embrace their sentiment—probably Pentheus included. But Dionysiac dancing—in theory and in practice—instantiates love of peace and moderation in ways that are difficult to fathom.[72]

After the messenger recognizes Dionysus' divinity in maenadic practice (769–770) and implicitly undermines the king's judgment and authority, Pentheus' insistent threats to wage war against Dionysus and his followers decide the terms of the final conflict.[73] The Stranger begins to convince Pentheus to dress up as a maenad, asks Dionysus to inflict *lyssa* on Pentheus (851), and announces: γνώσεται δὲ τὸν Διὸς / Διόνυσον, ὡς πέφυκεν ἐν μέρει θεὸς / δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος (and he will learn that Dionysus, the son of Zeus, is by turn a most terrible and a most gentle god to mortals, 859–861).[74] By revealing his most terrifying side, Dionysus will respond to the fear that

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the moral foundations of political stability" (154–155). My approach departs from Arthur's in the ways in which I see the chorus as integrated in the action, a type of integration that results in meaningful tensions within the play. Arthur's emphasis is on "ideas and themes developed by the chorus which are independent of, although not unrelated to, the dramatic action of the play" (146). Despite this difference, however, both our conclusions turn to what the incorporation of the Dionysiac element means for the polis itself. In Arthur, see esp. 148 and 169–170.

72 Segal (1997) 70 sees the utterances of gnomic wisdom as related to the conventional role of the tragic chorus while the parodos conveys the women's particular role within the play as a chorus of Dionysiac cult. In its latter role, according to Segal, "this chorus has an allegiance neither to city nor to family".

73 The messenger suggests: τὸν δαίμον' οὖν τόνδ', ὅστις ἔστ', ὦ δέσποτα, / δέχου πόλει τῇδ' (and so receive this god, whoever he is, into this city, 769–770). When he earlier describes how the maenads injured and put the men to flight, he mentions that they accomplished these deeds οὐκ ἄνευ θεῶν τινος (not without some god, 764).

74 The reading ἐν μέρει (860) is proposed by Diggle to replace ἐν τέλει that we find in manuscript T. Dodds preserves ἐν τέλει, discusses alternative proposed readings, and suggests that ἐντελής would be the simplest and best emendation. Seaford (1996a) 217 argues that the reading of the manuscript makes perfect sense: τέλος refers to mystic initiation, while "the word-order, together with the δὲ in 861, implies a strong antithesis between ἐν τέλει and 'humankind' (ἀνθρώποισι)". I follow Diggle's suggestion (1994b) 469 that ἐν μέρει here means "by turn" and implies indefinite repetition. Δεινότατος and ἠπιώτατος express the two sides that Dionysus manifests to mortals.

the king has attempted to inspire with his threats. More specifically, he will ridicule Pentheus by leading him through the town disguised as a woman ἐκ τῶν ἀπειλῶν τῶν πρὶν αἷσι δεινὸς ἦν (because of/ after the threats with which he was terrifying, 856).[75] From the moment that the Stranger announces that the two sides of Dionysus become manifest in turn, *deinos* ceases to have ambiguous meaning. It rather signifies the terror of the encounter with Dionysus as one's enemy. The agents of this terror will be, first, the Stranger/god himself and, subsequently and most prominently, the two choruses of maenads: the dramatic chorus will offer the rationale for Pentheus' killing and the Theban chorus will enact it.

In the stasimon that follows, the Lydian Bacchae explicate, support, and identify with Dionysus' most terrifying qualities in their praise of revenge upon one's enemies. The closer we get to Dionysus' triumph over Pentheus, the more the Lydian women rationalize the necessity for such triumph, acting as its agents in the only way available to them; deprived of their Bacchic rituals, they provide the rationale of Dionysiac *deinon*. They venerate revenge and connect divine vengeance with law and justice. More specifically, in their refrain, they view the defeat of enemies as a divinely granted gift that is *kalon*. I follow Cropp's suggestion, which omits punctuation after *sophon* and keeps the rest of the text as found in Diggle's edition.[76] Cropp paraphrases: "What is wisdom, or (to ask an equivalent or related question) what finer god-granted privilege is there amongst men than to hold one's hand in triumph over the head of one's enemies? Whatever is fine is dear/welcome (and so this privilege is to be highly valued)".[77] By endorsing Dionysus' decision to make Pentheus familiar with his most terrifying attributes as part of the general concept of just revenge, the Lydian Bacchae perform a strikingly inhumane joy at Pentheus' upcoming death at the hands of his mother (857–859). They also seem to suggest that (societal) laws about respecting the gods derive from and eventually verify natural laws.

75 My translation.

76 The text reads: † τί τὸ σοφὸν ἢ τί τὸ κάλλιον † / παρὰ θεῶν γέρας ἐν βροτοῖς / ἢ χεῖρ' ὑπὲρ κορυφᾶς / τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρείσσω κατέχειν; / ὅτι καλὸν φίλον αἰεί (877–881, 897–901).

77 Cropp (1981) 40. For different suggestions and discussion of other readings of the refrain see Dodds (1960b) 186–188 and Winnington-Ingram (1966) 34–37. Seaford (1996a) 217 suggests that instead of praising revenge, the refrain alludes to "the permanent happiness of mystic initiation as preferable to temporary power over enemies". According to this reading, the meaning of the refrain rests in the fact that the successful hunt for Pentheus will result in the liberation of the *thiasos*.

οὐ / γὰρ κρεῖσσόν ποτε τῶν νόμων
γιγνώσκειν χρὴ καὶ μελετᾶν.
κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νομί-
ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν,
ὅτι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιμόνιον,
τό τ' ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ νόμιμον
ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός.

For never should one think and act above the laws. For it is light expense to believe that these things have power, whatever it is that is divine and what over a long period exists as lawful always by nature. (890–6)

They frame these ideas on the one hand with a wish to perform their dances away from men (862–876) and on the other with a praise in mystic language of prosperous and untroubled life (902–912).[78] The individual ideas in this song reflect traditional beliefs: the customary law of helping one's friends and harming one's enemies, the idea that divine justice comes slowly but surely or even stealthily, the expression of humility at the nature of the divine.[79] But by emphasizing the idea of harming one's enemies in terms of revenge—they make this the refrain of their song—and by combining their more humane utterances with the belief that law is based on nature and with the desire for a quiet life in the wilderness, the chorus invests maenadism with a system of beliefs which resists political structure.[80] The identity of the chorus may render this attitude expected. This identity, however, is a dramatic choice and

78 Dodds (1960b) 190 points out the 'liturgical ring' of the language in 902–905 and suggests that in 910–911 we see an expression of the so-called hedonism of the *Bacchae*. Seaford (1996a) 221 identifies the language of mystic *makarismos* in particular.

79 See Dodds (1960b) 186–189 and Seaford (1996a) 220–221.

80 Dodds (1960b) 190 translates 895–896 as "And to consider what has been accepted through long ages (to be) an eternal truth and grounded in nature" and suggests: "If this is right, the Chorus anticipate in principle Plato's solution of the *nomos-phusis* antinomy, viz. that when the two terms are properly understood *nomos* is seen to be founded upon *phusis*". As Guthrie points out, *nomos* and *phusis* are catch-words of Greek thought in both the fifth and fourth centuries. For an overview of the debate and its representatives, see Guthrie (1969) 3.55–134. If the chorus members indeed anticipate the Platonic idea that *nomos* reflects and is based upon *phusis* (governed itself by wise principles and moral laws), they do so by identifying *to daimonion* with *to nomimon*. Since Thebes does not accept these two in the divinity of Dionysus (see also 530–537), the Lydian women seem to oppose political structure itself. But their very conception of it is defined through their experience of Pentheus' rule.

emphasizes that the Lydian Bacchae do not merely express beliefs familiar to their audience; as proponents of a divine *sthenos* (883–884) that is reliable even if slow and stealthy, they represent an element that, like divinity itself, resists thorough comprehension and rationalization. The *deinon* they evoke derives, to a great extent, from this characteristic of theirs and becomes most prominent in the next stasimon.

Interestingly, the *deinos* language marks out the last onstage exchange between Pentheus and the Stranger. During the robing scene, Dionysus begins to reveal his terrible side, all the more unsettling since only the chorus and the audience and not Pentheus himself can perceive it as such. The Stranger mocks the king's perception of himself: δεινὸς σὺ δεινὸς κἀπὶ δείν' ἔρχῃ πάθη, / ὥστ' οὐρανῷ στηρίζον εὑρήσεις κλέος (*deinos* you are, *deinos*, and you are going to *deina* sufferings, with the result that you will find glory towering to heaven, 971–972). Pentheus sees himself as *deinos*, hoping to inspire fear and admiration in the city of Thebes for his undertaking. He wants to be seen as awe-inspiring as well as terrifying in his power to encounter the maenads. In reality he is *deinos* only in so far as he will soon become the instrument for the manifestation of Dionysus, the *deinotatos* god, at the hands of his maenads. As Dionysus states explicitly, the god will be the winner in the contest which will soon begin (974–976). And the Lydian maenads purport to initiate this contest with their response.

The stasimon that follows introduces for the first time excited dochmiacs and epitomizes the doubling of the two choruses as agents of Dionysiac *deinon*. Choral excitement on stage overlaps with intense Bacchic action on the mountain. The Lydian Bacchae call upon the hounds of Lyssa to urge the Theban maenads to the punishment of Pentheus:

> ἴτε θοαὶ Λύσσας κύνες, ἴτ' εἰς ὄρος,
> θίασον ἔνθ' ἔχουσι Κάδμου κόραι·
> ἀνοιστρήσατέ νιν
> ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν γυναικομίμῳ στολᾷ
> λυσσώδη κατάσκοπον μαινάδων.
>
> Go, rushing hounds of Frenzy, go to the mountain, where the daughters of Cadmus have their *thiasos*; goad them to madness against the man dressed up as a woman, the frenzied spy on the maenads. (977–981)

They envision the maenads on the mountain (982–984) and ventriloquize Agave's address to the rest of the Theban women (985–990). They sing and dance as if they can instigate the action of the maenads on Cithairon; and they

visualize the revenge they sang about in the previous stasimon as a sword-bearing justice that cuts through Pentheus' throat:

> ἴτω δίκα φανερός, ἴτω
> ξιφηφόρος φονεύου-
> σα λαιμῶν διαμπὰξ
> τὸν ἄθεον ἄνομον ἄδικον Ἐχίονος
> γόνον γηγενῆ.
>
> Let Justice go manifest, let her go carrying a sword, slaughtering right through the throat the ungodly, unlawful, unjust earth-born offspring of Echion. (992–996, 1011–1016)

Despite the particularly corrupt text in the antistrophe (997–1010), the sword-bearing justice seems to be part of a broader conception of *dikê* that includes honoring the gods and leading a pure life night and day, a life that befits mortals.[81] As in the previous stasimon, a tension underlies the choral

81 Dodds' commentary on Murray's reading, Diggle, and Kovacs all offer different readings of the text in 1002–1007, which are representative of the suggestions a number of scholars have made. Dodds (1960b) 202–205 suggests: γνωμᾶν σωφρόν<ισμ>α θάνατος· ἀπροφασί- / στως <δ'> ἐς τὰ θεῶν ἔφυ / βροτείως τ' ἔχειν ἄλυπος βίος. / τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθονῶ· / χαίρω θηρεύουσα τὰ δ' ἕτερα μεγάλα / φανερὰ τ' ὄντ'· ἄ<γ>ει δ' ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ βίον, / ἦμαρ ἐς νύκτα τ' εὐ- / αγοῦντ' εὐσεβεῖν (for him death is a corrective of his purpose; but to accept without question in things that are of the gods, as befits mortality, is griefless life. The wise can have their wisdom, my joy is in pursuing these other aims, being high and plainly set—day long and through the night to be pure and reverent). Diggle (1994a) prints: †γνώμαν σώφρονα θάνατος ἀπροφάσιστος / εἰς τὰ θεῶν ἔφυ / βροτείω τ' ἔχειν ἄλυπος βίος. / τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθόνω χαίρω θηρεύου- / σα τὰ δ' ἕτερα μεγάλα φανερὰ τῶν ἀεὶ / ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ βίον† and in the apparatus criticus suggests for 1005: οὐ φθονῶ καιρῷ θηρεύουσι. Finally, Kovacs (2002) suggests: γνωμᾶν σωφρόνισμα θάνατος· ἀόκνως <δ'> / ἐς τὰ θεῶν ἔφυ / βροτείως τ' ἔχειν ἄλυπος βίος. / τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθονῶ καιρῷ θηρεύου- / σι· τὰ δ' ἕτερα μεγάλα †φανερὰ τῶν ἀεὶ† / ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ βίον/ ἦμαρ ἐς νύκτα τ' εὐ- / αγοῦντα εὐσεβεῖν (death will be the chastener of his purposes: <but> to be unhesitating toward the gods and act as mortal should means a life without grief. I feel no grudging resentment against those who pursue cleverness in due measure, but it is other qualities, great and manifest, that lead the life of mortals to success, to practice purity and godliness all the long day and into the night, honoring the gods and banishing all customs that lie outside justice). If we accept Diggle's reading of 1005, also adopted by Kovacs, there is no contradiction with the previous stasimon, where the chorus praises revenge as part of *to sophon*. Even though the precise meaning of *to sophon* and *sophia* is hard to define in the play, it seems that revenge is *sophon* in so far as it is necessary for one's just purpose, which agrees with the purpose of the divine precisely because it is just.

utterances. While common in Greek popular morality, when combined with the invitation of murderous revenge, these ideas reiterate a concept of justice very similar to that of Aeschylus' Erinyes before Athena incorporates them into the religious system of the democratic polis.[82] Pentheus' unjust judgment and unlawful rage—or emotional disposition—(ἀδίκῳ γνώμᾳ παρανόμῳ τ' ὀργᾷ, 997) incite him to use violence against the unconquerable (1001) and to perpetuate the customs which are beyond justice (τὰ δ' ἔξω νόμιμα δίκας) and which one has to cast aside (1009–1010). For this reason, the Lydian maenads call upon Bacchus to appear in his different forms—a bull, a snake, a lion—and make hunter Pentheus into the victim of the hunt: "Go, o Bacchus, beast, with laughing face throw around the hunter of bacchants the deadly noose as he falls under the herd of maenads" (1019–1022). The animal imagery foregrounds the terrifying force of the impending revenge. Since the Theban representative of law and justice misconceives and perverts both, a brutal form of justice and the deadly noose of Bacchus are to become the instruments of Dionysiac *deinon* in the hands of the Theban maenads and render Pentheus accountable for his violations.[83]

The onstage merging of the two choruses and the end of their doubling explicates further the nature of Dionysiac *deinon*. At the report of the *sparagmos* of Pentheus, the Lydian Bacchae rejoice (1031, 1034–1035) and sing a brief and cruel celebratory ode (1153–1164) before they receive Agave in a celebratory *kômos* (1165ff.). Finally free to sing and dance in honor of the Bacchic god (ἀναχορεύσωμεν Βάκχιον, 1153), they address the Theban Bacchae in their victory: βάκχαι Καδμεῖαι, / τὸν καλλίνικον κλεινὸν ἐξεπράξατε / ἐς γόον, ἐς δάκρυα (Cadmeian Bacchants, you have made your hymn of triumph, famous, into lamentation, into tears, 1160–2) and they call the killing of a child a

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The 'other aims' that the chorus members praise, namely purity and reverence, remain, however, the primary aims of the followers of Dionysus. It is in this sense that the chorus sang earlier that *to sophon* is not *sophia* (395): when it does not agree with divine wisdom, *to sophon* represents cleverness that proves to be false and devoid of true wisdom.

82 Arthur (1972) 167 suggests that by calling upon justice to inflict death on Pentheus, the Asian women resemble the Erinyes performing their binding song. See also Dodds (1960b) 199 according to whom Lyssa is a figure akin to the Erinyes.

83 For a discussion of animal and hunting imagery that blurs the line between the literal and the figural and deepens the isolation of the play's characters in a world that is incomprehensible and hostile, see Thumiger (2006). The reversal between hunter and hunted itself, Thumiger argues, "discredit[s] hunting as a traditional means of human survival, as a social and educational institution, and as a fundamental framework for the definition of the adult male" and contributes to the play's questioning of the ideological parameters that define human character (202).

contest that is "fine" (καλός, 1163). "They thus bend their celebratory victory-song toward an antiphonal song of lamentation—which would be appropriate to a sane Agave—even as they join the insane Agave in her wild cries of joy and victory".[84] When the leader of the Theban maenads meets the Lydian chorus for a lyric exchange onstage, all they can share reaches its limit.[85] As Segal has extensively shown, the *kômos* replaces the lament for the king and reveals not only that the two choral groups rejoice at fundamentally different things but also that no part of the city's ritual life has escaped the power of the god.[86] The performance of the *kômos* as well as Cadmus' attempt to bring Agave back to her senses now foregrounds the difference between the two choral groups, namely the enforced nature of the Theban women's practices in contrast to the conscious and wholehearted devotion of the Lydian Bacchae.

This fundamental difference between the two choruses brings the Theban maenads closer to Pentheus himself and, at the same time, sheds light on the nature of the terrifying elements of Dionysiac practice which the two choruses have enacted at various moments during the play. Just as Agave accuses herself of *aphrosunê* (1301), a number of characters and the dramatic chorus accuse Pentheus of lack of *phrenes*, outright foolishness, or madness throughout the play.[87] Even before Pentheus decides to dress up as a maenad and spy on the Theban women, his foolishness is described in Dionysiac terms through

84 Segal (1994) 13.

85 According to the first messenger speech, Agave was the leader of the second *thiasos* of the three female choruses on Cithairon (680–682). When the maenads discover that Pentheus spies on them, Agave is the one who suggests that they all capture him so that he might not reveal the secret choruses of Dionysus (1105–1109) and becomes the leader of the choral action on Cithairon.

86 See Segal (1994), esp. 17.

87 Teiresias repeatedly points to the king's lack of good sense: σὺ δ' εὔτροχον μὲν γλῶσσαν ὡς φρονῶν ἔχεις, / ἐν τοῖς λόγοισι δ' οὐκ ἔνεισί σοι φρένες (but you have a fluent tongue as if possessed of understanding, yet in your words there is no sense, 268–269); μὴ τὸ κράτος αὔχει δύναμιν ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν, / μηδ', ἢν δοκῇς μέν, ἡ δὲ δόξα σου νοσῇ, / φρονεῖν δόκει τι· (do not boast that it is mastery that has power over humans, nor, if you have belief, and your believing is sick, believe that you are being wise, 310–312); μαίνῃ γὰρ ὡς ἄλγιστα (for you are behaving madly in the most painful way, 326). After Cadmus has reiterated the seer's judgment (φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς: your thinking has no sense, 332), Teiresias addresses Pentheus for the last time: μέμηνας ἤδη, καὶ πρὶν ἐξεστὼς φρενῶν (you are now quite mad, after earlier losing your head, 359). And he concludes: μαντικῇ μὲν οὐ λέγω, / τοῖς πράγμασιν δέ· μῶρα γὰρ μῶρος λέγει (it is not by prophecy that I say this, but by the facts. For being a fool he speaks foolish things, 368–369). The chorus must view Pentheus among those who honor heedlessness (ἀγνωμοσύναν) and do not increase the things of the gods with mad judgment (σὺν μαινομένᾳ δόξᾳ) (884–887).

a convenient semantic slip. Not everyone deprived of good sense ends up being afflicted with Dionysiac madness. But in the *Bacchae*, lack of good sense, which reveals itself in the denial of Dionysus, results in forced and hence destructive Dionysiac practice as the means of the god's punishment. The women of Thebes deny the divine nature of Dionysus and, as a result of their *aphrosunê*, the god drives them mad to the extent that they desert their homes (32–36) and perform deeds that are *deina* and manifest the true nature of Dionysus. Lyssa goads both Pentheus and the Theban women (977, 981). It is precisely by converting the king's and the Theban women's lack of good sense into perverted maenadic madness, that the god ironically renders Pentheus *deinos* and transforms the women into agents of his own *deinotatos* nature. Such conversion results in the terrible and terrifying justice that the Lydian Bacchae celebrate and highlights the wisdom and good sense that they advocate.

Both the Theban women's and Pentheus' *aphrosunê* seems to consist of an almost obsessive tendency to rationalize everything related to Dionysus—the story of his birth and divine nature as well as maenadic practice—a tendency which can only result in denying Dionysus' divinity. Semele's sisters deny her relationship with Zeus; they call it a fabricated union, which aimed to cover up her sleeping with a man, a lie for which Zeus punished her with incineration (26–31). Pentheus not only denies Dionysus' divinity but also insists that the women on the mountain fake maenadism as an excuse for getting drunk and "serving Aphrodite" (217–225, 260–262), that the Stranger indulges in similar obscenities as "he introduces a new disease for women and violates their beds" (353–354), and that Teiresias supports the new religion with the ultimate purpose of gain through prophecy of signs supposedly sent by the new god (255–257). As mentioned above, Pentheus' initial resistance to the new religion is, to a certain degree, justifiable. His persistence in denying Dionysus, however, combined with his prejudiced tyrannical behavior exposes his lack of *phrenes* or *sôphrosunê*. Even though not in the most transparent or generous way, the multiple miracles (616–637) and the first messenger speech suggest that Dionysus offers Pentheus the means to adopt a new point of view and reevaluate maenadism and his divinity. Pentheus does not consider 'seeing' the miracles through his own or others' eyes to be a direct enough experience that conveys Dionysus' divinity. He thus falls into a great passion (εἰς ἔρωτα μέγαν, 813) to see what he ought not to and what would pain him, in order to believe in the god. In the *Bacchae*, interpretation founded exclusively on rationality—that is, on listening and watching from a habitual and overly commonsensical perspective—meets grand failure. The only rational element involved in the interpretive process of every new situation that Pentheus encounters concerns the ability and openness to take into account new

'evidence' and circumstances. Nonetheless, such evidence in itself requires a wholly new way of viewing.

As a counter-suggestion to this lack of good sense, the Lydian women offer their *sophia* which consists of thinking mortal thoughts, leading a balanced and untroubled life, and believing in divine justice. Yet, as pointed out above, the natural law that this justice confirms, the miraculous character of maenadism, and the murderous revenge that the Theban maenads unwillingly enact represent elements of Dionysiac *deinon* that resist rationalization. Views on what such resistance means for human civilization and political organization vary. Foley suggests that "to understand Dionysus is to understand that the order imposed on the world by human culture is arbitrary, and the permanent potential for a reversal or collapse of this order exists".[88] Segal argues that the play reverses the very process of civilization and progress, especially as it is expressed in the civic life of the polis, and offers "the voice of a countercultural, counterrational longing in which Western man has repeatedly sought an alternative to his attitude of domination and control".[89] Seaford, on the other hand, sees in the Dionysiac cult of the play a double contribution to the democratic polis: first, the communal subjugation of women for the political institution of marriage. Maenadism provides the contained expression of the threat to this subjugation, "which despite its irreversibly disastrous consequences in myth is practiced within the framework of polis cult".[90] The second contribution is a cultic paradigm for the transcendence of the individual household.[91] According to Seaford, then, *baccheia* performs a positive political function in the polis after the etiological moment of the play while the *Bacchae*, taking place in Thebes, represents the negative model of Athens as Zeitlin defines it.[92]

Even though Seaford's interpretation is, I believe, valid with regard to the function of Bacchic ritual in the polis, the *Bacchae* itself does not bring up its future political benefits. Rather it points to the potential of encountering Dionysus' terrifying qualities dramatized in the play as a concern that

88 Foley (1980) 124.

89 Segal (1997a) 31.

90 Seaford (1994) 311.

91 Ibid., 301.

92 Zeitlin (1990c) 131. Following this model, Goff (1995b) 362 argues that the women of Thebes in the different 'Theban plays' are deprived of their rituals, an element that shows "the Theban city's failure to constitute itself as a viable polis". With regard to the chorus of the *Bacchae* in particular, she suggests that under the double pressure that the women face by Dionysus (to participate in his cult) and by Pentheus (to prevent them from doing so), "the women of Thebes can produce only those disastrous forms of Dionysiac ritual which finally demand the death of the king in the place of a sacrificial victim" (360).

persists, in democratic Athens included. I would not suggest that such a concern involves primarily the introduction of new gods in Athens in the late 5th c. BCE.[93] As already mentioned, the appearance of Dionysus in the play, his language of learning (39, 1345), and the performance of the chorus raise the issue, among others, of the true content of *sophia* and its connection with perceptive interpretation in order to uphold justice.[94] The play, as Seaford argues, indeed dramatizes the end of the royal household. And Pentheus follows the example of the tragic tyrants who receive fierce but just punishment. Even though at the time of the play's performance the polis celebrates Dionysus with a number of festivals and rituals, maenadism included, the institution of maenadism in the *Bacchae* is not merely the result of the defeat of the tyrant as the opponent of democracy.[95] Rather, Dionysus' too human-like, vengeful

93 Although most of the inscriptional evidence for maenadism is late, Osborne's interpretation of pottery with maenadic depictions convincingly argues that the active exploration of (new) religious experiences takes place during the years around 510 BC. See especially Osborne (1997) 211: "The *Bacchae* has often been thought to reflect some sort of crisis in Athenian society brought on by the Peloponnesian War. But [...] the interesting moment on which new religious experiences were being actively explored was not the period of the Peloponnesian War, but the years around 510 BCE, the period in which Athens, with Spartan help, got rid of its tyranny and the period of young democracy. It is becoming conventional to assign major changes in religious activity to the advent of democracy, and there is no doubt that democracy did bring with it a revolutionary ritualization, in the broadest sense, of Athenian life. But it may be that our concentration on political life leads us to underestimate the extent to which democracy was a product of a wider change in attitudes, a change in which women may have played an expressive and important part through their roles as both religious symbols and religious actors". For the opposite opinion, namely that the play reflects contemporary uneasiness regarding new cults, see Allan (2004) 146 and *passim*.

94 For a discussion of *sophia* as an attribute of Euripides, the poet himself, in terms of sophistication and novelty, see Winnington-Ingram (1969b) 127–142.

95 At the end of the 5th c. a number of festivals in honor of Dionysus are part of the Athenian religious calendar: the Oschophoria (if indeed in honor of Dionysus and not of Athena Skiras), Anthesteria, Haloa (even though primarily for Demeter and Kore), Lenaia, Rural and City Dionysia. On the festivals of Dionysus, see, e.g., Parke (1977) 77–79, 98–120, and 125–135, Simon (1983) 89–104, and more recently Parker (2005) *passim*. Dodds (1940) 168 emphasizes the social function of the festivals: "The function of these genial festivals was, in the words of Pericles, to provide ἀνάπαυλαι τῶν πόνων; their value was more social than religious". On scholarship that focuses primarily on the political function of the City Dionysia, see, e.g., Goldhill (1990) 97–129 and (1999) 1–32 and Winkler (1990b) 20–62. Connor, moreover, argues (1996) 217–226 that the City Dionysia was established in the time of Cleisthenes or soon thereafter as a freedom festival that celebrated the fall of tyranny. For a recent reassessment of the sociopolitics of Dionysiac religion in the context

justice also points, I suggest, to a questioning of a particular tendency in political practice—democratic practice included: the tendency to resist new ways of 'seeing' that involve adjustments to habitual ways of thinking and feeling and affect the community as a whole.[96]

The choral doubling and the voice itself of the dramatic chorus dramatize the voice of an element that resists definition in familiar terms and is at the core of what Dionysus represents. The *Bacchae* presents the conflict between god and mortal as a war between women, both barbarian and maddened locals, who are immersed in Dionysiac rites—in theory or in involuntary practice—and Pentheus, the king who represents insular politics through his tyrannical attributes. It thus equates the unfamiliar with the counterpolitical, namely an element which does not neatly fit in already established political conceptions and structures. Practiced away from the city, Bacchic rites give access to the bliss and *sophia* that the Lydian Bacchae sing about and that the

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of Athens' theater-festivals, see the contributions by Spineto, Bierl, Ford, and Gehrke in Schlesier (2011).

96 For Dionysus' excessive and human-like justice see ll. 1249–1250: ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἐνδίκως μὲν ἀλλ' ἄγαν / Βρόμιος ἄναξ ἀπώλεσ' οἰκεῖος γεγώς (for the god, lord Bromius, destroyed us justly, but excessively, having been born into the household) and 1348: ὀργὰς πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς (it is not fitting for the gods to resemble mortals in their anger). As far as historicizing readings of the play, I include here only a few representative examples: Kitto (1954) 400 believes that the *Bacchae* is the product of Euripides' leaving Athens and thus disassociating himself from the city and the war. This distance allows him to write 'normal' tragedy again and return to his sources. Segal and Euben suggest that the *Bacchae* signals the end of tragedy as we know it. For Euben (1990) 162, tragedy used to be able to interrogate the cultural accommodations that defined civic life. Given the political circumstances of the time, the language of tragedy itself becomes corrupt. Segal (1997b) 85 reaches a similar conclusion by focusing on the role of the chorus. The communal voice of the chorus in the *Bacchae* ceases to offer a stabilizing factor for the polis. According to Segal, the negative result of this form of tragedy is the city's loss of the elasticity that can take in the Other embodied in Dionysus and his Asian worshipers. The positive side is the evocation of a world of experience that extends beyond the polis and belongs to a wider frame of reference in which the distinction between Greek and barbarian is blurred. Last, more recently, Atkinson traces a number of different connections between the *Bacchae* and contemporary politics and concludes with Euripides' effect on tragedy as a genre. He suggests that different interpretations are possible: Pentheus stands for Archelaus, the ruthless monarch; or the *Bacchae* reflects on Athenian attitudes to 'the other'; or Euripides appreciated the irony of the possible association of himself with the stranger who brought wisdom and superior knowledge to an alien court (7–8). Regarding tragedy itself, Atkinson suggests that, instead of bringing the genre to its end, "with the *Bacchae* Euripides created new possibilities" (14).

non-initiate cannot (and should not) rationally comprehend. Dionysiac *deinon* in the play involves precisely resistance to rigid political principle. When respected, Bacchic practice inspires awe; when opposed, terror. In both cases, however, the response resists rationalization and easy political categorization.

Two later sources also point in this direction. In one of our few and well known sources that record maenadic practices, Plutarch narrates how the Thyiads in their Bacchic frenzy find themselves in the agora of Amphissa during the Sacred War. They fall asleep there out of exhaustion.[97] Fearing that the maenads might suffer unfair treatment (ἀγνωμονηθῶσι) at the hands of the soldiers who fill the town, the women of Amphissa protect them by encircling them, offer them food, and escort them to the borders of the city so that they may depart safely. In order to escort them, however, they first have to get permission (πείσασαι) from their husbands.[98] In effect, the women of Amphissa convince the men of the city that maenadic practice and its female practitioners ought to remain outside the current political conflict.[99]

Plato, moreover, offers an explicit assessment and criticism of the inherent politics of Bacchic practice. The Athenian in the *Laws* first mentions in passing the origins of *baccheia*: Dionysus "was robbed of his soul's judgment (τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνώμην) by his stepmother Hera, and in vengeance he brought in Bacchic rites (τὰς βακχείας) and all the frenzied choristry (πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν χορείαν)" (672b3–7). Dionysus' vengeance seems to inflict the same state of mind as the one it avenges: a loss of *gnômê*. Elsewhere the Athenian connects this loss explicitly with a kind of fear that needs to be cured because ill-conceived fears indicate a poor condition of the soul. Bacchic dancing itself is meant to overpower, to shake off through external movement, the internal motion of fear and frenzy.[100] In the ideal state, however, where the soul has to

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97 Stadter (1965) 80 summarizes the information about the Sacred War: "[It] is that waged by the Phocians in the mid-fourth century under the tyrants Philomelus, Onomarchus, et al., against Boeotia and the other members of the Amphictyony. Amphissa was captured by the Phocians in 354 or early 353 BC (Diodorus 16.33.3). The soldiers stationed there would have been the more dangerous because they were probably mercenaries, as were most of the Phocian troops in this war, and might therefore have mistreated even Phocian women".

98 Plutarch, *Mulierum Virtutes* 13.

99 With regard to the truth of the event, Stadter (1965) 79 comments that the story may come from a historical source such as Demophilus' book on the sacred war, a continuation of Ephorus' history, or may be part of the stories that Plutarch accumulated as a priest at Delphi.

100 Plato, *Laws*, 790e8–791b2, where Corybantism and *baccheia* are states that are compared to the sleeplessness of small children and ought to be remedied.

be trained to feel the fears that are deemed appropriate, *baccheia* is not to be accepted. Even though he does not include maenads in the group of nymphs, Pans, Silenoi, and Satyrs who perform rites of expiation and initiation, the Athenian in the *Laws* classifies *baccheia* under the category of "questionable dancing" (ἀμφισβητουμένην ὄρχησιν). Keeping to his proscriptive agenda, he thus dismisses *baccheia* as neither warlike nor pacific, that is, as "not political" (οὐ πολιτικόν) and hence unfitting for the citizens of Magnesia.[101] Since Bacchic performances involve questionable—or difficult to categorize—emotions, they have nothing to contribute to the rigorously and strictly defined religious, social, and political practices of the ideal city and can have no place in it. In the *Bacchae, baccheia* becomes warlike because of the Thebans' resistance to it and its consequent perversion. When endorsed, as the parodos and the first messenger-speech make clear, it holds the middle ground that Plato rejects. And the play ends with what Plato opposes, the incorporation of *baccheia* in Thebes and, subsequently, in other cities as well.

In the *Bacchae*, then, when the conflict of the two *deina* represented by the god and the king is over, Dionysus establishes his rites in Thebes and creates a space for the fear that he and his agents inspire and that Pentheus resists. Maenadism, however, is not better explained or rationalized within the play. In the *Eumenides*, as we saw in Chapter 3, the rationalization of fear explains both the function of the new court and its judges and the role of the Semnai Theai in the city as benevolent and potentially fearsome and vengeful deities

101 Plato, *Laws*, 815b7-d4. I quote the full passage: τὴν τοίνυν ἀμφισβητουμένην ὄρχησιν δεῖ πρῶτον χωρὶς τῆς ἀναμφισβητήτου διατεμεῖν. τίς οὖν αὕτη, καὶ πῇ δεῖ χωρὶς τέμνειν ἑκατέραν; ὅση μὲν βακχεία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων, ἃς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὥς φασιν, μιμοῦνται κατῳνωμένους, περικαθαρμούς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελούντων, ξύμπαν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος οὔθ' ὡς εἰρηνικὸν οὔθ' ὡς πολεμικὸν οὔθ' ὅτί ποτε βούλεται ῥᾴδιον ἀφορίσασθαι· διορίσασθαι μήν μοι ταύτῃ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ὀρθότατον αὐτὸ εἶναι, χωρὶς μὲν πολεμικοῦ, χωρὶς δὲ εἰρηνικοῦ θέντας εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολιτικὸν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ κείμενον ἐάσαντας κεῖσθαι νῦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν ἅμα καὶ εἰρηνικόν, ὡς ἀναμφισβητήτως ἡμέτερον ὄν, ἐπανιέναι (So, in the first place, we must draw a line between questionable dancing and dancing that is above question. All the dancing that is of a Bacchic kind and cultivated by those who indulge in drunken imitations of Pans, Sileni, and Satyrs (as they call them), when performing certain rites of expiation and initiation—all this class of dancing cannot easily be defined either as pacific or as warlike, or as any one distinct kind. The most correct way of defining it seems to me to be this—to separate it off both from pacific and from warlike dancing, and to pronounce that this kind of dancing is unfitted for our citizens; and having thus disposed of it and dismissed it, we will now return to the warlike and pacific kinds which do beyond question belong to us). Translations are by Bury (1926).

and helps sustain the new system of justice. In the *Bacchae*, the victory of the Dionysiac in Thebes does not involve any similar readjustment. After Dionysus establishes his religion, both aspects of the Dionysiac *deinon*—awe and terror—as the two choruses enact them remain present but not explained. The only transformation that takes place within the play regards Agave's return to sanity at the point when the doubling of the chorus is complete. Because Zeus agreed with Dionysus' angry justice (1348–1349), Dionysiac *deinon* performed regularly by women, has to become part of the religious calendar of the polis.[102] Zeus' justification, however, does not offer any useful or consoling explication.

The figure of Pentheus, however, helps us expand further on the politics of this counterpolitical element that the play brings to the fore especially through its choral action. If Pentheus as a tyrannical figure exemplifies a rigid and most negative version of politics, he provides a paradigm of a type of political mentality. This kind of mentality is entrenched in its own ways of thinking and feeling (*gnômê* and *orgê*) that exhibit superficial openness. From this perspective, the *eukosmia* of the Theban chorus, for instance, is a type of good order that cannot be conceived of or allowed as an alternate possibility of being and acting in a collective setting. Democratic mentality itself is not immune to such flaws and inflexibility. If one side of Dionysiac *deinon* is fear of what demands intellectual and emotional openness in the polis, the play then problematizes political thinking in its tendency to become rigid and self-involved so as to lose its ability to question and reevaluate its own habits and the practices that sustain them. Such thinking can only reproduce itself. When Dionysus justifies his overly harsh treatment of Cadmus' family by saying that he was treated with contempt even though he is a god, Cadmus responds: ὀργὰς πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς (Gods ought not to be like mortals in their tempers, 1348). Dionysus' mirroring men's emotional dispositions provides the harshest way to reveal their shortcomings. Such emotional dispositions are inseparable from the rigid mentality just discussed, which is continuously brought home through an ironic flexibility in the use of central concepts, as we saw earlier.

This irony indicates that it is not just what one does that matters but also, emphatically, 'how' one does it, in terms of the conviction and emotion that

102 After Agave's return to sanity, in the text that survives the language of *deinos* describes mostly the sufferings of the royal family, emphasizing the terrible aspect of such justice: the three sisters undergo an *algos deinon* (1260) while the whole family has arrived at *deinon kakon* (1352) as all of its members are going into exile. Dionysus brought this remedy, that is exile, upon the house *deinôs* (1373), since, even though a god, he suffered terrible sufferings at the hands of Cadmus' family (1376). Thus the end of the play shows Dionysus to have been too cruel, even if just (1249).

motivate the act. The Theban maenads' performance on the mountain, for instance, constitutes maenadic practice. While it appears legitimate, however, it is perverted (because enforced) and concludes with the utmost perversion, the killing of a son by his mother and the dismemberment of a human body. Pentheus is *deinos*. While, however, he thinks he is *deinos* in one way (fearsome and awe-inspiring to his people), he is *deinos* in another (the instrument of Dionysiac terror). He grotesquely looks like a maenad but he cannot think like one and he does not really wish so, even if the possibility may be titillating. Overall, it is the doubling of the chorus that conveys this fear-inducing discrepancy most vividly. And it points to the openness necessary for assessing old and novel conceptions and practices of order so that the polis itself may be able to 'see' in changing circumstances. Thus 'dancing' on the mountain and dancing in the orchestra enact and reveal what Dionysiac terror is about in this play.

I conclude with some thoughts on the choice of chorality to bring out Dionysiac *deinon*. As numerous scholars have suggested, the masked Dionysus of the *Bacchae* along with his chorus(es) renders the play a reflection on the role of tragedy and theater as well. Regarding the chorus in particular, Segal, for instance, argues that "the community embodied in the maenads of the chorus is not of a kind that is usable for the civic life of a Greek polis". By choosing a chorus that does not offer any kind of stability to the community of Thebes, "Euripides anticipates a form of tragedy that is no longer primarily a civic or communal experience for the members of its audience, but speaks primarily to them as individuals who suffer a private grief".[103] Mastronarde sees in the lack of sympathy on the part of the foreign chorus an emphatic isolation of the characters in the play and possibly "a deliberate reflection of a world in which order and sense are hard to discern".[104] Foley, on the other hand, turns to the possibilities that (theatrical) art opens up: "By suggesting throughout the action of the play that we have access to the god by theatrical means—through mask, costume, voice and music, or through illusion, symbol, and transformation—Euripides seems to make a strong claim for art's ability to represent a reality inaccessible to ordinary human sight".[105]

While the play indeed problematizes the connection between chorus and civic community, it also seems to point particularly to communities that reproduce the characteristics embodied by Pentheus. The chorus' invitation to accept their god is an invitation to encounter the fear that he inspires through

103 Segal (1997b) 85.
104 Mastronarde (2010) 152.
105 Foley (1980) 132.

collective experience—the experience of *thiaseuein psuchan*. It seems, then, that the potential terror of Dionysiac *deinon* is—and can be—counteracted by encountering it as member of a (rightful) group. This may be one of the reasons for the diffusion of chorality in the play. While maenadism is a readily available device in a play about Dionysus, its particular dramatization emphasizes choral activity through a proliferation of choruses. In this context, emotional experience in and through the chorus leads to a kind of perception that motivates action. The experience of Dionysiac *deinon* as awe, as presented in the parodos, segments of the choral lyrics, and the first messenger speech, motivates the Lydian women to support their god and advocate the communal experience of the *thiasos*. Participation in the *thiasos* and exposure to Dionysiac *deinon* empowers and motivates Agave too, even though only to enable her to encounter both of its sides because of her initial resistance to it. Pentheus' desire to experience Dionysiac *deinon* is an *erôs* to participate in maenadic practice as a stealthy spectator (θεατής), namely not as an integrated member in the group. He is thus forced to participate fully through the final *sparagmos* and becomes acquainted with the most terrifying side of the god. All experiences of Dionysiac *deinon* then involve choral activity and are theorized by the chorus on stage. Even Teiresias and Cadmus form a chorus, contributing to the proliferation of choral activity in the play.[106]

Thus the expansion of the imagination takes place primarily in and through choral activity. Only genuine openness, however, to such expansion can lead to an ability to consider the insights that powerful emotion affords and to render them beneficial to individual and community alike, by reevaluating both the habits of thought and the political structures that resist it. From a (meta)theatrical point of view, moreover, the play has also been seen as an etiology if not of drama itself, then of "the ingredients that constitute drama—audience, impersonation, costume, wig, props, and the dramatic illusion", by showing Dionysus combining them for the first time in a sort of proto-drama.[107] The prominence of chorality fits well with this idea of proto-drama. In this case, belief in the power of theater to heighten human perception overlaps with a reliance on the power of choral performance to enact, evoke, and theorize strong emotion—especially fear.

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106 See Goldhill (1988) 144 who examines how 'playing the other' works in the play. He suggests that the two old men form this chorus to match the other choruses in the play (the dramatic chorus and the one on the mountain) and argues that "Playing the other to worship Dionysus is always a multiform activity already".

107 Damen and Richards (2012) 363. The two scholars focus especially on the robing scene. For other extensive metatheatrical readings, see n.52.

As we know, Dionysiac practice in its various forms, such as the symposium and religious festivals, becomes a central mechanism for the social and religious organization of democratic Athens while occasions for maenadism seem to be few and Bacchic performance restrained.[108] Nonetheless—or because of the institutionalization of Dionysiac practices—by providing access to new ways of 'viewing', the fear that I traced in the play points to a need for practices that, while remaining part of the sociopolitical structure of the state, both expand the sensibilities of their participants and render the polis aware of its emotional, and, therefore, ethical and political limitations. Choruses, it seems, do that most effectively. Thucydides' narrative, as we saw in Chapter 2, posits perspective-taking as a challenging process that involves the fine-tuning and integration of both *gnômê* and *orgê*, a challenge, moreover, that is more pronounced for collective bodies whose collectivity is the source of 'participatory pleasure' and influences profoundly the nature of such integration. For this reason, I suggested, the *History* conveys the need to devise ways and (aesthetic) practices to render collective emotion reflective and sensible. One response, the *Bacchae* intimates, might be through collective emotion in (voluntary) choral action. Hence Teiresias' admonition: ἀλλ᾽ὅμως χορευτέον (324).

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108 Henrichs (1978) 123. For a detailed treatment of the evidence for maenadic practice in Athens and other cities, see Henrichs (1978) 121–160, (1982) 137–160, (1990) 257–277 and 324–326.

Coda: The Value(s) of Collective Emotion in Action

> δεινὸν τὸ πλῆθος σὺν δόλῳ τε δύσμαχον.
>
> Terrifying is their great number—awe-inspiring;
> and, allied with deceit, hard to contend with.
> EURIPIDES, *Hecuba* 884

Tragic choruses and Thucydidean history, I have argued, both reflect and participate in shaping Athenian emotion in the 5th c. When considered together, the choral discourse of fear and pity and Thucydides' depiction of collective emotion offer invaluable insights into how the emotions are perceived and what they reveal about fundamental social and political concerns, values, and practices in democratic Athens. At the same time, this juxtaposition contributes to a deeper understanding of the role itself of the tragic chorus and of what I see as its particular weightiness and consequence within the plays and, potentially, within the polis as well.

Throughout this book, I approach choruses as paradigmatic for the ways in which they concentrate in their performance the acts of developing a shared point of view, literally and metaphorically, and of emoting and acting together. Even though in a highly mediated way, tragic choruses thus provide unique access to the operation and implications not only of individual but also of collective emotion. Collective emotion in 5th c. social and political life, I have suggested, is explicitly under negotiation. Whether in the assembly or on the tragic stage, decision making is shown to result not from rational arguments devoid of feelings but from reasoning explicitly tied with emotions of varying intensity. Or, to put it differently, decision making is shown to stem from emotions that reflect shared beliefs and ideological positions. Whereas proliferating work over the last years has provided sophisticated approaches to the emotions in different genres, tragedy included, the focus tends to be on individual psychology. Taking into account the analogy between individual and collective psychology reflected in the texts that I examined, my analysis shifted this focus with the aim to shed light on ideas about collective emotionality.

More specifically, by presenting collective psychology as analogous to individual psychology, Thucydides' *History*, I have argued, shows the political import of the desires, hopes, fears, and sympathies of the *dêmos*. Three main points emerge regarding the nature and function of (collective) emotion in the *History*. First, even though reason and emotion (*gnômê* and *orgê*) seem initially to be sharply contrasted, various narratives undermine the sharp divide.

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Emotions such as *erôs* and anger are not revealed to be irrational or primal but to stem from a rationale that often opposes long-held customs and laws or from reasoning that is fundamentally flawed. Misconstruing the relationship between self- and collective interest, for instance, is often presented as what leads to such flawed reasoning and thus disruptive emotion. Second, we can trace an emphasis on the experiential or affective aspect of emotion. Thucydides' text brings out not only the power of individual emotion but also the power of emoting as member of a group. In addition to the pain or pleasure that accompany emotions such as fear, pity, and *erôs*, there is also a pleasure inherent in experiencing these emotions—even negative emotions—as part of a group, whether that be the *dêmos* in the assembly or the army. It is the combination of the cognitive and the experiential aspects of collective emotion that leads to the translation of emotional experience into decision and action.

Last, it consequently becomes clear that emotion carries motivational and normative power. Thucydides presents such power as, by and large, misdirected since he sees collective psychology as leading to the catastrophic results of the Peloponnesian War. Having come to distrust the ability of the *dêmos* to regulate its desires, he advocates for competent leaders like Pericles who have a reliable vision of the congruity between individual and collective interests and can create a political culture of trust. Once wisely informed and calibrated, the emotions of the *dêmos* can then contribute to such culture of trust and thereby promote responsible political action. In other words, informed participatory pleasure can foster a sense of attachment and connection both among the citizens and between the citizens and the polis and can habituate them to thinking and feeling responsibly together. This is precisely what, according to Thucydides, the Athenian *dêmos* fails to do, when left to its own devices and self-oriented politicians. Thus, while condemning indulgence in certain emotions, the *History* conveys the motivational power of collective emotion and the need that it be rendered (more) reflective and sensible—and, as such, genuinely shared.

When we turn to fifth century tragedy, the choruses that I have examined take on the challenge of expanding individual and collective perspective and of cultivating individual and collective emotion. In the *Eumenides* the chorus undergoes a transformation that overlaps with a transformation of fear itself: the irrational and disorienting fear inspired by the Erinyes is rendered more rational and is channeled into the Areopagus and the cult of the Semnai Theai so as to be collectively embraced in ways that benefit the community at large. In the *Supplices*, choral fear sets off emotional and political confrontations

that lead to new civic interactions and pave the way for the sublimation of fear itself and for higher degrees of transparency and trust—in marriage as well as civic politics. In the *Seven*, the female choral perspective on war collapses the boundary between private and public, equalizes men and women, and redefines what constitutes harm at war precisely through the expression of fear and pity. Envisioning war in fundamentally different emotional terms leads to a reconsideration of its morality and politics, a stance that the resonating choral voice emphatically calls for. When we turn to choruses that 'enact' pity and fear, as defined in Chapter 4, we see that the chorus of sailors in the *Philoctetes* throws into sharp relief the value of active pity and the need for institutional structures that can contribute to cultivating such pity for the true integration of self- and collective interest. Finally, the choral enactment of Dionysiac fear in the *Bacchae* suggests that the institutions of the polis not only need to incorporate powerful emotion, especially fear; they also ought consistently to reassess their capacity for dealing with the ideological challenges that such emotion brings with it. In all plays, the chorus 'manipulates' emotion to show how habitual ways of feeling and thinking are not only closely interconnected but also in need of consistent reassessment and expansion on both the individual and collective level.

These tragic choruses then trigger and enact fear and pity in ways that change the affective sensibilities of those who encounter them within the plays (and often their own as well) and lead to different types of reconsideration, sublimation, and/or institutionalization of collective emotion. Especially when the choral voice is devoid of political authority, which is the case for most female choruses, it emphatically raises the question of which emotional voices deserve a hearing. The choruses that I have examined are particularly apt to compel attentive listening. They do not merely draw on their knowledge of their interlocutors' emotions; they challenge and reshape their interlocutors' understanding of these emotions and the ideas that define and are defined by them. They achieve that partly by implicating them in how they feel and with different degrees of forcefulness. This is particularly clear in the case of Pelasgus in Aeschylus' *Supplices*. Only when Pelasgus is forced to share the chorus' fear, does he come to share the Danaids' concerns and take political action. Active choruses, I have argued in Chapter 3, display a special power in this direction. This power is reconfigured in the plays examined in Chapter 4 in which choruses 'enact' fear and pity.

While pointing to some common threads that emerge from the examination of choral fear and pity, these conclusions do not aim to overcategorize or overgeneralize. My analysis of choral expression has shown that the impact

of the choral discourse stems from its specifics in every play. The emotional choral voice—and the choral voice more generally—is powerful precisely because of its versatility. Any rigid definition of the choral function and especially of choral emotion would downplay its varied character and its power to address anew collective concerns in changing circumstances—mythical and historical alike.

There is, however, one aspect of choral expression that is unvarying and points to the performative power of the chorus within the plays: it is a collectivity that remains cohesive. Not only is there power in numbers; the choral body itself also seems to be paradigmatic of the expansion of the sympathetic imagination. The members of the chorus communicate emotion with one voice by alternating between the use of the first person singular and the first person plural. They embody the very ideas of equality and similarity (ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης) that Aristotle views as the prerequisites and characteristics of the best type of *philia*.[1] And they perform the very act of developing a shared perspective, spatially and notionally.[2] Emotional experience, underlying beliefs, and motives are truly shared, unlike what we saw, for instance, in the case of the shared (*dus*)*erôs* in Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian expedition. Within the larger context of the theater as well, the pervasive choral culture renders the audience particularly receptive and open to exposure to choral emotion, especially in the City Dionysia with the dithyramb and the comic chorus bringing in multiple choral voices. Part, then, of the power of the choral voice consists in its collectivity. Choruses both embody collectivity (as collective characters and performers themselves) and compel an encounter with such collectivity

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1 See *NE* 1159b3–5: ἡ δὲ ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ᾽ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης (amity consists in equality and similarity, especially the similarity of those who are alike in virtue). Text and translation by Rackham (1934). Aristotle most likely would not endorse the analogy, given the dramatic identity of most choruses.

2 The cases of choral division into semi-choruses (e.g., the division that we saw at the end of Aeschylus' *Seven* in Chapter 3) or dialogue among individual members of the chorus (e.g., the well-known reaction to the king's murder in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*) do not seem to undermine the characteristics of collectivity and cohesiveness; they rather recast or manipulate them at crucial moments in the plays by creating more than one collective voices or emphasizing the multiple concerns that the collective perspective is called adequately to express. The fact, moreover, that it is often debated when choral division is indicated in our texts seems to point in the same direction, despite the fact that this would not be an issue in actual performance. For a list and discussion of the relevant passages in the three tragedians but also Aristophanes, see Kaimio (1970) 103–150 and 154–157.

(for their interlocutors within the plays and audiences in the theater).[3] This power of the choral voice is emphasized in the plays that I have analyzed. It is their collective body that renders the choruses' impact felt. Especially in the case of the Aeschylean choruses examined in Chapter 3, it is also their collective body that renders the choruses' political demands urgent. Thus the chorus becomes a paradigmatic institution that not only embodies but also prods and cultivates the expansion of the sympathetic imagination within the plays and the theater of Dionysus.

This double role is particularly palpable in the cases that I have examined in this book, namely with choruses that fall on or relatively close to the active end of what I have called the spectrum of choral action. The insights that they provide, however, are meant to invite a broader reexamination of choruses in the surviving corpus. Reiterated or reconfigured, the questions raised here can shed light on the workings of collective emotion triggered or performed by choruses that vary in terms of their (emotional) 'action' and 'responsiveness'.[4] For instance, what are the ideas and ideological concerns as well as the attachments that choral emotion reflects? How do such concerns shift throughout any given play and how do they reconfigure ideological and affective relations? And can we discern (new) tendencies or strategies like the movement toward sublimation, rationalization, and institutionalization of emotion that we saw in the previous chapters and that aim to calibrate collective emotion and capitalize on its power for the benefit of the community? Particularly instructive, I believe, would be to trace the kind of attention that variously defined choral initiative and response compel in the plays or, more often, markedly fail to compel. In other words, whether such attention is triggered, in what manner, and what effects it has on individual characters' views and actions will offer

3 One might argue that this is a characteristic of the chorus that, by definition, cannot be disassociated from its very identity. By emphasizing collectivity and cohesion, however, I view such emphasis as a conscious choice on the dramatists' part as well. For my understanding, moreover, of the interest in how the collective group thinks, feels, and acts as an interest that pervades the communal life of the Athenians, see Chapter 1, esp. Section 4.

4 Choruses other than the ones examined in the previous chapters are active in different ways and to different degrees. Foley (2003) 16–19 has discussed the action and initiatives taken by the choruses in the *Ion*, the *IT*, and the *Rhesus* and has emphasized that "choruses are not by any generic definition incapable of action and important initiatives, even in late Euripides" (24). Non-active choruses, in turn, can be emotionally involved in the action to different degrees. Defining this range of action and responsiveness and how they relate to emotional expression would greatly enrich our understanding of both collective emotion and chorality itself, as I suggest above.

different answers to these questions. Such examination, moreover, would be particularly fruitful, if it included a variety of emotions, such as *erôs* and anger.

The choral discourse of captive women in the *Trojan Women* and the *Hecuba*, for instance, centers on pity and self-pity. Through the performance of these emotions, I have argued elsewhere, these choruses powerfully articulate the connection between individual loss and the loss of affiliation to communal institutions and practices that define individual and collective identity and undermine the divide between private and public spheres. It is precisely through the performance of collective emotion that they raise questions of accountability and responsibility in the decision-making process and the practice of war. The fact, moreover, that their emotional discourse is not heeded within the plays dramatizes emphatically the kind of institutionalized thinking that can threaten whole communities from within.[5] In a different case, a comparison of female choruses of different ages and status (in the *Trachiniae, Hippolytus*, and *Medea*) shows how their collective expression of fear and pity not only responds to but also theorizes the power of *erôs*. The metaphors of *erôs* as disease and war that pervade the plays are recast from the choral perspective and help conceptualize a spectrum of potential attitudes toward its 'attacks' and effects. If such effects, as I have suggested, raise the broader issue of the role of passion in individual decision making and moral judgment as well as the assessment of responsibility and guilt on the part of the community, the choral perspective becomes particularly valuable for managing the contradictions raised by passion *per se*. It offers, in other words, conceptual paradigms that facilitate the assessment of emotionality in judgment for both individual and community within and, potentially, outside the plays.[6]

In my analysis of the *Seven*, I argued that silencing collective emotion is not presented as a viable political option within the play, because such silence would conceal what the citizens, individually and collectively, care most deeply about. A comprehensive analysis of choral emotional discourse, the degrees and ways in which it is (not) attended to, and the ramifications dramatized in each case can give us access to how choruses contribute to the 'affective economies' that shape 5th c. culture and negotiate emotions and the concerns and interactions they impact on.[7] At the same time, such analysis can further contribute to our understanding of what I called the weightiness and significance that are particular to the tragic chorus and to a reconceptualization of its modality.

5 Visvardi (2011).

6 Visvardi (2007) 198–274.

7 I borrow the term from Ahmed (2012) 15 and Chapter 2.

As introduced in Chapter 1, these questions about the nature of emotion and the affective economies of Athenian life have been informed by ongoing debate on the nature of emotional experience and the complex dynamic of affect and cognition that define it as well as on the role of emotion in public life. The juxtaposition of Thucydides' depiction of the *dêmos* and the army in (emotional) deliberation and action, on the one hand, and the tragic chorus, on the other, can, in turn, contribute new insights to this debate. In a broad sense, this juxtaposition adds an interesting case to the examination of the cultural politics of the emotions.

The notion of a cultural politics of the emotions has been articulated in various ways, given especially the broad acknowledgment of the belief-basis of emotional experience. Sara Ahmed, for instance, has made a strong case for seeing emotions as cultural practices that operate in complex ways "to 'make' and 'shape' bodies as forms of action, which also involve orientations towards others". As such, emotions shape boundaries "that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if they are objects".[8] Her focus on language and metonymy shows how 'texts' of various kinds participate in such delineation, "[h]ow words for feeling, and objects of feeling, circulate and generate effects: how they move, stick, and slide".[9] The 'words' provided by Thucydides and the choruses examined in this book indeed convey how emotions delineate both the individual and the collective—or the 'social'. And they are particularly instructive because they reflect and engage with the emotional, and therefore, the ethical and political orientations of a democratic culture that operates explicitly as a culture of passions.[10]

With regard to emotion in public life, there is also growing interest in numerous disciplines in moving away from seeing collective emotion as ignorant and potentially uncontrollable and violent to a more nuanced understanding of how emotion works in and through collective bodies, how it shapes deliberation, agency, and decision making, and especially whether and how we can conceive of and create institutions that render collective emotion such that it becomes conducive to better participatory practices.[11] As Susan Bandes points out:

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8 Ahmed (2012) 10.

9 Ibid., 14.

10 For my view of Athenian culture as a culture of passions, see Chapter 1, Section 2.

11 Landemore (2013) and the contributions in Fleming (2012) are representative of some of the questions that persist in the debate. On 'crowd' psychology, see also LeBon (1986) that has been seen as a foundational text in the field and, e.g., the contributions in Hogg and Tindale (2001) as well as Surowiecki (2005).

> Groups have their own emotional climates and emotional dynamics that arise through mechanisms like contagion and synchronization and through the creation and enforcement of emotion norms.[12] [...] Whether or not groups make 'better' decisions depends on the context, but there is increasing evidence that institutions can be structured to promote a range of values and attributes and that we ought to pay careful attention to the question of which values and attributes are worth promoting in particular contexts. For example, institutions can be structured to increase participation, to increase awareness of or empathy for diverse viewpoints, to encourage more thorough and informed deliberation, and to work toward other goals that are consistent with participatory democracy.[13]

This is all the more desirable, since there is evidence that, especially as individuals, we tend to resist revisiting our misconceptions, even when we have solid information that requires us to do so. For this reason, a range of institutions that constructively capitalize on the complex input of collective participation and the role of emotion in it is where these tendencies can be more adequately addressed and attitudes change.[14] When that happens, the arguments that are reflected in policy will be those that "appeal to sentiments and concerns that are generally shared by citizens, or to publicly accessible reasons".[15]

In the context of this inquiry, the analysis of the Athenian *dêmos* side by side with the tragic chorus as institutions of a fully participatory democracy can significantly add to the insights often sought by turning either to Thucydides' account by itself or to Plato and Aristotle. Crowd studies often emphasize that a group is not merely an aggregate of individuals and explore ways to analyze its collective emotionality. The analogy between individual and collective psychology traced in the performance of both the *dêmos* and the chorus offers one way to approach group dynamics and examine what creates true cohesion for strong collective agency that promotes collective interest and welfare. If seen as paradigmatic for the expansion of the sympathetic imagination that it embodies and invites, the chorus, moreover, presents a valuable paradigm of an institution that "increases awareness of or empathy for diverse viewpoints"[16]

12 Bandes (2012) 202.
13 Ibid., 203.
14 Ibid., 205 with additional references.
15 Krause (2008) 122 as cited by Bandes (2012) 200.
16 See the quotation from Bandes above.

and participates in defining emotional and political values.[17] Last, in addition to the particular insights that the *History* and the different plays provide, two aspects common in both genres are worth reiterating. The first aspect is what I have called participatory pleasure. Whether to disparage it as distracting or to promote it as worth cultivating for decisions that are genuinely shared both affectively and cognitively, both genres portray it as instrumental to holding a group together. They thus invite consideration as to how to retain such pleasure while rendering it a motive for concerted and genuinely community-oriented action. The second aspect regards pity itself. Demands on pity, I have argued, trigger a reassessment of what constitutes self- and collective interest. When well-informed, such reassessment often shows that acting on pity can integrate and serve both. In devising institutions that aim to increase emotionally invested participation, these two aspects can help address resistance to relinquishing purely rationalistic models of political praxis and offset some of the difficult demands that both collaboration and openness to empathy raise.

Within democratic institutions, then, collective emotion reflects ideas and attachments at the same time that it shapes them. As such, it warrants attentive listening for its motivational and normative power as much as it does for the challenges that it raises. I close, however, not with democratic institutions in general but by returning to 5th c. Athens and its tragic choruses in particular. By both inscribing the emotions in the sociopolitical realm and questioning the capacity of such a realm to contain them, and by enacting diverse or even competing models of reaction, the choral discourse of pity and fear does not merely suggest ways of feeling; it points to diverse possibilities for passionate judgment and action. If Thucydidean history reflects a certain weariness with misdirected emotion and participatory pleasure as a broader attitude in the 5th c., tragic choruses offer alternate perspectives on integrating *gnômê* and *orgê* on the Athenian stage. Feeling and judging, reevaluating and learning, I have argued, are all interconnected components of choral emotion. In dialogue with other public discourses (the funeral oration, law court and deliberative speeches, among others) the emotional discourse of tragedy reconfigures the boundary between private and public and what constitutes a voice worth listening to. In so doing, it also calls for both intellectual rigor and constant awareness and reconsideration of the emotional connections that translate civic ideology into action.

It is within Greek tragedy and Greek drama more generally that the most diverse voices are given a hearing in the 5th c.—women, men, foreigners. The

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17 It is worth repeating here that this role of the chorus is implemented through the *chorêgia*, an institution that combines citizen-only participation with elite funding.

choral discourse of the emotions, and that of pity and fear in particular, suggests diverse ways to experience, envision, and practice social and political participation. Such diversity offers paradigms of affective participation to be taken outside the theater, into the courts and the political assembly. Tragic choruses indeed (attempt to) cultivate fear and pity in and for action.

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